Harris v. Harris

No. 80-20

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA

1980

I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F
WARREN KIRK H A R R I S ,

P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l - a n t ,

DELLA MAE STROTHMAN H A R R I S ,

R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t c1f t h e E j - g h t ~ e e n t hJ u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of G a l l a t i n ,
T h e R o n o r a b l e W. FJ. L e s s l e y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :

For A p ; . j e l l a n t :

M o r r c l w , S e d i v y , O l s o n s. S c u l l y , B o z e m a n , Montana

For Respondent:

B o l k o v a . t z , R o m i n e & John F. Bell, Helen&, Montana

-
S u b m i t - t e d on b r i e f s : Auyust 14, 1980

Decided:
SLP 2 5 198fl

Filed:

Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Warren Kirk Harris appeals the decision of the District
Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County,
awarding property to his wife, Della Mae Harris, upon a find-

ing that their property settlement agreement was deficient.

On January 26, 1978, petitioner filed an action
for dissolution of the marriage. The matter came before the
Honorable W. W. Lessley, presiding without a jury, and was

completed on December 4, 1978. The following day, the parties

executed and signed a settlement agreement disposing of the
marital property. The agreement was approved by the Dis-
trict Court and incorporated into the decree of legal separa-
tion entered on December 19, 1978. The decree of legal
separation was converted into a decree of dissolution on

June 27, 1979. Husband petitioned the District Court for
enforcement of the settlement agreement.
At the conclusion of a July 3rd hearing, the District
Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
effect that the agreement was deficient in two items of
personal property, which the court subsequently granted to

the wife. After denial of petitioner's motion to amend the
findings, or in the alternative to grant a new trial, the

husband appealed to this Court. We affirm.
The parties were married in Bozeman, Montana, on July
4, 1975. After serious marital problems developed be-
tween them, the Harrises executed the December 5th settle-
ment agreement. By the terms of that agreement, the wife
was deeded property near Flathead Lake and a residence in
Missoula. She was to continue as co-owner with her husband
of commercial real estate being leased to her husband's
business. F u r t h e r , s h e was d i r e c t e d by t h e agreement t o

s i g n a six-year l e a s e of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y t o t h e b u s i n e s s

f o r $40,000 w i t h t h e s t o c k t o be p l a c e d i n escrow.

I n h i s p e t i t i o n f o r enforcement o f t h e agreement, t h e

husband a l l e g e d t h a t h i s w i f e had f a i l e d t o honor t h e t e r m s

of t h e i r agreement by f a i l i n g t o s i g n t h e lease f o r t h e r e a l

p r o p e r t y , t h a t s h e had f a i l e d t o d i r e c t t h e bank a s t o t h e

d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e r e n t a l income, and t h a t s h e had f a i l e d t o

complete t h e conveyance of h e r s t o c k i n t h e b u s i n e s s o p e r a t e d

by h e r husband. A t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n t o e n f o r c e

t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement, t h e w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had

r e f u s e d t o complete h e r o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e agreement be-

c a u s e i t was o b v i o u s t o h e r t h a t h e r husband, c o n t r a r y t o

p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and o r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , was no l o n g e r

going t o p r o v i d e h e r w i t h a n automobile and m e d i c a l i n s u r a n c e

coverage. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e was c o n f u s i o n a s t o what

i n f a c t was a g r e e d t o under t h e agreement. The D i s t r i c t

C o u r t concluded t h a t t h e agreement was d e f i c i e n t a s t o t h e

a u t o m o b i l e and t h e i n s u r a n c e , and d i r e c t e d t h e husband t o

f u r n i s h t h e a d d i t i o n a l items.

P e t i t i o n e r o f f e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r o u r re-

view:

1. Was M r s . Harris' request f o r additional property

made o r a l l y t o t h e c o u r t , o v e r s i x months a f t e r e n t r y of t h e

l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n d e c r e e and a p p r o v a l of t h e w r i t t e n agreement,

b a r r e d by R u l e 60 (b), M.R.Civ.P.

2. Was an e a r l i e r f i n d i n g of t h e c o u r t , a s t o t h e

c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of t h e agreement, - j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e
res

s u b s e q u e n t r e q u e s t s of t h e w i f e .

3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n c o n s i d e r i n g a l l e g a -

t i o n s of a n o r a l agreement made s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e
w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement?

4. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e of t h e o r a l agreement

a s t o p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e a u t o m o b i l e and m e d i c a l i n s u r a n c e t o

support the D i s t r i c t Court's findings?

5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n making t h e g r a n t of

p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e terms of t h e agreement,

w i t h o u t making r e q u i r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t , s u c h a s t h e n e t

worth of t h e p a r t i e s , a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MA
C?

R u l e 6 0 ( b ) o f t h e Montana R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e re-

c i t e s i n applicable part:

"On motion and upon such terms a s a r e j u s t ,
t h e c o u r t may r e l i e v e a p a r t y o r h i s l e g a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from a f i n a l judgment, o r d e r ,
o r proceeding f o r t h e following reasons:

" ( 6 ) any o t h e r r e a s o n j u s t i f y i n g r e l i e f from
t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e judgment. "

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e husband made

no o b j e c t i o n a t t h e enforcement h e a r i n g t o t h e t i m e l i n e s s of

h i s wife's requests. Although w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e may

have been a c r u c i a l i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t , t h e h u s b a n d ' s

f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t makes t i m e l i n e s s a n o n j u d i c i a b l e i s s u e on

appeal. The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s c l e a r . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d

n o t have i t s a t t e n t i o n drawn t o t h e o b j e c t i o n t o which w e a r e

now d i r e c t e d . I f t h e w i f e ' s r e q u e s t s were i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y

made t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , i t i s t h e o b l i g a t i o n of opposing

c o u n s e l t o i l l u m i n a t e t h e i m p r o p r i e t y by making a n e x p r e s s

o b j e c t i o n t o i t s o t h a t t h e judge may r e s o l v e t h e i s s u e .

E r r o r of t h i s k i n d must be r a i s e d a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t l e v e l

and may n o t be urged upon t h i s C o u r t f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on

appeal. Kearnes v . McIntyre C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173

Mont. 239, 567 P.2d 433; P i c k e t t v. Kyger ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont.

87, 439 P.2d 57. See a l s o Bower v . Tebbs ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 132 Mont.
 1 4 6 , 314 P.2d 731. W i t h o u t a n o b j e c t i o n t h e r e need b e no
r u l i n g , and w i t h o u t a r u l i n g t h i s C o u r t m u s t c o n c l u d e t h a t

t h e w i f e made h e r r e q u e s t s w i t h i n t h e " r e a s o n a b l e t i m e "

r e q u i r e d by R u l e 6 O ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t below acknowledged i n i t s d e c r e e

o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , d a t e d December 1 9 , 1978, t h a t t h e

s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s and i n c o r p o r a t e d

i n t o t h e d e c r e e w a s c o n s c i o n a b l e and s h o u l d b e a p p r o v e d .

The husband now a s k s t h i s C o u r t t o f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g as t o c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of t h e H a r r i s ' s e t t l e -

ment a g r e e m e n t i s res j u d i c a t a a s t o t h e i s s u e o f t h e i r

m a r i t a l a g r e e m e n t , t h u s b a r r i n g any f u r t h e r r e q u e s t s by t h e

wife. W e d o n o t come t o t h a t c o n c l u s i o n .

I n Brannon v . Lewis and C l a r k County ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont.

200, 387 P.2d 706, c i t i n g t h e r u l e of S t a t e e x r e l . S u l l i v a n

v . S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1 ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 468, 50 P.2d 252,

w e e s t a b l i s h e d f o u r c r i t e r i a which must b e e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e

a p l e a o f res j u d i c a t a c a n b e s u s t a i n e d . The p a r t i e s must b e

t h e same o r i n p r i v i t y t h e i s s u e s must b e t h e same, t h e

s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e a c t i o n must b e t h e same, and t h e r e l a -

t i o n s h i p o f t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r must b e t h e

same. Brannon c o n c l u d e s , a s d o w e , t h a t t h e most i m p o r t a n t

of t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s t h a t of t h e i d e n t i t y of i s s u e . In

t h i s c a s e t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t d i s s i m i l a r i t y as t o t h e i s s u e s

i n v o l v e d t o make t h e d o c t r i n e of res j u d i c a t a i n a p p l i c a b l e .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g was t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t
e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s was n o t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e , n o t t h a t i t

was n e c e s s a r i l y c o m p l e t e . The a g r e e m e n t d i s p o s e d o f t h e
H a r r i s ' m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y b u t made no p r o v i s i o n f o r a n y f u t u r e

support. The p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n h a s no d i r e c t b e a r i n g on

any contemporary agreement f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o be f u l f i l l e d i n
 the future- T h e r e f o r e , t h i s C o u r t must c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e
i s no i d e n t i t y of i s s u e s and t h a t - j u d i c a t a does n o t b a r
res

f u r t h e r a c t i o n on any a l l e g e d agreements between t h e p a r t i e s

a s t o m a t t e r s n o t i n v o l v i n g t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of m a r i t a l prop-

erty.

P e t i t i o n e r f u r t h e r a s s e r t s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court

e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g e v i d e n c e of a n o r a l agreement made

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t agreement.

However, t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e husband made no o b j e c -

t i o n during t r i a l c o u r t proceedings t o h i s w i f e ' s testimony

a b o u t t h e a u t o m o b i l e and t h e i n s u r a n c e . Once a g a i n , we must

c o n c l u d e t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e r e may have been a c r i t i c a l i s s u e

a s t o t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of such e v i d e n c e below, t h e h u s b a n d ' s

f a i l u r e t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e of p a r 0 1 e v i d e n c e a t t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t f o r f e i t e d any r i g h t t o a remedy on a p p e a l . Kearnes v .

McIntyre C o n s t r u c t i o n Co., supra. See a l s o Massey-Ferguson

C r e d i t Corp. v . Brown ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 396, 401, 547 P.2d

846.

I t i s the petitioner's position t h a t there i s insuf-

f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h a t a n o r a l agreement

e x i s t e d between t h e p a r t i e s . I n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s

i s s u e , w e a r e g u i d e d by a number of w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d

p r i n c i p l e s a d h e r e d t o by t h i s Court. The c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t -

n e s s e s and t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i m o n y a r e m a t t e r s

which a r e e x c l u s i v e l y t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n a

nonjury case. Corscadden v. Kenney ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 98, 572

P.2d 1234. I n examining t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e w e

r e v i e w t h e same i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g

p a r t y , and w e f u r t h e r presume t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and con-

c l u s i o n s o f law of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o be c o r r e c t , ~ock

S p r i n g s Corp. v. P i e r r e ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. -1 - . 2d
P I
 37 S t . ~ e p . 1378, 1384. Only i f o u r r e v i e w d i s c l o s e s a d e c i d e d

preponderance of e v i d e n c e c o n t r a r y t o t h e f i n d i n g s and con-

c l u s i o n s of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w i l l we d i s t u r b t h e judgment

of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Morgan and Oswood C o n s t . Co. v . Big Sky

of Montana ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 268, 275, 557 P.2d 1017, 1021.

I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e i s no p r e -

ponderance of e v i d e n c e c o n t r a r y t o t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l

court. The o n l y e v i d e n c e t h a t a n o r a l agreement d i d n o t

e x i s t was t h e h u s b a n d ' s d e n i a l t h a t such a n agreement was

made. However, t h e husband d i d p l a c e a c a r a t h i s w i f e ' s d i s -

p o s a l f o r s e v e r a l months a f t e r t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n which c o u l d

p r o p e r l y be i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n a c t i o n i n f u r t h e r a n c e of h i s

o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t . W w i l l not decide
e

whether o r n o t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n i t s a s s e s s -

ment of t h e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e i t , b u t we d o f i n d t h a t t h e

e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t d i f f e r i n g c o n c l u s i o n s , and

we a r e c o n s t r a i n e d t o honor t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t

Court .
A c c o r d i n g l y , w e c a n a l s o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t were based on s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e s o a s t o

p r o p e r l y s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s judgment.

P e t i t i o n e r f i n a l l y contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court

e r r e d i n making a n " e q u i t a b l e " g r a n t of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y

w i t h o u t making c e r t a i n f i n d i n g s , such a s t h e n e t worth of t h e

e s t a t e , a s r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. W e disagree.

T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t a D i s t r i c t C o u r t need n o t s e t

f o r t h with p a r t i c u l a r i t y i t s findings i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c o u r t was aware o f and c o n s i d e r e d t h e d i r e c -

t i v e i t e m s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. The husband s p e c i f i c a l l y
mentions t h e n e t worth of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . A s t h i s Court

found i n Maberry v . Maberry ( 1 9 7 9 ) , ,
Mont. - 598 P.2d
 "There i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e
t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e n e t worth
of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e p r i o r t o g r a n t i n g main-
tenance t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r " .
The c o u r t below h e l d a h e a r i n g on a l l e l e m e n t s i n m a r i t a l

e s t a t e , and t h e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h e c o u r t d i d n o t

c o n s i d e r t h e whole of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e

s e p a r a t i o n agreement was d e f i c i e n t . Mcreover, a s w e found i n

I n Re t h e M a r r i a g e of M i l l e r ( C h . u = ~ N o80-71,
. Decided August

27, 1 9 8 0 ) , t h e e x i s t e n c e of a v a l i d agreement presumes t h a t

t h e n e t w o r t h of t h e p a r t i e s h a s been c o n s i d e r e d by t h e

p a r t i e s a s t o t h e p r o p e r t y d i s p o s e d of by t h e agreement.

I n t h e case before us t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t t h e

n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s was e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t and by t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s .

T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e lower

c o u r t a b s e n t a c l e a r a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n by which t h e t r i a l

judge a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t t h e employment of c o n s c i o u s

judgment o r exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n . I n R e t h e Marriage

of F r e d e r i c k s e n ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. , - P.2d , 37 St.Rep.

191, 1 9 2 . Although we r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e by which

t h e w i f e ' s r e q u e s t was g r a n t e d w a s i r r e g u l a r and p r o c e d u r a l l y

i n f i r m , we c a n n o t go s o f a r a s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t a c t e d w i t h o u t " t h e employment of c o n s c i o u s r e a s o n " o r

"exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n . "

Accordingly, w e a f f i r
\

hV&
&
Justices
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d i s s e n t i n g :

I dissent.

T h e m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e p a v e s t h e way f o r

d i s g r u n t l e d s p o u s e s t o come i n t o c o u r t a t a n y t i m e f o r a r e v i e w

o f t h e i r w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreements. Not o n l y does

t h i s v i o l a t e s e t t l e d c o n t r a c t law, b u t i t circumvents t h e pur-

p o s e s o f t h e U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t as a d o p t e d i n t h i s

state. S e c t i o n 40-4-201(1), MCA p r o v i d e s t h e p r o c e d u r e b y w h i c h

p a r t i e s t o a marriage can e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement s e t t i n g

f o r t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s u p o n t e r m i n a t i o n o f

t h e i r marriage:

" S e p a r a t i o n agreement. ( 1 ) To p r o m o t e a m i -
c a b l e s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s ~ u t e sb e t w e e n ~ a r t i e s
t o a m a r r i a g e a t t e n d a n t ' upon t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n
o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e i r marriage, t h e par-
t i e s may e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n s e p a r a t i o n
agreement c o n t a i n i n g p r o v i s i o n s f o r d i sposi-
t i o n o f a n y p r o p e r t y owned b y e i t h e r o f t h e m ,
m a i n t e n a n c e o f e i t h e r o f t h e m , and s u p p o r t ,
c u s t o d y , and v i s i t a t i o n o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n . "

T h i s agreement i s b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t , unless the

c o u r t f i n d s i t t o be u n c o n s c i o n a b l e :

" ( 2 ) I n a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o f
marriage o r f o r legal separation, the terms o f
t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement, e x c e p t t h o s e pro-
v i d i n g f o r t h e s u p p o r t , c u s t o d y , and v i s i t a -
t i o n o f c h i l d r e n , a r e b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t
u n l e s s i t f i n d s , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e econom-
i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e p a r t i e s and a n y o t h e r
r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e produced b y t h e p a r t i e s , on
t h e i r own m o t i o n o r on r e q u e s t o f t h e c o u r t ,
t h a t t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement i s unconscionable."
S e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA.

The d i s t r i c t j u d g e , i n e n t e r i n g t h e decree o f l e g a l

s e p a r a t i o n o f D e c e m b e r 1 9 , 1 9 7 8 , made s e v e r a l f i n d i n g s w i t h

r e s p e c t t o t h e p a r t i e s ' w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement:

"2. That t h e P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t Agreement o f
t h e p a r t i e s , d a t e d D e c e m b e r 5 , 1 9 7 8 , i s made a
p a r t o f t h i s Decree."

"6. That s a i d P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t Agreement
i s not unconscionable."
 Once s u c h f i n d i n g s a r e e n t e r e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

t h e UMDA f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t l e r m s o f t h e agreement ...
are enforceable . . . as c o n t r a c t terms." S e c t i o n 40-4-201(5),

MCA. I n e n f o r c i n g p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t s as c o n t r a c t u a l

agreements, t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e 1 ied o n M o n t a n a

c o n t r a c t law t o f i n d t h a t a w r i t t e n instrument supersedes a l l

o r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s which occurred p r i o r t o o r simultaneously w i t h

t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e w r i t t e n agreement. Sect i o n 28-2-904, MCA;

M e r r i t t v. M e r r i t t (1974), 165 Mont. 1 7 2 , 1 7 8 , 5 2 6 P.2d 1375, 1379.

B o t h p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n a d m i t t o e x t e n s i v e nego-

t i a t i o n s and d i s c u s s i o n s p r i o r t o s i g n i n g t h i s agreement. Mrs.

H a r r i s acknowledged i n c o u r t t h a t " . . . for a w h o l e y e a r we

d i s c u s s e d i n many ways [ s i c ] o f settlement. E v e r y t i m e he

d e c i d e d t o d i v o r c e me a g a i n , we w o u l d come u p w i t h a n o t h e r t y p e

o f settlement."

Finally, o n D e c e m b e r 5, 1978, the parties did sign a

w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t agreement, d i s p o s i n g o f t h e i r r e a l and p e r -

sonal property. At t h a t point i n time they fixed t h e i r r i g h t s

and o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r p r o p e r t y , M i l l e r v. Miller

(1980) , Mont. -9 -P.2d , 37 St.Rep. 1523, 1526, and
t h e i r p r i o r d i s c u s s i o n s about d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y were
2
.
no l o n g e r d e t e r m i n a t i v e . S e c t i o n 2 8 - X - 9 0 4 , MCA.

T h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e made no f a c t u a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e par-

t i e s had e n t e r e d i n t o a s e p a r a t e e n f o r c e a b l e o r a l agreement.

Rather, he c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t f i n a l i z e d t h e

p a r t i e s ' p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e s and was a c o m p l e t e a n d f i n a l property

a g r e e m e n t e x c e p t t h a t i t was d e f i c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n s u r a n c e

and t h e c a r . T h e r e w e r e no a l l e g a t i o n s o f , o r findings of, fraud,

mistake o r overreaching, n o r was any r e a s o n g i v e n t o e x p l a i n why

t h e s e i t e m s were n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e agreement. Yet t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t and t h i s C o u r t a r e p r e p a r e d t o r e w r i t e t h i s w r i t t e n p r o p e r t y

agreement, signed v o l u n t a r i l y by both p a r t i e s , and i n t h e p r e -

s e n c e o f t h e i r own a t t o r n e y s .

- 10-
 The m a j o r i t y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e c a r and t h e i n s u r a n c e as

m a t t e r s w h i c h w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be c o v e r e d b y t h e p r o p e r t y

s e t t l e m e n t agreement, b u t r a t h e r as i t e m s o f " f u t u r e s u p p o r t "

t h a t c o u l d be t h e s u b j e c t o f a s e p a r a t e agreement. Y e t t h e r e was

no f a c t u a l f i n d i n g o f a s e p a r a t e s u p p o r t agreement, and i n f a c t ,

t h e d i s t r i c t judge i m p l i c i t l y noted i n h i s f i n d i n g s t h a t these

t w o i t e m s were m e r e l y o m i s s i o n s from t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , and

i n a w a r d i n g t h e s e t o Mrs. Harris, t h e d i s t r i c t judge found t h a t

t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u p p o r t e d t h e a w a r d o f t h e s e i t e m s a s s u p -

p o r t e d t h e o t h e r property d i s t r i b u t e d t o her.

I do n o t d i s p u t e t h e power o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e s

in M o n t a n a t o m o d i f y a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t . Sect i o n 40-4-208 ( 3 )

provides :

"(3) T h e p r o v i s i o n s as t o p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n
may n o t be r e v o k e d o r m o d i f i e d b y a c o u r t ,
except:

"(a) upon w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s ; or

"(b) i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f con-
d i t i o n s t h a t j u s t i f y the reopening o f a
judgment under t h e laws o f t h i s s t a t e .

B u t t h e r e was no f i n d i n g made b y t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e w h i c h

j u s t i f i e s t h e reopening o f t h i s judgment. T h e r e was no f i n d i n g o f

f r a u d , m i s t a k e , m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r any o t h e r c o n d i t i o n w h i c h

allows the rescission or modification of a contract. This

c o n t r a c t was m o d i f i e d o n l y b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t f o u n d i t t o be

"inequitable," despite the 'er finding that the

a g r e e m e n t was n o t

I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e i f one p a r t y t o an agreement n e g l e c t s

t o i n c l u d e t e r m s which i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t spouse f e e l s s h o u l d

have been i n c l u d e d . B u t t h i s i s no r e a s o n t o o v e r t u r n t h e a g e -

o l d law o f contracts, which seeks t o p r e s e r v e t h e s a n c t i t y o f a

w r i t t e n agreement, a n d a l l o w s p a r t i e s t o i t t o be a p p r i s e d o f

t h e i r r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h a t a g r e e m e n t .

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Chief Justice