Vincent v. Edwards

No.14831
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979

CHARLOTTE VINCENT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
JOHN ROBERT EDWARDS et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
McDonough, Cox and Simonton, Glendive, Montana
For Respondents:
Douglas Y. Freeman, Hardin, Montana
Ronald Lodders, Billings, Montana
Charles Cashmore, Billings, Montana

Submitted on briefs: September 12, 1979

flf;T , :
, ir;?
-.
Filed:
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.

his is an appeal from the judgment in a personal
injury action from the District Court, Thirteenth Judicial
~istrict,Yellowstone County. Plaintiff Charlotte Vincent
appeals from the District Court order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, Schultz & Meyer Con-
struction Company, Empire Sand & Gravel Company, Inc., and
Jimmy D. Arndt.
Plaintiff brought this cause to recover for injuries
suffered in an automobile accident on the night of July 3,
1974. She was a passenger in an automobile which struck a
cow lying on Interstate 94 which was then under construc-
tion. The cow had been struck by two other automobiles
immediately before plaintiff's collision.
The original complaint alleges the accident resulting
in plaintiff's injuries was caused by the negligence of the
operators of the two other automobiles and the construction
companies working on Interstate 94. The original complaint
was filed on June 28, 1977. At that time, plaintiff posi-
tively knew the identity of only two defendants, John Robert
Edwards and George Mike Edwards. Consequently, the driver
of the second car, Jimmy D. Arndt, and the two construction
companies, Schultz & Meyer Construction Company and ~mpire
Sand & Gravel Company, Inc., were designated by fictitious
names pursuant to section 25-5-103, MCA. Respondent Arndt
was designated as "John Doe" and the two construction com-
panies were designated as "A.B.C. Construction company" in
the original complaint.
Later, plaintiff moved to amend the original complaint
upon discovering the true identities of the fictitiously
named d e f e n d a n t s . The motion was g r a n t e d on September 25,

1978, and p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a n amended c o m p l a i n t .

The t h r e e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s w e r e e a c h

s e r v e d w i t h a summons on o r a f t e r September 25, 1978. Prior

t o such s e r v i c e , t h e y had no n o t i c e o f e i t h e r t h e a c c i d e n t

o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f any p r i o r a c t i o n on b e h a l f o f p l a i n -

tiff. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e t r u e names of t h e two

c o n s t r u c t i o n companies c o u l d have been o b t a i n e d from informa-

t i o n e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e upon mere i n q u i r y .

The t h r e e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r

summary judgment on t h e grounds t h a t t h e t h r e e - y e a r statute

o f l i m i t a t i o n s on p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m had r u n on J u l y 3, 1977,

under s e c t i o n 27-2-204(1), MCA. The motion was g r a n t e d , and

judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f on A p r i l 3 0 , 1979.

P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h i s judgment.

This appeal r a i s e s an i s s u e of f i r s t impression i n t h i s

jurisdiction: whether o r n o t t h e " r e l a t i o n back" l i m i t a t i o n s

o f Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., a p p l y t o a n amendment o f a com-

p l a i n t made t o i d e n t i f y d e f e n d a n t s o r i g i n a l l y named f i c t i -

t i o u s l y p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-5-103, MCA, and made a f t e r

t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s has run.

T h i s a p p e a l i n v o l v e s two Montana s t a t u t e s and t h e i r

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and r e l a t i o n s h i p t o e a c h o t h e r . Plaintiff-

a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 25-

5-103, MCA, which p r o v i d e s :

"Suing a p a r t y a f i c t i t i o u s name. When t h e
p l a i n t i E f i s i g n o r a n t of t h e name o f t h e d e f e n -
d a n t , such d e f e n d a n t may be d e s i g n a t e d i n any
p l e a d i n g o r p r o c e e d i n g by any name; and when
h i s t r u e name i s d i s c o v e r e d , t h e p l e a d i n g s o r
p r o c e e d i n g s may be amended a c c o r d i n g l y . "

The second s t a t u t e r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a p p e a l i s Rule 1 5 ( c ) ,

M.R.Civ.P., r e g a r d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n back of amendments t o

p l e a d i n g s , which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
 --
" R e l a t i o n back of amendments. Whenever t h e
c l a i m o r d e f e n s e a s s e r t e d i n t h e amended p l e a d -
i n g a r o s e o u t of t h e c o n d u c t , t r a n s a c t i o n , o r
o c c u r r e n c e s e t f o r t h o r a t t e m p t e d t o be s e t
f o r t h i n t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g , t h e amendment
r e l a t e s back t o t h e d a t e of t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d -
i n g . An amendment changing t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t
whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s back i f t h e
f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i s s a t i s f i e d and, w i t h i n
t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e d by law f o r commencing t h e
a c t i o n a g a i n s t him, t h e p a r t y t o be b r o u g h t i n
by amendment (1) h a s r e c e i v e d s u c h n o t i c e of
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t h a t he w i l l n o t
be p r e j u d i c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e
m e r i t s , and ( 2 ) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t ,
b u t f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t y of
t h e p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n would have been
b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him."

I n h e r b r i e f a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.,

and t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e speak t o d i f f e r e n t circum-

stances. She c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 25-5-103 i s concerned

w i t h d e f e n d a n t s whose names o r i d e n t i t i e s a r e o r i g i n a l l y

unknown and a r e l a t e r d i s c o v e r e d and no change of p a r t i e s i s

involved. Rule 1 5 ( c ) , s h e a r g u e s , i s concerned w i t h a

s i t u a t i o n where a p l a i n t i f f h a s e i t h e r misnamed t h e p r o p e r

d e f e n d a n t o r h a s m i s t a k e n l y named t h e wrong d e f e n d a n t , and

t h e r e f o r e w i s h e s t o make a n amendment "changing t h e p a r t y . "

She a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 1 5 ( c ) , which admit-

t e d l y have n o t been s a t i s f i e d h e r e , do n o t a p p l y t o amend-

ments s u b s t i t u t i n g named d e f e n d a n t s f o r f i c t i t i o u s d e f e n d a n t s

a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s h a s e x p i r e d . Thus, a p p e l -

l a n t c o n t e n d s , amendments i d e n t i f y i n g and s u b s t i t u t i n g named

d e f e n d a n t s r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l com-

p l a i n t naming f i c t i t i o u s d e f e n d a n t s , and t h e s t a t u t e of

limitations is tolled. The o n l y p u r p o s e of t h e f i c t i t i o u s

name s t a t u t e i s t o t o l l t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i n a

s i t u a t i o n s u c h a s t h a t which c o n f r o n t e d a p p e l l a n t i n t h e

present case. F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s any

r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a p l a i n t i f f u t i l i z i n g t h e f i c t i t i o u s name

s t a t u t e t o e x e r c i s e reasonable d i l i g e n c e t o determine t h e
t r u e name o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , i f t h e r e

i s such a r e q u i r e m e n t , t h e d e f e n d a n t must d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u -

d i c e , which h a s n o t been done i n t h i s c a s e .

Respondents u r g e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had

r u n o u t b e f o r e any of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e named a s p a r t i e s

d e f e n d a n t , and t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r l y

g r a n t e d summary judgment. They a r g u e t h a t t h e amended

c o m p l a i n t d o e s n o t r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l

c o m p l a i n t f o r two r e a s o n s : (1) Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., is

a p p l i c a b l e and i t s r e q u i r e m e n t s have n o t been m e t ; and ( 2 )

t h e p l a i n t i f f did n o t exercise reasonable diligence t o

d e t e r m i n e t h e t r u e names o f t h e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s .

Because we h o l d t h a t a n amendment t o a c o m p l a i n t s u b s t i -

t u t i n g named d e f e n d a n t s f o r f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s

f a l l s w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of Rule 1 5 ( c ) , i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y

f o r u s t o c o n s i d e r t h e second i s s u e r a i s e d on a p p e a l .

A t t h e o u t s e t i t i s worthy o f n o t e t h a t w h i l e Montana's

f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 25-5-103, MCA, p e r m i t s

amendment of t h e p l e a d i n g s upon d i s c o v e r y of t h e d e f e n d a n t s '

t r u e names, t h e s t a t u t e i s s i l e n t a s t o t h e r e l a t i o n back of

t h e amendment and t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . Both o f t h e s e

i s s u e s , t h e r e l a t i o n back o f amendments and t h e s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s , a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d i n Rule 1 5 ( c ) , b u t

are n o t mentioned i n s e c t i o n 25-5-103, t h e f i c t i t i o u s name

statute. Nevertheless, a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t d e s p i t e t h e

a b s e n c e of any l a n g u a g e i n s e c t i o n 25-5-103 tolling the

s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s o r p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e r e l a t i o n back of
a n amendment, t h e o n l y p u r p o s e of a f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e

i s t o t o l l t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s and t h e amended com-

p l a i n t must t h e r e f o r e r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e

o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t , c i t i n g Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 1 3 0 , 134, i n
s u p p o r t of h e r p o s i t i o n . W e r e f u s e t o r e a d such a r u l e i n t o

s e c t i o n 25-5-103 by i m p l i c a t i o n , s i n c e Rule 1 5 ( c ) e x p r e s s l y

d e a l s with the matter.

I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e more s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s of Rule

1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., a r e controlling i n the present case.

This r u l e provides:

". . . An amendment changing t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t
whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s - -i -t h e
back f
f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i s s a t i s f i e d [same t r a n s -
a c t i o n o r occurrence]and, within t h e period
p r o v i d e d by - - commencing the a c t i o n
law for
a g a i n s t him, t h e p a r t y t o b e b r o u g h t i n by
amendment (1) h a s r e c e i v e d such n o t i c e o f t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n t h a t he w i l l n o t be
p r e j u d i c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e
m e r i t s , and ( 2 ) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t ,
b u t f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t y of
t h e p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n would have been
b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him." (Emphasis and b r a c k e t e d
material supplied. )

A p p e l l a n t a p p a r e n t l y acknowledges t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s

o f Rule 1 5 ( c ) have n o t been m e t i n t h i s c a s e i n t h a t n e i t h e r

r e s p o n d e n t Jimmy D. A r n d t n o r r e s p o n d e n t s S c h u l t z & Meyer

C o n s t r u c t i o n Company and Empire Sand & G r a v e l Company, I n c . ,

had any n o t i c e o r knowledge o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n

a g a i n s t them u n t i l a f t e r t h e t h r e e - y e a r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a -

t i o n s had e x p i r e d . L a f o r e s t v. Texaco, I n c . (1978),

Mont. , 585 P.2d 1318, 1321, 35 St.Rep. 1580. Appellant

s e e k s t o a v o i d t h e consequences of t h i s f a c t under Rule

1 5 ( c ) by a t t e m p t i n g t o l i m i t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of Rule 1 5 ( c )

t o s i t u a t i o n s where a p l a i n t i f f h a s e i t h e r misnamed t h e

p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t o r h a s m i s t a k e n l y named t h e wrong p e r s o n a s

a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , and by a t t e m p t i n g t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s c o v e r e d by t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e , where

t h e i d e n t i t i e s of d e f e n d a n t s whose names w e r e o r i g i n a l l y

unknown a r e l a t e r d i s c o v e r e d . W e agree with the respondents

t h a t t h i s i s a d i s t i n c t i o n without a difference.
 A s f a r a s r e s p o n d e n t s a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e s e amendments

w e r e amendments "changing t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s

a s s e r t e d , " s i n c e t h e f i r s t t i m e r e s p o n d e n t s had any n o t i c e

o r knowledge t h a t t h e y w e r e b e i n g sued was when t h e y w e r e
s e r v e d w i t h t h e amended c o m p l a i n t s . From t h e i r s t a n d p o i n t ,
r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y new p a r t i e s b r o u g h t i n t o t h e

a c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s

had r u n .
Rule 1 5 ( c ) i s d e s i g n e d t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r i n d i -

v i d u a l s i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s , who had no n o t i c e o r

knowledge of t h e l a w s u i t u n t i l more t h a n a y e a r a f t e r t h e
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n . I n L a f o r e s t v . Texaco, I n c .

(1978) - Mont. , 585 P.2d 1318, 1321, 35 St.Rep.

1580, t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t e r r o n e o u s l y named t h e wrong

p e r s o n s a s d e f e n d a n t s , and t h e p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t , Texaco, had

no n o t i c e o r knowledge of t h e l a w s u i t u n t i l i t was s e r v e d

w i t h a n amended c o m p l a i n t a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s

had r u n . Although t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e was n o t

involved i n L a f o r e s t , t h i s Court discussed t h e reasoning
u n d e r l y i n g Rule 1 5 ( c ) i n t h a t c a s e , q u o t i n g from Munetz v .

Eaton Yale & Towne, I n c . (E.D. Pa. 1 9 7 3 ) , 57 F . R . D . 476,

" ' I f p l a i n t i f f had i n mind i n i t i a l l y t h e p r o p e r
e n t i t y o r p e r s o n and a c t u a l l y had s e r v e d t h a t
intended person o r e n t i t y , then it i s c l e a r t h a t
t h e amendment would be p e r m i t t e d even though t h e
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n a s t o t h e p e r s o n
s o misnamed i n t h e p r o c e s s and c o m p l a i n t , be-
c a u s e t h e p e r s o n o r e n t i t y would a l r e a d y be i n
c o u r t , would have had a d e q u a t e n o t i c e of t h e
pendency of t h e a c t i o n , and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e
would be no p r e j u d i c e t o t h e p e r s o n o r e n t i t y
by a l l o w i n g t h e amendment. However, when t h e
e f f e c t of t h e amendment i s t o b r i n g b e f o r e t h e
Court f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a completely d i f f e r e n t
p e r s o n o r e n t i t y which had n o t p r e v i o u s l y had
n o t i c e of t h e s u i t and such amendment, assuming
i t would r e l a t e back, o c c u r s a f t e r t h e a p p l i c a b l e
 s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s h a s r u n , t h e n t h e new
p e r s o n o r e n t i t y would b e p r e j u d i c e d and t h e
amendment i s n o t a l l o w e d ...
" ' T h e a d d i t i o n o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f p a r t i e s who
had no n o t i c e o f t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n i s n o t a l -
lowed. S u b s t i t u t i o n o f a c o m p l e t e l y new d e f e n -
d a n t c r e a t e s a new c a u s e of a c t i o n . Permitting
s u c h p r o c e d u r e would undermine t h e p o l i c y upon
which t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i s b a s e d . '
(Citations omitted. ) "

T h i s same r a t i o n a l e h a s been f o l l o w e d i n c a s e s from

o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o n s i d e r i n g b o t h a f i c t i t i o u s name

s t a t u t e s i m i l a r o r i d e n t i c a l t o Montana' s - Rule 1 5 ( c ) :
and

" A s a n i n i t i a l m a t t e r , b e c a u s e from t h e view-
p o i n t o f t h e p a r t y s o u g h t t o b e added b e l a t e d l y ,
i t c a n make no d i f f e r e n c e whether he was o r i -
g i n a l l y d e s i g n a t e d a s John Doe and n o t s e r v e d ,
o r o r i g i n a l l y n e i t h e r named n o r s e r v e d b e c a u s e
a n o t h e r p e r s o n was e r r o n e o u s l y t h o u g h t t o be
t h e c o r r e c t defendant, w e hold t h a t both s i t u -
a t i o n s are encompassed by S 8 1 A - 1 1 5 ( c ) ' s r e f e r -
e n c e t o ' c h a n g i n g t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m
i s asserted.'" Sims v . American C a s u a l t y Com-
pany ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 3 1 Ga.App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121,
134, a f f ' d . , 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61.

See a l s o Gould v. T i b s h r a e n y ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 2 1 Ariz.App. 146, 517

P.2d 104, 106. The p o l i c y behind o u r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s

h a s been s t a t e d and g i v e n e f f e c t by t h e Montana C o u r t i n

C a s s i d y v. F i n l e y ( 1 9 7 7 ) , ,
- Mont. - 568 P.2d 1 4 2 , 1 4 4 ,

" T h i s C o u r t h a s o f t e n s t a t e d one o f t h e o b j e c t s
of a t r u e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i s t o p r e v e n t
p o t e n t i a l p l a i n t i f f s from s i t t i n g on t h e i r
r i g h t s , and t o s u p p r e s s s t a l e c l a i m s a f t e r t h e
f a c t s c o n c e r n i n g them have become o b s c u r e d by
l a p s e of t i m e , d e f e c t i v e memory, o r d e a t h o r
removal of w i t n e s s e s . "

Appellant argues t h a t t h e only purpose of a f i c t i t i o u s

name s t a t u t e i s t o t o l l t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s s o t h a t

t h e amendment s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' t r u e names f o r

t h e f i c t i t i o u s d e f e n d a n t s w i l l r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f

t h e o r i g i n a l complaint. T h i s argument i g n o r e s t h e r e q u i r e -

ments o f Rule 1 5 ( c ) and t h e p o l i c i e s e x p r e s s e d i n c a s e s
construing that rule. Furthermore, other purposes and
applications of the fictitious name statute can be readily

found in cases involving unknown heirs, in quiet title
actions and other actions, and in discovery procedures..
Appellant relies largely on Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 130,
and cases cited therein, for the proposition that an amend-
ment substituting the true name of a defendant designated by
a fictitious name in the original complaint relates back to
the filing of the original complaint for the purpose of
tolling the statute of limitations. Two of the cases, while
considering a fictitious name statute or a court rule allow-
ing designation of unknown defendants by a fictitious name,
were decided before the adoption of Rule 15(c) or its equi-
valent in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, Maddux
v. Gardner (1945), 239 Mo.App. 289, 192 S.W.2d 14, and Wall
Funeral Home, Inc. v. Stafford (1969), 3 N.C.App. 578, 165
S.E.2d 532, cannot be considered as authority for appellant's
proposition that Rule 15(c) is inapplicable or for the
proposition that the amendments relate back to toll the
statute of limitations in the present case, since there was
no Rule 15(c) or equivalent to consider when those cases
were decided. By the same token, Sousa v. Casey (1973), 111
R.I. 623, 306 A.2d 186, and Farrell v. Votator ~ivisionof
Chemetron Corp. (1973), 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394, also
failed to address the question presented here concerning the
effect of Rule 15(c) on fictitiously named defendants.
While those jurisdictions had adopted Rule 15(c) or its
equivalent at the time the cases were decided, the decisions

made no mention of the rule. Thus, although Rule 15(c) was
in force, those cases were decided solely on the basis of a
fictitious name statute or court rule, and the effect of

Rule 15(c) was not considered.
 Appellant points out that Montana's fictitious name
statute, section 25-5-103, MCA, was adopted verbatim from
the California statute, and argues that the California cases
construing that statute support her contentions. This
argument ignores the fact that California has no Rule 15(c)
nor any equivalent procedural rule that speaks to the rela-
tion back of amendments. See West's Annotated California
Code of Civil Procedure, sections 473, 474. Therefore,
Mayberry v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1966), 244 Cal.App.2d
350, 53 Cal.Rptr. 317, and other California cases are dis-
tinguishable since they did not consider the issue involved
in the present case.
On the other hand, the federal cases cited by respon-
dents were decided under Rule 15(c) alone, as there is no
federal fictitious name statute, and the federal courts have
not adopted a court rule allowing the designation of unknown
defendants by fictitious names. Craig v. United States (9th
Cir. 1969)r 413 F.2d 854; Stephens v. Balkamp, Inc. (E.D.
Tenn. 1975), 70 F.R.D. 49. This is true even in a diversity
suit where state law provides for a fictitious name statute,
on the grounds that such a statute is procedural rather than
substantive, and is therefore inapplicable in a federal
diversity action under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938),
304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188. See Williams v.
Avis Transport (D. Nev. 1972), 57 F.R.D. 53.
The only cases considering both a fictitious name statute
and Rule 15(c) have held that an amendment to a complaint sub-
stituting named defendants for fictitious defendants will
relate back to the filing of the original complaint and toll
the statute of limitations only if the requirements of ~ u l e
15 (c) are satisfied. Gould v. Tibshraeny (1973), 21 ~riz.App-
146, 517 P.2d 104, is squarely on point with the present case.
In Gould the plaintiff named fictitious defendants pursuant
to a fictitious name statute nearly identical to Montana's,
then subsequently filed an amended complaint substituting
Tibshraeny for one of the "Doe" defendants after the statute
of limitations had run. The court rejected the same argument
presented here by appellant, holding that the amended com-
plaint did not relate back to the filing of the original com-
plaint to toll the statute of limitations where the require-
ments of Rule 15(c) had not been met:
"It is fundamental that the purpose of the
statute of limitations is to provide a cutoff
point in time for stale claims. Rule 15(c)
carries out this sound policy by requiring
notice of the institution of the action within
the time limitations set by the statute of
limitations before an amendment adding new
parties will relate back to the date of the
original pleading." Gould, 517 P.2d at 106.
The Arizona Court relied on an earlier Arizona decision
which is also on point. See Hartford Insurance Group v.
Beck (1970), 12 Ariz.App. 532, 472 P.2d 955. Cases con-
sidering both a fictitious name statute and Rule 15(c) have
also been decided in Georgia with the same result. In Sims
v. American Casualty Company (1974), 131 Ga-App. 461, 206
S.E.2d 121, 134-136, aff'd., 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61, the
plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute several named
defendants for those fictitiously named in her original
complaint after the statute of limitations had run. Summary

judgment for the defendant was affirmed, against the plain-
tiff's contentions that the amendment related back to the
filing of the original complaint under the fictitious name
statute. As in the present case, the requirements of Rule
15(c) had not been satisfied because the defendants did not
have notice or knowledge of the action within the period of
limitations. S e e a l s o B r e r R a b b i t Mobile Home S a l e s , I n c .

v . P e r r y ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 132 Ga.App. 1 2 8 , 207 S.E.2d 578, and

Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 1 3 0 , 146-148, S7(a).

I n summary a p l a i n t i f f may u t i l i z e t h e f i c t i t i o u s name

s t a t u t e and may amend a c o m p l a i n t t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e t r u e

name o f t h e d e f e n d a n t when d i s c o v e r e d . I f t h e amendment

o c c u r s a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s h a s r u n , however,

t h e r e a l o r i n t e n d e d d e f e n d a n t must have e i t h e r been s e r v e d

o r o t h e r w i s e r e c e i v e d n o t i c e of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e

a c t i o n under t h e c o n d i t i o n s provided i n Rule 1 5 ( c ) .

Af f i r m e d .

W e concur:

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Chief J u s t i c e

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Justices
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