No. 80-36
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
SHARON MACKIN, Guardian ad Litem
of MICHAEL TIMMER, a minor,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Sternhagen & Johnson,
Helena, Montana
Keith Keller argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
J. Michael Younq, Dept. of Administration, Helena,
-
Montana (argued)
Carter N. Picotte, Helena, Montana- ~t-~k?-(1&"."
Robert Cummins, argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: September 12, 1980
Decided: ~ F I : 1 9 1980
Filed:
OEC 4 3
-
f980
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff-appellant Sharon Mackin brought this tort
action against the State in the Lewis and Clark County
District Court on behalf of her minor son Michael Timmer.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment based upon section 2-9-104, MCA, dealing
with sovereign immunity. The plaintiff appeals.
Michael Timmer, plaintiff's 12-year-old son, and some
friends were playing in an open field at Fort Harrison near
Helena, Montana, on August 15, 1978. The field was used as
a small arms firing range by the Montana National Guard.
While playing there, Michael allegedly picked up a practice
grenade which had failed to explode when fired from a 40
millimeter grenade launcher. The grenade later exploded,
injuring Michael's feet with shrapnel, burns and impaction
of powder.
A tort complaint was filed by Sharon Mackin on behalf
of her son against the State of Montana on February 27,
1979. The plaintiff's amended statement of the claim specifies
the following damages:
1. Special Damages
Shodair Hospital $ 725.75
Helena Radiological Assoc. 47.00
Dale Johnson, M.D. 89.00
Children's Clinic 104.00
Estimated future med. expenses 1,000.00
2. Loss of earning capacity $5,000.00
3. General damage--pain & suffering
and disfigurement $93,000.00
The State pleaded several affirmative defenses. Its
foW!l affirmative defense asserts that section 2-9-104, MCA,
precludes recovery of noneconomic damages under the sovereign
immunity doctrine. Under this affirmative defense, it was
alleged that the claimed "general damages" ($93,000 under
the amended claim) constitute noneconomic damages since no
permanent disabling injuries resulted from the accident.
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue
of sovereign immunity on the grounds that section 2-9-104,
MCA, is unconstitutional and that the State has waived its
right to assert the defense. The State then moved for
partial summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's claim
for pain and suffering and disfigurement, contending that
section 2-9-104, MCA, bars recovery.
We set forth here in full, the provisions of section 2-9-
104, MCA:
"Limitation on governmental liability for
damaaes in tort--setition for relief in excess
of limits. (1) heither the state, acounty,
municipality, taxing district, nor any other
political subdivision of the state is liable in
-
tort action for:
" (a) noneconomic damages; or
"(b) economic damages suffered as a result of
an act or omission of an officer, agent, or
employee of that entity in excess of $300,000
for each claimant and $1 million for each occurrence.
"(2) The legislature or the governing body of a
county, municipality, taxing district, or other
political subdivision of the state may, in its
sole discretion, authorize payments for noneconomic
damages or economic damages in excess of the sum
authorized in subsection (l)(b) of this section, or
both, upon petition of plaintiff following a final
judgment. No insureris liable for such no~economic
damages or excess economic damages unless such insurer
specifically agrees by written endorsement to provide
coverage to the governmental agency involved in amounts
in excess of the limitation stated in this section or
specifically agrees to provide coverage for noneconomic
damages, in which case the insurer may not claim the
benefits of the limitation specifically waived." (Emphasis
added. )
For the purposes of section 2-9-104, noneconomic damages
and economic damages are defined in section 2-9-101(2), MCA.
Plaintiff argued at the District Court hearing that the
statute is unconstitutional under 1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11,
618, as amended by the voters in 1974, and which now provides:
"State subject - -
to suit. The state, counties,
cities, towns, and all other local governmental
entitles shall have no immunity from suit for
injury to a person or property, except as may
be specifically provided by law by a 2/3 vote of
each house of the legislature."
The District Court filed a memorandum opinion and order
on December 31, 1979. The order denied plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and granted the State's motion for
partial summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for damages.
The District Court also directed the entry of a final judgment
in favor of the State against all claims for "noneconomic"
damages. The court found that there were no just reasons
for delay and certified its reasons therefore pursuant to
Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P. As a result, the order is appealable
within Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., although the judgment encompasses
fewer than all the claims.
The plaintiff raises issues on appeal that section 2-9-
104, MCA, is unconstitutional, that it is an invalid attempt to
reinstate immunity, and that the State, by the adoption of
section 2-9-201, et seq., MCA, providing for self insurance,
is precluded from raising the defense of sovereign immunity.
The State responds that the provisions of the 1972 Mont.
Const., Art. 1 Sl8, as amended, do not restrict the legislature
from imposing such conditions or limitations as are set out in
section 2-9-104 (1).
We do not reach the constitutional or other contentions
raised by the parties in this case. It is clear from the
provisions of section 2-9-104(2), that the entry in this
case of a summary judgment against the plaintiff on certain
of her claimed damages was premature. An analysis of the
statute and its background is necessary in order to explain
our reasons.
In 1972, the members of the Montana Constitutional Convention
adopted Art. 11, 518, which abolished governmental immunity from
-4-
s u i t f o r i n j u r y t o a person o r property without q u a l i f i c a t i o n .
That s e c t i o n of A r t . I1 was amended by t h e v o t e r s i n t h e
g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n of 1974 by a d d i n g t o t h e p r o v i s i o n " e x c e p t a s
may be s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e d by law by a 2/3 . vote of each
house o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . "
W note p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y t h a t the proper t e r m t o describe
e
t h e immunity now p r o v i d e d i n 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, 818,
a s amended, i s "governmental immunity." Since t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p r o v i s i o n e x t e n d s t o " c o u n t i e s , c i t i e s , towns, and a l l o t h e r
l o c a l government e n t i t i e s " , it i s improper t o d e s c r i b e t h e i r
immunity as " s o v e r e i g n . " Only t h e s t a t e h a s " s o v e r e i g n immunity",
which i s a s o l d a s t h e common law, and t h o u g h t t o be i n h e r e n t
i n t h e n a t u r e of s o v e r e i g n t y . See Nevada v. H a l l ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 440
U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 5 9 L.Ed.2d 416, r e h . d e n . 4 4 1 U.S. 917.
Governmental, o r m u n i c i p a l immunity, d e r i v e s from R u s s e l l v .
The Men of Devon (17881, 2.Term.Rep. 667, 100 Eng.Bep. 3 5 9 , and
i s t h e r e f o r e based on court-made law. See ort thing ton v. S t a t e
(wyo. 1 9 7 9 ) , 598 P.2d 796. I t i s t o be n o t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l t h a t
s e c t i o n 2-9-104, t h e s e c t i o n w i t h which w e a r e concerned h e r e ,
s p e a k s of " l i m i t a t i o n on governmental l i a b i l i t y " w i t h no r e f e r e n c e
t o t h e t e r m " s o v e r e i g n immunity."
However, t h e r e f e r e n c e i n t h e c a p t i o n of s e c t i o n 2 - 9 - 1 0 4 ,
" l i m i t a t i o n on governmental l i a b i l i t y " sets t h e s t a g e f o r o u r
discussion here. When t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 2-9-104, are
r e a d i n j u x t a p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 1972 Mont. C o n s t . ,
Art. 11, 818 ( a s amended), t h i s q u e s t i o n i s immediately r a i s e d :
Did t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n a d o p t i n g s e c t i o n 2-9-104 reinstate a
l i m i t e d governmental immunity, o r d i d i t merely l i m i t t h e remedy
r e c o v e r a b l e a g a i n s t a governmental u n i t ?
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h e nuance c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t
question. I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t s e c t i o n 2-9-104 was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
amenable under 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, S18 ( a s amended), t h e
D i s t r i c t Court s a i d t h i s :
-5-
". . . I can only conclude that the legislature
subsequently has the same power and authority
to reinstate immunity with whatever terms and
conditions regarding the amount and types of
damages that it had when it waived the State's
immunity by legislation prior to 1973. The power
to limit liability is the same, whether it is
exercised by waiving or reinstating the State's
immunities. Indeed, there is no valid distinction
between the limited waiver of immunity up to the
limits of liability insurance, which was the law
in Montana for many years, and the imposition of
statutory damage limits pursuant to Article 11,
section 18, as amended. The fundamental authority
of the legislature is identical in each instance
and only the amounts are different.
"Therefore, I conclude that the limitations on
the amount and types of damages awardable against
the State in accordance with sections 2-9-101 and
2-9-104, MCA, constitute a valid, constitutional
reinstatement of governmental immunity within the
meaning of Article 11, section 18, Montana Con-
stitution, as amended."
Accepting arguendo the District Court's conclusion that the
legislature could either reinstate total governmental immunity,
or provide limited immunity against certain types of damages
(whether called waiver or reinstatement), we come to the next
question that logically follows from the District Court's deter-
mination: Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment
against all but plaintiff's claimed economic damages in the light
of the provisions of section 2-9-104, MCA?
We call attention, now, to the language in section 2-9-
104(2), MCA, to the effect that a governmental unit, in its
sole discretion, may authorize payments for noneconomic
damages or economic damages in excess of $300,000, or both,
upon "petition of plaintiff following a final judgment". We
find it plainly the legislative scheme under section 2-9-
104(2), that a tort claim against a governing body of this
state may proceed to final judgment on all claims for damages
which the plaintiff may have, both for noneconomic and
economic damages. After "final judgment" under section 2-9-
104(2), the plaintiff may petition the governmental body
for noneconomic damages, or for economic damages in excess
Our duty in interpreting a statute is to give effect to
the objects of the statute, to construe it so as to promote
justice,and to give such construction to the statute as will
preserve the constitutional rights of the parties. Yurkovich
v. Industrial Accident Board (1957), 132 Mont. 77, 314 P.2d
866. Neither statutory nor constitutional construction by
US should lead to absurd results if reasonable construction
will avoid it. State v. School District No. 1 of Fergus
County (19601, 136 Mont. 453, 348 P.2d 797, 78 A.L.R.2d
1012. Governmental units in Montana are not immune from
suits for torts. Section 2-9-102, MCA. Section 2-9-104
does not make a governmental unit of the State of Montana
immune from suit. Rather, it limits the governmental
liability to economic damages not in excess of $300,000. It
then goes one step further and provides that other damages,
or economic damages in excess of $300,000, may be sought by
petition from the governmental entity and by its grace, upon
"petition of plaintiff following a final judgment." In
order to petition the governmental unit for the exercise of
its grace, there must be a "plaintiff" and there must be a
"final judgment." It may be argued that the plaintiff here
has a final judgment against her for noneconomic damages,
but that argument begs the question. Section 2-9-104,
interpreted as we see it, provides a method for a plaintiff
to obtain a determination in a judicial setting of damages
beyond economic damages in the amount of $300,000 after which
petition to the governmental body can be made. Unless a
plaintiff is allowed to proceed to final judgment on all
claimed damages, where a governmental entity is a defendant,
the legislative purpose as set out in section 2-9-104(2),
MCA, would be frustrated.
Where the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous,
direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself and there
-7-
is nothing for a court to construe. Clark v. Hensel Phelps
Const. Co. (1977), 172 Mont. 8, 560 P.2d 515; Security Bank
and Trust Company v. Connors (1976), 170 Mont. 59, 550 P.2d
1313.
The prosecution of a tort claim against a governmental
entity, or a defense of the same, under this interpretation
of section 2-9-104, will present no real problem or difficulty
to reasonably adept counsel. In this case, in fact, the
complaint was amended to set forth specifically the economic
and noneconomic damages. By the use of special interrogatories,
the jury will be instructed, if it finds for the plaintiff,
to determine both economic and noneconomic damages. When
these are entered in a final judgment, the amount of "governmental
liability" can be determined. The amounts, if any, in
excess of the governmental liability, under section 2-9-104,
can be pursued at plaintiff's pleasure following a final
judgment.
We see no waste of judicial resources in so providing.
Certainly the determination of damages in a judicial setting
far outweighs the determination of an award by a governmental
entity bound by no rules and bare of precedent.
There are other reasons which lead us to interpret the
statute as we do. We can envision any number of situations
in which the economic damages might exceed $300,000. If we
were to affirm the District Court, how in a proper case would
the excess of economic damages over $300,000 be determined?
Undoubtedly, an affirmance of the District Court would result
in the refusal of any evidence of damages beyond that figure in
future cases.
Another situation that we can envision is one where a
governmentalentity is sued as a joint tortfeasor with one or
more defendants which are not governmental entities. In
determining comparative negligence in such a situation, it
- 8-
w i l l be f a r e a s i e r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a l l o w e v i d e n c e
o f a l l damages of w h a t e v e r k i n d o r n a t u r e , and i f t h e v e r d i c t
s h o u l d r e q u i r e i t , t h e r e a f t e r t o a p p l y t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f govern-
m e n t a l l i a b i l i t y found i n s e c t i o n 2-9-104, MCA. It is instructive
t o remember t h a t :
" I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t by c o n s e n t i n g t o
b e s u e d t h e s t a t e does n o t h i n g more t h a n waive
i t s immunity from a c t i o n . I t d o e s n o t t h e r e b y
concede i t s l i a b i l i t y i n f a v o r of t h e c l a i m a n t
o r c r e a t e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n i n h i s f a v o r which
did not theretofore exist. Thus, l i a b i l i t y of
t h e s t a t e f o r t o r t c a n n o t be p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e
f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t e has entered i t s general
s t a t u t o r y c o n s e n t t o be s u e d , d i r e c t i n g t h e
manner i n which s u i t s may be b r o u g h t by t h o s e
having claims a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . Neither does
a s p e c i a l s t a t u t e p e r m i t t i n g s u i t s on p a r t i c u l a r
c l a i m s concede t h e j u s t i c e of t h e c l a i m s . Statutory
c o n s e n t t o be s u e d merely g i v e s a remedy t o e n f o r c e
a l i a b i l i t y and s u b m i t s t h e s t a t e t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n
o f t h e c o u r t , s u b j e c t t o i t s r i g h t t o i n t e r p o s e any
lawful defense." 57 Am.Jur.2d 81, Municipal E t c .
T o r t L i a b i l i t y , 872.
And a g a i n :
"Consent o f t h e s t a t e t o be s u e d upon c l a i m s a g a i n s t
i t by p r i v a t e p e r s o n s i s g e n e r a l l y g i v e n e x p r e s s l y
by s t a t u t o r y enactment d i r e c t i n g i n what manner and
i n what c o u r t such s u i t s may be b r o u g h t ; t h e g e n e r a l
p u r p o s e and e f f e c t of s u c h s t a t u t e s , as commonly
understood, i s t o r e f e r t o t h e j u d i c i a r y t h e s e t t l e m e n t
of t h e q u e s t i o n s o f l a w and f a c t i n v o l v e d i n t h e claims,
and t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , i n t h e form o f a judgment, o f
t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s . . ." 72 Am.Jur.2d 511,
S t a t e s E t c . , S120.
W e d e t e r m i n e t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f s e c t i o n 2-9-
104, MCA, i s t o l i m i t t h e remedy a v a i l a b l e a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e
o r governmental e n t i t y a f t e r i t s l i a b i l i t y h a s been d e t e r m i n e d
by f i n a l judgment, e x c e p t s u c h f u r t h e r payment a s t h e governmental
e n t i t y may by g r a c e p r o v i d e . T h e r e f o r e t h e summary judgment
o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a g a i n s t t y p e s of damages n o t a u t h o r i z e d
i n s e c t i o n 2-9-104, MCA, p r i o r t o f i n a l judgment i s p r e m a t u r e .
T h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would n o t have
power t o g r a n t a summary judgment where a governmental
e n t i t y i s a d e f e n d a n t on i s s u e s n o t encompassed i n s e c t i o n
2-9-104, MCA.
We therefore do not reach the constitutional or other
issues raised by the parties in this case as they are not
properly before us at this time.
Reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the
summary judgment in favor of the State. The denial of
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed
without prejudice.
n
Justice
We Concur:
..............................
Chief Justice
,/." / Justices V
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l , d i s s e n t i n g .
I respectfully dissent.
Here t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d judgment d e n y i n g
p l a i n t i f f ' s claim f o r noneconomic damages, h o l d i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y
limitation constitutional. On a p p e a l t h e m a j o r i t y h a v e r e v e r s e d
t h i s j u d g m e n t as p r e m a t u r e b e c a u s e a f i n a l judgment i n c l u d i n g
n o n e c o n o m i c damages c l a i m e d by p l a i n t i f f was n o t e n t e r e d . I n my
v i e w t h i s is e r r o r .
The Montana R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e
t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t "may d i r e c t t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n t
a s t o o n e or more b u t f e w e r t h a n a l l of t h e claims . . . upon an
e x p r e s s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y and
upon a n e x p r e s s d i r e c t i o n f o r t h e e n t r y o f judgment." Rule
5 4 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d t h i s . T h i s rendered
t h e judgment a p p e a l a b l e as a f i n a l j u d g m e n t . R u l e 1,
M.R.App.Civ.P.
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 2-9-104, MCA, was the
o n l y i s s u e r a i s e d , b r i e f e d , r e s e a r c h e d or argued i n t h e D i s t r i c t
Court. T h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t it w i l l n o t r e v i e w
o r d e t e r m i n e o n a p p e a l i s s u e s which were n o t r a i s e d i n t h e
District Court. Mont. A s s ' n . of Underwriters. v. S t a t e , e t c .
( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 2 1 1 , 5 6 3 P.2d 577; S p e n c e r v. R o b e r t s o n
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 5 0 7 , 4 4 5 P.2d 48; C l a r k v. W o r r a l l ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 6
Mont. 3 7 4 , 406 P.2d 8 2 2 ; S t a t e Highway Commission v. Y o s t Farm
Company ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 2 Mont. 2 3 9 , 384 P.2d 277. Y e t here the
m a j o r i t y h a v e d e c i d e d t h i s case o n a n i s s u e n o t r a i s e d , b r i e f e d
o r a r g u e d by a n y p a r t y e i t h e r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t or upon
appeal.
S e c t i o n 2-9-104, MCA, p r o v i d e s , among o t h e r t h i n g s , that
t h e S t a t e is n o t l i a b l e f o r noneconomic damages i n a t o r t a c t i o n
s u c h as w e h a v e h e r e . The s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" ( 1 )N e i t h e r t h e s t a t e ... n o r any ..
. p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o f t h e s t a t e is l i a b l e
i n tort action for:
" ( a ) n o n e c o n o m i c damages; o r
I f t h e S t a t e h a s no l i a b i l i t y f o r noneconomic d a m a g e s , how c a n a
f i n a l j u d g m e n t t h a t i n c l u d e s noneconomic damages be e n t e r e d
against the State?
T h e r e is o n l y o n e way--by declaring the s t a t u t e
unconstitutional. But h e r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court d e c l a r e d t h e sta-
tute constitutional. I n so d o i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t u p h e l d t h e
s t a t u t o r y l i m i t a t i o n o n t h e S t a t e ' s l i a b i l i t y and e n t e r e d t h e
o n l y f i n a l judgment it was empowered t o e n t e r u n d e r s u c h
circumstances. T h i s p l a c e d t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of
the s t a t u t e squarely i n issue i n t h i s appeal.
The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n a v o i d s r u l i n g o n t h i s i s s u e by
i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a t u t e t o r e q u i r e a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e amount o f noneconomic damages as a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t to
p l a i n t i f f p e t i t i o n i n g t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r payment t h e r e o f as a
matter o f g r a c e . I n my o p i n i o n t h i s is a t o r t u r e d c o n s t r u c t i o n
of the s t a t u t e .
The r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e r e a d s a s f o l l o w s :
" ( 2 ) The l e g i s l a t u r e ... may, i n i t s s o l e
7--
d i s c r e t i o n , a u t h o r i z e p a y m e n t s f o r noneconomic
damages ... upon p e t i t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f
f o l l o w i n g a f i n a l judgment . . . ."
2 - 9 - 1 0 4 ( 2 ) , MCA. ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . )
Section
I n my v i e w t h e q u o t e d p o r t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e p l a i n l y s a y s t h a t
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , i n i t s sole d i s c r e t i o n , may a u t h o r i z e s u c h
p a y m e n t s f o r noneconomic damages as it sees f i t a f t e r f i n a l
judgment; it may d e n y a n y payment a t a l l , o r it may a u t h o r i z e
payment i n p a r t and d e n y payment i n p a r t , o r it may p a y s u c h
d a m a g e s i n f u l l as it a l o n e may d e t e r m i n e . Where t h e l a n g u a g e o f
a s t a t u t e i s p l a i n , u n a m b i g u o u s , d i r e c t and c e r t a i n , t h e s t a t u t e
s p e a k s f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e is n o t h i n g l e f t f o r t h e c o u r t t o
construe. K e l l e r v . S m i t h ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 0 Mont. 3 9 9 , 5 5 3 P.2d 1002;
Dunphy v . Anaconda Company, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d 660.
Our f u n c t i o n i s s i m p l y to d e c l a r e w h a t is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e
s t a t u t e , and n e i t h e r i n s e r t w h a t h a s b e e n o m i t t e d n o r o m i t w h a t
h a s been i n s e r t e d . S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA; Mont. A s s ' n of Under-
w r i t e r s v. S t a t e , e t c . , s u p r a ; C l a r k v. H e n s e l P h e l p s C o n s t .
- 12 -
Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 8 , 560 P.2d 5 1 5 ; H a r n r n i l l v. Young ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,
1 6 8 Mont. 8 1 , 540 P.2d 971.
Where t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s sole d i s c r e t i o n o v e r w h e t h e r
p a y m e n t o f noneconomic damages s h a l l be a u t h o r i z e d and t h e amount
t h e r e o f , how c a n t h e s t a t u t e be i n t e r p r e t e d t o r e q u i r e a j u d i c i a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e amount of noneconomic damages i n a f i n a l
judgment? A s I see i t , t h i s would be a t o d d s w i t h l e g i s l a t i v e
i n t e n t regarding determination thereof. No discernable purpose
would be s e r v e d t h e r e b y . The amount of noneconomic damages i n a
j u d g m e n t is s i m p l y a lump sum commonly commingled w i t h e c o n o m i c
damages. The l e g i s l a t u r e is n o t bound by it and is p e r f e c t l y
c a p a b l e o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e amount o f noneconomic damages it is
w i l l i n g t o p a y as a matter o f g r a c e r a t h e r t h a n as a m a t t e r o f
liability. A d d i t i o n a l l y it is a waste o f t i m e , the taxpayers1
money, and j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s t o e n g a g e i n s u c h a m e a n i n g l e s s
exercise. The law d o e s n o t r e q u i r e i d l e a c t s . S e c t i o n 1-3-223,
MCA. For t h e s e reasons I d o not b e l i e v e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended
t o empower t h e t r i a l c o u r t s t o a d j u d i c a t e t h e amount o f nonecono-
m i c damages f o r which t h e S t a t e is n o t l i a b l e u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e
and i n c l u d e s u c h i t e m s i n a f i n a l judgment b e f o r e t h e p l a i n t i f f
c a n p e t i t i o n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r payment t h e r e o f .
I b e l i e v e t h i s Court should determine the s o l e issue
r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h i s a p p e a l - - t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of
s e c t i o n 2-9-104, MCA.
Chief J u s t i c e