No. 80-293
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
THE STATE O F MONTANA ex re1
JOANN PALMER,
P l a i n t i f f i n I n t e r v e n t i o n and
Relator,
THE D I S T R I C T COURT O F THE
NINTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T e t a l . ,
D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
O R I G I N A L PROCEEDING:
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For P l a i n t i f f :
R. V. Bottomly, G r e a t Falls, M o n t a n a
For R e s p o n d e n t :
P o o r e , R o t h , R o b i s c h o n and R o b i n s o n , B u t t e , M o n t a n a
N e l s o n and Werner, C u t B a n k , M o n t a n a
- - - -- -- - -
Submitted: September 4, 1980
Decided: DEC - 4
M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e
Court.
R e l a t o r J o A n n P a l m e r a p p l i e d t o t h i s C o u r t on S e p t e m b e r 4 ,
1980, f o r a w r i t of supervisory control, seeking review of the
D i s t r i c t Court's denial of her motion f o r intervention. We f i n d
t h a t t h i s i s s u e i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court by ' w r i t , b u t we
deny a l l re1i e f t o r e l a t o r .
R e l a t o r and h e r s i s t e r M a r g a r e t Simonson a r e t h e p r i m a r y
h e i r s o f t h e i r deceased mother, Emma S a u t e r . P r i o r t o Emma's
death, Emma's c o n s e r v a t o r , Dwaine I v e r s o n , i n i t i a t e d proceedings
a g a i n s t M a r g a r e t S i m o n s o n and h e r h u s b a n d , o n b e h a l f o f Emma
Sauter. He a l l e g e d o p p r e s s i o n , fraud, and m a l i c e i n t h e i r
l e a s i n g o f f a r m l a n d f r o m Emma. The S i m o n s o n s r e t a i n e d t h e l a w
f i r m o f W e r n e r & N e l s o n t o d e f e n d t h e a c t i o n , b u t Emma d i e d
t e s t a t e p r i o r t o f u r t h e r proceedings i n the lawsuit.
Emma's w i l l named W i l b u r W e r n e r o f t h e W e r n e r & N e l s o n l a w
f i r m as p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f h e r e s t a t e . Shortly
thereafter, B a r n e y R e a g a n was s u b s t i t u t e d as c o u n s e l f o r defen-
d a n t s Simonsons i n t h e p r e v i o u s l y - f i l ed l a w s u i t . JoAnn Palmer
t h e n p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t f o r t h e appointment o f Dwaine I v e r s o n
as personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e s t a t e , or i n the alternative
f o r h i s a p p o i n t m e n t as a s p e c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f
h a n d l i n g t h e l a w s u i t a g a i n s t t h e Simonsons. Palmer a l l e g e d t h a t
W e r n e r s h o u l d be d i s q u a l i f i e d f r o m a c t i n g a s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n -
t a t i v e because o f h i s c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t i n p r e v i o u s l y r e p r e -
s e n t i n g t h e defendants. I n November 1979, t h e t r i a l c o u r t denied
the petition, f i n d i n g t h a t p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t a d e q u a t e l y show
t h a t W e r n e r was b i a s e d and f u r t h e r t h a t P a l m e r h a d a n a d e q u a t e
r e m e d y a g a i n s t W e r n e r i f he f a i l e d t o p r o s e c u t e t h e c l a i m .
Palmer appealed t h a t r u l i n g t o t h i s Court. I n an o p i n i o n
d a t e d August 13, 1980, I n the Matter of the Estate of Sauter
(1980) , Mont. , 6 1 5 P.2d 8 7 5 , 3 7 St.Rep. 1 4 2 5 , we d e t e r -
m i n e d t h a t W e r n e r s h o u l d r e m a i n as p e r s o n a l representative, but
t h a t a s p e c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t s o l e l y f o r h a n d l i n g t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e Simonsons. The
d i s t r i c t judge appointed Dwaine I v e r s o n , P a l m e r ' s personal
choice.
I n F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 0 , w h i l e t h e a p p e a l was p e n d i n g , P a l m e r
f i l e d a motion t o intervene i n the law s u i t , a l l e g i n g t h a t Werner
was n o t e f f e c t i v e l y p u r s u i n g t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e S i m o n s o n s , and
t h a t i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t h e r i n t e r e s t as b e n e f i c i a r y , she s h o u l d
become a p a r t y . The d i s t r i c t j u d g e d e n i e d h e r m o t i o n on J u n e 20,
1980. P a l m e r f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l f r o m t h a t r u l i n g on J u l y
17, 1980. P r i o r t o t h e hearing o f the appeal, but subsequent t o
t h i s C o u r t ' s r u l i n g o f August 13 on t h e m a t t e r o f t h e p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Palmer p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r a w r i t o f super-
visory control t o review the denial of the motion t o intervene.
R u l e 1, M.R.App.Civ.P, sets out those judgments o r orders
f r o m w h i c h an a p p e a l c a n be t a k e n . A denial of a motion t o
i n t e r v e n e i s n o t one o f t h o s e o r d e r s . Thus, t h e J u n e 20, 1980,
r u l i n g by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s not appealable, b u t we f i n d t h a t i t
i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e u s on a w r i t . I f we w e r e n o t t o r e v i e w t h i s
decision immediately, and t h e p e n d i n g l a w s u i t went t o c o m p l e t i o n
without the joinder of a proper intervenor, t h e i n t e r v e n o r would
b e l e f t a t t h e end o f t h e s u i t w i t h o u t a p r o p e r r e m e d y a t l a w .
However, we f i n d t h a t J o A n n P a l m e r i s n o t a p r o p e r i n t e r v e n o r i n
t h e s u i t because h e r i n t e r e s t i s a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e
special admini s t r a t o r , Dwaine I v e r s o n .
Relator p e t i t i o n e d t o intervene pursuant t o Rule 24(a) (2),
M.R.Civ.P.:
"Intervention o f right. Upon t i m e l y a p p l i c a t i o n
a n y o n e s h a l l b e p e r m i t t e d t o i n t e r v e n e i n an
action: . .. ( 2 ) when t h e a p p l i c a n t c l a i m s a n
interest relating t o the property or transaction
w h i c h i s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e a c t i o n a n d he i s so
s i t u a t e d t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n may
as a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r i m p a i r o r impede h i s a b i -
l i t y t o protect t h a t interest, unless the
a p p l i c a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i s adequately represented
by existing parties."
She a r g u e d t h a t t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ( t h e n W e r n e r )
could not adequately represent her i n t e r e s t s i n the lawsuit
b e c a u s e o f h i s c o n f l i c t i n h a v i n g h a d an a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h defendants. She a l l e g e d t h a t s h e was t h e o n l y
p e r s o n i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e o u t c o m e of t h i s l a w s u i t , making h e r t h e
s o l e person i n t e r e s t e d i n prosecuting i t t o completion. We f i n d
t h i s p o s i t i o n t o be u n t e n a b l e .
At the outset, we n o t e t h a t t h r o u g h o u t t h i s l i t i g a t i o n ,
J o A n n P a l m e r h a s a r g u e d t h a t W e r n e r as p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
was an i m p r o p e r p e r s o n t o h a n d l e t h e l a w s u i t , and t h a t i t s h o u l d
b e h a n d l e d i n s t e a d b y I v e r s o n , who f i l e d t h e s u i t i n i t i a l l y a s
conservator. Yet a t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n , she a r g u e s
t h a t she s h o u l d i n t e r v e n e because t h e n o w - a p p o i n t e d special admi-
n i s t r a t o r Iverson cannot adequately represent her i n t e r e s t s . It
w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t r e l a t o r i s h a r d l y i n a p o s i t i o n t o a r g u e now
against Iverson's a b i l i t y t o represent her.
Additionally, the prosecution of claims f o r the benefit of
t h e estate i s a task delegated t o the personal representative of
an e s t a t e , s e c t i o n 72-3-613(22), MCA, 3 3 C.J.S., Executors &
Administrators §loo, a n d an h e i r d o e s n o t h a v e t h e r i g h t t o p u r -
sue t h e a c t i o n h i m s e l f u n l e s s t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f a i l s
to a c t on t h e c l a i m . H o l l a n d v. K e l l y (1917), 177 C a l . 507, 171
P. 421. T h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y no e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t t h a t
I v e r s o n has f a i l e d i n h i s d u t y t o p r o s e c u t e .
At t h i s point, the lawsuit i s being brought t o protect the
interest o f the heirs, and R u l e 1 7 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P, demands t h a t
a l l a c t i o n s be p r o s e c u t e d i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n
interest. B u t i t f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t "[an] administrator ...
may s u e i n h i s own name w i t h o u t j o i n i n g w i t h h i m t h e p a r t y f o r
whose b e n e f i t t h e a c t i o n i s b r o u g h t . " T h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y
discussed t h e purpose o f t h i s r u l e , n o t i n g t h a t any o t h e r r u l e
would promote a m u l t i t u d e o f s u i t s by h e i r s , r e s u l t i n g i n hope-
l e s s c o n f u s i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f an a c t i o n .
S t a t e ex r e l . C a r r o l l v. D i s t r i c t Court (1961), 139 Mont. 367,
371-72, 3 6 4 P.2d 739, 741.
T h i s same p r o b l e m was a d d r e s s e d i n t h e r e c e n t C o l o r a d o
c a s e o f I n t h e M a t t e r o f t h e E s t a t e of S c o t t ( 1 9 7 8 ) 40 Colo.App.
3 4 3 , 5 7 7 P.2d 311. There, h e i r s o f t h e decedent attempted t o
intervene, i n o r d e r t o appeal f r o m an a d v e r s e r u l i n g on a c l a i m
defended by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r . I n denying intervention, the
Colorado Court said:
"We n o t e d ... t h a t there are substantial
p r o b l e m s w i t h b a s i n g t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e upon
v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s a s t o how o r i n w h a t m a n n e r a
l a w s u i t s h o u l d be p r o s e c u t e d . When t h e l a w
c r e a t e d a mechanism w h e r e b y one p e r s o n as a
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a g r o u p c o u l d c o n d u c t
l i t i g a t i o n , t h e p u r p o s e was t h e e f f i c i e n t ,
s p e e d y , and o r d e r l y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f r i g h t s
w h i c h w e r e h e l d i n common. For the courts t o
g r a n t i n t e r v e n t i o n t o a n y member o f a r e p r e -
s e n t e d c l a s s who d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n s o f
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , s o l e l y on t h a t b a s i s , w o u l d
i n our view d e f e a t t h e e n t i r e purpose o f repre-
sentative litigation. A personal representa-
t i v e , u n d e r s u c h a r u l e , w o u l d a l w a y s be i n
d a n g e r o f l o s i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o r e p r e s e n t and
a c t f o r t h e e s t a t e and m i g h t we1 1 f i n d h i m s e l f
r e l e g a t e d t o a p o s i t i o n o f l o o k i n g on as t h e
a f f a i r s o f t h e e s t a t e became h o p e l e s s l y
entangled. I t seems h a r d l y l i k e l y t h a t t h e
G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y when i t c l o t h e d t h e p e r s o n a l
representative w i t h f a r reaching a f f i r m a t i v e
powers, c o u l d have i n t e n d e d f o r h i s p o s i t i o n t o
b e so f r a g i l e . " E s t a t e o f S c o t t , s u p r a , 5 7 7 P.2d at
313.
T h a t c o u r t w e n t on t o s a y t h a t i n d e t e r m i n i n g a d e q u a c y o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n under Rule 24(a), the court w i l l l o o k t o see i f
" t h e r e i s a p a r t y charged by law w i t h representing [ t h e absent
party's] interest. [ I f so,] t h e n a c o m p e l l i n g showing w o u l d be
r e q u i r e d t o show why t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n o t a d e q u a t e . "
Estate of Scott, supra.
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n a b o u t t h e d u t y o f I v e r s o n ( s p e c i a l
a d m i n i s t r a t o r ) t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f JoAnn Palmer. By
statute, he i s deemed a f i d u c i a r y , and i s c h a r g e d w i t h a c t i n g i n
t h e best i n t e r e s t s o f t h e successors t o t h e estate. Sections
72-3-610, 72-3-701-704, MCA. I f he d o e s n o t so a c t , he i s l i a b l e
t o i n t e r e s t e d p e r s o n s f o r damages. Sect i o n 72-3-616, MCA.
See a l s o E s t a t e o f G r a f ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 150 Mont. 577, 580, 4 3 7 P.2d 371,
373.
Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g , we f i n d t h a t J o A n n P a l m e r ' s
i n t e r e s t s are being adequately represented by p a r t i e s t o t h e
1a w s u i t. Therefore, we d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e t r i a1 j u d g e c o r r e c t l y
denied her p e t i t i o n t o intervene.
Chief Justice
Me c o n c u r :
..............................
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting:
The majority has reached the illogical result of saying
to JoAnn Palmer: "This is your fight, but we won't let you
fight it."
The true protagonists in cause no. 9346, now entitled
"Dwaine J. Iverson, as special administrator of the Estate
of Emma Sauter, deceased, versus Margaret and Wayne Simonson"
are JoAnn Palmer on the one hand and the Simonsons on the
other. While Dwaine J. Iverson is the nominal plaintiff
suing the Simonsons on behalf of the estate, the only bene-
ficiary if he wins, and the only loser if he loses, is JoAnn
Palmer. The suit exists because JoAnn Palmer, one of Emma
Sauter's heirs, argues that Margaret Simonson, the only
other of Emma Sauter's heirs, and Wayne Simonson, took
advantage of Emma Sauter during her lifetime to their advantage
and the disadvantage of JoAnn Palmer. Dwaine J. Iverson, as
special administrator, is thus suing one heir for the benefit
of the other. Margaret Simonson, one of the heirs, can
personally defend herself to the fullest extent. JoAnn
Palmer, says this Court, may not personally prosecute her
action to her fullest extent, but must rely on the efforts
of the special administrator, even though JoAnn is now the
vested one-half owner of the subject matter of the suit.
Simply to state the situation is to demonstrate the error of
the majority, for it is precluding the one person vitally
interested in the success of the suit from personally
litigating the issues.
While granting that JoAnn Palmer's petition to intervene
was denied while Wilbur Werner was the sole personal representative
of the Sauter estate, and also granting that Dwaine J.
Iverson was JoAnn Palmer's choice both as conservator and as
-7-
special administrator, I would nevertheless hold her right
to intervene is mandated by the intent and spirit of Rule
24 (a)(2), M. R. Civ.P. The applicable rule reads:
"(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action:
"(2) when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented
by existing parties."
The foregoing rule is identical to its federal counter-
part a£ter the federal amendment of 1966. Rule 24 (a)(2),
Fed.R.Civ.P. In a case prior to the 1966 amendment, the
United States Supreme Court held that federal Rule 24(a) was
not a complete inventory of interventions allowable of
right. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. U.S. (1941), 312
U.S. 502, 61 S.Ct. 666, 85 L.Ed. 975. The U.S. Supreme
Court hewed to the same line after the 1966 amendment in
Cascade Nat. .Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. (1967), 386
U.S. 129, 87 S.Ct. 932, 17 L.Ed.2d 814. In the latter case,
instead of a rigid rule, the Supreme Court found "elasticity"
in its provisions.
It is beyond cavil that JoAnn Palmer's ability to
protect her interest in cause no. 9346 will be impaired or
impeded by the disposition eventually to be made in that
cause. The decision will be final as to her. The only
remaining consideration is how this Court should treat the
language of 24(a)(2), M.R.Civ.P., "unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties."
The federal Rule 24 (a)(2) pre-1966 granted the right to
intervene if the applicant's interest "is or may be inadequate."
After 1966, the federal Rule, and now our Rule, omit the
phrase "or may be." Professor Moore states:
"In making the language conversion from an
affirmative requirement that the representation
'is or may be inadequate' to the exception clause
'unless the ...interest is adequately represented,'
the words 'may be' have been dropped. The resulting
meaning should, nevertheless, remain the same. That
is, if the applicant shows that the representation
'may be inadequate' then this showing should preclude
the court from finding that 'the interest is adequately
represented.' See Note, 1968 Duke L.J. 117, 129."
3B Moore's Federal Practice 24-316, 524.09-1[4].
The decision of the Colorado Appellate Court in Matter
of Estate of Scott (1978), 40 Colo.App. 343, 577 P.2d 311,
cited by the majority, requires a closer examination in the
light of an earlier case. In Scott, the intestate mother
was survived by three children, and several grandchildren
who were all the descendant of a deceased daughter of the
intestate mother. One of the sons filed a claim for $100,000
against the mother's estate, for work he allegedly performed
in her cattle-ranching operation prior to her death. His
brother, as administrator, disallowed the claim and suit was
brought by the claimant. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court allowed the claim to the extent of $60,000. The
administrator did not appeal the decision. The grandchildren
sought to intervene for the purpose of making an appeal. It
appears that none of the children of the decedent were
interested in appeal. The Colorado court decided not to
allow the intervention on the basis that the "identity of
interest" approach showed that the administrator as defendant,
had an identical interest with all the other heirs in the
suit brought by one of them, stood to suffer the same gain
or loss from the result of the suit as all the other heirs,
including the grandchildren, and therefore, the estate was
adequately represented, which meant that the grandchildren
were adequately represented.
- 9-
In an earlier case, Howlett v. Greenberg (1974), 34
Colo.App. 356, 530 P.2d 1285, the Colorado court allowed an
heir to intervene in a wrongful death case where a mother,
granted an exclusive right by statute to sue, refused to
appeal an adverse decision. The Colorado court in Scott used
the decision in Howlett as authority for its decision in the
Scott case. Apparently then, the Colorado court did not
move away from its position stated in Howlett, as follows:
"Colorado follows the rule that an applicant
for intervention of right under C.R.C.P. 24(a)
(2) must show both, that the representation of
his interest by existing is or might be
--
inadequate and that the applicant is or might-
-
be bound by the judgment in action." (Emphasis
in original. )
Therefore, whatever else may be derived from the Scott
decision, it appears that Colorado is in agreement with the
United States Supreme Court and the better authorities that
Rule 24(a) (2) is not a complete inventory of interventions
as of right; and further, that in considering whether the
intervenor-applicant is adequately represented in the pending
suit, his petition will be granted if his representation "is
or may be" inadequate.
Moreover, in Scott, the Colorado Court of Appeals had
before it an heir who was suing the estate, not another
heir.
There cannot be an identity of interest between JoAnn
Palmer and the special administrator. The special administrator
represents the estate of Emma Sauter, and in effect, he is
representing the only heirs, JoAnn Palmer and Margaret
Simonson. If he has a fiduciary responsibility to protect
JoAnn Palmer, as the majority implies, he likewise has a
fiduciary responsibility not to injure Margaret Simonson.
He has a conflicting duty and because of that, it cannot be
said that JoAnn Palmer is adequately represented by him.
-10-
In Atlantis Development Corporation v. United States
(5th Cir. 1967), 379 F.2d 818, it was held that the amended
federal Rule 24(a)(2), should be given retroactive application
to the maximum extent possible, so as to incorporate the
pre-1966 interpretation, and the Court further noted that
federal Rule 24(a)(2) ties into the related situations of
joinder of parties and class actions, particularly in Rule
19, Fed.R.Civ.P.
Rule 19, M.R.Civ.P., is identical to Rule 19, Fed.R.Civ.P.
Those rules contain language which is identical to Rule
24(a)(2), in that the Court under Rule 19 will make a finding
as to whether "as a practical matter [refusal of joinder will]
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest."
In an earlier case, State ex rel. Drum v. District Ct. of
Thirteenth J. D. (1976), 169 Mont. 494, 548 P.2d 1377, this
Court refused to dismiss an action where an out-of-state
defendant could not be joined, though the out-of-state
defendant was a usurer that had done business in this state.
The holding in the Drum case was contra to the spirit of
Rule 19, as expressed in Atlantis, that the real parties in
interest should litigate the issues. To the extent that the
majority is rigidly applying Rule 24 in JoAnn Palmer's case,
it is at least consistent with its holding in Drum.
It is useful to repeat what the United States Supreme
Court and other authorities hold in connection with Rule
24(a)(2), that it is not a complete inventory of interventions
allowable of right. Justice is better served when the true
adversaries are allowed to wage the war. I recall the story
of the woman who showed her young son Michaelangelo's statue
of David. When she explained to the boy that the artist had
carved the magnificent figure out of a great block of stone,
the incredulous boy asked how the artist knew that David was
-11-
in there. The time is in the future when this Court will
cut through its granitic view of the Montana Rules, and
release the soul imprisoned therein.
I would grant the writ to permit the intervention of
JoAnn Palmer.