State v. Gopher

No. 80-276 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . THANE GOPHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Donovan and Anderson, Office of Public Defender, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: June 10, 1981 Decided: @p 1 4 ifdl Filed: s! i' i rlr>r-r tybl oi;F,,p**d Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . Daiy d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . Defendant Thane Gopher was charged on October 16, 1959, with aggravated a s s a u l t , s e c t i o n 45-5-202(1)(d), MCA, by an information f i l e d i n Cascade County D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The information alleged that defendant purposely or k n o w i n g l y c a u s e d b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a p e a c e o f f i c e r by k i c k i n g nim i n the leg. Defendant e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y . On A p r i l 1, 1 9 8 0 , a j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y anci tne court sentenced defendant t o t h r e e years in the Montana S t a t e Prison, with all of the sentence suspended except for t h e f i r s t s i x months which was t o be s e r v e d in the Cascade County jail. On June 23, 1980, the court e x c u s e d d e f e n d a n t from s e r v i n g a n y f u r t h e r t i m e i n j a i l on the requirement that he complete certain conditions of employment. Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n . On t h e morning of October 5, 1979, an a u t o m o b i l e i n w h i c h d e f e n d a n t was a p a s s e n g e r was stopped for "erratic" driving. The deputy sheriff requested the operator's l i c e n s e of the driver , d e f e n d a n t ' s b r o t h e r , who was u n a b l e t o produce one. Af t e r receiving the necessary information from t h e d r i v e r , the deputy s h e r i f f issued a c i t a t i o n and inquired as to the identities of the passengers. Upon learning the names of the passengers, the deputy sheriff checked w i t h t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t o a s c e r t a i n i f t h e r e were a n y o u t s t a n d i n g w a r r a n t s on t h e p a s s e n g e r s . When t h e d e p u t y s h e r i f f was i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e r e was a n o u t s t a n d i n g b u r g l a r y war r a n t f o r " J a y Thane G o p h e r , " he approached t h e v e h i c l e and asked the passengers which one was Thane Gopher. Defendant hesitated but identified himself and e x i t e d the v e h i c l e upon t h e d e p u t y ' s r e q u e s t . He was t h e n i n f o r m e d by t h e d e p u t y t h a t h e was u n d e r a r r e s t f o r b u r g l a r y . B e f o r e d e f e n d a n t was p l a c e d i n t h e p a t r o l v e h i c l e , h e was p a t t e d down and handcuffed. At this time defendant became v e r b a l l y a b u s i v e and v e r b a l l y t h r e a t e n e d t h e d e p u t y sheriff. Defendant a l s o refused t o g e t i n t o t h e backseat of t h e p a t r o l c a r and p h y s i c a l l y r e s i s t e d t h e d e p u t y s h e r i f f by k i c k i n g him i n t h e l e g j u s t above t h e knee. Thereafter, defendant fell back into the patrol car and c o n t i n u e d to r e s i s t t h e d e p u t y s h e r i f f by k i c k i n g a t him. Finally, the deputy, with assistance from another officer, pushed d e f e n d a n t i n t o t h e c a r f a r enough t o g e t t h e d o o r c l o s e d . The b a s i s for t h e c h a r g e of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t was t h e "bodily injury" t h a t t h e deputy s h e r i f f received from the defendant's k i c k t o the deputy's leg. When q u e s t i o n e d about the nature and degree of the injury, the deputy sheriff t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s l e g was d i s c o l o r e d and s o r e f o r a b o u t a week b u t t h a t t h e i n j u r y d i d n o t r e q u i r e a n y m e d i c a l treatment whatsoever. The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w a r e : 1. Whether, by r e f u s i n g t o i n c l u d e a n o f f e r e d i n - s t r u c t i o n on resisting arrest, the trial court committed reversible error? 2. Whether t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t a v e r d i c t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ? 3. Whether t h e t r i a l j u d g e had p r o p e r j u r i s d i c t i o n ? Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury that the o f f e n s e o f r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t was a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f aggravated a s s a u l t . I t is a b a s i c r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t the trial court's i n s t r u c t i o n s must cover every issue or theory having support in the evidence. State v. Buckley ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 238, 557 P.2d 283. T h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Ostwald (1979), -- Mont. , 591 P.2d 646, 651, 36 St.Rep. 442, 448, stated that, ". . . a defendant is e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s on l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s i f any e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d which would p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o rationally f i n d him g u i l t y o f a lesser o f f e n s e and a c q u i t him of a greater." See a l s o S t a t e v. Baugh ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 456, 571 P.261 779; State v. Bouslaugh (1978), 176 Mont. 7 8 , 576 P.2d 261; S t a t e v . R a d i ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 451, 578 P.2d 1169. Further, t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Hamilton (1980)t - Mont . , 605 P.2d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 2 9 , 37 S t . R e p . 70, 77, emphasized t h a t , " [w]e h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t s u c h a n i n s t r u c t i o n is r e q u i r e d where t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e t o support the lesser offense." The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n refusing to instruct the jury on t h e o f f e n s e o f resisting arrest because the offenses of resisting arrest and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a r e n o t i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d and t h i s C o u r t should adopt t h e " i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p " test t o determine i f t h e two o f f e n s e s a r e i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d . The "inherent relationship" test is a product of several United States Supreme Court cases culminating in K e e b l e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 412 U.S. 205, 93 S . C t . 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844. I n Keeble t h e Court held t h a t ". . . the d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s on a l e s s e r included offense, if evidence would permit the jury rationally to f i n d him g u i l t y o f t h e l e s s e r o f f e n s e and a c q u i t him o f t h e greater ." 412 U.S. a t 208. I n o t h e r words, t h e t e s t t o be applied is, if the lesser offense is supported by the e v i d e n c e and i s " i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d " t o t h e g r e a t e r o f f e n s e , t h e n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e j u r y . T h i s t e s t d o e s n o t d i f f e r i n a n y a p p r e c i a b l e way f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d t h a t h a s been u s e d i n t h i s s t a t e . See S t a t e v. Ostwald (1979), Mont. , 5 9 1 P.2d 646, 36 S t . R e p . 442. Therefore, t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o a d o p t t h e " i n h e r e n t relationship" test. The S t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t c a n n o t p o s s i b l y be a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t is erroneous. The b a s i s f o r i t s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e two sections, 45-5-202(1)(d), MCA ( a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ) , a n d 4 5 - 7-301, MCA ( r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t ) , p r o t e c t two t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t interests i n our society. It argues t h a t the aggravated a s s a u l t s e c t i o n p r o t e c t s t h e p h y s i c a l s a f e t y of p e a c e o f f i - c e r s w h i l e t h e y p e r f o r m t h e i r d u t i e s and t h a t t h e r e s i s t i n g arrest section protects society's interest in preventing suspects from t h w a r t i n g an arrest. Therefore, the State concludes, there is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two sections to require the lesser included offense instruction. The r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 45-7-301, MCA, provides: "A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t i f h e knowingly p r e v e n t s o r a t t e m p t s t o p r e v e n t a p e a c e o f f i c e r from e f f e c t i n g an a n a r r e s t by: " ( a ) using or threatening t o use physical f o r c e or violence a g a i n s t t h e peace o f f i c e r or another; or " ( b ) u s i n g any o t h e r means which c r e a t e s a r i s k of c a u s i n g p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o t h e p e a c e o f f i c e r or another. " The testimony of the deputy sheriff was that the defendant verbally threatened the deputies, kicked one of them i n t h e l e g , and c o n t i n u e d t o k i c k u n t i l b o t h o f f i c e r s forced defendant i n t o the backseat. C l e a r l y , t h i s is s u f f i - cient evidence to satisfy the elements of the resisting a r r e s t s t a t u t e ; t h a t is, the defendant did use "threatening" language to the peace officers and he did use "physical force" against the peace officers. The testimony of the d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s was n o t e v e n c o n t r a v e r t e d by d e f e n d a n t . Further, under t h e p e r t i n e n t p a r t of the aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e , i t i s s t a t e d : "A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated assault if he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s e s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a peace o f f i c e r . " I t is a p p a r e n t from t h e f a c t s t h a t t h e r e was a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e t r i e r o f f a c t a s t o whether defendant "purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury" t o the deputy s h e r i f f . Again, when t h e f a c t s a r e a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t u t e s , t h e y would be s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y the necessary elements for either offense. Finally, from t h e l a n g u a g e of O s t w a l d , i . e . , " [ a ] d e f e n d a n t is e n t i t l e d t o instructions on lesser included offenses if any e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d which would p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o r a t i o n - a l l y f i n d him g u i l t y o f a l e s s e r o f f e n s e and a c q u i t him o f a greater ," 5 9 1 P.2d 6 5 1 , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t s h o u l d h a v e been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y . Under f e d e r a l c a s e l a w t h e r e s u l t i s a l s o t h e same. The two f e d e r a l c a s e s t h a t b e s t i l l u s t r a t e how t h e " i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p " t e s t works a r e United S t a t e s v. Whitaker (7th Cir. 1 9 7 1 ) , 447 F.2d 34, and U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Johnson (9th Cir. 1980), 637 F.2d 1224, 1233. In Johnson the court a n a l y z e d t h e i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p t e s t u s e d by t h e U n i t e d States Supreme C o u r t in Keeble, by utilizing a two-part test. First, the court stated that a lesser included o f i e n s e m u s t be i d e n t i t i e d , and s e c o n d , a r a t i o n a l j u r y m u s t be a b l e t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h e i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e b u t i n n o c e n t of t h e g r e a t e r o f f e n s e . H e r e , a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e i s i d e n t i f i a b l e and a j u r y , if the resisting a r r e s t i n s t r u c t i o n is given, could reasonably find defendant g u i l t y of r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t and a c q u i t on a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . The J o h n s o n c o u r t a p p r o a c h i s b a s e d upon i t s r e a d i n g of Rule 3 1 ( c ) , Fed.R.Crim.P. (synonymous w i t h s e c t i o n 46- 1 6 - 6 0 3 ( 3 ) , MCA), which r e g u l a t e s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f when a lesser included offense instruction s h o u l d be g i v e n . The c o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t , " [ t l h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s r u l e is t o a v o i d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e j u r y , convinced t h a t t h e defen- d a n t i s g u i l t y o f some c r i m e , i s t e m p t e d t o c o n v i c t him o f t h e charged o f f e n s e s . " 637 F.2d 1233. From t h e f a c t s , as t h e y have been p r e s e n t e d in t h i s case, the jury could have been f o r c e d t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y - - t h a t is, the jury may not have wanted to let the defendant's action go unpunished, s o t h e y c h o s e t o f i n d him g u i l t y of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b e c a u s e t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e was a c q u i t t a l . The question as to whether the State presented s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a v e r d i c t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t d o e s n o t r e q u i r e d i s c u s s i o n s i n c e t h e c a s e is b e i n g r e v e r s e d on o t h e r grounds. Defendant's argument that the trial judge lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n is without merit. T h i s C o u r t r u l e d on F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s "Motion and A s s i g n m e n t o f J u d g e " to hear disqualification proceedings was moot, and that order s t i l l stands. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is r e v e r s e d , and the sentence is v a c a t e d . The c a u s e i s remanded f o r a new triai consistent with this opinion. W e concur: 8 A & & , u d ~upP-9 Chief ~ust-ice