State v. Seadin

                                  No. 14573

               I N THE S P E E COURT O THE STATE OF MIIWANA
                        UR M          F

                                     1979



STATE: O M)NTANA,
        F

                        Plaintiff and Respondent,



ERNEST SEADIN,
                        ~efendantand Appellant.



Appeal f m :       District Court of the Third Judicial District,
                   Honorable Fbbert J. Boyd, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:

    For Appellant:

          Byron Boggs argued, Anaconda, Wntana

    For Respondent:

          Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Mntana
          Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General, H e l e n a ,
           Wntana
          Ted L. Mizner argued, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Wntana



                                              Subnitted:   March 12, 1979


               i     . .. s
                     .
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                         -.
Filed :        -
               4
Mr.   J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.

        On September 1 4 , 1 9 7 8 , d e f e n d a n t moved t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t o f t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , P o w e l l County, f o r a n

o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e I n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d a g a i n s t him b e c a u s e

o f t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o comply w i t h t h e

p r o v i s i o n s of t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on D e t a i n e r s .           Sec-

t i o n s 95-3131 t h r o u g h 95-3132,            R.C.M.      1 9 4 7 , now s e c t i o n s 46-

31-101 t h r o u g h 46-31-102            MCA.      The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h e

motion.        On O c t o b e r 2 , 1978, d e f e n d a n t was found g u i l t y o f

t h e o f f e n s e of escape.          H e appeals.

        On A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 7 7 , d e f e n d a n t e s c a p e d from t h e Montana

S t a t e P r i s o n w h i l e s e r v i n g c o n c u r r e n t t e r m s of f i v e and

s e v e n y e a r s imposed i n J a n u a r y 1975.              H e was a r r e s t e d i n

C o l o r a d o on a n o t h e r c h a r g e i n August 1977 and s u b s e q u e n t l y

convicted.          While a t t h e Denver County j a i l a w a i t i n g d i s -

p o s i t i o n o f t h e C o l o r a d o c h a r g e , d e f e n d a n t was s e r v e d w i t h a

d e t a i n e r c h a r g i n g him w i t h e s c a p e from t h e Montana S t a t e

Prison.

        H e was s u b s e q u e n t l y t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e C o l o r a d o S t a t e

P r i s o n a t Canyon C i t y b u t a p p a r e n t l y t h e p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s

w e r e n o t n o t i f i e d of t h e outstanding d e t a i n e r .             Because t h e

d e t a i n e r was n o t f o r w a r d e d t o t h e p r i s o n , t h e p r i s o n o f f i -

c i a l s would n o t a i d d e f e n d a n t i n p r o c e s s i n g t h e d e t a i n e r .

Defendant t h e n sought t h e a i d of a n o t h e r inmate a t t h e

Colorado i n s t i t u t i o n .       A m o t i o n f o r q u i c k and s p e e d y t r i a l

was d r a f t e d a n d , on F e b r u a r y 23, 1 9 7 8 , d e f e n d a n t s e n t c o p i e s

o f t h e motion t o t h e C l e r k of t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r Powell

County, t h e Warden o f t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , and t h e

County A t t o r n e y f o r P o w e l l County.
        i l o l o r e s Munden, s u p e r v i s o r o f r e c o r d s a t t h e I~Iontana

S t a t e prison, subsequently t e s t i f i e d t h a t she received a

copy of t h e m o t i o n a l o n g w i t h a copy o f d e f e n d a n t ' s C o l o r a d o

commitment on March 2, 1978.                      D e f e n d a n t was r e t u r n e d t o

Montana on F r i d a y , 3larch 2 5 , 1978, and a n I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g -

i n g him w i t h e s c a p e was f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h e

f o l l o w i n g Thursday.        The m a t t e r was s c h e d u l e d f o r t r i a l o n

May 1 5 .      The t r i a l was r e s c h e d u l e d f o r J u l y 1 7 , a n d t h e n

r e s c h e d u l e d a g a i n f o r September 1 9 .         No r e a s o n f o r t h e

continuances appears i n t h e record.

        On September 6 , c o u n s e l were n o t i f i e d t h a t t h e Septem-

b e r 1 9 t r i a l s e t t i n g had been v a c a t e d .         Defendant responded

by moving t o d i s m i s s t h e I n f o r m a t i o n on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t h e

had n o t r e c e i v e d a prompt d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e c h a r g e a s

r e q u i r e d by t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on D e t a i n e r s .          The

m o t i o n was d e n i e d .    D e f e n d a n t was t r i e d on O c t o b e r 2 , 1 9 7 8 ,

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 210 d a y s o r s e v e n months a f t e r d e f e n d a n t had

n o t i f i e d t h e o f f i c i a l s o f h i s d e s i r e t o b e t r i e d on t h e

escape charge.

        The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w i s w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t

Court e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o dismiss t h e

I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g him w i t h e s c a p e p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o -

v i s i o n s o f t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on D e t a i n e r s .

        D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t h e s h o u l d h a v e been t r i e d w i t h i n

t h e n e x t " t e r m of c o u r t " a f t e r h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e S t a t e

o f Montana.         H e a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o b r i n g him

t o t r i a l w i t h i n t h r e e months v i o l a t e s t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e

I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on ~ e t a i n e r s s a d o p t e d i n Montana.
                                                  a

        The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e Agreement on ~ e t a i n e r s o e s
                                                                                 d

n o t a p p l y where a p r i s o n e r ' s t r a n s f e r t o t h e r e c e i v i n g s t a t e
i s n o t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e f f e c t i n g a prompt d i s p o s i t i o n of

u n t r i e d c h a r g e s t h e r e and i s n o t t o b e f o l l o w e d by t h e

p r i s o n e r ' s r e t u r n t o t h e sending s t a t e .        The S t a t e g o e s on
t o argue t h a t defendant's request d i d n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y

comply w i t h t h e Agreement's r e q u i r e m e n t s b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t

i n c l u d e a c e r t i f i c a t e from Colorado a u t h o r i t i e s s t a t i n g " t h e

term of      [ h i s ] commitment, t h e t i m e s e r v e d and t h e t i m e

r e m a i n i n g t o be s e r v e d , t h e amount of good t i m e d e f e n d a n t

may have e a r n e d , and d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r o l e s t a t u s . "     Finally,

t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s a speedy t r i a l

q u e s t i o n and t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e , t h e r e was no

d e p r i v a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l .

        The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r e c e n t l y a d d r e s s e d t h e

p r o v i s i o n s of t h e I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on D e t a i n e r s i n

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Mauro ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S.         340, 98 S . C t .     1834,

56 L Ed 2d 329.            Noting t h a t t h e agreement h a s been a d o p t e d

by 46 s t a t e s , t h e C o u r t went on t o s t a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g :

       "The Agreement           ...          i s designed ' t o encourage
       t h e e x p e d i t i o u s and o r d e r l y d i s p o s i t i o n of  ...
       c h a r g e s [ o u t s t a n d i n g a g a i n s t a p r i s o n e r ] and de-
       t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r s t a t u s of any and a l l
       d e t a i n e r s b a s e d on u n t r i e d i n d i c t m e n t s , informa-
       t i o n s , o r complaints.'               A r t . I.     I t prescribes
       p r o c e d u r e s by which a member S t a t e may o b t a i n
       f o r t r i a l a p r i s o n e r i n c a r c e r a t e d i n a n o t h e r mem-
       b e r j u r i s d i c t i o n and by which t h e p r i s o n e r may
       demand t h e speedy d i s p o s i t i o n of c e r t a i n c h a r g e s
       pending a g a i n s t him i n a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n .        In
       e i t h e r c a s e , however, t h e p r o v i s i o n s of -e Agree-
                                                                        - th
       ment a r e t r i g g e r e d o n l y when a ' d e t a i n e r ' i s
       --                                         --
                  --
       f i l e d with t h e c u s t o d i a l (sending) S t a t e b             y
                                                                                y
       another S t a t e ( r e c e i v i n g ) having u n t r i e d charges
       pending a g a i n s t t h e p r i s o n e r ; t o o b t a i n temporary
       c u s t o d y , t h e r e c e i v i n g S t a t e must a l s o f i l e a n
       appropriate ' r e q u e s t ' with t h e sending S t a t e . "
        (Emphasis added.)                 436 U . S . a t 343-44, 98 S . C t .
       a t 1838, 56 L Ed 2d a t 336.

The p r o v i s i o n s of t h e agreement, t h e r e f o r e , b i n d t h e r e -

c e i v i n g s t a t e when t h e d e t a i n e r i s f i l e d .
        Two q u e s t i o n s a r i s e a t t h i s p o i n t .      The f i r s t i s whe-

t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r speedy t r i a l s u b s t a n t i a l l y

complied w i t h t h e requirements o f t h e A c t .                     W e find t h a t it

did.

        I n Rockmore v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 21 Ariz.App.                  388, 519 P.2d

877, t h e A r i z o n a Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d a s i m i l a r i s s u e .

The s t a t e had a r g u e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p e t i t i o n was

i n c o m p l e t e b e c a u s e i t was n o t accompanied by a c e r t i f i c a t e

a s r e q u i r e d by A r t i c l e I11 and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had n o t

had t h e s e n d i n g s t a t e , C a l i f o r n i a , o f f e r t o d e l i v e r t e m -

p o r a r y c u s t o d y a s r e q u i r e d by A r t i c l e V.      The c o u r t found no

m e r i t i n t h e s e a r g u m e n t s b e c a u s e t h e o f f i c i a l s of t h e s e n d i n g

s t a t e a r e r e q u i r e d t o s e n d t h e c e r t i f i c a t e and a n o f f e r o f

custody.        R e l i e f s h o u l d n o t b e d e n i e d a d e f e n d a n t when

o f f i c i a l s o f t h e s e n d i n g s t a t e f a i l t o comply w i t h t h e

p r o v i s i o n s t o which t h e y a r e bound.            Rockmore, 519 P.2d a t

879.      I n s o finding, t h e c o u r t c i t e d ~ r t i c l e X of t h e
                                                                 I

Agreement which p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t l h i s a g r e e m e n t s h a l l b e

l i b e r a l l y construed s o a s t o e f f e c t u a t e i t s purposes."

        I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e it appears t h a t defendant d i d a l l

t h a t h e c o u l d do t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Agree-

ment.      The S t a t e i n v o k e d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Agreement by

l o d g i n g t h e d e t a i n e r a n d by o b t a i n i n g c u s t o d y o f d e f e n d a n t

i n accordance w i t h t h e Agreement's p r o v i s i o n s .                   W e find,

t h e n , t h a t under t h e circumstances of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ,

d e f e n d a n t ' s s u b s t a n t i a l compliance w i t h t h e Agreement's

p r o c e d u r e i n v o k e d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Agreement.

        The second q u e s t i o n w e must a d d r e s s c o n c e r n s t h e mean-

i n g of t h e phrase "next t e r m of c o u r t " a s it appears i n

A r t i c l e I11 o f M o n t a n a ' s v e r s i o n o f t h e Agreement.
        The Agreement a s a d o p t e d i n most s t a t e s p r o v i d e s :

        ". . .        h e s h a l l b e b r o u s h t t o t r i a l w i t h i n o-- e
                                                                        - - - --
                                                                            -       - n-
        hundred e i g h t y d a y s a f t e r h e s h a l l h a v e c a u s e t o
        b e d e l i v e r e d t o t h e p r o s e c u t i n g o f f i c e r and t h e
        a p p r o p r i a t e c o u r t of t h e p r o s e c u t i n g o f f i c e r s
        j u r i s d i c t i o n w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f t h e p l a c e of h i s
        i m p r i s o n m e n t and h i s r e q u e s t f o r a f i n a l d i s p o s -
        i t i o n t o b e made o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t , i n f o r m a t i o n
        o r complaint         . . ."          (Emphasis a d d e d . )        A r t . 111,
        I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on D e t a i n e r s .

Montana's v e r s i o n s u b s t i t u t e s t h e p h r a s e " a t t h e n e x t t e r m

o f c o u r t " f o r t h e u n i f o r m a c t ' s p h r a s e " w i t h i n one hundred

e i g h t y days."      T h i s s u b s t i t u t e d p h r a s e h a s n e v e r been con-

s t r u e d by t h i s C o u r t .

        D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 93-315,   R.C.M.       1 9 4 7 , now

s e c t i o n 3-5-401     MCA,       defines t h i s phrase:

        "The d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f e a c h c o u n t y which i s a j u d i -
        c i a l d i s t r i c t by i t s e l f h a s no terms, a n d m u s t b e
        a l w a y s open f o r t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o f b u s i n e s s , e x c e p t
        o n l e g a l h o l i d a y s and n o n j u d i c i a l d a y s .   Juries for
        t h e t r i a l o f c a u s e s must b e c a l l e d by t h e judge a s
        o f t e n as t h e p u b l i c b u s i n e s s r e q u i r e s .  - -c h
                                                                          I n ea
                                  two o more c o u n t i e s a r e u n i t e d t h e
        d i s t r i c t where - -r-
        j u d g e t h e r e o f m u s t f- - -t e r m o f c o u r t - -c h
                                -- i x t h e                                i n ea
        c o u n t y i n h i s d i s t r i c t , and t h e r e m u s t b-a t l e a s t
                                                -                --       e
        f o u r t e r m s - - e a- i n e a c h c o u n t y . Any o r d e r of t h e
                            a y- r
        judge of such d i s t r i c t f i x i n g t e r m s of c o u r t s h a l l
        b e f i l e d i n t h e o f f i c e of t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t
        c o u r t i n e a c h c o u n t y o f h i s d i s t r i c t , and s h a l l
        remain i n e f f e c t u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e judge;
        provided, t h a t nothing i n t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be
        construed t o prevent t h e c a l l i n g of a s p e c i a l t e r m
        o f c o u r t , w i t h o r w i t h o u t a j u r y , when i n t h e o p i n -
        i o n o f t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e t h e same i s n e c e s s a r y .
        The d i s t r i c t j u d g e may a d j o u r n a t e r m o f d i s t r i c t
        c o u r t i n o n e c o u n t y t o a f u t u r e day c e r t a i n , and
        i n t h e meantime h o l d c o u r t i n a n o t h e r c o u n t y . "
         (Emphasis a d d e d . )

        D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t s i n c e " t h e r e must b e a t l e a s t

f o u r t e r m s a y e a r " e a c h t e r m m u s t b e t h r e e months i n l e n g t h .

The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t e r m s o f c o u r t

does n o t r e q u i r e t e r m s t o be of equal length.                      Thus, t h e

requirement of four t e r m s could conceivably be s a t i s f i e d i n

a d i s t r i c t w i t h t h r e e t e r m s of one day and one t e r m of 362

days.
        A problem would a r i s e i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s p h r a s e a s

a p p l i e d t o a c o u n t y which i s a j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t by i t s e l f

i n t h a t , according t o t h e s t a t u t e , such a d i s t r i c t "has -
                                                                              no

terms."          But i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , c o u n s e l f o r t h e S t a t e

a d m i t t e d d u r i n g o r a l argument t h a t t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s -

t r i c t c o m p r i s e s more t h a n one c o u n t y and h a s t e r m s , though

t h e length of t h e t e r m s i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t .           The S t a t e a l s o

a d m i t t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t t r i e d w i t h i n t h e n e x t t e r m

of c o u r t a f t e r h e had s u b m i t t e d h i s r e q u e s t f o r d i s p o s i t i o n .

        A r t i c l e V ( c ) o f t h e Agreement p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t
part:

        ". .      . i n t h e e v e n t t h a t an a c t i o n on t h e .         ..
        information         ...         on t h e b a s i s of which t h e de-
        t a i n e r h a s been lodged i s n o t b r o u g h t t o t r i a l
        w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d s p r o v i d e d by t h i s a c t , t h e
        a p p r o p r i a t e c o u r t o f t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e
        . . . information              ..     . h a s been pending s h a l l
        e n t e r a n o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e same w i t h p r e j u d i c e
        and any d e t a i n e r based t h e r e o n s h a l l c e a s e t o b e
        o f any f o r c e o r e f f e c t . "

Therefore, defendant's conviction i s reversed.                                 The D i s t r i c t

C o u r t i s i n s t r u c t e d t o e n t e r an o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g w i t h p r e j u -

d i c e t h e information charging defendant with escape.




W concur:
 e



      s h i e f Justice,,
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring:

        I concur in the result on the ground that institutional

delay chargeable to the state denied defendant his right to
a speedy trial.



                                       Chief Justice