No. 14461
IN THE SUPREME @JUF!!l' O THE STATE O KNIANA
F F
1979
IlEAN LYLE,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
MAX S. M3OIIE and PEARL m R E ,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal f r m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Twelfth Judicial D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable B. W. Thcmas, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Jardine, Stephenson, B l e w e t t and Weaver, Great F a l l s , Mntana
Ion Holden argued, G r e a t Falls, Mntana
For Respondent:
Bunn and Brown, Chester, Mntana
Bruce Brawn argued and Gregory G. Parrott argued, Chester,
Mntana
SWtted: May 2, 1979
Decided: 3C)L 2 3 1979
Filed : mL " 19'4
r
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of
t h e Court.
T h i s a p p e a l i s from a judgment i n p l a i n t i f f ' s f a v o r
entered i n t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, ~ i b e r t y
County, t h e H o n o r a b l e B. W. Thomas p r e s i d i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y .
P l a i n t i f f , Dean L y l e , i s a r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r and one-
t i m e c l o s e f r i e n d o f d e f e n d a n t s , Max and P e a r l Moore. In
e a r l y 1975, L y l e l e a r n e d t h r o u g h a t h i r d p a r t y t h a t t h e
Moores w e r e c o n s i d e r i n g s e l l i n g t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e i r farm
l o c a t e d i n t h e P r o v i n c e o f Saskatchewan, Canada. Lyle
c o n t a c t e d t h e Moores a n d t o l d them, among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t
h e knew a p r o s p e c t i v e p u r c h a s e r who would pay more f o r t h e
f a r m t h a n t h e y were t h i n k i n g o f a s k i n g .
On March 3, 1 9 7 5 , t h e p a r t i e s s i g n e d a r e a l e s t a t e
b r o k e r ' s c o n t r a c t f o r t h e s a l e o f t h e farm. The c o n t r a c t
was a one-page document which was t o e x p i r e A p r i l 1, 1975.
The c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e :
". . . you h e r e b y a r e g r a n t e d t h e a b s o l u t e ,
s o l e and e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o s e l l o r exchange
the s a i d described property. I n t h e e v e n t of
any s a l e , by m e o r any o t h e r p e r s o n ... during
t h e t e r m o f y o u r e x c l u s i v e employment, o r i n
case I w i t h d r a w t h e a u t h o r i t y h e r e b y g i v e n
p r i o r t o s a i d e x p i r a t i o n d a t e , I a g r e e t o pay
you t h e s a i d commission j u s t t h e same as i f a
s a l e had a c t u a l l y been consummated by you."
The c o n t r a c t f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d t h a t L y l e would r e c e i v e 6
p e r c e n t o f t h e $220,000 s e l l i n g p r i c e , o r $13,200 f o r h i s
services.
L y l e t h e n b r o u g h t Gene F o u l k s , t h e p r o s p e c t i v e p u r -
c h a s e r , from Kansas t o Montana t o v i e w t h e p r o p e r t y . Lyle,
F o u l k s and Max Moore i n s p e c t e d t h e p r o p e r t y on March 4 a n d
v i s i t e d a Canadian a t t o r n e y . The a t t o r n e y a d v i s e d t h e
p a r t i e s t h a t a s a l e o f t h e Moores' f a r m t o F o u l k s and h i s
w i f e would n o t b e l e g a l u n d e r t h e Saskatchewan Farm Owner-
s h i p A c t o f 1974. However, a f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , i t ap-
p e a r e d t h a t a s a l e would b e p o s s i b l e t o F o u l k s and h i s
brother o r father.
F o u l k s r e t u r n e d t o Kansas t o work o u t t h e d e t a i l s , and
t h e Moores v i s i t e d t h e i r a c c o u n t a n t t o d i s c u s s t h e t a x
c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e i r s a l e . During t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n , t h e
a c c o u n t a n t a s k e d why t h e Moores were n o t s e l l i n g t h e f a r m t o
t h e i r sons. They t o l d him t h e y had t h o u g h t s u c h a s a l e
would b e i l l e g a l b u t would now c o n t a c t t h e i r s o n s . On March
1 0 , 1975, t h e Moores withdrew L y l e ' s a u t h o r i t y t o s e l l t h e
p r o p e r t y and s u b s e q u e n t l y s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e i r s o n s .
Lyle brought t h i s a c t i o n r e c o v e r t h e commission
provided f o r i n t h e c o n t r a c t . Following a t r i a l i n t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , judgment was e n t e r e d i n h i s f a v o r i n t h e
amount of $13,200 p l u s $7,500 a s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and $155
f o r other costs. From t h i s judgment, t h e Moores a p p e a l .
One i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by d e f e n d a n t s i s d e t e r m i n a t i v e on
appeal. That i s s u e i s whether t h e l i s t i n g agreement s i g n e d
by d e f e n d a n t s was i n v a l i d b e c a u s e p l a i n t i f f u s e d i t t o t a k e
a d v a n t a g e of d e f e n d a n t s w i t h o u t t h e i r c o n s e n t o r knowledge.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t made two p e r t i n e n t f i n d i n g s of f a c t
with respect t o t h i s issue:
"10. P l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t s on March 3 ,
1975, had been l o n g - t i m e f r i e n d s and n e i g h -
bors. D e f e n d a n t s had c o n f i d e n c e i n p l a i n -
t i f f ' s i n t e g r i t y and h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l a b i l i t y
and when p l a i n t i f f a s k e d them t o s i g n t h e
employment c o n t r a c t t h e y d i d s o w i t h o u t t a k -
i n g t i m e t o r e a d it. They had no p r e v i o u s
e x p e r i e n c e w i t h such agreements. They d i d
n o t understand t h a t , under t h e withdrawal
c l a u s e q u o t e d i n F i n d i n g 3 , t h e y would b e
l i a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f f o r t h e f u l l amount of
h i s commission i f t h e y withdrew h i s a u t h o r i t y
b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n d a t e . Nor d i d t h e y
u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t make a s a l e on
t h e i r own d u r i n g t h e t e r m of t h e a g r e e m e n t .
Otherwise, t h e y do n o t c l a i m t h a t t h e t e r m s
o f t h e l i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t d o n o t conform w i t h
t h e i r understanding.
"11. N f r a u d , m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r undue
o
i n f l u e n c e on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f induced
t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e employment c o n t r a c t by
defendants. The c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e i n s u f f i -
c i e n t t o e x c u s e t h e f a i l u r e of d e f e n d a n t s t o
r e a d t h e employment c o n t r a c t b e f o r e s i g n i n g
it."
I t i s t h i s l a t t e r f i n d i n g w i t h which w e t a k e i s s u e .
I n C a r n e l l v . Watson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 578 P.2d
308, 312, 35 St.Rep. 550, 555, we r e c o g n i z e d a f i d u c i a r y
r e l a t i o n s h i p between a r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r and h i s c l i e n t .
T h i s f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p between a b r o k e r and h i s c l i e n t
h a s been found t o encompass a " d u t y of f u l l d i s c l o s u r e " by
a number of c o u r t s .
I n Batson v. S t r e h l o w ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 68 C a l . R p t r . 589, 4 4 1
P.2d 1 0 1 , 109-10, t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t found:
"The law imposes on a r e a l e s t a t e a g e n t ' t h e
same o b l i g a t i o n o f u n d i v i d e d s e r v i c e and loy-
a l t y t h a t i t imposes on a t r u s t e e i n f a v o r of
h i s beneficiary. ' [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. 1 This
r e l a t i o n s h i p n o t o n l y imposes upon him t h e
d u t y of a c t i n g i n t h e h i g h e s t good f a i t h
towards h i s p r i n c i p a l b u t p r e c l u d e s t h e a g e n t
from o b t a i n i n g any a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h e p r i n c i -
p a l i n any t r a n s a c t i o n had by v i r t u e of h i s
agency. [ C i t a t i o n omitted.] 'Such a n a g e n t
i s c h a r g e d w i t h t h e d u t y of t h e f u l l e s t d i s -
c l o s u r e of a l l material f a c t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e
t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t might a f f e c t t h e p r i n c i p a l ' s
decision.' [Citations omitted.]
"When t h e p r i n c i p a l q u e s t i o n s t h e a c t s done
by t h e a g e n t i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e agency t h e
burden i s c a s t upon t h e l a t t e r t o p r o v e t h a t
h e a c t e d w i t h t h e u t m o s t good f a i t h toward
t h e p r i n c i p a l and t h a t p r i o r t o t h e t r a n s a c -
t i o n h e made a f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of a l l t h e
f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e a c t s under a t t a c k . "
A d u t y t o f u l l y d i s c l o s e p e r t i n e n t f a c t s h a s l i k e w i s e been
r e c o g n i z e d i n Zwick v. U n i t e d F a r m Agency, I n c . (Wyo. 19761,
556 P.2d 508, 511; MacDonald v . Dormaier ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 272 O r .
122, 535 P.2d 527, 529; J e n n i n g s v. L e e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 105 A r i z .
1 6 7 , 461 P.2d 161, 167; Holland R e a l t y I n v e s t m e n t Co. v .
S t a t e Dept. of Commerce ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 84 Nev. 91, 436 P.2d 4 2 2 ,
The d u t y i n c l u d e s t h e d u t y t o r e v e a l t h e n a t u r e and
e x t e n t of t h e b r o k e r ' s f e e s t o t h e c l i e n t . Rushing v .
S t e p h a n u s ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 64 Wash.2d 607, 393 P. 2d 281, 284.
F u r t h e r m o r e , b e c a u s e o f t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p between a
b r o k e r and h i s c l i e n t , t h e b r o k e r "must make a f u l l and
u n d e r s t a n d a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e c l i e n t b e f o r e h a v i n g him
s i g n any c o n t r a c t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h e c o n t r a c t s a r e w i t h
t h e broker himself." S t a r k w e a t h e r v . S h a f f e r ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 262
Or. 198, 497 P.2d 358, 360.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s w e have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t :
"The p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Real E s t a t e L i c e n s e
A c t [ s e c t i o n 37-51-101 e t s e q . M A s e t a
C ]
s t a n d a r d o f c o n d u c t t o which l i c e n s e d b r o k e r s
and salesmen must conform.
"While a b r e a c h of a d u t y may a l s o be a v i o -
l a t i o n of t h e l i c e n s i n g a c t , i t may a l s o
c o n s t i t u t e a n i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n t o deny a
commission t o t h e b r o k e r o r a g e n t - - p e r h a p s
t h e most e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t of a l l . " Car-
n e l l v . Watson, 578 P.2d a t 311-12, 35 St.Rep.
a t 554-55.
Along t h e s e l i n e s , two r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of p l a i n t i f f ' s
own t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e t h a t h e d i d n o t f u l l y d i s c l o s e t o
d e f e n d a n t s t h e f a c t t h a t h e would b e e n t i t l e d t o h i s com-
m i s s i o n i f t h e y withdrew h i s a u t h o r i t y t o s e l l p r i o r t o t h e
A p r i l 1st deadline. F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l had t h e
f o l l o w i n g exchange w i t h p l a i n t i f f :
"Q. And d i d you t e l l them a t t h a t t i m e t h a t
i f they s o l d t h e property during t h e l i s t i n g
p e r i o d t h a t you would b e e n t i t l e d t o your
f u l l commission? A. I don't recall t h a t I
d i d , no.
"Q. Did you i n f o r m them of t h e e x i s t e n c e of
t h i s withdrawal c l a u s e t h a t s a y s i f they
would withdraw your a u t h o r i t y d u r i n g t h e
l i s t i n g p e r i o d t h e y would have t o pay you a
f u l l commission j u s t a s i f you had s o l d t h e
p r o p e r t y f o r them? A. I don't recall i f I
went i n t o i t o t h e r t h a n t o r e a d t h r o u g h i t .
I w a s s u r e t h e r e w a s no problem w i t h t h e
s i t u a t i o n . The p a r t i e s w e r e g o i n g t o buy i t
o r n o t buy i t and t h a t was i t . "
L a t e r , p l a i n t i f f i n d i c a t e d h e had r e v i e w e d t h e proposed
t e r m s o f t h e s a l e w i t h d e f e n d a n t s b u t when a s k e d s p e c i f i c a l l y
a b o u t a n y d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r i n t e d l a n g u a g e on t h e
form, h e c o u l d n o t r e c a l l a n y s u c h d i s c u s s i o n .
That p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o p o i n t o u t t h e p o t e n t i a l
e f f e c t of d e f e n d a n t s ' e a r l y withdrawal of a u t h o r i t y might
s e e m l i k e a s m a l l o v e r s i g h t i s n o t b o r n e o u t by t h e amount
o f t h e judgment i n t h i s c a s e . I t was a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f
t h e c o n t r a c t which d e f e n d a n t s s i g n e d and s h o u l d n o t h a v e
been overlooked. T h e r e i s f u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y which i n d i c a t e s
t h a t p l a i n t i f f h u r r i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' s i g n i n g and e v e n e n c o u r -
aged them n o t t o r e a d t h e c o n t r a c t b e f o r e s i g n i n g i t .
D e f e n d a n t Max Moore t e s t i f i e d on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n as
follows :
"Q. Did you and y o u r w i f e and M r . L y l e d i s -
c u s s whether t h a t agreement should b e r e a d
by you and y o u r w i f e ? A. W e l l , I d i d n ' t ,
and--but my w i f e a s k e d M r . L y l e , s h e s a i d a t
t h a t t i m e , s h e s a i d , a f t e r I had a l r e a d y
s i g n e d i t , t h a t maybe s h e s h o u l d r e a d t h e
f i n e p r i n t b e f o r e s h e s i g n e d h e r name t o
something and t h a t ' s , M r . L y l e k i n d o f l a u g h e d
and h e s a i d t h a t w a s n ' t n e c e s s a r y . H e said,
I j u s t want t h i s t o show t h e Kansas man. So
t h e n s h e s i g n e d i t . B u t s h e d i d n ' t r e a d any-
thing.
"Q. Did M r . L y l e a t t h a t t i m e r e v i e w t h e
l i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h you? A . No. The o n l y
t h i n g h e r e v i e w e d was t h e w r i t i n g h e p u t on i t .
H e n e v e r d i d r e v i e w any of t h e f i n e p r i n t t y p e d
on i t . J u s t w h a t h e w r o t e on t h e r e , h i m s e l f .
"Q. Your t e s t i m o n y t h e n i s t h e p r i n t e d l a n -
guage o f t h e l i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t was n o t r e v i e w e d
w i t h you a t t h a t t i m e , i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? A.
That's true.
"Q. Did M r . L y l e a t t h a t t i m e i n f o r m you t h a t
by t h e a g r e e m e n t h e had t h e e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o
s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y a t t h a t t i m e ? A. No.
"Q. Did you a t t h a t t i m e b e l i e v e you s t i l l
had t h e r i g h t t o s e l l t h a t p r o p e r t y ? A . Oh,
I thought I did.
"Q. Did h e a t t h a t t i m e i n f o r m you t h a t he
c o u l d c o l l e c t h i s f u l l commission i f , i n f a c t ,
you made a s a l e o f t h a t p r o p e r t y , y o u r s e l f ,
d u r i n g t h e l i s t i n g p e r i o d ? A. No.
"Q. Did h e i n f o r m you a t t h a t t i m e t h a t i f
you w i t h d r e w h i s a u t h o r i t y d u r i n g t h e l i s t i n g
p e r i o d t h a t h e would b e e n t i t l e d t o h i s f u l l
commission i n t h e amount o f t h i r t e e n t h o u s a n d
two hundred d o l l a r s ( $ 1 3 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 ) ? A. No.
"Q. Were you g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e a d t h e
c o n t r a c t a t t h a t t i m e ? A. No.
"Q. Why n o t ? A . W e l l , h e was i n , seemed t o
be i n a hurry. Wanted t o g e t i t s i g n e d and
t h e n , o f c o u r s e , I d i d n ' t a s k him t o r e a d i t
b u t my w i f e had m e n t i o n e d i t and h e s a i d i t
was, t h e r e was no r e a s o n t o r e a d i t . "
A s w e have n o t e d , t h e r e a r e t i m e s when t h e l a w imposes
a d u t y upon a p a r t y t o s p e a k r a t h e r t h a n t o r e m a i n s i l e n t
and t h e r e b y t o d i s c l o s e i n f o r m a t i o n t o p l a c e t h e p e r s o n w i t h
whom h e i s d e a l i n g on a n e q u a l f o o t i n g w i t h him. The f a i l u r e
t o s p e a k i n s u c h a c a s e amounts t o t h e s u p p r e s s i o n o f a f a c t
which s h o u l d have been d i s c l o s e d and c o n s t i t u t e s f r a u d .
Wheeler v . M i s s o u r i P.R. Co. ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 328 Mo. 888, 42 S.W.2d
579, 583; D i r k s T r u s t and T i t l e Co. v . Koch ( 1 9 1 3 ) , 32 S.D.
551, 1 4 3 N.W. 952, 953.
Here t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p which e x i s t s between a
b r o k e r and h i s c l i e n t , imposed upon p l a i n t i f f a d u t y t o d i s -
c l o s e a number o f f a c t s which w e r e n o t d i s c l o s e d . These i n -
cluded t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t s could n o t withdraw p l a i n -
t i f f ' s a u t h o r i t y under t h e agreement w i t h o u t f o r f e i t i n g a
s i z e a b l e commission, n o r c o u l d t h e y s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y on
t h e i r own d u r i n g t h e t e r m o f t h e a g r e e m e n t . The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h e r e was no f r a u d i n v o l v e d i n t h e
e x e c u t i o n of t h e employment c o n t r a c t and t h e judgment o f t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t must be r e v e r s e d .
With r e s p e c t t o a t t o r n e y f e e s , w e n o t e t h e f o l l o w i n g
provision i n the broker's contract:
" I n c a s e of s u i t o r a c t i o n on t h i s c o n t r a c t ,
I a g r e e t o pay s u c h a d d i t i o n a l s m as t h e
u
c o u r t may a d j u d g e r e a s o n a b l e a s p l a i n t i f f ' s
a t t o r n e y s fees."
By v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 28-3-704 MCA, t h i s c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t t o
attorney fees is reciprocal. T h e r e f o r e , t h e case i s remanded
f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of and a n o r d e r awarding r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r -
ney f e e s t o d e f e n d a n t s .
Reversed and remanded.
2 bJ u s-c e ~ ~ $ k d
Chief ti
W concur:
e
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissents:
It is straining the theory of fiduciary relationships
a bit to hold that between a realtor and a seller of real
property, the relationship exists before the execution of an
enforceable listing agreement or earnest money agreement. A
fiduciary relationship was held to exist before the signing of
an earnest money agreement in Starkweather v. Shaffer (Ore.
1972), 497 P.2d 358, 360, but that was a case involving intentional
deceit on the part of the realtor. A fiduciary relationship
applies when the parties are not on equal footing, which does
not appear to me to be the case here. However, we have held
that as between a realtor and the seller, a fiduciary relationship
does arise, especially after the listing agreement has been
signed. Carnell v. Watson (1978), Mont. , 578 P.2d
308, 35 St.Rep. 550. I would concede, for the sake of argument
here, that prior to the execution of the listing agreement, a
fiduciary relationship existed between the owners (Moore) and
the real estate agent (Lyle), although this has not been
specifically held to be true in Montana until now.
Even so, the duty of the fiduciary (Lyle) to make full
disclosure to his beneficiary (Moore) does not apply where the
beneficiary has equal and full opportunity, or the means at hand,
to acquire knowledge of the facts on his own. It is stated in
Lee v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank (1922), 63 Mont. 262, 284, 207 P.
623, 630, that:
"When it appears that a party, who claims to
have been deceived to his prejudice, has
investigated for himself, br that the means
were at hand to ascertain I T i e t . u t- . .
---- .
r E .
of - re~resentationsmade - --
- - anv
- -.--
A - to him, his
reliance upon such representations made to
him, however false they may have been, affords
no ground of complaint (citing cases)."
See also, Lowe v. Root (1975), 166 Mont. 150, 156, 531 P.2d
674, 677.
- 9-
Here, the Moores, each of whom can read, and of whom
the husband especially has a long experience in contractual
matters, had before them in its entirety, the one-page listing
agreement with its terms set out for their reading. In that
situation they are in no different position than any other
prospective contractor, absent fraud or coercion, in their duty
to read and know the contents of any agreement they sign. It
will not suffice for them to say later they never read the
instrument before affixing their signatures, or did not under-
stand the obligations imposed by the contract. Guthrie v.
Halloran (19311, 90 Mont. 373, 380, 3 P.2d 406, 408.
The exceptions to the rule, of course,xe fraud or coercion.
It is injudicious to hold that the plaintiff here defrauded the
Moores. The District Court did not find so, and under ordinary
appellate rules, we are bound by fact determinations of the
District Court. Rule 52(a), M0nt.R.Civ.P. The record does not
show any act or representation by Lyle which led the husband
Moore to sign without reading. The grounds relied on by the
majority to show the wife was misled are paper-thin, and were
rejected by the District Court. In fact, the husband testified
he read over the listing agreement a few days later and understood
it. It was with that knowledge that he withdrew from the contract
before the time expired. He did not move to rescind the contract.
Rather Moore testified emphatically that the reason he withdrew
Lyle's authority was that Moore had reached the conclusion the
sale to the Kansan was void under Canadian law.
It should be made clear that the Moores were at all times
aware of the size of the commission involved for a total selling
price of $220,000 under their agreement. The husband Moore
had in his possession defendant's exhibit 2, which he produced
at trial, and which was given to him by Lyle prior to the
execution of listirgac_i~ement,
which shows on it "commission 6%
of selling price $13,200.00."
-10-
The majority opinion that Lyle committed a fraud goes
against the warp of the evidence. There is every indication
that he acted fairly: He found a buyer who would pay $15
more per acre than the Moores could find on their own; the
length of time of the listing agreement was 28 days, certainly
not a long time for an exclusive listing; he procured an attorney
to ascertain what the Canadian law required. The listing agreement
which he presented to the Moores was a standard one, and its
provisions respecting withdrawal are the common provisions one
finds in the real estate business in Montana. For doing business
in the ordinary way, he has been found fraudulent. Not only
does he lose the commission, his attorney fees and costs, but
he has now been subjected to attorney fees for the other side.
I cannot agree with that result.
I concur in the foregoing dissenting Opinion.
A------ Justice