No. 13413
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
PHILIP STENBERG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
BEATRICE FOODS, COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial
District,
Honorable Robert Keller, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Hash, Jellison and O'Brien, Kalispell, Montana
Kenneth E. O'Brien argued, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent :
Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana
Gary L. Graham argued and Candace C. Fetscher argued,
Missoula, Montana
Submitted: January 19, 1977
M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t
Court, F l a t h e a d County, f a v o r i n g defendant B e a t r i c e Foods Co .
i n a products l i a b i l i t y c a s e . P l a i n t i f f Philip Stenberg's l e f t
arm was amputated below t h e elbow when h i s arm s l i p p e d i n t o
t h e i n t a k e end of a g r a i n auger ( a mechanical, screw-type g r a i n
e l e v a t o r ) manufactured by t h e defendant B e a t r i c e Foods Co. The
a c t i o n was t r i e d on two t h e o r i e s : (1) t h a t defendant was n e g l i g e n t
i n n o t designing a s h i e l d f o r t h e i n t a k e end of t h e g r a i n a u g e r ,
and ( 2 ) t h a t defendant was l i a b l e under t h e d o c t r i n e of s t r i c t
l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o p l a c e a s h i e l d on t h e
i n t a k e end of t h e g r a i n auger.
A t t h e c l o s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t took
t h e c a s e away from t h e j u r y on t h e d e s i g n n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y on
t h e ground p l a i n t i f f was g u i l t y of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence a s
a m a t t e r of law. Thereafter, the jury returned a v e r d i c t f o r
defendant on t h e s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s s u e . P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from
t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g and from t h e judgment i n f a v o r of de-
fendant.
P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s many i s s u e s f o r review, b u t because
we r e v e r s e and g r a n t a new t r i a l we d i s c u s s only t h o s e i s s u e s
t h a t a r e d e t e r m i n a t i v e of our o r d e r i n g a new t r i a l and t h o s e
which may be h e l p f u l on r e t r i a l . W w i l l d i s c u s s t h e following
e
issues :
(1) Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g a
n o n s u i t on t h e negligence count of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint
on t h e b a s i s t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t
a s a m a t t e r of law. I n t h i s regard, p l a i n t i f f a l s o alleges
i t was improper f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y
t h a t he had taken t h e c a s e away from i t because he had
found p l a i n t i f f t o be c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t a s a
m a t t e r of la^.
(2) Whether t h e j u r y must be i n s t r u c t e d i n t h e l i t e r a l
terminology of t h e Restatement of T o r t s 2d, §402A,
t h a t recovery f o r s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s allowed only
where t h e product i s i n a " d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n un-
reasonably dangerous t o t h e u s e r o r consumer ." In
t h i s c o n t e x t we a l s o d i s c u s s whether t h e term "de-
f e c t i v e condition" must be d e f i n e d f o r t h e j u r y ,
whether t h e two d e f i n i t i o n s of "unreasonably dangerous1'
a s given t o t h e j u r y were i n c o n s i s t e n t , and whether
t h e Restatement d e f i n i t i o n of "unreasonably dangerous1'
should p r o p e r l y be given where t h e c o n d i t i o n complained
of i s one t h a t i s open and obvious a s opposed t o one
t h a t i s hidden o r l a t e n t .
( 3 ) Whether t h e j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d on assump-
t i o n o f r i s k and whether such a n i n s t r u c t i o n was j u s t i f i e d
under t h e f a c t s .
P l a i n t i f f Stenberg worked a s a g r a i n t r u c k d r i v e r f o r
Grosswiler Dairy, I n c . from t h e f a l l of 1971 u n t i l August 31,
1972, t h e day of t h e i n j u r y . I n t h e course of h i s work he ob-
served t h e procedures followed i n unloading g r a i n t r u c k s i n t o
t h e g r a i n auger and he had done it h i m s e l f a few times. Normally,
however, he d i d n o t unload h i s own t r u c k . When he d i d unload a
g r a i n t r u c k , he followed t h e procedures he had observed. His
employer had never i n s t r u c t e d him i n t h e proper method of unload-
ing the grain.
Grosswiler Dairy used t h e auger t o e l e v a t e t h e g r a i n i n t o
a bin. The unshielded i n t a k e end of t h e auger was placed i n a
homemade box and g r a i n was dumped from t h e t r u c k s i n t o t h e box.
The box was approximately f o u r f e e t square and a f o o t and a h a l f
high. P l a i n t i f f was aware t h e auger was dangerous. He a l s o knew
t h a t h i s employer owned a newer auger w i t h a s h i e l d over t h e i n -
t a k e end.
On August 31, 1972, p l a i n t i f f was unloading h i s t r u c k a t t h e
g r a i n auger. He was out of t h e t r u c k , had placed h i s l e f t hand
on t h e t a i l g a t e of t h e t r u c k , and was i n t h e process of removing
a 2 x 4 board from t h e t a i l g a t e w i t h h i s r i g h t hand. I n order
t o g r a s p t h e handle on t h e t a i l g a t e p l a i n t i f f had t o reach f o r -
ward approximately two f e e t and leaned over t h e box i n doing so.
While removing t h e board t h e t a i l g a t e suddenly slammed s h u t ,
he l o s t h i s balance and f e l l forward i n t o t h e moving g r a i n
auger. H i s l e f t arm was severed below t h e elbow. The i n t a k e
end of t h e auger was n o t equipped w i t h a s h i e l d , nor was i t
designed t o be equipped w i t h a s h i e l d .
Stenberg f i r s t contends t h a t t h e j u r y should have been
allowed t o determine whether o r n o t he was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y
negligent.
The t e s t , of c o u r s e , of p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e
i s whether he a c t e d a s a n o r d i n a r i l y prudent man. Even where
t h e f a c t s a r e n o t d i s p u t e d , t h e q u e s t i o n i s one f o r t h e j u r y i f
reasonable minds might draw d i f f e r e n t conclusions from t h e e v i -
dence. Dahlin v. Rice Trusk L i n e s , (1960), 137 Mont. 430, 352
P.2d 801; S t a h l v. Farmers Union Company, (1965), 145 Mont. 106,
399 P.2d 763. I n r u l i n g on d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t , t h e c o u r t r e l i e d e n t i r e l y on t h e testimony of t h e p l a i n -
t i f f and we conclude t h a t reasonable minds could d i f f e r a s t o
whether he was g u i l t y o f c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence.
P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he was never i n s t r u c t e d a s t o how a
t r u c k should be unloaded, and on t h e few occasions he d i d unload
h i s own t r u c k he followed t h e same procedures he observed o t h e r s
follow. There was no evidence i n t h e record a s t o any o t h e r
standard of use. I n taking t h e case away from the jury t h e t r i a l
c o u r t concluded t h a t he was doing so because p l a i n t i f f should
have hung on t o the t a i l g a t e , and thus would n o t have s l i p p e d
and l o s t h i s balance. The t r i a l c o u r t s t a t e d :
"* * * This i s c l e a r l y from t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s
s t a n d p o i n t , he was n e g l i g e n t and he knew t h e
danger was t h e r e and t h e r e i s no question every-
body standing n e x t t o something l i k e t h a t
a p p r e c i a t e s , i f you a r e going t o g e t i n t o i t ,
you a r e i n t r o u b l e . And he d i d n ' t hang on. He
was negligent. ** *I1 (Emphasis added.)
While t h e t r i a l c o u r t concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f had a duty t o
"hang on", and was n e g l i g e n t i n n o t doing s o , we cannot say a s
a matter of law t h a t t h e reasonable minds of j u r o r s would make
t h a t same determination. C l e a r l y , t h e question was one f o r
the jury.
O a r e l a t e d i s s u e p l a i n t i f f complains when t h e c o u r t
n
took t h e case away from t h e jury t h a t a t t h e defendant's request
t h e c o u r t t o l d the jury he had taken t h e i s s u e of design n e g l i -
gence from i t , because he had found p l a i n t i f f t o be g u i l t y of
c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence a s a matter of law. P l a i n t i f f complains
t h i s prejudiced h i s c a s e on t h e remaining i s s u e of s t r i c t l i a -
bility.
I n s i t u a t i o n s such a s t h i s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s must be
c a r e f u l t o n o t give t h e wrong impression t o t h e jury. Here, s i n c e
the c o u r t ruled a s a matter of law t h a t p l a i n t i f f was g u i l t y of
c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence, and so informed t h e j u r y , t h e jury could
w e l l conclude t h e c o u r t d i d n o t t h i n k much of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
e n t i r e case. This could a f f e c t t h e remainder of t h e t r i a l , a s
t h e jury could g e t t h e impression, however s u b t l e , o r however un-
j u s t i f i e d , t h a t t h e c o u r t leaned i n defendant's favor. This i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e where t h e case i s a c l o s e one o r where a r u l i n g
on one i s s u e may well g i v e t h e jury a f e e l i n g a s t o how t h e c o u r t
f e l t about t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct. The d i s t i n c t i o n s between
c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence and assumption of r i s k have never been
t h a t c l e a r t o t h e c o u r t s and t h e l e g a l .profession, l e t alone a
l a y jury.
While a jury need not be kept i n t h e dark t h a t t h e t r i a l
c o u r t has taken a cause of a c t i o n away from i t , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
t h e t r i a l judge must be extremely c a r e f u l a s t o what he t e l l s
t h e jury. Here, t h e judge could have t o l d t h e jury t h a t a s a
r e s u l t of a r u l i n g he had made on a question of law, t h e only
remaining i s s u e i t was concerned with was t h a t of t h e p l a i n -
t i f f ' s claim of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . He a l s o could have informed
t h e j u r y t h a t i t was not t o be concerned why t h e c o u r t made
t h i s ruling. See, f o r example, McBride, The A r t of I n s t r u c t i n g
t h e J u r y , (1969), Sec. 4.12, page 141. A f t e r t h e jury returned
with i t s v e r d i c t t h e c o u r t could then have explained i t s r u l i n g
to it.
The remaining two i s s u e s r e l a t e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s claim
t h a t t h e jury was n o t properly i n s t r u c t e d on t h e questions
r e l a t i n g t o i t s products l i a b i l i t y claim. Montana has adopted
t h e r u l e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a s s e t out i n t h e Restatement of
Torts. Bcandenberger v. Toyota Motor S a l e s , U.S.A., Inc.,
(1973), 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268. Most of t h e claimed e r r o r s
r e l a t e d i r e c t l y t o an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e r u l e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y
s e t out i n 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, §402A, which provides:
" ( I ) One who s e l l s any product i n a d e f e c t i v e
condition unreasonably dangerous t o t h e user o r
consumer o r t o h i s property i s s u b j e c t t o l i a -
b i l i t y f o r physical harm thereby caused t o t h e
- -
u l t i m a t e u s e r o r consumer, o r t o h i s property, i f :
" ( a ) t h e s e l l e r i s engaged i n t h e business of
s e l l i n g such a product, a n d .
"(b) it i s expected and does reach t h e user
o r consumer without s u b s t a n t i a l change i n the
condition i n which i t i s sold.
"(2) The r u l e s t a t e d i n Subsection (1) . a p p l i e s
although
" ( a ) the s e l l e r has exercised a l l p o s s i b l e
c a r e i n t h e preparation and s a l e of h i s product,
and
" ( b ) the u s e r o r consumer has n o t bought
t h e product from o r entered i n t o any c o n t r a c t u a l
r e l a t i o n with t h e s e l l e r . " (Emphasis added.)
W emphasize t h a t t h i s Court adopted t h e r u l e a s s e t
e
out i n t h e Restatement, b u t we did n o t and do not intend t h e
r e s t r a i n t s i n t h e comments t o t h i s r u l e t o hamstring us i n
developing and defining t h e r u l e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . To t h e
e x t e n t t h a t t h e comments a r e h e l p f u l i n our development of t h e
law, we s h a l l accept them; b u t we w i l l r e j e c t them where we
b e l i e v e a more a p p r o p r i a t e explanation of t h e r u l e of s t r i c t
l i a b i l i t y can be provided.
The p l a i n t i f f r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s concerning t h e key
terminology f o r ' r e c o v e r y under t h e Restatement i n s t r i c t l i a -
b i l i t y , namely, t h a t f o r recovery t h e product must be i n a
" d e f e c t i v e condition unreasonably dangerous." ( ~ m p h a s i sadded.)
(a) He contends t h e court f a i l e d t o define t h e
term " d e f e c t i v e condition".
(b) He contends t h a t i n adopting two d e f i n i t i o n s
of "unreasonably dangerous" t h e c o u r t adopted inconsis-
tent definitions.
(c) He contends t h a t one of t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of
"unreasonably dangerous" a s taken from a d e f i n i t i o n i n
t h e Restatement, e f f e c t i v e l y precluded recovery under any
s i t u a t i o n where t h e condition complained of i s open
and obvious r a t h e r than one which i s hidden o r l a t e n t .
These i s s u e s a r e interconnected by t h e terminology of
t h e Restatement it6el.f. -
The i s s u e a s t o " d e f e c t i v e condition" a r o s e when p l a i n t i f f
o f f e r e d two i n s t r u c t i o n s defining " d e f e c t i v e condition" which
the t r i a l court rejected. The defense o f f e r e d no i n s t r u c t i o n s
d e f i n i n g t h i s term, and t h e c o u r t d i d n o t g i v e any of i t s own.
The r e s u l t was t h a t t h e jury was without guidance a s t o t h e
meaning of "defective condition". Plaintiff contended a t t r i a l
and a s s e r t s h e r e t h a t only " d e f e c t i v e condition" should be
defined, and t h a t t h e words "unreasonably dangerous" should
be eliminated from t h e proof required of a p l a i n t i f f . He r e l i e s
on Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972), 104 Cal.Rptr. 433,
501 P.2d 1153, which held t h a t a p l a i n t i f f need only prove i n
a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y case t h a t t h e product was "defective".
Cronin expressly eliminated t h e requirement t h a t a p l a i n t i f f
prove t h e product was "unreasonably dangerous". The b a s i s of
t h e d e c i s i o n was t h a t t h e term "unreasonably dangerous" r i n g s
of negligence concepts and t h e policy of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s t o
avoid t h i s . However, we r e j e c t p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h a t Montana
should a l s o e l i m i n a t e t h e requirement of "unreasonably dangerous".
The i s s u e of d e f i n i n g "unreasonably dangerous" a r o s e i n
the context of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 10 d e f i n i n g "unreasonably dan-
gerous". It gave t h e jury two d e f i n i t i o n s of "unreasonably
dangerous". It was agreed by t h e p a r t i e s t h a t the c o n d i t i o n
complained of (unshielded i n t a k e end of a g r a i n auger) was open
and obvious.
I n s t r u c t ion No. 10 reads:
he term 'unreasonably dangerous' a s used e l s e -
where i n these i n s t r u c t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o the
d o c t r i n e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y has a p a r t i c u l a r
meaning a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s l e g a l d o c t r i n e . For
l i a b i l i t y t o be imposed under t h i s d o e t r i n e , you
must f i n d t h a t t h e product was unreasonably
dangerous, by which i s meant dangerous t o an ex-
t e n t beyond t h a t which would be contemplated by
t h e ordinary consumer who purchased i t , with t h e
ordinary knowledge common t o t h e community a s
t o t h e product's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
"Another t e s t of ' unreasonably dangerous ' i s
assuming t h a t t h e defendant had knowledge of t h e
condition of the product, would t h e defendant
then have been a c t i n g unreasonably i n placing i t
on t h e market?"
The d e f i n i t i o n contained i n t h e f i r s t paragraph of
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 10 i s obviously i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e d e f i n i t i o n
contained i n t h e second paragraph, The f i r s t views "unreasonably
dangerous" from what t h e consumer could s e e a t the time of
purchase o r use. The second views "unreasonably dangerous"
from what t h e manufacturer knew o r should have known a t t h e
time of manufacture. By t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s a jury could conclude
under t h e f i r s t t e s t t h a t t h e unshielded auger was n o t "unreason-
ably dangerous" but under t h e second t e s t t h a t i t was "unreasonably
dangerous". What then was t h e jury t o do? This i n s t r u c t i o n
could only have confused t h e jury a s t o what i s meant by t h e
term "unreasonably dangerous", and it was improper. This a l s o
i s s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r r e v e r s a l .
The t h i r d i s s u e concerning t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "unreasonably
dangerous" i s connected with the Restatement d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s
term. P l a i n t i f f contends t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n
i s t o provide a j u r y with a b u i l t - i n reason t o conclude t h a t an
open and obvious condition i s not "unreasonably dangerous".
He argues t h a t i t e f f e c t i v e l y confines p o s s i b l e recovery t o a
c o n d i t i o n which may be l a t e n t o r hidden. One o f t h e i n s t r u c -
t i o n s d e f i n i n g "unreasonably dangerous1' s u p r a , was taken from
Comment i . , 2 Restatement of T o r t s Zd, $402A, which s t a t e s :
'I* * * The a r t i c l e s o l d must be dangerous t o
a n e x t e n t beyond t h a t which would be contemplated
by t h e o r d i n a r y consumer who purchases i t , w i t h
t h e o r d i n a r y knowledge common t o t h e community
as t o its characteristics. * * *"
W b e l i e v e t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n may b e adequate i n s i t u a t i o n s where
e
t h e c o n d i t i o n complained of i s l a t e n t , b u t i t should n o t be given
where t h e c o n d i t i o n complained of i s open and obvious.
Most of $402A, 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, d i s c u s s e s s t r i c t
l i a b i l i t y i n s i t u a t i o n s involving food, medicine, drugs and
o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s where t h e danger i s n o t an open and obvious one.
Comment i. t o 8402A does n o t c i t e any example where t h a t danger
may be one t h a t i s open and obvious. However, t h i s Court
r e c e n t l y h e l d t h e r e i s no l e g i t i m a t e reason t o r e f u s e recovery
i n a s i t u a t i o n where t h e c o n d i t i o n i s open and obvious. Brown
v. North American Manufacturing Co., (1978), Mont . Y
P.2d , 35 S t . Rep. 194.
The problem w i t h using t h e Restatement d e f i n i t i o n o f
"unreasonably dangerous1' i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by what happened
i n t h i s case. Defendant manufacturer c o n s i s t e n t l y maintained i t
was n o t l i a b l e a s a m a t t e r of law because t h e unshielded i n t a k e
end of t h e g r a i n auger could be seen by an o r d i n a r y consumer o r
u s e r o f t h e product, and t h e r e f o r e t h e danger could be contemplated.
P l a i n t i f f d i d n o t d i s p u t e t h a t he saw t h e unshielded i n t a k e end
of t h e g r a i n a u g e r , and he a l s o recognized i t a s being dangerous.
S u r e l y , i f he could s e e t h e danger, he could contemplate t h e
danger. Under t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n t h e r e f o r e , i t was a
simple m a t t e r f o r t h e j u r y t o conclude t h a t t h e unshielded
i n t a k e end of t h e g r a i n auger was n o t unreasonably dangerous,
because p l a i n t i f f saw i t and could contemplate what he had seen.
A t t h e c l o s e of a l l evidence defendant moved f o r a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t p r e c i s e l y on those grounds, s t a t i n g :
"[Defendant] *** moves t h e Court f o r a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t o r e n t r y of judgment i n favor of t h e
Defendant on t h e grounds and f o r t h e reasons
t h a t t h e elements of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y were n o t
proved, p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard t o t h e unreason-
ably dangerous and d e f e c t i v e condition which i s
required under t h e s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y law i n Montana.
ÿ he determination of unreasonably dangerous, it i s
f e l t t h a t t h e Montana law with r e s p e c t t o t h a t
involves a determination of whether t h e u s e r
contemplates a danger. I n t h i s case a l l of t h e
evidence has been t h a t t h e danger i s open and
obvious and t h e P l a i n t i f f himself has t e s t i f i e d
t h a t he has appreciated t h e danger."
Although t h e t r i a l court denied t h i s motion, defendant,
l a t e r armed with an i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d i n e f f e c t t h a t an
open and obvious danger i s n o t "unreasonably dangerous" i f i t
can be contemplated by t h e u s e r , was a b l e t o make a more con-
vincing argument t o t h e jury. Under t h i s instruction
i t would be v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r an open and obvious condi-
t o be unreasonably dangerous. For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes
recovery would be l i m i t e d t o l a t e n t c o n d i t i o n s . A s stated in
Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co., supra, t h e r e a r e no
p o l i c y reasons t o r e f u s e recovery i f t h e condition i s one t h a t
i s open and obvious.
I n t h e l a s t i s s u e concerning jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , p l a i n t i f f
a t t a c k s t h e assumption of r i s k i n s t r u c t i o n given i n t h i s c a s e .
P l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d no i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h i s d o c t r i n e because he
contended t h e d o c t r i n e d i d n o t apply t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s case.
Furthermore, even when defendant d i d o f f e r such an i n s t r u c t i o n ,
which was t h e standard Montana Jury I n s t r u c t i o n No.
p l a i n t i f f made no s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i o n t o i t . Moreover, i n Brown
we r e c e n t l y discussed i n d e t a i l t h e d o c t r i n e of assumption of
r i s k a s i t a p p l i e s t o s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , and t h e d e c i s i o n t h e r e
i s a s u f f i c i e n t guide f o r t h e r e t r i a l of t h i s cause.
P l a i n t i f f a l s o contends t h e evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t
f o r t h e d o c t r i n e of assumption of r i s k t o apply. I n t h i s regard
we n o t e t h e jury i n t h e i n s t a n t case was n o t properly i n s t r u c t e d
on e i t h e r of p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r i e s of l i a b i l i t y , and t h e e n t i r e
cause must be t r i e d a g a i n , under proper i n s t r u c t i o n s . Under these
circumstances, we do not t h i n k the defendant should be precluded
from presenting i t s evidence on t h e defense of assumption of
risk. The t r i a l c o u r t can then make a determination of whether
t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence of assumption of r i s k t o p r e s e n t it
t o a jury.
W reverse t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court.
e This cause
i s remanded f o r r e t r i a l with d i r e c t i o n s t o proceed i n accord
with t h i s opinion.
W Concur:
e
Chief J u s t i c e
M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . S h e a ' s S p e c i a l Concurring Comment t o Opinion:
While we concluded h e r e i n t h a t i f t h e term " d e f e c t i v e
c o n d i t i o n " i s given t o t h e j u r y it must somehow be d e f i n e d ,
L believe t h a t i t i s n o t necessary t o present t h e i s s u e s t o the
j u r y i n t h e p r e c i s e terminology of t h e Restatement -- "defective
c o n d i t i o n unreasonably dangerous."
The above wording h a s , I am c e r t a i n , caused many problems
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and undoubtedly h a s been t h e s o u r c e of much
c o n f u s i o n i n t h e minds of j u r o r s . Because i t i s confusing and
n o n d e f i n a b l e , t h e term should n o t be g i v e n t o t h e j u r y u n l e s s
i t i s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l t o t h e meaning of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y .
I b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s n o t s o e s s e n t i a l , and a c c o r d i n g l y , t h e term
" d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n " can be e f f e c t i v e l y e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t
t a k i n g any of t h e meaning away from t h e b a s i c t h r u s t of s t r i c t
liability. That b a s i c t h r u s t i s t o p r o t e c t t h e p u b l i c , o r g i v e
them r e d r e s s a g a i n s t manufacturers whose p r o d u c t s f o r some r e a s o n
a r e rendered unreasonably dangerous.
The change i n t h e law by t h e a d o p t i o n of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y
and t h e f a i l u r e t o d e f i n e " d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n " o r " d e f e c t " was
d i s c u s s e d by P r o f e s s o r Keeton i n 5 S t . Mary's Law J o u r n a l , 30,33
"The change i n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e law a s r e g a r d s
t h e l i a b i l i t y of makers of p r o d u c t s and o t h e r
s e l l e r s i n t h e marketing c h a i n h a s been from
f a u l t t o d e f e c t . The p l a i n t i f f i s no l o n g e r
r e q u i r e d t o impugn t h e maker, b u t h e i s r e q u i r e d
t o impugn t h e p r o d u c t . Simply s t a t e d , t h e product
must be d e f e c t i v e a s marketed, and it may be de-
f e c t i v e a s marketed f o r one o r t h e o t h e r of a t
l e a s t t h r e e r e a s o n s : (1) I t may have been f a b r i -
cated o r constructed defectively i n the sense t h a t
t h e s p e c i f i c product was n o t a t t h e t i m e of s a l e
by t h e maker o r o t h e r s e l l e r i n t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t
t h e maker intended it t o b e ; o r ( 2 ) i t may have
been improperly d e s i g n e d ; and ( 3 ) p u r c h a s e r s and
t h o s e who a r e l i k e l y t o u s e t h e product may have
been misinformed o r i n a d e q u a t e l y informed, e i t h e r
about t h e r i s k s and t h e dangers involved i n t h e u s e
of t h e product o r how t o avoid o r minimize t h e
harmful- consequences from such r i s k s . I n so
c a t e g o r i e s of d e f e c t s a r e recognized, t h e r e h a s
been no r e s o l u t i o n of t h e u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n a s t o
t h e meaning of d e f e c t . " (Emphasis added.)
The f i r s t q u e s t i o n f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s whether t h e
p l a i n t i f f i s r e q u i r e d t o prove t h a t t h e product was " d e f e c t i v e "
and a l s o t h a t i t was "unreasonably dangerous". I f both a r e
r e q u i r e d t h e n c l e a r l y t h e j u r y must u n d e r s t a n d t h e meaning of
"defect" o r "defective". Otherwise a j u r y would be l e f t w i t h o u t
meaningful g u i d e l i n e s concerning t h e key language o r c o r e t e s t
of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . I t i s axiomatic t h a t where m a t e r i a l elements
of t h e law t u r n on key words o r terms, t h o s e words o r t e r m s , a s
w e l l a s t h e e l e m e n t s , must b e d e f i n e d f o r t h e j u r y . F i r s t Nat.
Bank of P o r t l a n d v. C a r r o l l , (1907), 35 Mont. 302, 314, 88 P. 1012
( h o l d i n g t h a t an i n s t r u c t i o n on damages which i n c l u d e d t h e words
11
"actual", remote" and " s p e c u l a t i v e " should have been d e f i n e d
f o r t h e j u r y ) ; Rand v. B u t t e E l e c t r i c Ry. Co., (1910), 40 Mont.
398, 410, 411, 107 P. 87 ( h o l d i n g t h a t "preponderance o f t h e
evidence" and " d i r e c t and proximate r e s u l t " should have been de-
fined f o r the jury). Likewise t h e term " d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n "
i s a t e c h n i c a l term, d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e
c o n t e x t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , and should be d e f i n e d f o r t h e j u r y
i f t h e l i t e r a l terminology of t h e Restatement " d e f e c t i v e condi-
t i o n unreasonably dangerous" i s t o be g i v e n t o t h e j u r y . In
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s i n c e t h e term " d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n " was t w i c e given
t o t h e j u r y , i t should have been d e f i n e d .
Analysis of t h e Restatement language l e a d s m t o conclude
e
t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l t h r u s t of t h e ~ e s t a t e m e n t ' sp o s i t i o n on
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y can b e r e t a i n e d without t h e c o u r t s and
j u r i e s having t o w r e s t l e w i t h t h e meaning of " d e f e c t i v e condi-
tion" . Concerning " d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n unreasonably dangerous"
P r o f e s s o r Keeton s t a t e s i n 5 S t . Mary's Law J o u r n a l 30,
"ik * I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e perhaps t h a t
S e c t i o n 402A of t h e Restatement (Second)
of T o r t s , provides t h a t a s a b a s i s f o r
recovery, i t must be found t h a t t h e pro-
d u c t was both ' d e f e c t i v e ' and 'unreason-
a b l y dangerous' , when a s a m a t t e r of f a c t
t h e term 'unreasonably dangerous' was meant
only a s a d e f i n i t i o n of d e f e c t . The p h r a s e
was n o t intended a s s e t t i n g f o r t h two requirements
b u t only one, t h e n o t i o n being t h a t t h e product
was n o t d e f e c t i v e f o r t h e purpose of s h i f t i n g
l o s s e s due t o p h y s i c a l l y harmful e v e n t s u n l e s s i t
was I unreasonably dangerous' .** 9
;" (Emphasis
added. )
By t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n t h e r e i s only one requirement, r a t h e r than
two, and I b e l i e v e i t t o be t h e most reasonable approach.
For a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n concluding t h a t t h e term "unreasonably
dangerous" i s t h e c o r e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y under t h e Restatement,
s e e a l s o : Tobias & Rossbach, A Framework f o r Analysis of
Products L i a b i l i t y i n Montana, 38 Montana Law Review 221,
Two comments t o 2 Restatement 2d, $402~4a l s o l e a d m t o
e
b e l i e v e t h e f o c a l p o i n t i s whether o r n o t t h e c o n d i t i o n complained
of i s "unreasonably dangerous". Comment g. provides i n r e l e v a n t
part:
"The r u l e [of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y ] s t a t e d i n t h i s
Section a p p l i e s only where t h e product i s , a t
t h e time i t leaves t h e s e l l e r ' s hands, i n a con-
d i t i o n n o t contemplated by the u l t i m a t e consumer,
which w i l l be unreasonably dangerous t o him."
(Emphasis added.)
Comment j . provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"In order t o prevent t h e product from being
unreasonably dangerous, t h e s e l l e r may be
required t o give d i r e c t i o n s o r warning, on t h e
c o n t a i n e r , a s t o i t s use." (Emphasis added.)
Each of these comments c e n t e r s around t h e u l t i m a t e f i n d i n g t h a t
t h e condition complained of must render t h e product unreasonably
dangerous. Otherwise, t h e r e i s no l i a b i l i t y .
Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i r e c t l y i n j e c t e d t h e term
" d e f e c t i v e condition" i n t o t h e u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e case
by s t a t i n g i t a s p a r t of t h e i s s u e s t o be determined. Instruction
No. 27 s t a t e d :
"The i s s u e s t o be determined by you i n t h i s a c t i o n
a r e these:
" F i r s t , was t h e auger i n a d e f e c t i v e condition
unreasonably dangerous? I f your answer t o t h i s
question i s 'No', you w i l l riot consider t h e matter
f u r t h e r , but w i l l r e t u r n a v e r d i c t i n favor of t h e
Defendant, and n o t i f y t h e b a i l i f f , who w i l l r e t u r n
you i n t o Court. I f your answer t o t h i s question i s
',Yes1, you w i l l have a second i s s u e t o determine,
namely: was t h e d e f e c t i v e condition unreasonably
dangerous a proximate cause of any i n j u r y t o t h e
Plaintiff? ** (Emphasis added.)
It was n o t necessary t o s t a t e t h e i s s u e s i n t h i s fashion.
Without taking any meaning from t h e f o c a l p o i n t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y
under t h e Restatement, t h e jury could have been i n s t r u c t e d on t h e
i s s u e s a s follows:
F i r s t , d i d t h e unshielded i n t a k e end of t h e
g r a i n auger render i t unreasonably dangerous?
I f your answer t o t h i s question i s "yes", you
w i l l have a second i s s u e t o determine, namely:
was t h e unshielded i n t a k e end of t h e g r a i n auger
t h e proximate cause of any i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ?
The case was n o t complex i n terms of t h e condition complained
of which rendered t h e g r a i n auger unreasonably dangerous. If
t h e r e was more than one a l l e g a t i o n of unreasonably dangerous
c o n d i t i o n , i t would be a simple matter t o convert t h e above
i n s t r u c t i o n t o one covering each of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s .
A s s t a t e d e a r l i e r i n quoting Professor Keeton, supra,
t h e i s s u e under s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s one of impugning t h e pro-
duct r a t h e r than impugning t h e conduct of t h e manufacturer.
Accordingly, t h e f o c a l p o i n t i s on t h e condition of t h e product
a s i t entered t h e stream of commerce. The v i t a l q u e s t i o n i s :
Was it unreasonably dangerous? I t i s v i t a l l y important i n t h i s
regard t h a t t h e j u r y does not g e t bogged down i n w r e s t l i n g
with t h e nondefinable and unnecessary terminology of " d e f e c t i v e
condition" .
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