No. 80-198
I N THE SUPREME: COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA
1981
CARMEN CORRIGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE O F THE
ESTATE O F MAX MORRIS CORRIGAN,
DECEASED,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
W. P. JANNEY and KAY JANNEY, H i s
w i f e , and JANNEY TRUCKING C O . , a
Montana Corporation,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of P o w e l l .
H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t B o y d , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For A p p e l l a n t :
K n i g h t , D a h o o d , M c L e a n and E v e r e t t , A n a c o n d a , Montana
D a v i d M. M c L e a n a r g u e d , A n a c o n d a , M o n t a n a
For R e s p o n d e n t s :
P o o r e , R o t h , R o b i s c h o n and R o b i n s o n , B u t t e , M o n t a n a
J a m e s A. P o o r e , J r . , a r g u e d , B u t t e , , M o n t a n a
Submitted: January 1 2 , 1 9 8 1
Decided :
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
Plaintiff Carmen Corrigan, as personal representa-
tive, filed this action i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o recover
damages f o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h and s u r v i v a l . D e f e n d a n t s , W. P.
J a n n e y and Kay J a n n e y , a n s w e r e d by d e n y i n g t h e a l l e g a t i o n s
of t h e complaint, a l l e g i n g t h r e e defenses: (1) f a i l u r e t o
s t a t e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a claim for r e l i e f ; (2)
assumption of risk; and (3) contributory negligence. A
motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the
Janneys.
D e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r summa.ry judgment was b a s e d on
t h e t h e o r y t h a t no v a l i d c l a i m f o r r e l i e f was s t a t e d i n t h e
c o m p l a i n t b a s e d upon p r e v i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f a Montana
s t a t u t e by t h e Supreme C o u r t o f Montana. S e c t i o n s 42-201
and 42-202, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ; D i e r v. Mueller ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 53 Mont.
2 8 8 , 1 6 3 P. 466. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e m o t i o n f o r
summary judgment on t h i s c o n t e n t i o n b e c a u s e ". . . t h e Court
b e l i e v e s it h a s no a l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o f o l l o w t h e m a n d a t e s o f
t h e Supreme C o u r t i n t h i s r e g a r d . . ." The p r e s e n t a p p e a l
i s b a s e d upon t h i s p o r t i o n o f t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e m o t i o n
f o r summary judgment .
The issue presented for review is simply: Was t h e
granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants Janney proper? More s p e c i f i c a l l y , should this
Court reverse its longstanding rule on the doctrine of
" d e d u c t and r e p a i r " and t h e r e b y a l l o w a n a c t i o n f o r damages
for personal injuries sustained by a tenant against the
landlord?
Janney Trucking Company was the owner of a rental
house located at Janneyville, about four miles west of
G a r r i s o n , Montana. D u r i n g 1 9 7 3 t h e h o u s e was r e n t e d t o Max
M o r r i s C o r r i g a n and h i s w i f e , Carmen C o r r i g a n , by Kay J a n n e y
on b e h a l f o f J a n n e y T r u c k i n g Company.
The C o r r i g a n s a l l e g e d t h e y r e c e i v e d e l e c t r i c a l s h o c k s
when t h e y t o u c h e d a p o r t i o n o f t h e p l u m b i n g s y s t e m f r o m t h e
day they occupied the premises. Numerous g u e s t s in the
h o u s e a l s o r e c e i v e d e l e c t r i c a l s h o c k s from t o u c h i n g p o r t i o n s
of t h e plumbing system. Appellant contends she and her
husband requested the Janneys to inspect the electrical
s y s t e m and t o h a v e i t r e p a i r e d , b u t t h e J a n n e y s d i d n o t h i n g .
A t e n a n t who o c c u p i e d t h e same h o u s e prior to the
Corrigans also repeatedly reported electrical shocks from
t h e plumbing system t o t h e J a n n e y s . When t h e y r e f u s e d to
make t h e n e c e s s a r y r e p a i r s , t h i s t e n a n t moved o u t .
On F e b r u a r y 2 , 1 9 7 4 , w h i l e t h e C o r r i g a n s w e r e t a k i n g
a b a t h , a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t Max C o r r i g a n came i n c o n t a c t
w i t h t h e f a u c e t on t h e b a t h t u b and r e c e i v e d an e l e c t r i c a l
s h o c k which u l t i m a t e l y c a u s e d h i s d e a t h .
The h o u s e was l a t e r i n s p e c t e d by E a r l D. Roberts, a
State of Montana electrical inspector. The house was
condemned u n t i l s u c h t i m e a s i t was w i r e d s a f e l y . Roberts
noted that if the electrical system had been properly
grounded and banded to the plumbing system, the circuit
b r e a k e r would h a v e o p e n e d .
Wayland S m i t h , a master electrician, testified that
i f t h e h o u s e had been p r o p e r l y g r o u n d e d , t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r
should have tripped and the accident would have been
avoided.
P r e v i o u s l y t h i s C o u r t h a s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e r e i s no
implied warranty of h a b i t a b i l i t y i n r e s i d e n t i a l l e a s e s ; t h a t
a t e n a n t chooses e i t h e r to repair t h e d e f e c t by d e d u c t i n g
one month's rent or t o vacate the premises if the defect
continues. L a n d t v. Schneider (1904, 3 1 Mont. 15, 77 P .
307; Busch v. Baker (1915), 5 1 Mont. 326, 152 P. 750.
F u r t h e r , t h i s Court has denied recovery a g a i n s t t h e landlord
for personal injury to a tenant, holding that the "repair
and d e d u c t " s t a t u t e i s t h e e x c l u s i v e remedy. D i e r v. M u e l l e r
( 1 9 1 7 ) , 53 Mont. 288, 1 6 3 P . 466.
In 1977 t h e legislature enacted the Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act. Sections 70-24-101 through
70-24-442, MCA. T h i s Act adopts the doctrine of implied
w a r r a n t y o f h a b i t a b i l i t y which a l l o w s r e c o v e r y o f damages i n
cases involving injury to tenants from dangerous latent
defects in residential rental property. However, the
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A c t c a n n o t be made r e t r o a c t i v e t o a p p l y t o
cases prior to 1977. S e e Chap. 313, S e c t i o n 47, Laws o f
Mont. (1977). T h e r e f o r e , w e must l o o k t o t h e c a s e l a w o f
t h i s S t a t e p r i o r t o t h e enactment.
In Dier v. Mueller, supra, this Court applied the
"repair and d e d u c t " s t a t u t e t o a c l a i m by a t e n a n t a g a i n s t
the landlord for personal injuries. In Dier, the trial
c o u r t , i n g r a n t i n g summary j u d g m e n t , n o t e d t h a t i t was bound
by Busch v . Baker ( 1 9 1 5 ) , 5 1 Mont. 326, 1 5 2 P . 750. Quoting
from B u s c h , w e s t a t e d :
"'. . . This construction is t o t h e e f f e c t
t h a t , i f the landlord f a i l s t o repa.ir, a f t e r
n o t i c e , t h e t e n a n t may h i m s e l f r e p a i r , w i t h i n
a c e r t a i n l i m i t , o r move o u t ; b u t h e h a s no
r e d r e s s i n damages f o r i n j u r y t o p e r s o n o r
p r o p e r t y c o n s e q u e n t upon t h e l a n d l o r d ' s
failure t o repair. I" . . D i e r , 1 6 3 P. a t
467. (Emphasis added.)
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o
the absence of redress for injury was dictum in Busch.
Busch i n v o l v e d a s u i t f o r u n l a w f u l d e t a i n e r o f t h e p r e m i s e s ,
not personal injury. In Dier this Court failed to
d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a c l a i m f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y and damages
t o a leasehold interest. W now f i n d t h a t t h e C o u r t e r r e d ,
e
and we o v e r r u l e t h e h o l d i n g a s n o t b e i n g a p p l i c a b l e t o c a s e s
involving tenant suits for personal injuries against a
landlord. I t is u n n e c e s s a r y t o o v e r r u l e o u r h o l d i n g i n Lowe
v. Root ( 1 9 7 5 ) 1 6 6 Mont. 150, 531 P.2d 674, b e c a u s e Lowe
involved a contract a c t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of damages to the
l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t a n d , f u r t h e r , b e c a u s e we a r e n o t d e c i d i n g
t h i s c a s e on b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f h a b i t a b i l i t y .
W need n o t h e r e t r a c e t h e h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s o f
e
the repair and d e d u c t d o c t r i n e o r the doctrine of caveat
emptor a s a p p l i e d t o t e n a n t s o f r e n t a l residences. Courts
in other jurisdictions have adequately traced those
developments. S e e Mease v . Fox ( I o w a 1 9 7 2 ) , 200 N.W.2d 791;
Green v. Superior Ct. of City & Cty. of San Francisco
(1974), 111 C a 1 . R p t r . 704, 517 P.2d 1168. The same
conclusions reached by these courts are applicable here:
t o d a y ' s urban t e n a n t s a r e i n t e r e s t e d , not in the land, but
i n a h o u s e s u i t a b l e f o r human o c c u p a t i o n . The r e s i d e n t i a l
tenant rents a place t o live. The common-law d o c t r i n e of
c a v e a t emptor d o e s n o t a p p l y i n t h e s e contemporary s e t t i n g s .
Art. 11, S16, 1 9 7 2 Mont. C o n s t . , provides:
"The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . Courts of
j u s t i c e s h a l l be o p e n t o e v e r y p e r s o n , and
s p e e d y remedy a f f o r d e d f o r e v e r y i n j u r y o f
person, property, or character . . ."
It would be patently unconstitutional to deny a
tenant all causes of action for personal injuries or
wrongful death arising out of the alleged negligent
management o f r e n t a l p r e m i s e s by a l a n d l o r d . If t h i s action
w e r e t o b e t a k e n away, a s u b s t i t u t e remedy would h a v e t o be
provided. A r g u a b l y , t h e r e p a i r and d e d u c t s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s
a n a l t e r n a t i v e remedy f o r damage t o t h e l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t .
However, in no way can it be considered an alternative
remedy for damages caused by p e r s o n a l injury or wrongful
death.
I n view of our holding t h a t a cause of action for
p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s and w r o n g f u l d e a t h c a n b e m a i n t a i n e d h e r e ,
we must determine the standard of care owed under the
circumstances. A general o b l i g a t i o n s t a t u t e was i n e f f e c t
i n Montana when this accident occurred. S e c t i o n 58-607,
R.C.M. 1947, provided:
" E v e r y o n e is r e s p o n s i b l e , n o t o n l y f o r t h e
r e s u l t of h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , b u t a l s o f o r an
i n j u r y o c c a s i o n e d t o a n o t h e r by h i s want o f
o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l i n t h e management o f
h i s property or person, except so f a r a s t h e
l a t t e r h a s , w i l l f u l l y o r by w a n t o f o r d i n a r y
c a r e , b r o u g h t t h e i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f . The
e x t e n t o f l i a b i l i t y i n s u c h c a s e s is d e f i n e d
b y t h e t i t l e on c o m p e n s a t o r y r e l i e f . "
I n Brennan v. C o c k r e l l I n v e s t m e n t s , I n c . , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 111
Cal.Rptr. 122, 35 Cal.App.3d 796, the California appeals
c o u r t had a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n
identical statute to a landlord/tenant relationship. In
B r e n n a n a n a c t i o n was b r o u g h t by a t e n a n t s e e k i n g t o r e c o v e r
damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d when h e f e l l o f f t h e
back s t a i r s o f a h o u s e . The p l a i n t i f f s o u g h t a n i n s t r u c t i o n
s t a t i n g t h a t t h e owner o f t h e p r e m i s e s is under a duty t o
e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y c a r e i n t h e management o f t h e p r e m i s e s t o
avoid exposing persons thereon t o an unreasonable r i s k of
harm. This i n s t r u c t i o n was r e f u s e d . Instead, the t r i a l
court instructed that ordinarily the owner of premises
leased to a tenant is n o t liable for any injury to the
t e n a n t t h a t r e s u l t s f r o m a d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n which e x i s t e d
when the tenant took possession. The C a l i f o r n i a appeals
court reversed the d e c i s i o n of the trial court and, in
doing so, s t a t e d :
" C a l i f o r n i a d e p a r t e d from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l
r u l e s governing t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e owners
and o c c u p i e r s o f l a n d i n t h e c a s e o f Rowland
v . C h r i s t i a n , 69 C a l . 2 d 1 0 8 , 70 C a l . R p t r . 9 7 ,
4 4 3 P . 2 d 5 6 1 , when t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t
s e c t i o n 1714 o f t h e C i v i l Code c o n t r o l l e d t h e
l i a b i l i t y of tenants for i n j u r i e s t o t h e i r
social guests. That s t a t u t e provides a s
follows: 'Everyone is r e s p o n s i b l e , n o t o n l y
for t h e r e s u l t of h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , b u t a l s o
f o r a n i n j u r y o c c a s i o n e d t o a n o t h e r by h i s
want of o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l i n t h e
management o f h i s p r o p e r t y o r p e r s o n , e x c e p t
s o f a r a s t h e l a t t e r h a s , w i l l f u l l y o r by
want of o r d i n a r y c a r e , b r o u g h t t h e i n j u r y
upon h i m s e l f .. .' ...
"The Rowland c o u r t d e c i d e d t h a t no p u b l i c
p o l i c y r e q u i r e d t h a t an e x c e p t i o n be c a r v e d
o u t of t h e s t a t u t e f o r t e n a n t s i n p o s s e s s i o n
when t h e y w e r e s u e d b y t h e i r g u e s t s . The
q u e s t i o n i n t h e c a s e under review is whether
o n e s h o u l d b e made f o r l a n d l o r d s n o t i n
p o s s e s s i o n when t h e y a r e s u e d b y t h e i r
tenants.
". . . T h a t a l a n d l o r d must a c t toward h i s
t e n a n t a s a r e a s o n a b l e person under a l l of
the circumstances, including the likelihood
of i n j u r y , t h e probable s e r i o u s n e s s of such
i n j u r y , t h e burden of reducing o r avoiding
t h e r i s k , and h i s d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l o v e r t h e
risk-creating defect, seems a sound
p r o p o s i t i o n and o n e t h a t e x p r e s s e s w e l l t h e
p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e and r e a s o n a b l e n e s s upon
which t h e law o f t o r t s is b a s e d . I t i s no
p a r t of f a i r n e s s and r a t i o n a l i t y t o t r a n s f o r m
p o s s e s s i o n and c o n t r o l from mere f a c t o r s
b e a r i n g on n e g l i g e n c e i n t o b a r r i e r s t o
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h a t i s s u e . (See 2 Harper
and J a m e s , The Law o f T o r t s , 27.16 a t p .
1 5 0 9 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . ) A s t h e c o u r t s a i d i n Rowland,
' [ T l o f o c u s upon t h e s t a t u s o f t h e i n j u r e d
party, . . . i n order t o determine the
q u e s t i o n whether t h e landowner h a s a d u t y o f
c a r e , i s c o n t r a r y t o o u r modern s o c i a l m o r e s
and h u m a n i t a r i a n v a l u e s . ' ( I b i d , a t p. 1 1 8 ,
70 C a l . R p t r . a t p . 1 0 4 , 443 P.2d a t p . 5 6 8 ) .
". . . The d i r e c t i o n t h e law i s now t a k i n g
c l e a r l y i s t o w a r d ' " ' i m p o s i n g o n o w n e r s and
o c c u p i e r s a s i n g l e d u t y of r e a s o n a b l e c a r e i n
a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' 'I' . . . If Brennan,
111 C a l . R p t r . a t 124-126.
Brennan w a s later followed in Golden v. Conway
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 128 Cal.Rptr. 6 9 , 5 5 Cal.App.3d 948.
We hold that the duty of care stated in section
58-607, R.C.M. 1947, is c o n t r o l l i n g . The owner o f p r e m i s e s
i s u n d e r a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y c a r e i n t h e management
of the premises to avoid exposing persons thereon t o an
u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k o f harm.
I n summary, w e o v e r r u l e D i e r v . Mueller, supra, and
hold t h a t our C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f have a
f o r m o f r e d r e s s f o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h and s u r v i v a l d a m a g e s . We
hold that s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947, is c o n t r o l l i n g and
t h a t o n e is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n j u r y o c c a s i o n e d t o a n o t h e r by
his want of ordinary care subject to the defenses of
contributory negligence or assumption of r i s k .
This case is remanded for trial under the legal
p r i n c i p l e s enunciated herein.
W concur:
e