State v. Stuit

No. 13556

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F

1978

STATE O F MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

D A E STUIT,
U N

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t J. Boyd, J u d g e p r e s i d i n a .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

Greg J . S k a k l e s a r g u e d , Anaconda, Montana

For Respondent:

H o n o r a b l e Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Denny Moreen a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
James J. Masar, County A t t o r n e y , Deer Lodge, Montana

Submitted: January 30, 1978

~ e c i d e CAR
d 2 2 1978

Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court:

Duane S t u i t a n inmate o f Montana s t a t e p r i s o n was con-

v i c t e d by j u r y v e r d i c t f o r t h e crime of escape, a f e l o n y i n

v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-7-306, R.C.M. 1947. The D i s t r i c L

Court, Powell County, ordered defendant be punished by c o n f i n e -

ment i n Montana s t a t e p r i s o n f o r 10 y e a r s . Defendant a p p e a l s

from t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n .

On February 13, 1976, defendant, w h i l e i n t h e l a w f u l

custody of Montana s t a t e p r i s o n , f l e d t h e c o n f i n e s of t h e

p r i s o n and made h i s way t o Colorado S p r i n g s , Colorado, where

he surrendered himself t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f i v e days a f t e r h i s

escape. On March 18, 1976, t h e county a t t o r n e y f o r Powell

County f i l e d an Information charging defendant w i t h t h e crime

of escape. Defendant e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y and r e l i e d on

t h e defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r escape due t o n e c e s s i t y , d u r e s s

o r f e a r of g r e a t b o d i l y harm, a s s e t out i n s e c t i o n 94-3-110,

R.C.M. 1947.

The c r u x of S t u i t ' s defense l i e s i n t h e c o n t e n t i o n h i s

escape from Montana s t a t e p r i s o n was n e c e s s i t a t e d by h i s f a i l u r e

t o o b t a i n adequate medical a t t e n t i o n . Defendant's r i g h t eye had

been removed a s a r e s u l t of a childhood i n j u r y . I n i t s place

a p r o s t h e s i s o r g l a s s eye was i n s t a l l e d . While a n inmate a t

Montana s t a t e p r i s o n defendant c o n t r a c t e d a s t a p h i n f e c t i o n i n

h i s r i g h t eye. P r i s o n medical s t a f f d o c t o r s and s p e c i a l i s t s

were provided f o r t r e a t m e n t of t h e i n f e c t i o n . A t r e a t i n g physician

recommended arrangements be made t o s e c u r e a new p r o s t h e s i s f o r

defendant. The p r i s o n warden t e s t i f i e d t h a t a new p r o s t h e s i s

could only be obtained i n Spokane, Weshington a t t h a t time, b u t

t h e necessary equipment would soon be a v a i l a b l e i n Montana.
Defendant contends the fear of infection spreading from the

right eye to the left eye and the potential for loss of sight

in his left eye necessitated his escape in order to obtain

necessary medical care.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal:

1 Whether the District Court erred in restricting defendant's
)
voir dire by precluding defense counsel from questioning prospective

jurors on their attitute toward the defense of justification?

2 Whether the District Court erred in its instructions
)
to the jury?

Defendant contends the District Court's limitation on the

scope of voir dire questioning of prospective jurors denied

defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed

by Art. 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution and the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The specific

instances of purported error involved the state's objections to

defense counsel's voir dire questioning of prospective jurors.
The state objected on the grounds the questions propounded were
irrelevant, misstated the law and counsel was arguing the case to

the jury. The District Court sustained the state's objections.

Upon reviewing the transcript of jury voir dire, we conclude

the District Court did not err in sustaining the state's objec-

tion. The court's ruling merely precluded defense counsel from

arguing the case to the jury during voir dire. Defense counsel
was not restrained from questioning jurors on the defense of

justification. The purpose of voir dire is to enable counsel

to determine the existence of bias and prejudice on the part of

prospective jurors and to enable counsel to intelligently exercise

his peremptory challenges. State ex rel. Stephens v. District

Court, (1976), - .
Mont , 550 P.2d 385, 33 St.Rep. 469. This
purpose was not undermined in the present case.
 I n h i s second i s s u e defendant c h a l l e n g e s t h e D i s t r i c t

c o u r t ' s instructions t o t h e jury. Defendant contends I n s t r u c t i o n

Nos. 15 and 1 6 , i n essence, d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and

placed upon defendant t h e burden of proving h i s defense. Instruc-

t i o n No. 15 s t a t e d :

"A person s u b j e c t t o o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n commits
t h e o f f e n s e of ESCAPE i f he knowingly o r purposely
removes himself from o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n . "

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 16 s t a t e d :

"To s u s t a i n t h e charge of ESCAPE, t h e S t a t e must
prove t h a t each element of t h e o f f e n s e was done
purposely o r knowingly."

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15 merely d e f i n e s t h e crime of escape

i n t h e language of s e c t i o n 94-7-306(2), R.C.M. 1947. In-

s t r u c t i o n No. 16 e s t a b l i s h e s t h e s t a t e ' s burden of proof which i s t o

e s t a b l i s h t h e mental s t a t e f o r each element of t h e crime of

escape, a s provided i n s e c t i o n 94-2-103(1), R.C.M. 1947. We

f a i l t o conclude t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s amount t o a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t

of g u i l t o r impose upon t h e defendant t h e burden of proving h i s

defense. Other i n s t r u c t i o n s given t o t h e j u r y s e t f o r t h t h e

defense of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12

s p e c i f i c a l l y provided:

"The Defendant has presented evidence showing
t h a t he a c t e d o u t of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
The Defendant does n o t have a burden of proof t o
s u s t a i n t h i s defense. I f h i s evidence r a i s e s a
reasonable doubt a s t o h i s g u i l t , he i s e n t i t l e d
t o a c q u i t t a l . He i s n o t o b l i g e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, o r even by a
preponderance of t h e evidence. The p r o s e c u t i o n
must prove h i s g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defendant contends given I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A, ( 1 ) e r r o n -

eously placed an a f f i r m a t i v e burden on defendant t o prove h i s

defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and (2) erroneously r e q u i r e d t h a t

defendant be faced w i t h a s p e c i f i c t h r e a t of d e a t h o r s u b s t a n t i a l
bodily i n j u r y i n t h e immediate f u t u r e t o be j u s t i f i e d i n h i s

escape, thus imposing an o b j e c t i v e standard r a t h e r than a sub-

j e c t i v e standard. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A s t a t e d :

"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e defense of n e c e s s i t y
o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e only i f t h e following
conditions e x i s t e d a t t h e time of t h e escape:

"(1) The Defendant was faced with a s p e c i f i c
t h r e a t of death, o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily i n j u r y i n
t h e immediate f u t u r e .

"(2) There i s no time f o r a complaint t o t h e
a u t h o r i t i e s o r t h e r e e x i s t s a h i s t o r y of f u t i l e
complaints which make any r e s u l t from such complaint
illusory.

( 3 ) There i s n o t time o r opportunity t o r e s o r t
t o t h e Courts.

"(4) The p r i s o n e r immediately r e p o r t s t o t h e proper
a u t h o r i t i e s when he has a t t a i n e d a p o s i t i o n of s a f e t y
from t h e immediate t h r e a t .

" I f you f i n d from your c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l t h e
evidence t h a t a l l t h e s e conditions d i d n o t e x i s t
a t t h e time of t h e escape, then you should f i n d
t h a t t h e defense of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s
not a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Defendant."

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A i s derived from a C a l i f o r n i a Court of

Appeals d e c i s i o n , People v. Lovercamp, (1974), 43 Cal.App.3d 823,

118 Cal.Rptr. 110, which a r t i c u l a t e d t h e elements of t h e l i m i t e d

defense of n e c e s s i t y a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e crime of escape.

Lovercamp has been r e c e n t l y construed i n another C a l i f o r n i a

Court of Appeals d e c i s i o n , People v. Condley, (1977), 69 Cal.

App.3d 999, 138 Cal.Rptr. 515. I n Condley t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n -

s t r u c t e d t h e jury:

"The defendant has t h e burden of proving by t h e
preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t n e c e s s i t y forced
him t o escape. Preponderance of t h e evidence means
such evidence a s , when weighed with t h a t opposed t o
i t , has more convincing f o r c e and t h e g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y
of t r u t h . " 138 Cal.Rptr. 519.
The defendant in Condley contended such an instruction
constituted reversible error because the defense of necessity
as justification for the crime of escape is of the type of
'It
***defenses asserted by an accused which
raise factual issues collateral to the question
of the accused's guilt or innocence and do not
bear directly on any link in the chain of proof of
any element of the crime. Among such defenses are
those which raise no challenge to the sufficiency
of the prosecution's proof of any element of the
crime charged, but for reasons of public policy
insulate the accused notwithstanding the question of
his guilt. 1 (People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d
953, 963-964, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 142-143, 544 P.2d
1335, 1342-1343.)" 138 Cal.Rptr. 520.
The California Court then went on to conclude in Condley:

"* * * the Lovercamp defense is founded upon public .
policy and provides a justification distinct from
the elements required to prove escape. Therefore,
the trial court correctly instructed the jury that
the defendants had the burden of proving the defense
by a preponderance of the evidence." 138 Cal.Rptr. 522.
We hold that under Montana law the defense of justification is
an affirmative defense which must be proved by the defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence.

In the present case, Instruction No. 12 provides that
defendant, in asserting the defense of necessity or justifica-
tion, is entitled to acquittal if the evidence he presents merely
raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Instruction No. 12

goes on to specifically provide defendant "is not obligated to

establish this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by

a preponderance of the evidence." The burden of raising a
reasonable doubt as to guilt is far less than the burden of
proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, which

is the standard approved by California. We fail to find
defendant's argument in this area persuasive.
 Defendant a l s o contends I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A erroneously

required t h a t defendant be faced with a s p e c i f i c t h r e a t of

death o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily i n j u r y i n t h e immediate f u t u r e i n

order t o be j u s t i f i e d i n h i s escape, thus imposing an o b j e c t i v e

standard r a t h e r than a s u b j e c t i v e standard. This same i s s u e

was addressed by t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court of Appeals i n Lovercamp

and Condley:

"Under t h e l i m i t e d circumstances described i n
Lovercamp, when t h e defendant's d e c i s i o n t o escape
i s o b j e c t i v e l y t h e 'only v i a b l e and reasonable
choice a v a i l a b l e ' we excuse t h e offense a s being
j u s t i f i e d under t h e circumstances. It would be
ludicrous t o apply a s u b j e c t i v e standard t o d e t e r -
mine whether t h e defendant's escape i s j u s t i f i e d a s
being t h e only v i a b l e and reasonable choice. These
terms thernselbes connote an o b j e c t i v e standard. A s
noted i n Lovercamp, ' I t i s hardly e a r t h s h a t t e r i n g
t o observe t h a t prisons a r e n o t Brownie Camps and
t h a t w i t h i n t h e inmate population a r e those who,
i f given t h e opportunity, w i l l d e p a r t without due
process of law.' (s., a t p. 826, 118 Cal.Rptr.,
a t p. 111) Were we t o adopt a s u b j e c t i v e standard
t o e s t a b l i s h t h e elements of t h e Lovercamp defense,
i t would take l i t t l e imagination on t h e p a r t of any
inmate t o claim t h a t t h e p r i s o n milieu i t s e l f c r e a t e s ,
s u b j e c t i v e l y , t h e r e q u i s i t e elements of t h e overc cam^ -
defense." People v. Condley, 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1011,
138 Cal.Rptr. 515, 521.

W a r e i n agreement with t h e o b j e c t i v e standard imposed by
e

t h e "Lovercam2 i n s t r u c t i o n " i n determining whether a defendant' s

escape i s j u s t i f i e d .

The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed.

/ Justice.

W Concur:
e

Chief JUS tic: