No. 14693
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979
MELROY L. MEDHUS, JR., BEN WILLIAMS,
BILLY G. REDDIG and LYNNE A. REDDIG,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
KENNETH A. DUTTER, MARY E. DUTTER,
THOMAS J. DEUTSCH, and JANET M. DEUTSCH,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
Moore, Lympus and Doran, Kalispell, Montana
Warden, Walterskirchen and Christiansen, Kalispell,
Montana
Submitted on briefs: August 15, 1979
Decided: YOV 2 1 1979
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
Appellants i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n i n D i s t r i c t Court, t h e
E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable R o b e r t C . Sykes
p r e s i d i n g , a s k i n g t h e c o u r t t o e n j o i n r e s p o n d e n t s from
o b s t r u c t i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' use of a road t h a t crossed respon-
dents' property. Appellants sought t o o b t a i n a decree g r a n t -
i n g them a n easement a l o n g t h e r o a d . Appellants a l s o sought
damages f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e u s e of t h e r o a d , and a p p e l -
l a n t Medhus s o u g h t damages f o r t r e s p a s s t o h i s p r o p e r t y .
Respondents f i l e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t
Medhus f o r t i m b e r t r e s p a s s and s o u g h t an o r d e r r e q u i r i n g
Medhus t o move a f e n c e e r e c t e d a l o n g t h e boundary o f t h e i r
p r o p e r t y and t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t s had a n e a s e -
ment f o r roadway p u r p o s e s a c r o s s a p o r t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s '
p r o p e r t y , b u t found no easement a c r o s s a n o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e
property. The c o u r t o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t s be a l l o w e d t o remove
some p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y from t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e roadway a c r o s s
which no easement was found. However, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d no
f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s o r judgment c o n c e r n i n g a p p e l l a n t s '
trespass c l a i m .
The c o u r t f u r t h e r found a p p e l l a n t Medhus had n o t com-
m i t t e d t i m b e r t r e s p a s s b u t had e r e c t e d a f e n c e on r e s p o n d e n t s '
property. The c o u r t o r d e r e d t h e f e n c e moved t o t h e c o r r e c t
boundary l i n e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded c o s t s o f t h e s u i t
t o r e s p o n d e n t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o s t o f a boundary s u r v e y done
a t t h e r e q u e s t of r e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e l l a n t s a p p e a l t h i s judg-
ment.
Respondents Thomas Deutsch and J a n e t Deutsch a r e t h e
l e g a l owners, and r e s p o n d e n t s Kenneth D u t t e r and Mary D u t t e r
a r e t h e e q u i t a b l e owners, b e i n g p u r c h a s e r s under c o n t r a c t
f o r deed, of c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n F l a t h e a d
County. The d i s p u t e d r o a d p a s s e s a c r o s s t h e i r p r o p e r t y .
The D e u t s c h e s a c q u i r e d t h e p r o p e r t y i n 1964 from A. P . and
Martha T. Marcoux. The Marcouxes conveyed t h e p r o p e r t y t o
t h e D e u t s c h e s by a w a r r a n t y deed. The deed c o n t a i n e d l a n -
guage r e f e r r i n g t o a n easement f o r r o a d p u r p o s e s a c r o s s t h e
premises. The n o t i c e o f p u r c h a s e r s ' i n t e r e s t g i v i n g n o t i c e
o f t h e c o n t r a c t under which t h e D u t t e r s h o l d t h e i r e q u i t a b l e
i n t e r e s t t o t h e property c o n t a i n s s i m i l a r language. This
p r o p e r t y w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e " D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . "
A p p e l l a n t Melroy Medhus owns r e a l p r o p e r t y t h a t l i e s
e a s t of t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y and above it o n a m o u n t a i n s i d e .
T h i s p r o p e r t y w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e "Medhus p r o p e r t y . "
A p p e l l a n t s B i l l y G. Reddig and Lynne A. Reddig a r e buying a
p o r t i o n o f t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y under c o n t r a c t f o r deed.
A p p e l l a n t Ben W i l l i a m s i s t h e owner of t h r e e p a r c e l s of r e a l
p r o p e r t y which a r e e a s t o f b o t h t h e D u t t e r and Medhus prop-
er t i e s .
F o o t h i l l s Road, a p u b l i c highway, p a s s e s c l o s e t o t h e
w e s t e r n boundary o f t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . Near t h e s o u t h e r n
boundary of t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y a d i r t and g r a v e l r o a d
l e a v e s F o o t h i l l s Road and g o e s up t h e m o u n t a i n s i d e a c r o s s
t h e Dutter property. T h i s roadway l e a v e s t h e D u t t e r prop-
e r t y and e n t e r s t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y and forms a "Y" on t h e
Medhus p r o p e r t y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found, a p p a r e n t l y f o r
t h e s a k e o f c o m p l e t e n e s s , t h a t a l l of t h e a p p e l l a n t s had a n
easement a l o n g t h a t roadway from t h e F o o t h i l l s Road t o t h e
boundary o f t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . An easement o v e r t h i s
s e c t i o n of road w a s n o t asked f o r i n a p p e l l a n t s ' complaint.
The n o r t h e r n brand of t h e "Y" c o n t i n u e s a c r o s s t h e Medhus
p r o p e r t y and r e e n t e r s t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y f o r 300 f e e t
whereupon i t r e e n t e r s t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y and c o n t i n u e s
e a s t e r l y and up t h e m o u n t a i n s i d e o n t o t h e W i l l i a m s p r o p e r t y .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t none o f t h e a p p e l l a n t s had a n
easement a c r o s s t h i s 300 f o o t r o a d on t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y .
The f o l l o w i n g diagram a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e
p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s and r o a d i n d i s p u t e (marked " d i s p u t e d
road" on t h e d i a g r a m ) :
- - -- - -- - - - - - -
\
\
\
i
MEDHUS Property
granted easement.
The u s e of t h e 300 f o o t r o a d marked " d i s p u t e d r o a d " on
t h e diagram i s t h e c e n t e r of controversy i n t h i s case.
A p p e l l a n t s do n o t c o n t e s t t h e p o r t i o n of t h e judgment o r d e r -
i n g them t o move t h e i r f e n c e , and r e s p o n d e n t s do n o t c h a l -
l e n g e t h e f i n d i n g of a n easement o f t h e o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e
road. The T r a b l i k p r o p e r t y marked on t h e diagram i s n o t i n -
volved i n t h e c u r r e n t d i s p u t e .
The r o a d was b u i l t i n 1933 by t h e Koenig b r o t h e r s ,
l o g g e r s working e a s t o f t h e D u t t e r and Medhus p r o p e r t i e s .
B e f o r e c o n s t r u c t i n g and u s i n g t h e r o a d , t h e l o g g e r s g o t
p e r m i s s i o n from C l a r e n c e Haines, t h e n t h e owner o f t h e
Dutter property. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t s i n c e t h e
1 9 3 0 1 s , t h e d i s p u t e d r o a d h a s seldom been used. The c o u r t
found t h a t n e i g h b o r s used t h e r o a d f o r c u t t i n g f i r e w o o d o r
C h r i s t m a s trees and members o f t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c used t h e
r o a d t o go up M i l l Creek t o h u n t , h i k e and g a t h e r h u c k l e -
berries. The b r i d g e o v e r M i l l Creek l e a d i n g t o t h e r o a d
washed o u t f o r a p e r i o d o f t i m e and was r e p l a c e d i n t h e
1970's. D u t t e r b u l l d o z e d t h e r o a d s h u t i n 1978, l e a d i n g t o
t h e i n s t i g a t i o n of t h i s s u i t .
T h i s a p p e a l raises t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r o u r con-
sideration :
1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l -
l a n t s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement a c r o s s t h e
d i s p u t e d road?
2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l -
l a n t s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a n easement o f r e c o r d a c r o s s t h e
d i s p u t e d road?
3. Did t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t err i n n o t e n t e r i n g f i n d -
t
i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s and a judgment on a p p e l l a n t s 1 t r e s p a s s
claim?
4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n awarding c o s t s t o t h e
respondents?
To e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement,
t h e p a r t y c l a i m i n g t h e easement must show open, n o t o r i o u s ,
e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e , c o n t i n u o u s and u n i n t e r r u p t e d u s e o f t h e
easement c l a i m e d f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d . G a r r e t t v.
J a c k s o n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. -1 - P.2d ,
- 36 St.Rep.
1769, 1771; Hayden v . Snowden ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. -, 576 P.2d
1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. 367, 369; T a y l o r v . P e t r a n e k ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,
Mont. , 568 P.2d 1 2 0 , 1 2 2 , 34 St.Rep. 905, 909;
Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d
613, 615. The c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h i s c a s e t u r n s on whether
a p p e l l a n t s showed t h e u s e o f t h e d i s p u t e d r o a d by them and
t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t was a d v e r s e r a t h e r t h a n
permissive. I f a p p e l l a n t s f a i l e d t o show a d v e r s e u s e , t h e y
have n o t e s t a b l i s h e d a l l t h e e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o p e r f e c t
a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l i n g on
t h i s i s s u e must be upheld.
I n Taylor, we s a i d :
"Although a u s e p e r m i s s i v e i n i t s i n c e p t i o n may
r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t , it c a n n o t do s o
u n l e s s t h e r e i s a l a t e r d i s t i n c t and p o s i t i v e
a s s e r t i o n of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner, which
must b e b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e owner,
and t h e u s e c o n t i n u e d f o r t h e f u l l p r e s c r i p t i v e
period. (Citations omitted.)" 568 P.2d a t 123.
I n Wilson v. C h e s t n u t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 484, 491, 525
P.2d 2 4 , 27, we a p p r o v i n g l y q u o t e d 2 Thompson on Real Prop-
e r t y (1961 R e p l a c e m e n t ) , Easements, 8345, a s f o l l o w s :
I1 I
... I f t h e u s e r began by t h e p e r m i s s i o n of
t h e owner, i t w i l l n o t r i p e n i n t o a n a d v e r s e
o r h o s t i l e r i g h t u n t i l n o t i c e of s u c h a d v e r s e
u s e r i s b r o u g h t home t o t h e owner and t h e u s e r
continued t h e r e a f t e r f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y period.'"
S e e a l s o White v. Kamps ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 102, 1 7 1 P.2d 343.
Here, the testimony shows the use of the disputed road
was originally permissive. Clarence Haines gave the Koenig
brothers permission to build and use the road. Since the
use of the road was permissive at its inception, to find a
prescriptive easement here we must find in the record a
distinct and positive assertion of a right to use the dis-
puted road hostile to the owners by those claiming the
easement. The record must also show the right was brought
to the attention of the owners and continued use of the
easement for the full statutory period.
Looking to the record, we find occasional use of the
road by hunters, hikers and neighbors cutting Christmas
trees and gathering firewood. We have previously held this
type of use insufficient to raise a presumption of adverse
use. Taylor v. Petranek, supra, 568 P.2d at 123; Harland v.
Anderson, supra, 169 Mont. at 451-452. Being insufficient
to initially establish adverse use, this type of use does
not represent the distinct and positive assertion of a
hostile right brought home to the owner of the purportedly
servient tenement necessary to transform originally permis-
sive use into adverse use. Under these facts, the use of
the road began permissively and continued to be permissive
until Dutter blocked the road in 1978. Appellants, there-
fore, did not establish the existence of a prescriptive
easement across the Dutter property.
The second issue raised by this appeal concerns the
language in the deeds used to convey the Dutter property-
The language in the deeds reads, "Subject, however to an
easement for road purposes now existing over and across the
herein described premises."
The m a j o r i t y r u l e i s t h a t a n easement c a n n o t be c r e a t e d
i n f a v o r o f a s t r a n g e r t o t h e deed. Wilson v . C h e s t n u t ,
s u p r a , 164 Mont. a t 492; s e e a l s o Annot., 88 ALR2d 1199,
1201-1202 (1963). I n t h e p r o p e r c a s e , however, w e w i l l
d e p a r t from t h a t r u l e t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e g r a n t o r ' s i n t e n t .
S t a t e of Montana, By and Through t h e Montana S t a t e F i s h and
G a m e Commission v. C r o n i n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 587 P.2d
395, 399, 35 St.Rep. 1798, 1802; Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492.
The q u e s t i o n t h u s becomes o n e of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i n t e n t o f
t h e g r a n t o r s i n i n c l u d i n g t h e above l a n g u a g e i n t h e d e e d s .
B e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n easement i n a s t r a n g e r t o a
conveyance w i l l be r e c o g n i z e d , t h e i n t e n t of t h e g r a n t o r t o
c r e a t e t h e easement must be c l e a r l y shown. Cushman v. Davis
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 145 Cal.Rep. 791, 793, 80 Cal.App.3d 731. I f it
a p p e a r s i t i s a s l i k e l y t h e purpose o f t h e c l a u s e i n t h e
deed was t o p r o t e c t t h e g r a n t o r ' s w a r r a n t y of t i t l e a s t o
r e s e r v e a n easement, w e w i l l n o t d e p a r t from t h e m a j o r i t y
r u l e and f i n d a n easement. Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492. To
determine t h e i n t e n t of t h e grantor i n s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o
t h e c a s e a t b a r , c o u r t s have c o n s i d e r e d t h e e x p r e s s l a n g u a g e
o f t h e d e e d , Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492; t e s t i m o n y by g r a n t o r s
s t a t i n g t h e i r i n t e n t , W i l l a r d v. F i r s t Church of C h r i s t ,
S c i e n t i s t , P a c i f i c a ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 102 Cal.Rep. 739, 498 P.2d 987,
989; t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g r a n t o r r e c e i v e d l e s s v a l u e f o r t h e
p r o p e r t y conveyed b e c a u s e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of an e a s e m e n t ,
Mott v. S t a n l a k e ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 6 5 Mich.App. 440, 234 N.W.2d 667,
668, and W i l l a r d , 498 P.2d a t 989-990; and, t h e s u f f i c i e n c y
of t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e easement and
whether o r n o t t h e r e s e r v a t i o n names a dominant tenement,
S t a t e of Montana, By and Through t h e S t a t e F i s h and G a m e
Commission v . C r o n i n , s u p r a , 587 P.2d a t 399.
Considering these factors here, we find the language
contained in the deed almost identical to the language in
~ilson,where we held no easement had been reserved. Further,
respondent Deutsch stated he knew the deed contained the lan-
guage and had discussed it with appellant Bill Reddig, but
that he did not know the implications of the language. Deutsch
said he did know there was a road up to the home on the Dutter
property that nobody other than the owners should be using.
This testimony indicates that in executing the documents
that passed equitable title to the property, Deutsch did not
intend to create an easement. There is no testimony on the
record showing any of the grantors of the Dutter property
received less than full value for the land because of the
existence of an easement. Finally, although the language
of the deed does locate the easement, it fails to name a
dominant tenement. Considering these factors together, here,
as in Wilson, it is as likely the grantors intended to pro-
tect their warranty of title as to reserve an easement. Thus,
the deeds do not establish an easement of record.
The third issue raised by this appeal involves the
failure of the District Court to enter findings, conclusions
or a judgment concerning Count IV of appellants' complaint.
This count alleges Dutter trespassed on the Medhus property
while bulldozing the disputed road shut and damaged the
property by removing gravel to build the Kelly bump that
blocked the road.
Appellants elicited testimony at the hearing on this
case supporting the claim. The trial judge did not, however,
enter findings, conclusions or judgment concerning the matter*
The District Court should have made findings concerning this
issue and entered a judgment accordingly. Claver v, Rosen-
q u i s t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 4 , 1 3 , 499 P.2d 1235, 1240. W there-
e
f o r e r e t u r n t h e matter t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with i n s t r u c t i o n s
t o e n t e r f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s and a judgment on t h i s i s s u e .
I n d o i n g s o , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d h o l d whatever f u r t h e r proceed-
i n g s , i f any, i t deems n e c e s s a r y .
The f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d h e r e d e a l s w i t h t h e award o f
c o s t s t o respondents. S e c t i o n s 25-10-101 and 25-10-102,
MCA, c o n t r o l t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h i s q u e s t i o n . Those s e c -
t i o n s r e q u i r e t h e awarding of c o s t s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s o r
t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n c a s e s o f t h i s n a t u r e upon a judgment i n
t h e i r favor.
I n t h i s c a s e , t h e judgment g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t s a n e a s e -
ment o v e r a p o r t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s ' p r o p e r t y , b u t d e n i e d
a p p e l l a n t s any r i g h t t o u s e t h e s e c t i o n o f r o a d o v e r which
t h e a p p e l l a n t s prayed f o r a n easement i n t h e i r c o m p l a i n t .
On remand, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may f i n d i n f a v o r o f a p p e l l a n t s
o r r e s p o n d e n t s on a p p e l l a n t s ' t r e s p a s s c l a i m . The judgment
s t a t e d r e s p o n d e n t s s h o u l d t a k e n o t h i n g by t h e i r c o u n t e r -
c l a i m b u t a l s o o r d e r e d Medhus t o move h i s f e n c e . Respon-
d e n t s had r e q u e s t e d t h e f e n c e be moved a s p a r t of t h e i r
counterclaim.
The judgment t h u s found i n f a v o r of b o t h p a r t i e s t o t h e
l a w s u i t on d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e case. W e have
p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t a p l a i n t i f f need n o t r e c o v e r on a l l
c l a i m s p r e s e n t e d by a c o m p l a i n t t o be e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s
under s e c t i o n 25-10-101, MCA. J o n e s v . Great N o r t h e r n
R a i l r o a d Company ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 68 Mont. 231, 242-245, 217 P . 673,
677-678. W e have a l s o a l l o w e d a d e f e n d a n t t o r e c o v e r c o s t s
when o n l y p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l on a c o u n t e r c l a i m b u t t o t a l l y
s u c c e s s f u l i n d e f e a t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. Spencer v .
Mungus ( 1 9 0 3 ) , 28 Mont. 357, 359-360, 72 P . 663, 664. We
have n e v e r s q u a r e l y f a c e d , however, t h e i s s u e of awarding
c o s t s i n a c a s e where t h e p l a i n t i f f p a r t i a l l y s u c c e e d s on
t h e c o m p l a i n t and t h e d e f e n d a n t p r e v a i l s a s t o a p a r t of t h e
counterclaim. I n the only case presenting t h e question, the
Court decided i n favor of t h e defendant without discussion.
Aronow v . H i l l ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 153, 1 6 3 , 286 P. 1 4 0 , 1 4 4 .
Montana a d o p t e d i t s c o s t s t a t u t e from C a l i f o r n i a . That
s t a t e s t i l l h a s a s i m i l a r s t a t u t o r y s e t u p f o r awarding
costs. S e c t i o n 1032, C a l . Code Civ. Proc. In interpreting
t h e i r c o s t s t a t u t e s , t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t s have come t o t h e
s a m e r e s u l t r e a c h e d i n Aronow by d e t e r m i n i n g which p a r t y
p r e v a i l e d on t h e main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y i n a case.
Whiting v . S q u e g l i a ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 70 Cal.App. 1 0 8 , 232 P . 986,
990. I n Whiting t h e p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t and t h e
defendant counterclaimed. The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a judg-
ment g r a n t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f s p a r t o f t h e r e l i e f t h e y re-
q u e s t e d and t h e d e f e n d a n t p a r t o f h i s c l a i m w i t h c o s t s t o
t h e defendant. Whiting, 232 P . a t 987. On a p p e a l , t h e
award o f c o s t s w a s upheld under t h e c o s t s s t a t u t e based on
t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had p r e v a i l e d on t h e main
i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y and, t h e r e f o r e , judgment had been
entered i n h i s favor. W h i t i n q , 232 P . a t 990.
Given t h e u s e o f t h e main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y r u l e i n
California i n interpreting cost s t a t u t e s s i m i l a r t o those i n
Montana, w e now a d o p t t h e r u l e i n Montana f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g
s e c t i o n s 25-10-101 and 25-10-102, MCA. If a plaintiff files
a c o m p l a i n t i n a n a c t i o n covered by s e c t i o n 25-10-101, MCA,
and s u c c e e d s o n l y p a r t i a l l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o
costs. I f an a c t i o n i s f i l e d , t h e defendant counterclaims
and s u c c e e d s i n h a v i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m t o t a l l y d e n i e d
b u t o n l y r e c o v e r s a p o r t i o n of t h e r e l i e f demanded i n t h e
counterclaim, t h e defendant should r e c e i v e c o s t s . If,
however, a p a r t y i n i t i a t e s a l a w s u i t , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u n t e r -
c l a i m s , and t h e judgment awards b o t h p a r t i e s p a r t o f t h e
r e l i e f t h e y s e e k , t h e p a r t y p r e v a i l i n g o n t h e main i s s u e i n
c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e case must be a l l o w e d c o s t s .
Applying t h i s r u l e t o t h e c a s e a t b a r , w e f i n d t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y awarded c o s t s t o r e s p o n d e n t s . The
main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y h e r e was t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n
easement a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d road. The c l o s i n g o f t h e r o a d
p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e l a w s u i t a n d most o f t h e t e s t i m o n y a t t h e
t r i a l concerned t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n easement over t h e road.
R e s p o n d e n t s p r e v a i l e d on t h a t i s s u e . The c o s t s t a t u t e s
t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d them t o t h e i r c o s t s o f s u i t , i n c l u d i n g
t h e c o s t o f t h e s u r v e y n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e boundary
between t h e Medhus a n d D u t t e r p r o p e r t i e s .
The judgment i s a f f i r m e d i n p a r t b u t remanded t o t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r a judgment o n
a p p e l l a n t s ' t r e s p a s s claim.
W e concur:
Cbref J u s t i c e
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Justices