State v. Ulrich

No. 80-29
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980

STATE OF b1ONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

JOEL JON ULRICH,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead,
Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ted 0 . Lympus, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Dennis J. Hester argued, Deputy County Attorney,
Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent :
Daley, Sherlock & Nardi, Kalispell, Montana
Stephen J. Nardi argued, Kalispell, Montana

Submitted: February 28, 1980

Filed:
r I
m
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

his i s a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l by t h e S t a t e o f Montana

from a judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i -

c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , n and f o r F l a t h e a d County, s u p p r e s s i n g
i

c e r t a i n e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e of J o e l J o n U l r i c h , who i s

c h a r g e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide.

Testimony r e c e i v e d a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g h e l d on

August 1 0 , 1979, and a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g h e l d on J a n -

u a r y 4 , 1980, i n d i c a t e s t h a t Carolyn Wiley d i e d i n h e r

Columbia F a l l s t r a i l e r house a s a r e s u l t o f a g u n s h o t wound

i n f l i c t e d i n t h e l a t e evening hours of J u l y 1 4 o r t h e e a r l y

morning h o u r s of J u l y 1 5 , 1979. Death was c a u s e d by a

s m a l l c a l i b e r b u l l e t e n t e r i n g t h e back of h e r head.

A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8:00 a . m . on J u l y 1 5 , 1979, O f f i c e r

Gregory Dawson o f t h e Columbia F a l l s P o l i c e Department

a r r i v e d a t t h e t r a i l e r house o c c u p i e d by d e f e n d a n t , J o e l J o n

U l r i c h , and t h e d e c e a s e d , Carolyn Wiley, and l o c a t e d t h e

body of M s . Wiley. During a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n conducted t h a t

morning by O f f i c e r Dawson and o t h e r o f f i c e r s of t h e Columbia

F a l l s P o l i c e Department, i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d from i n t e r -

views i n d i c a t e d t h a t C a r o l y n Wiley and d e f e n d a n t had been
l i v i n g t o g e t h e r f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e y e a r s ; t h a t t h e y had

been a r g u i n g t h e day p r e c e d i n g h e r d e a t h ; and t h a t d e f e n -

d a n t was t h e l a s t p e r s o n s e e n w i t h h e r i n t h e t r a i l e r .

A t a b o u t 2:30 p.m. t h a t same d a y , d e f e n d a n t U l r i c h

walked i n t o t h e Columbia F a l l s p o l i c e s t a t i o n and a s k e d ,

" W i l l someone t e l l m e w h a t ' s g o i n g on .. .?" H e w a s taken

t o t h e o f f i c e o f t h e c h i e f of p o l i c e and p l a c e d under a r r e s t .

H e w a s t h e n g i v e n h i s Miranda r i g h t s . A t t h a t time, defen-

d a n t s t a t e d t h a t h e was n o t g o i n g t o s a y any more u n t i l he

saw a n a t t o r n e y . Defendant was a s k e d some q u e s t i o n s and
s e v e r a l t i m e s informed t h e o f f i c e r s t h a t h e wished t o have

an attorney present. During t h i s t i m e p e r i o d , O f f i c e r

Dawson e n t e r e d t h e room, p r e p a r e d h i s equipment, and p e r -

formed a n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t upon d e f e n d a n t .
The n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t i n v o l v e s r u n n i n g c o t t o n
swabs o v e r t h e f i n g e r s , palms, and t o p o f t h e hands. The

swabs a r e t h e n p l a c e d i n a s p e c i a l k i t and m a i l e d t o a

s c i e n t i f i c l a b o r a t o r y f o r examination t o determine t h e

p r e s e n c e o f barium and antimony, t h e r e s i d u e o f gunpowder.

A t no t i m e d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n s e n t t o t h e t a k i n g of

t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n t e s t . A t no t i m e up t o and d u r i n g

t h e t a k i n g of t h e t e s t w a s d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l p r e s e n t o r

had he c o n s u l t e d w i t h c o u n s e l . A t no t i m e up t o and d u r i n g

t h e swabbing of d e f e n d a n t ' s hands d i d h e v o i c e a r e f u s a l o r

o f f e r any p h y s i c a l o r v e r b a l r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a -

t i o n of t h e n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t . N f o r c e of any k i n d
o
w a s used i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n

t e s t by O f f i c e r Dawson.
U l r i c h was c h a r g e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide by c o m p l a i n t d a t e d J u l y 1 6 , 1979. H e has entered a

p l e a of n o t g u i l t y . On December 26, 1979, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a

motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e r e s u l t s of t h e n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n
t e s t on t h e grounds t h a t i t was a n u n r e a s o n a b l e and i l l e g a l

s e a r c h and s e i z u r e under t h e F o u r t h Amendment. He also

s o u g h t t o s u p p r e s s o t h e r e v i d e n c e a s b e i n g i n v i o l a t i o n of
h i s r i g h t s a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n under t h e F i f t h

Amendment and Miranda, and i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s S i x t h Amend-
ment r i g h t t o c o u n s e l .
A h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s was h e l d on J a n u a r y

4 , 1 9 8 0 , a t which t i m e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made f i n d i n g s of
f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law and o r d e r e d c e r t a i n i t e m s of
evidence suppressed. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found a s a m a t t e r

of law t h a t t h e a r r e s t of d e f e n d a n t a t t h e Columbia F a l l s

p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t w a s l a w f u l and p r o p e r i n t h a t t h e r e w a s
probable cause t o a r r e s t defendant a t t h a t t i m e . The C o u r t

a l s o d e t e r m i n e d a s a m a t t e r o f law t h a t t h e t a k i n g of t h e

neutron a c t i v a t i o n test without having a f f o r d e d defendant

h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l and w i t h o u t o b t a i n i n g h i s a f f i r m a t i v e

c o n s e n t v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Such e v i d e n c e

obtained w a s thereby ordered suppressed. The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , however, a r e u n c l e a r a s t o t h e s p e c i f i c

l e g a l b a s i s f o r s u p p r e s s i n g t h e r e s u l t s of t h e n e u t r o n

a c t i v a t i o n test.

P u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 46-20-103(2) ( e ), MCA, t h e S t a t e of
Montana a p p e a l s o n l y t h a t p a r t of t h e o r d e r s u p p r e s s i n g t h e
r e s u l t s o f t h e n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t and p r e s e n t s t h e

f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r review:
1. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t t o b e
s e c u r e a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s w a s v i o -

l a t e d by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t

w i t h o u t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t immediately a f t e r h i s a r r e s t ?
2. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s F i f t h Amendment r i g h t s a g a i n s t
s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n w e r e v i o l a t e d by a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e neu-

tron activation test?

3. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o coun-

s e l a p p l i e s t o t h e administration of t h e neutron a c t i v a t i o n
test?
The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a n e u t r o n
a c t i v a t i o n t e s t by p o l i c e o f f i c e r s upon d e f e n d a n t a f t e r a

l a w f u l and p r o p e r a r r e s t i s w i t h i n t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e
o f f i c e r ' s r i g h t t o search t h e defendant's person i n c i d e n t t o

a l a w f u l a r r e s t under t h e F o u r t h Amendment of t h e u n i t e d
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and under s e c t i o n s 46-5-102(4) and 46-5-

1 0 1 ( 1 ) , MCA. The manner of s e a r c h w a s r e a s o n a b l e under t h e

s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n Schmerber v . C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384

U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. The F o u r t h Amend-

ment d o e s n o t p r o h i b i t a l l s e a r c h e s and i n t r u s i o n s , o n l y

t h o s e "which a r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o r

which a r e made i n a n improper manner," i . e . , "unreasonable."

Schmerber, 384 U.S. a t 768.

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o m e e t i t s

burden of proof a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g t o make an a f f i r -

m a t i v e showing t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d by t h e n e u t r o n

a c t i v a t i o n t e s t c o u l d o r would have been d e s t r o y e d o r l o s t

had a s e a r c h w a r r a n t been o b t a i n e d , c i t i n g Cupp v . Murphy

( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 2 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900; Schmerber,

s u p r a ; and S t a t e v. C r i p p s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 582 P.2d

312, 35 St.Rep. 967. Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly

s u p p r e s s e d any e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e t a k i n g of o r r e s u l t s

from t h e n e u t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t . Furthermore, defendant

a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e c o u l d b e no v a l i d s e a r c h i n c i d e n t t o

arrest b e c a u s e t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o

a l l o w a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t , and d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t w a s

t h e r e f o r e unlawful.

F i r s t , w e t a k e n o t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t found p r o b a b l e

c a u s e and a l e g a l a r r e s t . T h i s i s s u e h a s n o t been a p p e a l e d ,

and i s n o t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t .

T h i s a p p e a l c o n c e r n s t h e p e r m i s s i b l e s c o p e of a w a r r a n t -

less s e a r c h i n c i d e n t t o a r r e s t where t h e m a t e r i a l s e i z e d
from t h e p e r s o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of t h e

offense. " I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a search incident t o a

lawful a r r e s t i s a t r a d i t i o n a l exception t o t h e warrant
r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e F o u r t h Amendment." u n i t e d S t a t e s v.
Robinson ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 4 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d

427. S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Edwards ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 415 U.S.

800, 802, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771. A search incident

t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t r e q u i r e s no a d d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i f

i t i s w i t h i n t h e p e r m i s s i b l e s c o p e , Robinson, 4 1 4 U.S. at

235, and t h e r e i s no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e make a

showing t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i s d e s t r u c t i b l e .

"The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a s e a r c h i n c i d e n t
t o a r r e s t d o e s n o t depend on whether t h e r e
i s any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p e r s o n a r r e s t e d
p o s s e s s e s weapons o r e v i d e n c e . The f a c t of
a lawful a r r e s t , standing alone, authorizes
a s e a r c h . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Robinson . . ."
Michigan v. Def i l l i p p o (1979) , U.S.
, 9 9 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 6 1 ~ . E d . 2 d 343.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , a l t h o u g h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was e v i d e n c e

upon d e f e n d a n t ' s p e r s o n t h a t c o u l d be d e s t r o y e d o r l o s t o v e r

a p e r i o d o f t i m e w a s a f a c t o r c o n s i d e r e d by t h e C o u r t i n

Schmerber and i n Cupp v. Murphy, s u p r a , t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s

case w a s a l s o d e s t r u c t i b l e o r subject t o l o s s with the

p a s s a g e of t i m e , a s w e r e t h e f i n g e r n a i l s c r a p i n g s i n Cupp

and t h e b l o o d sample i n Schmerber.

W are of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f a neu-
e

t r o n a c t i v a t i o n t e s t by p o l i c e o f f i c e r s upon d e f e n d a n t

f o l l o w i n g h i s a r r e s t was w i t h i n t h e p e r m i s s i b l e s c o p e of a

s e a r c h i n c i d e n t t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t under t h e F o u r t h Amend-

ment. To b e g i n w i t h , t h e F o u r t h Amendment d o e s n o t p r o h i b i t

a l l s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s , o n l y t h o s e which a r e "unreason-

able"; i.e., "which a r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

o r which a r e made i n a n improper manner." Schmerber, 384

U.S. a t 768. Any i n t r u s i o n i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e w a s mini-

m a l , and t h e s e a r c h and t h e manner i n which i t was conducted

w e r e r e a s o n a b l e under t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h by t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Schmerber and Cupp.
 In affirming the defendant's conviction for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
Schrr~erberheld that the
liquor, a majority of the Court in - -
extraction from the defendant of a blood sample to test for
alcohol as an incident to his arrest was not an unreasonable
search. The Court compared searches of dwellings and "intru-
sions into the human body," and went on to observe that the
taking of a blood sample to prevent the destruction of
evidence was justified by the emergency nature of the search:
"We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood
begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body
functions to eliminate it from the system." 384 U.S. at
770.
There is no doubt an affirmative showing was made in
Schmerber, but it is highly questionable that this becomes
part of the rule. In any event, we do not have an intrusion
of the body in this case, so we view the matter in a softer
light than the defendant and look to a more factually simi-
lar case for direction.
In Cupp v. Murphy, supra, the suspect voluntarily
appeared at the police station for questioning concerning
the strangulation death of his wife, at which time the
police noticed what appeared to be dried blood on his finger.
The suspect had not been formally placed under arrest,
although the police had probable cause to arrest him at that
time. He attempted to rub the evidence off his hands after

refusing to consent to the taking of a fingernail sample.
Against his will and without obtaining a search warrant, the

police took scrapings from the defendant's fingernails which
produced incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court held

that the search did not violate the defendant's Fourth

Amendment rights:
 "We b e l i e v e t h i s s e a r c h was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
p e r m i s s i b l e under t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Chimel v .
C a l i f o r n i a , 395 U.S. 752 . .
. Chimel s t a n d s
i n a l o n g l i n e of cases r e c o g n i z i n g a n excep-
t i o n t o t h e w a r r a n t r e q u i r e m e n t when a s e a r c h
i s i n c i d e n t t o a v a l i d arrest . .
. The b a s i s
f o r t h i s e x c e p t i o n i s t h a t when a n a r r e s t i s
made, it i s r e a s o n a b l e f o r a p o l i c e o f f i c e r
t o e x p e c t t h e a r r e s t e e t o u s e any weapons he
may have and t o a t t e m p t t o d e s t r o y any i n c r i -
minating evidence then i n h i s possession . ..
The C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d i n Chimel t h a t t h e s c o p e
o f a w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h must b e commensurate
with the r a t i o n a l e t h a t excepts the search
from t h e w a r r a n t r e q u i r e m e n t .

". .
. The r a t i o n a l e o f Chimel, i n t h e s e c i r -
cumstances, j u s t i f i e d t h e p o l i c e i n s u b j e c t i n g
him t o t h e v e r y l i m i t e d s e a r c h n e c e s s a r y t o
preserve t h e highly evanescent evidence they
found under h i s f i n g e r n a i l s .. .
"On t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , c o n s i d e r i n g t h e
e x i s t e n c e of probable cause, t h e very l i m i t e d
i n t r u s i o n undertaken i n c i d e n t t o t h e s t a t i o n
house d e t e n t i o n , and t h e r e a d y d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y
of t h e e v i d e n c e , w e c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h i s s e a r c h
v i o l a t e d t h e F o u r t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments."
Cupp, 4 1 2 U.S. a t 295-96.

The r a t i o n a l e o f t h e s e h o l d i n g s i s t h a t t h e p e r m i s s i b l e

s c o p e of a s e a r c h i n c i d e n t t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t , when t h e
o f f i c e r s are s e a r c h i n g f o r e v i d e n c e o f t h e o f f e n s e , i s

r e s t r i c t e d t o where t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d w a s of such a n a t u r e

t h a t i t w a s l i k e l y t o be l o s t o r d e s t r o y e d i f n o t immedi-

a t e l y seized. C o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s , however,
t h e s e c a s e s do n o t impose upon t h e S t a t e a burden o f making

an a f f i r m a t i v e showing t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d w a s o f such

a n a t u r e t h a t i t was l i k e l y t o be l o s t o r d e s t r o y e d i f n o t
immediately s e i z e d . I n any e v e n t , t h e S t a t e i n i t s t r i a l
b r i e f informed t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t a f t e r a p e r i o d of

t i m e t h e p r e s e n c e of gunpowder r e s i d u e s on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
hand c a n change and f i n a l l y be d e s t r o y e d s o t h a t t h e e v i -
dence i n f a c t disappears. Furthermore, t h i s Court has

u p h e l d a f u l l body s e a r c h i n c i d e n t t o a c u s t o d i a l a r r e s t i n
State v. Cripps (1978), Mont. 582 P.2d 312, 35
St.Rep. 967, where the police had probable cause to arrest
the defendants and found illegal drugs in one defendant's
pocket and on the other defendant during a jailhouse search.
We said:
"It is well settled that law enforcement of-
ficers may make a full body search pursuant
to a lawful arrest for purposes of protecting
themselves or seizing evidence cf the crime."
Cripps, 582 P.2d at 318.
In the same case, a search of the defendant's car for illegal
drugs conducted at the scene of the arrest was held improper
"when there was no chance of defendant's harming the police
officers nor of their destroying their evidence." 582 P.2d
at 319.
From the uncertainty of the trial court's order, we
should comment beyond the Fourth Amendment to avoid any
future delay in this matter.
The administration of a neutron activation test upon
defendant did not violate his rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment because the Fifth Amendment protects only against
compelling "evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761. The gunpowder resi-
dues taken from defendant's hands do not meet this criteria.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to
these circumstances. An initial search of a defendant

incident to arrest does not require the presence of counsel
because the defendant's right to counsel attaches only at
the time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him by way of a formal charge. See Kirby v. Illinois
(1972), 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877r 32 L.Ed.2d 411.
 The judgment of the trial court is reversed on the one

issue appealed from said judgment, suppression of the re-

sults of the neutron activation test. The cause is remanded

for further proceedings.

),
. dd
+
Justice

We concur:

s;&l wid weeQ
C- Justice

Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting:

The holding of the District Court is not unclear to
me. It found that no reason existed for the police not seeking
a search warrant before applying the neutron activation test:
". .
. There is no showing that a warrant was not
available under the procedure in Montana for
securing same, nor is there any showing that the
neutron activation test could not have been obtained
at that time through proper request, and ips un-
fortunate; that the Court is of the opinion that
such could have been taken within that time and
it would have been permissible.. . ."
Neither Cupp v. Murphy (1973), 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000,
36 L.Ed.2d 900, nor Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S.

757, -sect. -1 - L.Ed.2d , are applicable in this
case, and do not support the majority. In Ccpp, the Court
found that the fingernail scrapings were evanescent; in
Schmerber, the Court found the prejudicial evidence in the
blood sample would disappear. Here, the District Court found
no such situation. There is - evidence here, as the District
no
Court found, that the incriminating evidence would disappear
before a search warrant could be obtained. To say that the
State has no burden to make an affirmative showing that the
object of the search might be lost or destroyed is to say
that the State never needs to justify a warrantless search
if the search reveals some incriminating evidence. Under
that rationale, we can kiss the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
goodbye.