State v. Patton

No. 14482
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1979

STATE OF YONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
TER-RANCE DWAYNE PATTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

O R D E R

Counsel for the Appellant, having filed a Motion To Strike, and
good cause appearing therefrom;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the names of the minor children con-
tained in this Court's opinion of September 11, 1979 be stricken from
such opinion.
DATED this %j7@. day of Axn,kKy&\ ,1379.
 No. 14482
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
TERRANCE DWAYNE PATTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Greg Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
James Masar, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana

Submitted: September 11, 1979
-

Decided: 3E? 5 1979
Filed: - i 2 --2 !$Tz
$E
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction after a
jury verdict for sexual assault in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, County of Powell.
Defendant was charged by information with two counts of
sexual assault in violation of section 45-5-502, MCA. To
each charge, defendant pleaded not guilty. Trial by jury
commenced on February 27, 1978, and resulted in a hung jury
on the first count and a finding of guilty on the second.
On April 27, 1978, the Honorable Robert J. Boyd sentenced
defendant to twenty years' imprisonment in the state prison.
Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction on the
second count of sexual assault.
At the time of the incidents giving rise to the charges,
defendant was 41 years of age. The complaining witness was
13 years of age and lived next door to defendant and was a
frequent visitor at defendant's residence. Count I charged
the defendant with sexual contact with the prosecutrix on
December 17, 1977, at defendant's residence. Regarding this
first incident, the prosecutrix testified that she went to
defendant's residence to return a fish net. Defendant was
alone at the time, and he invited her to stay and watch
television, which she declined to do. The prosecutrix
testified that defendant grabbed her by the arm, dragged her
into his living room, forced her down on a couch, and as-
saulted her. She was able to break away from defendant and
ran out the door. Defendant denied all of the foregoing,
and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on this charge.
Defendant was convicted on the second charge, which
stems from an incident occurring on January 21, 1978, in a
g a r a g e s h a r e d by d e f e n d a n t and t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s f a t h e r .

The p r o s e c u t r i x t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e was i n t h e g a r a g e a t

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9:00 t o 10:OO p.m. l o o k i n g f o r a cookbook when

d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d t h e g a r a g e , t u r n e d o f f t h e l i g h t and s h u t

t h e door. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t grabbed h e r and

pushed h e r a g a i n s t a bench, f o r c e a b l y lowered h e r p a n t s and

h i s own and u n s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t e m p t e d t o have s e x u a l i n t e r -

c o u r s e w i t h h e r , t o u c h i n g h e r b r e a s t s and t o u c h i n g between

h e r l e g s w i t h h i s hand. She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e

managed t o g e t away from d e f e n d a n t and p u t h e r p a n t s on and

t h a t h e r f a t h e r opened t h e g a r a g e d o o r and t u r n e d on t h e

l i g h t as s h e was a b o u t t o go o u t t h e d o o r .

The f a t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he opened t h e p a r t i a l l y

opened g a r a g e d o o r , t u r n e d on t h e l i g h t s and o b s e r v e d h i s

d a u g h t e r walking toward t h e door and d e f e n d a n t s t a n d i n g by

t h e bench i n s i d e t h e g a r a g e . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he

a s k e d h e r what was g o i n g on s h e d i d n o t r e p l y ; s h e t e s t i f i e d

t h a t s h e r e p l i e d " n o t h i n g " b e c a u s e s h e was embarrassed.

Defendant's testimony w a s t h a t he e n t e r e d t h e garage t o

g e t a g r e a s e gun w i t h o u t t u r n i n g on t h e l i g h t s b e c a u s e t h e r e

w a s s u f f i c i e n t l i g h t from t h e l i g h t s i n h i s r e s i d e n c e coming
t h r o u g h t h e window, t h a t h e saw t h e p r o s e c u t r i x who s a i d

h e l l o t o him and t h a t a s he was l e a v i n g t h e g a r a g e , h e r

f a t h e r came i n . H e d e n i e d t h a t he e v e r touched o r a s s a u l t e d

the prosecutrix.

Before t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y f i l e d a motion i n

l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s any t e s t i m o n y by two proposed p r o s e c u t i o n

witnesses regarding an a l l e g e d previous i n c i d e n t of sexual

c o n t a c t between t h e d e f e n d a n t and a n o t h e r a p p a r e n t l y under-

aged female:
 "COMES NOW the defendant through his attorney and
moves in limine that the testimony of prosecution
witness G ..a +
&+ -M relating to an al-
lesed prior criminal act of the Defendant against
G M be suppressed on the grounds that
such testimony would be wholly irrelevant or that
if at all relevant for any purpose the prejudi-
cial effect of such testimony outweighs its proba-
tive value in light of the actual need of the
prosecution to introduce it."
The following colloquy took place in chambers:
"THE COURT: Let the record show the following
motions are held in chambers and outside the
presence of the jury panel. Mr. Boggs?
"MR. BOGGS: Your Honor, I would like to file the
defendant's motion in limine for suppression of
certain evidence, copies of which have been pre-
viously served on Mr. Masar and I also have for
filing on behalf of Mr. Masar a memorandum in
opposition to that motion.
"THE COURT: Let the record show that the matter
was presented by way of oral argument in chambers
on Friday of last week at which time the Court
considered the testimony and its provative [sic]
value and concluded that the motion for suppres-
sion should be granted. In granting the motion
I intend in no way to restrict the State from any
proper rebuttal matters which may arise in the
course of the defense of the case.
"MR. MASAR: For clarification, your Honor, I
would ask -- it is my understanding that the mo-
tion in limine restricts any testimony by the
two named witnesses, the MI children, as op-
posed to any testimony with reference to those
children?
"THE COURT: That is correct.
"MR. MASAR: Is that all, Mr. Boggs?
"MR. BOGGS: That is all at this time."

It is evident from this exchange that defendant's motion was
granted and that this ruling precluded any testimony - the
by
two named prosecution witnesses. It did not preclude all

testimony whatsoever with reference - those witnesses.
to
Defendant's attorney made no objection to the scope of this
ruling, or any objection whatsoever at this time. Neither
of the two proposed State's witnesses testified at trial.
 During t h e examination of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , the State

b r o u g h t o u t t h a t d e f e n d a n t had o f f e r e d h e r a s w e a t e r - s u i t i n

r e t u r n f o r s e x u a l f a v o r s and t o l d h e r t h a t i f s h e d i d n o t

s u b m i t , h e would g i v e i t t o "O " who had a l r e a d y
p e r f o r m e d s u c h a n a c t w i t h him:

"Q. And h e o f f e r e d you t h e s w e a t e r . Did he
e v e r make s u g g e s t i o n s you c o u l d n ' t g e t t h e
s w e a t e r o r you w o u l d n ' t r e c e i v e t h e s w e a t e r ?
A. H e would s a y t h a t h e t r i e d w i t h a n o t h e r
girl, G , which i s -- I d o n ' t know, and
t h e n --

"Q. T h a t was 6c I ? A. Yes. And i f I
w o u l d n ' t go up i n t h e camper, h e c o u l d g i v e
t h e s u i t t o rJ,' because G did [it]
o n c e w i t h him."

Defendant's counsel d i d n o t o b j e c t t o any of t h e f o r e -

going questions o r testimony. A f t e r t h i s t e s t i m o n y was

presented, t h e s h e r i f f was c a l l e d t o t h e s t a n d and a s k e d i f

t h e name "G " was mentioned i n a s t a t e m e n t g i v e n by t h e
prosecutrix, t o which h e r e p l i e d " y e s " and i d e n t i f i e d - - ( ; -

29 . D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l made no o b j e c t i o n t o a n y q u e s -

t i o n s asked of t h e s h e r i f f .

The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r o r n o t

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o exclude evidence of a l l e g e d

p r i o r unlawful a c t s of t h e defendant c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e

error. The c h a l l e n g e d e v i d e n c e i s t e s t i m o n y by t h e p r o s e -

c u t r i x on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , s e t f o r t h a b o v e , a s t o a

s t a t e m e n t made t o h e r by d e f e n d a n t t h a t h e had had s e x u a l

r e l a t i o n s w i t h "G ," a n o t h e r underaged female. Defen-

d a n t contends t h a t t h i s evidence i s i n a d m i s s i b l e under Rule

4 0 4 ( b ) , Mont.R.Evid., a s e v i d e n c e o f a n o t h e r c r i m e , and t h a t

h i s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o it a t t r i a l does n o t p r e c l u d e

a p p e l l a t e review because h i s motion i n l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s

p r e s e r v e d t h e o b j e c t i o n and b e c a u s e t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h i s

t e s t i m o n y was " p l a i n e r r o r . "
 ÿ he p r o c e d u r a l a s p e c t of t h i s a p p e a l w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d

first. Defendant made no o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l t o t h e t e s t i m o n y

upon which t h i s a p p e a l i s based. There c a n be no d o u b t t h a t

a D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i l l n o t be p u t i n e r r o r where i t was n o t

accorded an opportunity t o c o r r e c t i t s e l f . S t a t e v. Walker

( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 216, 223, 419 P.2d 300. The a d m i s s i b i l i t y

o f e v i d e n c e t o which no o b j e c t i o n i s made c a n n o t be reviewed

on a p p e a l . S t a t e v. Armstrong ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 296, 562

P.2d 1129, 1132; S t a t e v. D i l l o n ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 1 2 5 Mont. 24, 30,

230 P.2d 764. The f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o o r t o move t o s t r i k e

t e s t i m o n y p r e c l u d e s o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l . S t a t e v. C r i p p s

(1978) , Mont. , 582 P.2d 312, 317, 35 St.Rep. 967.

Notwithstanding h i s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o t h e testimony a t

t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s motion i n l i m i n e t o

s u p p r e s s p r e s e r v e d h i s o b j e c t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s of a p p e a l ,

c i t i n g c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . I t i s not necessary

f o r t h i s C o u r t t o d e c i d e whether o r n o t t h i s r u l e a p p l i e s i n

Montana, b e c a u s e i t h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e f a c t s i n t h e

present case.

Although d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was

a p p r i s e d o f , and r u l e d a g a i n s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n a t t h e

t i m e i t c o n s i d e r e d t h e motion i n l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s , s o a s
t o make any o b j e c t i o n a t t h e time o f t r i a l f u t i l e , t h i s

c o n t e n t i o n i s n o t b o r n e o u t by t h e r e c o r d . Defendant's

motion r e q u e s t e d o n l y t h a t t h e c o u r t s u p p r e s s any t e s t i m o n y

by t h e two proposed p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s . T h i s motion w a s

g r a n t e d , and t h e two w i t n e s s e s d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t r i a l . In

t h e exchange which t o o k p l a c e i n chambers a t t h e t i m e o f t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e motion, s e t f o r t h above, t h e

--
D i s t r i c t C o u r t made i t c l e a r t h a t i t s o r d e r d i d n o t p r e c l u d e

a l l t e s t i m o n y whatsoever w i t h r e f e r e n c e - t h e two proposed
to
prosecution witnesses, only testimony - those witnesses.
by
Defendant's attorney did not object or give any indication
that he opposed the scope of this ruling.
Defendant's second argument is that the alleged error
committed by the District Court is reviewable under the
"plain error" doctrine which is contained in the following
statute:
"Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall

(Emphasis added.)
The sheriff was asked on direct examination if he had
been able to determine who "G " was, whereupon he replied
"yes" and provided her last name. The defendant did not
object to this testimony. He now asserts that it could only
be based on secondhand knowledge, i.e., the statements of
the victim, and that it was hearsay evidence which precluded
cross-examination and deprived defendant of his constitu-
tional right to confrontation. Therefore, defendant con-
tends, it should be reviewable under the plain error doc-
trine as enacted by statute, despite defendant's failure to
object at trial. These contentions are without merit. The
sheriff's testimony was not hearsay as defined in Rule
801(c), Mont.R.Evid., and defendant was not deprived of his
constitutional right of confrontation. There was no plain

error which would justify this Court's review of the matter.
Although evidence of other crimes is generally inadmis-
sible under Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid., there is an exception
which makes such evidence admissible for the purpose of
proving intent. Rule 404 (b), Mont. R. ~ v i d . provides:
,
 "Evidence of o t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs, o r a c t s i s
n o t a d m i s s i b l e t o prove t h e c h a r a c t e r of a p e r -
son i n o r d e r t o show t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y
therewith. I t m a y , however, be a d m i s s i b l e f o r
o t h e r p u r p o s e s , such a s p r o o f o f m o t i v e , oppor-
t u n i t y , i n t e n t , p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n , knowledge,
i d e n t i t y , o r absence of mistake o r accident."
( ~ m ~ h a s added. )
is

T h i s r u l e of e v i d e n c e i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r Montana c a s e

law:

"The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t e v i d e n c e o f c r i m e s
o t h e r t h a n t h e o n e f o r which a d e f e n d a n t i s on
t r i a l i s not admissible, but t o t h i s general
r u l e t h e r e a r e e x c e p t i o n s , and one i s where
e v i d e n c e i s m a t e r i a l a s t e n d i n g t o show t h e
i n t e n t o r m o t i v e of t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e com-
m i s s i o n of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which he i s on t r i a l ,
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g -------l s o t e n d s t o
t h e f a c t t h a t it a
p r o v e t h e commission - - - a n o t h e r o f f e n s e . "
by him of
S t a t e v. H o l l o w e l l ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 343, 349,
256 P. 380, 382. (Emphasis a d d e d . )

The o f f e n s e of s e x u a l a s s a u l t w i t h which t h e d e f e n d a n t

w a s c h a r g e d r e q u i r e d proof t h a t he knowingly made s e x u a l

c o n t a c t f o r t h e purpose o f arousing o r g r a t i f y i n g t h e sexual

d e s i r e of e i t h e r p a r t y .

"A p e r s o n who knowingly s u b j e c t s a n o t h e r n o t
h i s spouse t o any s e x u a l c o n t a c t w i t h o u t con-
s e n t commits t h e o f f e n s e of s e x u a l a s s a u l t . "
S e c t i o n 45-5-502, MCA.

" ' S e x u a l c o n t a c t ' means any t o u c h i n g of t h e
sexual o r o t h e r i n t i m a t e p a r t s of t h e person
of a n o t h e r f o r t h e purpose of a r o u s i n g o r g r a t i -
f y i n g t h e s e x u a l d e s i r e s of e i t h e r p a r t y . ' Sec-
t i o n 45-2-101 ( 5 4 ) , MCA.

Due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e S t a t e must p r o v e e v e r y

e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e a s t h a t o f f e n s e i s d e f i n e d by s t a t e

law. P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97

I n re Winship

U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; S t a t e v .

Cooper ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 589 P.2d 133, 135, 36 St.Rep.

30, 32. T h e r e f o r e , t h e e l e m e n t of i n t e n t was i n i s s u e a s a

m a t t e r of l a w . T h i s was n o t changed by t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n -

d a n t c o m p l e t e l y d e n i e d committing t h e a c t s , r a t h e r t h a n
admitting the acts but denying that he had the requisite
intent as in State v. Jensen (1969), 153 Mont. 233, 238, 455
P.2d 631, where a chiropractor was convicted of a similar
sexual offense after defending on the grounds that his acts
with the prosecutrix were for the purpose of treatment.
The question then becomes one of whether or not the
testimony of the prosecutrix is relevant to the issue of
intent, and whether or not its probative value is outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rationale underlying
Rule 404(b) and prior case law is that the evidence of other
crimes generally should be excluded because it is irrelevant
to the offense charged and highly prejudicial, and because
the defendant may not be prepared to meet the extraneous
charges. State v. Tiedemann (1961), 139 Mont. 237, 242, 362
P.2d 529; State v. Merritt (1960), 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d
683, 684; State v. Jensen, supra.
In the present case, the challenged testimony was
relevant because defendant's statements to the prosecutrix
regarding the sweater and his sexual relations with "Glenda"
were evidence of his sexual desire for the prosecutrix and
his intention to gratify it. This testimony was not offered
to establish that defendant had committed other crimes; it
was offered to prove that before he forceably assaulted her,
defendant had verbally attempted to seduce the complaining
witness. This being so, it was not crucial that the State
demonstrate "similarity of crimes or acts, nearness in time,
and tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or system,"

to establish the relevance of the evidence of defendant's
other crimes. Jensen, 153 Mont. at 239, 455 P.2d at 633.
State v. Tiedemann (1961), 139 Mont. 237, 362 P.2d 529,
relied on by defendant, is clearly distinguishable. In
Tiedemann t h e d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h a t t e m p t e d r a p e o f a

16 year o l d g i r l . During c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , the prosecutor

was a l l o w e d t o q u e s t i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n c e r n i n g a p r i o r

s t a t e m e n t i n which h e a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had been warned a b o u t

g o i n g o u t w i t h g i r l s u n d e r t h e a g e o f 1 8 and t h a t h e c o u l d

have been c h a r g e d w i t h s t a t u t o r y r a p e i n a n o t h e r i n c i d e n t .

This w a s c l e a r l y an attempt t o introduce evidence of o t h e r

l i k e crimes h a v i n g n o r e l e v a n c e t o t h e c a s e b e i n g t r i e d and

was p r o p e r l y condemned by t h i s C o u r t .

Defendant's f i n a l contention i s t h a t t h e testimony,

e v e n i f i t was r e l e v a n t , s h o u l d n o t b e r e c e i v e d b e c a u s e i t s

p r e j u d i c i a l n a t u r e f a r outweighed a n y p r o b a t i v e v a l u e . Rule

403, Mont.R.Evid., provides: "Although r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e

may b e e x c l u d e d i f i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y

o u t w e i g h e d by t h e d a n g e r o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e . . ." This

r u l e h a s a p p l i c a t i o n t o e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r crimes: "The

D i s t r i c t Court a s w e l l a s t h i s Court, i s o b l i g a t e d t o look

v e r y c a r e f u l l y a t t h e r e l a t i v e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e e v i -

dence of o t h e r o f f e n s e s . . . and weigh t h i s a g a i n s t t h e

p r e j u d i c e i n h e r e n t i n t h i s t y p e of evidence i n l i g h t of t h e

a c t u a l need t o i n t r o d u c e s u c h e v i d e n c e by t h e S t a t e . " State

v . S k i n n e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 58, 64, 515 P.2d 81, 84. The

testimony i n t h i s c a s e , while having t o do w i t h a n o t h e r

c l a i m e d v i c t i m o f d e f e n d a n t , was a c o n v e r s a t i o n c r e d i t e d t o

defendant while i n t h e a c t of seduction of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x

h e r e and was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s

i n t u i t i o n i n the matter.
T h i s C o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d a d i s t i n c t i o n between t e s t i -

mony t h a t t e n d s t o p r o v e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t committed a n

u n r e l a t e d crime and t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d h e

committed s u c h a n o f f e n s e . S t a t e v . C o l l i n s (19781,
Mont. , 582 P.2d 1179, 35 S t - R e p . 993, 998. The l a t t e r

may b e a d m i s s i b l e a s " r e l e v a n t a s a p a r t o f t h e whole f a c t u a l

situation." C o l l i n s , 35 St.Rep. a t 998. Such was t h e

s i t u a t i o n i n t h e present case.

The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .

/.
'i
;
w z /
Justice

W e concur:

Chief J u s t i c e