No. 80-367
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA
I N THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE:
BRUCE YOUNG BY CONSTRUCTION AND GENERAL
LABORERS' LOCAL NO. 1 3 3 4 A F L - C I O ,
R e s p o n d e n t and C o m p l a i n a n t ,
vs.
C I T Y O F GREAT F A L L S ,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of C a s c a d e .
H o n o r a b l e J o e l G. R o t h , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For A p p e l l a n t :
D a v i d V. G l i k o , C i t y A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Manthna
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana
-Jarner--&?l s , Z ~ ~ S I ~ F X ,-Ye-n+a*
D. P a t r i c k M c K i t t r i c k argued, G r e a t F a l l s , M o n t a n a
- -
-
Submitted: June 1 8 , 1 9 8 1
Decided: August 20, 1981
A!!G 2 9 1981
Filed:
Y d Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n of
t h e Court.
T h i s a p p e a l f o l l o w s a n o r d e r and judgment of t h e E i g h t h
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cascade County, denying a motion t o amend
and d i s m i s s i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of a
d e c i s i o n and o r d e r of t h e S t a t e Board of P e r s o n n e l Appeals.
On J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t , C o n s t r u c t i o n and
G e n e r a l L a b o r e r s ' Union L o c a l No. 1334, AFL-CIO, f i l e d an
u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e c h a r g e w i t h t h e Montana S t a t e Board of
P e r s o n n e l Appeals. T h i s c h a r g e was f i l e d on b e h a l f of Bruce
Young a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t , C i t y of G r e a t F a l l s . Appellant
answered and d e n i e d t h e c h a r g e , whereupon a h e a r i n g was h e l d
by a n examiner f o r t h e Board. Following t h e h e a r i n g , t h e
examiner on October 1 2 , 1979, i s s u e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t ,
c o n c l u s i o n s of law and a recommended o r d e r , c o n f i r m i n g i n
p a r t the u n f a i r labor p r a c t i c e charge.
A p p e l l a n t f i l e d e x c e p t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e d e c i s i o n
r e n d e r e d by t h e h e a r i n g s examiner. A review hearing w a s
t h e n h e l d and t h e Board of P e r s o n n e l Appeals confirmed t h e
recommended o r d e r . A f i n a l o r d e r w a s i s s u e d by t h e Board on
F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1980.
On March 21, 1980, a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of t h e f i n a l o r d e r . S e r v i c e of
t h e p e t i t i o n and a summons was acknowledged by Young, t h e
a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l of t h e S t a t e of Montana and t h e Board of
P e r s o n n e l Appeals. A p p e l l a n t , however, d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e
Board a s a named p a r t y on t h e p e t i t i o n .
Respondent, on A p r i l 2 1 , 1980, moved t o d i s m i s s t h e
p e t i t i o n f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o name t h e
Board a s a p a r t y w i t h i n t h e 30-day l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i d e d f o r
i n s e c t i o n 2-4-702, MCA. On A p r i l 30, 1980, a p p e l l a n t moved
t o amend i t s p e t i t i o n t o add t h e Board a s a p a r t y . A
h e a r i n g on t h e m a t t e r w a s h e l d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on J u l y
2 4 , 1980. On J u l y 29, 1980, t h e c o u r t i s s u e d a memorandum
d e c i s i o n and o r d e r , denying a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o amend t h e
p e t i t i o n and g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s . Judgment
was s o e n t e r e d , and t h e C i t y of G r e a t F a l l s now a p p e a l s .
The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s whether t h e S t a t e Board of
P e r s o n n e l Appeals i s r e q u i r e d t o be d e s i g n a t e d a s a p a r t y on
a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review. W e hold t h a t the S t a t e
Board of P e r s o n n e l Appeals i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o be made a
party .
S e c t i o n 2-4-702, MCA, governs j u d i c i a l review proceedings
under t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e A c t , i n c l u d i n g r e v i e w of
d e c i s i o n s by t h e Board of P e r s o n n e l Appeals. That s t a t u t e ,
i n p a r t , provides a s follows:
" ( 2 ) (a) Proceedings f o r review s h a l l be i n s t i t u t e d
by f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h i n 30
d a y s a f t e r s e r v i c e of t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e
agency o r , i f a h e a r i n g i s r e q u e s t e d , w i t h i n 30
days a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n thereon. Except a s o t h e r -
w i s e p r o v i d e d by s t a t u t e , t h e p e t i t i o n s h a l l be
f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t h e c o u n t y where t h e
p e t i t i o n e r r e s i d e s o r h a s h i s p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of
b u s i n e s s o r where t h e agency m a i n t a i n s i t s p r i n c i -
pal office. Copies of t h e p e t i t i o n s h a l l be
promptly s e r v e d upon t h e agency and a l l p a r t i e s of
record. "
The o n l y b a s i s f o r d i s m i s s i n g t h i s p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l
r e v i e w i s t h e c l a i m by r e s p o n d e n t t h a t t h e Board i s a n
i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y w i t h i n t h e purview of Rule 1 9 , M.R.Civ.P.
I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , Rule 19 p r o v i d e s :
"A p e r s o n who i s s u b j e c t t o s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s
s h a l l b e j o i n e d a s a p a r t y i n t h e a c t i o n i f (1)
i n h i s a b s e n c e complete r e l i e f c a n n o t be a c c o r d e d
among t h o s e a l r e a d y p a r t i e s , o r ( 2 ) he c l a i m s a n
i n t e r e s t r e l a t i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t of t h e a c t i o n and
i s s o s i t u a t e d t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e a c t i o n
i n h i s a b s e n c e may ( i )a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r i m -
p a i r o r impede h i s a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h a t i n t e r -
e s t o r ( i i )l e a v e any of t h e p e r s o n s a l r e a d y p a r t i e s
s u b j e c t t o a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of i n c u r r i n g d o u b l e ,
multiple, o r otherwise i n c o n s i s t e n t obligations
by r e a s o n of h i s c l a i m e d i n t e r e s t : . . ."
T h e r e i s some s u p p o r t f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a n
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency must b e j o i n e d under Rule 1 9 , M.R.Civ.P.
S e e Smith v. County of E l Paso ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 4 2 Colo.App. 316, 593
P.2d 979; C i v i l S e r v . Com'n o f C . & C. o f Denver v . D i s t r i c t
C o u r t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 186 Colo. 308, 527 P.2d 531.
W e b e l i e v e t h a t Rule 1 9 , M.R.Civ.P., d o e s n o t , by i t s
t e r m s , c o n t e m p l a t e i n c l u s i o n of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o a r d a s
a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y f o r p u r p o s e s of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w .
Where t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s i n t e n d e d f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d i e s
t o b e made p a r t i e s , t h e y have s p e c i f i c a l l y s o p r o v i d e d . For
example, s e c t i o n 39-51-2410, MCA, providing f o r j u d i c i a l
r e v i e w o f a d e c i s i o n by t h e Board of Labor A p p e a l s , p r o v i d e s
t h a t t h e Employment S e c u r i t y D i v i s i o n s h a l l b e deemed t o b e
a p a r t y i n any a c t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . Yet when t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d 2-4-702, MCA, no p r o v i s i o n was made f o r
naming t h e " b o a r d " a s a p a r t y f o r p u r p o s e s o f review.
Our c o u r t e n c o u r a g e s a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o c e d u r a l
r u l e s g o v e r n i n g j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o a r d .
F.W. Woolworth Co., I n c . v . Employment S e c . Div. (1981), -
Mont. , 627 P.2d 851, 38 St.Rep. 694. Justice is best
s e r v e d by a v o i d i n g a n o v e r - t e c h n i c a l a p p r o a c h and a l l o w i n g
t h e p a r t i e s t o have t h e i r d a y i n c o u r t .
W h o l d t h a t t h e Board of P e r s o n n e l Appeals need n o t be
e
a p a r t y t o proceedings f o r j u d i c i a l review. Accordingly,
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r and judgment i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e
c a s e remanded f o r p r o c e e d i n g s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n .
W e concur:
Chief J u s t i c e
Justices
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d i s s e n t i n g :
W dissent.
e
I t is t r u e t h e s t a t u t e does n o t s p e c i f y whether the
agency i s r e q u i r e d t o be named a s a p a r t y i n t h e p e t i t i o n
f o r r e v i e w and d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o make t h e a g e n c y ' s j o i n d e r
mandatory or jurisdictional in nature. A thirty-day
limitation on filing a petition for judicial review,
however, h a s been i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t any c h a l l e n g e t o
the agency action must be perfected within the required
thirty days. Perfection in this r e g a r d must include the
c o r r e c t joinder o f a l l p a r t i e s r e q u i r e d t o be j o i n e d under
R u l e 1 9 , M.R.Civ.P. See Smith v. County o f E l P a s o ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
42 Colo.App. 316, 593 P.2d 979; C i v i l S e r v i c e Commission v .
D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 186 Colo. 308, 527 P.2d 531. (It
should be pointed out that Colorado has not adopted the
Administrative Procedure Act but provided for a judicial
review of agency a c t i o n in its r u l e s of civil procedure,
R u l e 1 0 6 , C.R.C.P., under which t h e a b o v e - c i t e d c a s e s were
decided. )
I f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is a c c e p t e d by t h e C o u r t , t h e n
a proper joinder o f t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s o r a g e n c i e s deemed t o
be e s s e n t i a l or i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t i e s t o t h e p e t i t i o n , under
Rule 19, R.R.Civ.P., must be considered a jurisdictional
r e q u i r e m e n t t o b e s a t i s f i e d i f d i s m i s s a l i s t o be a v o i d e d .
R u l e 1 9 , M.R.Civ.P., provides i n pertinent part:
"A p e r s o n who i s s u b j e c t t o s e r v i c e o f
p r o c e s s s h a l l be j o i n e d a s a p a r t y i n t h e
a c t i o n i f (1) i n h i s a b s e n c e c o m p l e t e r e l i e f
c a n n o t b e a c c o r d e d among t h o s e a l r e a d y
parties, or ( 2 ) he c l a i m s an i n t e r e s t
r e l a t i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t of t h e a c t i o n and i s
s o s i t u a t e d t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e
a c t i o n i n h i s a b s e n c e may ( i ) a s a p r a c t i c a l
m a t t e r i m p a i r o r impede h i s a b i l i t y t o
protect that interest . . ."
Here, a p p e l l a n t is a t t e m p t i n g t o c h a l l e n g e a d e c i s i o n
and o r d e r o f t h e Board o f P e r s o n n e l A p p e a l s , i s s u e d i n f u r -
therance of its duty a s a quasi-judicial body t o a d m i n i s t e r
t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y of t h i s S t a t e a s set f o r t h i n T i t l e 39,
Chap. 3 1 , MCA ( C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g f o r P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ) .
I n f u n c t i o n i n g t o promote and a d v a n c e t h i s p u b l i c p o l i c y ,
t h e Board h a s a d e f i n i t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p e t i t i o n t o r e v i e w
and, as a practical matter, must be joined to insure a
c o m p l e t e and j u s t a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h a t i n t e r e s t .
The majority, of course, disagrees with this
c o n c l u s i o n and a s s e r t s t h a t t h e Board i s , by some l i b e r a l
interpretation, e x c l u d e d from t h e i r review h e a r i n g i n c o u r t
and that "justice is best served by avoiding an over-
t e c h n i c a l a p p r o a c h and a l l o w i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o have t h e i r
day i n c o u r t . " W do n o t u n d e r s t a n d how you g i v e p a r t i e s
e
t h e i r d a y i n c o u r t by e x c l u d i n g them. I suppose it depends
o n whose ox i s b e i n g g o r e d .
What t h e m a j o r i t y f a i l s t o r e a l i z e , h o w e v e r , is t h a t
i n t h i s c a s e a j o i n d e r of a l l e s s e n t i a l p a r t i e s w i t h i n t h e
thirty-day limitation period is a j u r i s d ------ a l
iction
requirement. A s a consequence of its jur i d i c t i o n a l nature,
if a party is deemed essential or necessary to the
proceeding, t h a t p a r t y a u t o m a t i c a l l y becomes i n d i s p e n s a b l e .
T h i s i n no way d e p e n d s on a l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o r o t h e r
s e l f - s e r v i n g j i n g o i s m s r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y .
Those e s s e n t i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y
t o p e r f e c t a p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w m u s t be s a t i s f i e d t o v e s t
a u t h o r i t y i n t h e reviewing o r a p p e l l a t e t r i b u n a l . A failure
t o s a t i s f y t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h u s l e a v e s t h e c o u r t w i t h no
a d j u d i c a t o r y o r r e v i e w i n g power; no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a c t ; and
no discretion to remedy or waive the jurisdictional defects.
Here, appellant appears to have failed to vest the
District Court with jurisdiction to consider the petition
for review. If this is the case, then the court was unable
to entertain appellant's motion to amend and was left with
no alternative but to dismiss the action.
We would affirm the
We concur in the foregoing dissent:
VL-Q-J,
Chief Justice