No. 80-101
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A
F OTN
1980
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
SHIRLEY BUSBY H R a / k / a
AT
SHIRLEY A N CHITTENDEN,
N E
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: District Court of t h e Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f C u s t e r .
Honorable A l f r e d B. Coate, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
M o r r i s o n Law O f f i c e s , M i s s o u l a , Montana
W i l l i a m Rossbach a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
K e i t h D. H a k e r , County A t t o r n e y , M i l e s C i t y , Montana
J. D e n n i s C o r b i n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , M i l e s
C i t y , Montana
Submitted: November 1 7 , 1980
Decided: ~~~ 3 0 1381
Mr.J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
Defendant a p p e a l s a C u s t e r County D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n v i c -
t i o n , by a j u r y , of t h e f t by a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , f o r which s h e
r e c e i v e d a f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e and was o r d e r e d t o make p a r t i a l
restitution.
Three women e n t e r e d Mann C r e d i t J e w e l e r s i n M i l e s C i t y ,
Montana, on t h e a f t e r n o o n o f May 2 4 , 1979. The o n l y employee
i n t h e s t o r e a t t h e t i m e w a s a c l e r k , June Carranza. Carranza
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e e women came i n t o t h e s t o r e a t a b o u t
t h e same t i m e b u t t h e n s e p a r a t e d . Two o f t h e women, who
a s s o c i a t e d o p e n l y and were c l e a r l y t o g e t h e r , asked t h e c l e r k
t o show them some r i n g s i n a d i s p l a y c a b i n e t . The t h i r d
woman, i d e n t i f i e d by C a r r a n z a a s d e f e n d a n t S h i r l e y H a r t ,
browsed t h r o u g h o u t t h e s t o r e . She asked t o l o o k a t some
w i n e g l a s s e s , which C a r r a n z a handed t o h e r . ( F i n g e r p r i n t s on
t h e w i n e g l a s s e s were l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d i n c o u r t a s t h o s e of
S h i r l e y C h i t t e n d e n , a l s o known a s S h i r l e y H a r t . ) From t h e
w i n e g l a s s e s , d e f e n d a n t went t o t h e cuckoo c l o c k s and a s k e d
t h e c l e r k a series o f q u e s t i o n s a b o u t them, d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t
t h e key and a box f o r t h e c l o c k s h e was i n t e r e s t e d i n w e r e
downstairs. H a r t t o l d t h e c l e r k t h a t s h e would need t h e box
b e c a u s e s h e wanted t o m a i l it.
C a r r a n z a t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h a t p o i n t d e f e n d a n t engaged
i n a s h o r t , i n a u d i b l e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h one of t h e two
women, a l t h o u g h from t h e t i m e t h e t h r e e women e n t e r e d t h e
s t o r e , H a r t had shown no s i g n of a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r
two women. A f t e r t h i s b r i e f c o n v e r s a t i o n , no f u r t h e r
c o n t a c t was made between H a r t and t h e o t h e r women. As
C a r r a n z a and d e f e n d a n t d i s c u s s e d t h e c l o c k , t h e o t h e r women
l e f t t h e s t o r e and looked t h r o u g h t h e s t o r e window a t t h e
i t e m s displayed.
C a r r a n z a t h e n went down i n t o t h e basement t o s e a c h f o r
t h e key t o t h e c l o c k and a box i n which t o m a i l i t . Once
d o w n s t a i r s , C a r r a n z a h e a r d t h e sounds of r u n n i n g f e e t from
t h e s t o r e above and t h e sound of what seemed t o be t h e
bumping of g l a s s . She abandoned h e r s e a r c h f o r t h e key and
box and r a n back u p s t a i r s t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t w a i t i n g a t t h e
t o p of t h e s t a i r s . Testimony g i v e n by t h e owner of t h e
s t o r e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e area i n which H a r t was s t a n d i n g w a s
t h e o n l y a r e a i n t h e e n t i r e s t o r e where t h e s t a i r s t o t h e
basement c o u l d be watched. H a r t was on t h e main f l o o r of
t h e s t o r e d u r i n g t h e d i s t u r b a n c e which b r o u g h t J u n e C a r r a n z a
r u s h i n g back u p s t a i r s , b u t made no mention t o h e r of any
irregularities.
C a r r a n z a informed d e f e n d a n t t h a t s h e c o u l d n o t f i n d
t h e box f o r t h e c l o c k b u t t h a t h e r b o s s would be back a t
3:30 p.m. and he c o u l d c e r t a i n l y h e l p h e r . H a r t told the
c l e r k t h a t s h e had some shopping t o do a t P e n n e y ' s and t h a t
s h e would r e t u r n . When d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e s t o r e it w a s
m i n u t e s b e f o r e 3:20. The t h e f t was r e p o r t e d a t 3:25.
C a r r a n z a had informed H a r t t h a t h e r employer would be back
w i t h i n t e n m i n u t e s , y e t d e f e n d a n t c h o s e t o l e a v e and n o t
return. The c l e r k f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h u r r i e d
away a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e s t o r e .
C a r r a n z a t h e n went t o c l e a n t h e d i s p l a y c a s e s and
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t two d i s p l a y t r a y s o f r i n g s w e r e m i s s i n g from
t h e f r o n t window where t h e two women had j u s t been examining
the rings. When p o l i c e a r r i v e d , s h e gave a d e s c r i p t i o n of
t h e t h r e e women and d e s c r i b e d what had t r a n s p i r e d . Latent
f i n g e r p r i n t s were t a k e n from t h e d i s p l a y c a s e and from t h e
wineglasses. The p r i n t s on t h e d i s p l a y c a s e were t h o s e of
Donna S t a n d l e y (a/k/a Donna H a r r i s ) and Mary Gunsch; t h o s e
on t h e w i n e g l a s s e s were t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s of S h i r l e y C h i t t e n d e n
(a/k/a S h i r l e y H a r t ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t .
Two of t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t o d e f e n d a n t ' s
e i t h e r p r i o r o r s u b s e q u e n t a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r two
women s e e n i n Mann C r e d i t J e w e l e r s on May 2 4 , 1979. The
e x a c t d a t e of t h e meeting between t h e s e t h r e e women was n o t
s p e c i f i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d by any w i t n e s s , b u t t h e S t a t e ' s
w i t n e s s e s p l a c e d a l l t h r e e i n t h e home of D i x i e S t r i d on o r
n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t .
S h i r l e y H a r t p r e s e n t s f o u r i s s u e s f o r o u r review:
1. Did s h e r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l ?
2. Did t h e p r o s e c u t i o n adduce s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o
prove t h e elements of t h e charge, thereby j u s t i f y i n g t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t t s d e c i s i o n t o deny h e r motion f o r a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t and t h e s u b m i s s i o n of t h e c a s e t o t h e j u r y ?
3. Were h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s v i o l a t e d by h e r
a b s e n c e d u r i n g t h e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s t a g e of j u r y s e l e c -
tion?
4. Was t h e j u r y p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d ?
FAIR TRIAL
H a r t a s s e r t s t h a t s h e d i d n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l and
t h a t h e r due p r o c e s s r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d by t h e c o n d u c t of
t h e p r o s e c u t o r and t h e e r r o r s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t .
Defendant f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d e l i b e r a t e l y
i n t r o d u c e d t h e t e s t i m o n y of Maryona Johnson, knowing t h a t
t h e t e s t i m o n y w a s l i k e l y t o be p e r j u r e d . To show t h e a s s o c i -
a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t and t h e two o t h e r women, t h e S t a t e c a l l e d
Johnson t o t e s t i f y t h a t i n l a t e May o r J u n e s h e saw S h i r l e y
H a r t a t D i x i e S t r i d ' s house w i t h two women whom s h e d i d n o t
know and t o whom s h e was n o t i n t r o d u c e d . Johnson was h o s t i l e
and u n c o o p e r a t i v e t h r o u g h o u t h e r t e s t i m o n y . She was e v a s i v e
a s t o t h e d a t e of t h e e n c o u n t e r a t S t r i d ' s house.
H a r t c o n t e n d s t h a t J o h n s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y was more p r e j u -
d i c i a l t h a n p r o b a t i v e and s e r v e d t o deny h e r r i g h t t o a f a i r
trial. According t o H a r t , t h e manner i n which J o h n s o n ' s
t e s t i m o n y was d e l i v e r e d was s o c o n f u s i n g and e v a s i v e t h a t i t
gave t h e a p p e a r a n c e t h a t s h e was a t t e m p t i n g t o p r o t e c t
someone. Defendant s u b m i t s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r r e a l i z e d t h e
p r e j u d i c i a l i m p a c t of t h e t e s t i m o n y , i n s o f a r a s it i m p l i e d
t h a t Johnson w a s t r y i n g t o p r o t e c t d e f e n d a n t , and w i l l f u l l y
continued h i s examination t o strengthen t h a t impression.
T h i s C o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t
t r i a l s be conducted w i t h " d i g n i t y , o r d e r , and decorum."
I l l i n o i s v. A l l e n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057,
25 L.Ed.2d 353. The p r o s e c u t o r h a s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o see
t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s f a i r and j u s t ; he
must be i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t i c e , n o t j u s t c o n v i c t i o n s . Berger
v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed.
1314. See a l s o t h e Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , EC
7-13. Misconduct by t h e p r o s e c u t o r may form t h e b a s i s o f a
new t r i a l where t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a c t i o n s have d e p r i v e d a
d e f e n d a n t of a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . S t a t e v . Bain
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 23, 575 P.2d 919.
During h i s opening s t a t e m e n t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o l d t h e
j u r y t h a t he would p r o v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s i n M i l e s C i t y on
o r n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . H e s a i d he would e s t a b l i s h
t h a t f a c t by t h e t e s t i m o n y o f two o f h e r f r i e n d s , one of
which w a s Maryona Johnson. A t t h e o u t s e t Johnson was e v a s i v e
and u n c o o p e r a t i v e . She a d m i t t e d t h a t s h e had s e e n d e f e n d a n t
i n t h e company of two women a t S t r i d ' s house i n May o r J u n e
of 1979. Defendant o b j e c t e d t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a t t e m p t t o
elicit a more cogent testimony on the grounds that the
prosecutor was attempting to impeach his own witness.
he trial judge properly overruled the objection since
under the rules of evidence an attorney can impeach any
witness. Rule 607, Mont.R.Evid. A party does not vouch for
his or her witnesses, except for expert and character wit-
nesses, because a party's witnesses are not chosen but are
those persons who happen to be present and see the events
which give rise to the case. Commission Comment to Rule 607
Mont.R.Evid. Under the facts as they exist before us, we
can determine no prosecutorial misconduct or prejudicial
error to defendant with respect to Johnson's testimony.
Defendant claims secondly that the prosecutor deliber-
ately introduced testimony to impeach a defense witness on
matters which were known to him to be improper, incompetent,
and collateral. In the trial court, Hart originally gave
notice that she planned to call certain alibi witnesses.
Hart's counsel withdrew that defense and moved the court for
an order limiting the prosecutor from inquiring into any
matters concerning that defense. The court ruled that the
prosecutor would not be allowed to exceed the scope of
direct examination. Defense called Sandy Karst to testify
about defendant's physical condition during the spring of
1979. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Karst
whether she had previously made any statement that she was
with defendant at defendant's home in ~illingson May 24,
1979. Over objection, Karst replied that she had. ~efen-
dant deems this an improper attempt to impeach a witness and
violative of the court's order to stay within the scope of
direct examination.
The State counters that defendant made her physical
condition at the time of the theft an issue. On cross-
examination, the prosecution attempted to determine if the
witness's testimony related to defendant's condition on the
day of the theft. To this extent the cross-examination was
properly within the bounds of the court order. Since our
decision in Kipp v. Silverman (1901), 25 Mont. 296, 64 P.
884, we have consistently determined that cross-examination
should be allowed an extended range rather than a limited
one. Further, the latitudes of cross-examination are deter-
mined by the trial court. It is not within the authority of
this Court to disturb the District Court's ruling unless a
clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Gallaher
(1978), 177 Mont. 150, 580 P.2d 930, 35 St.Rep. 848. See
also State v. Babella (1978), 177 Mont. 275, 581 P.2d 838,
35 St.Rep. 985. We respect the District Court's judgment in
the conduct of the trial and do not find that its discre-
tionary powers were abused.
Defendant further argues on appeal that the court erred
in its decision to call Bob Lucas, president of the First
Security Bank in Miles City, to the stand to clarify the
testimony of Maryona Johnson. Hart claims that Lucas'
testimony was completely collateral and wrongfully prejudiced
her case. The court, however, felt compelled to call Lucas
to verify Johnson's testimony once her credibility had been
called into question, especially in view of the fact that
Johnson was a major witness for the State on the issue of
association.
Rule 614(a), Mont.R.Evid., allows the court to call
witnesses and entitles all parties to examine those witnesses.
The reason for this prerogative is the usual tendency to
a s s o c i a t e a n u n d e s i r a b l e w i t n e s s w i t h one p a r t y o r t h e
other. œ his problem i s m e t by h a v i n g t h e bench c a l l t h e
w i t n e s s t o o b t a i n h i s o r h e r knowledge of t h e r e l e v a n t
facts. Commission Comment t o Rule 6 1 4 ( a ) , Mont. R.Evid.
Because t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c a l l w i t n e s s e s i s e x p r e s s l y g r a n t e d
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t by t h e r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e , and t h a t au-
thority is largely discretionary, we w i l l not disturb the
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t a showing o f abused d i s c r e t i o n o r
m a n i f e s t p r e j u d i c e , n e i t h e r of which a r e p r e s e n t h e r e .
Accord, United S t a t e s v . L e s l i e ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 542 F.2d
285 ( a p p l y i n g Rule 6 1 4 ( a ) , Fed.R.Evid., which i s i d e n t i c a l
t o t h e Montana r u l e ) .
Defendant H a r t c o n c l u d e s h e r a p p e a l on t h e f a i r t r i a l
i s s u e by d i r e c t i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l o s i n g
statement t o t h e jury. I n t h a t statement, H a r t argues, the
p r o s e c u t o r i m p r o p e r l y commented on h e r r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y
during t r i a l . The p r o s e c u t o r a r g u e d t o t h e j u r y : "The
dates. I a s k you t o r e j e c t t h o s e d a t e s . You know what t h e
d a t e was. J u n e [ C a r r a n z a ] knows what t h e d a t e was and t h e
d e f e n d a n t knows what t h e d a t e was." Defendant a s k s t h i s
C o u r t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t drew t h e f a c t of h e r
r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y before t h e jury, thereby c r e a t i n g i n the
minds of t h e j u r y t h a t s h e was n o t t e s t i f y i n g b e c a u s e of h e r
guilt. W e do n o t f i n d h e r argument p e r s u a s i v e .
Read i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s e n t i r e c l o s i n g
s t a t e m e n t , w e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d a t e s
i s p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a comment on d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e
t o t e s t i f y on h e r own b e h a l f . I t merely s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e
f a c t of t h e t h e f t and t h e f a c t of d e f e n d a n t ' s p r e s e n c e i n
t h e s t o r e on t h e day of t h e t h e f t had been proven. It is
c e r t a i n l y improper f o r a p r o s e c u t o r t o comment on a d e f e n -
dant's refusal to take the stand (Griffin v. California
(1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S-Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106), but
this reference to defendant's knowledge is simply too
remote an inference to be prejudicial error. Moreover, the
District Court instructed the jury on defendant's consti-
tutionally protected right to remain silent. Any possible
error or taint caused by the prosecutor's comment was clearly
made harmless by the proper instruction of the jury.
SUFFICIENCY - - EVIDENCE
OF THE
Defendant's second contention is that the evidence
adduced was insufficient to sustain her conviction of theft
by accountability and that the District Court committed
reversible error in submitting the case to the jury. In
support of this point she argues (1) that the State failed
to prove that she intended to promote or facilitate the
theft; (2) that the State's proof of her association with
the two principals was flawed and insufficient to prove
intent; (3) that the State failed to prove that the two
women seen at Dixie Strid's house were indeed the principals
in the crime; (4) that the State failed to prove that Hart's
fingerprints were the same as those found at the scene of
the theft; and (5) that there is not sufficient evidence
generally to uphold defendant's conviction.
Every defendant in a criminal action is innocent until
proven guilty, and it is the burden of the State to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Proctor (1969), 153 Mont. 90, 454 P.2d 616. But, it is the
jury's purpose and duty to decide if the State has proved
its case against the defendant by rendering a verdict on the
facts presented. State v. Espelin (1937), 106 Mont. 231, 76
P.2d 629. his C o u r t on a p p e a l i s g u i d e d by t h e sound and
w e l l - r e a s o n e d r u l e t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d i s p u t e d
q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s i s t h e
s o l e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y . S t a t e v . Bubnash ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142
Mont. 377, 382 P.2d 830; S t a t e v . M e s s e r l y ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont.
62, 244 P.2d 1054; S t a t e v. Robinson ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 109 Mont. 322,
96 P.2d 265; S t a t e v . E s p e l i n , s u p r a .
With r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t , w e n o t e t h a t t h e
j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d on e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e and n o t e
w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 4 : "An a c t
i s done 'knowingly' i f done v o l u n t a r i l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y ,
and n o t b e c a u s e of m i s t a k e o r a c c i d e n t o r o t h e r i n n o c e n t
reason . . ." Reviewing t h e e v i d e n c e most s t r o n g l y i n f a v o r
of t h e S t a t e , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e
f o r t h e j u r y t o f i n d t h a t S h i r l e y H a r t i n t e n t i o n a l l y com-
m i t t e d t h e c r i m e o f t h e f t by a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .
Both a f i n g e r p r i n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and a n e y e w i t n e s s
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p l a c e d H a r t i n Mann C r e d i t J e w e l e r s . June
C a r r a n z a t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e w a s i n t h e s t o r e a t t h e same
t i m e a s t h e women l a t e r a r r e s t e d a s p r i n c i p a l s i n t h e t h e f t .
The e v i d e n c e a l s o shows t h a t H a r t d i d n o t a s s o c i a t e w i t h t h e
o t h e r women, e x c e p t f o r t h e b r i e f and i n a u d i b l e exchange a
few m i n u t e s b e f o r e t h e t h e f t . T h i s l a c k of a s s o c i a t i o n i s
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t e s t i m o n y of Maryona Johnson and ~ i x i e
S t r i d t h a t t h e t h r e e women w e r e a l l t o g e t h e r on o r n e a r t h e
d a t e of t h e t h e f t .
The S t a t e proved t h a t d e f e n d a n t s e n t t h e c l e r k i n t o t h e
basement f o r a key and a box f o r a c l o c k t h a t d e f e n d a n t
i n t e n d e d t o m a i l , t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g a s i t u a t i o n where no one
was l e f t on t h e main f l o o r of t h e s t o r e . The e v i d e n c e
showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t p o s i t i o n e d h e r s e l f i n t h e o n l y area i n
t h e e n t i r e s t o r e where t h e s t a i r s t o t h e basement c o u l d be
watched; t h e o n l y l o g i c a l a r e a i n which a " l o o k o u t " would
s t a n d t o make s u r e t h a t t h e t h i e v e s would have n o t i c e o f t h e
c l e r k ' s r e t u r n from t h e basement. The e v i d e n c e showed t h a t
d e f e n d a n t was i n t h e s t o r e d u r i n g t h e t h e f t . It further
showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t s a i d n o t h i n g t o t h e c l e r k of a n y t h i n g
u n u s u a l happening even though t h e c l e r k , w h i l e i n t h e base-
ment, h e a r d t h e sounds of r u n n i n g f e e t and t h e bumping of
glass.
C a r r a n z a f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t , even i n view of t h e
f a c t t h a t defendant appeared so i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e purchase
of t h e c l o c k t h a t s h e wanted a box f o r i t , s h e l e f t w i t h o u t
returning. Moreover, a l t h o u g h C a r r a n z a ' s employer would b e
r e t u r n i n g i n a m a t t e r of m i n u t e s a t which t i m e t h e s a l e of
t h e c l o c k c o u l d be made, complete w i t h box and k e y , d e f e n -
d a n t h u r r i e d away from t h e s t o r e and n e v e r r e t u r n e d . Hart's
a c t i o n s w e r e n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e of a g e n u i n e l y i n t e r -
e s t e d shopper. They were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e a c t i o n s o f a
" l o o k o u t , " whose p a r t i n t h e t h e f t was t o g e t t h e l o n e c l e r k
o f f t h e f l o o r of t h e s t o r e and t h e n watch t h e s t a i r s w h i l e
h e r p a r t n e r s i n t h e c r i m e committed t h e a c t u a l t h e f t .
W e are n o t r e q u i r e d t o d e t e r m i n e H a r t ' s g u i l t from t h e
above f a c t s . When s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e i s a s s a i l e d ,
i t i s t h e p r o v i n c e of t h i s C o u r t t o view e v i d e n c e which
t e n d s t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t and n o t second-guess t h e j u r y
o r c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h what w e may have done a s j u r o r s .
S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 278, 557 ~ . 2 d
1023,
v a c a t e d 433 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2968, 53 ~ . E d , 2 d 1089, on
remand 581 P.2d 1205, v a c a t e d 99 S.Ct. 3094, c e r t . d e n i e d 99
S.Ct. 3103. See a l s o M i l e s v. Commonwealth ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 2 0 5 V a .
462, 138 S.E.2d 22.
The j u r y was f u l l y i n s t r u c t e d on i t s d u t y and r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y i n e v a l u a t i n g t h e e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t . I t i s reason-
a b l e t o assume t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d m a t e r i a l q u e s t i o n s of f a c t
r e g a r d i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t t o a i d i n t h e t h e f t which, i n
o u r system of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , a r e d e c i d e d by t w e l v e j u r o r s .
F i n a l l y , t h e d e c i s i o n t o submit a c a s e t o t h e j u r y and deny
a motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t l i e s w i t h i n t h e a m b i t of t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s broad d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers and s h o u l d n o t
be d i s t u r b e d by t h i s C o u r t on a p p e a l i n t h e a b s e n c e of a
c l e a r a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Armstrong ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 149
Mont. 470, 4 2 8 P.2d 611. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e
i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s case.
H a r t a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d no e v i d e n c e a t
t r i a l t h a t t h e women s e e n a t D i x i e S t r i d ' s house were Gunsch
and Harris, t h e p r i n c i p a l s of t h e c r i m e . The c o n n e c t i v e
l i n k , H a r t a r g u e s , was t h e t a k i n g o f j u d i c i a l n o t i c e by t h e
c o u r t of t h e S t a t e ' s p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t t h e two women. This,
s u b m i t s d e f e n d a n t , i s a f a i l u r e t o prove a n e l e m e n t of t h e
crime, i.e. a s s o c i a t i o n , and i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W disagree.
e
F i r s t o f a l l , from t h e t e s t i m o n y of D i x i e S t r i d :
"Q. Now t h e s e f o u r women, r e f e r r i n g t o S h i r l e y
H a r t , Maryona Johnson and Mary Gunsch and Donna
H a r r i s , how d i d t h e y a r r i v e a t your house? A .
Donna and Mary went t o m house w i t h m e from
y
m bar.
y
"Q. D you know how S h i r l e y H a r t g o t t h e r e ?
o
A. She d r o v e m c a r o r E r n e s t ' s c a r .
y
"Q. Could you t e l l m e who l e f t f i r s t , S h i r l e y
H a r t o r Maryona Johnson? A. I d o n ' t remember
f o r s u r e , W e had s e v e r a l d r i n k s . "
From t h i s t e s t i m o n y and t h a t of Maryona Johnson, w e c a n
f i n d ample e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t S h i r l e y H a r t and t h e two
p r i n c i p a l s , H a r r i s and Gunsch, were i n d e e d a s s o c i a t e s , a t
some p o i n t n e a r t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . H a r t ' s argument on
a p p e a l , however, a s s i g n s e r r o r t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n t o t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t
t h e two women, c h a r g i n g them w i t h t h e a c t u a l t h e f t a t t h e
j e w e l r y s t o r e on May 24, 1979. I n e s s e n c e t h i s means t h a t
w h i l e t h e S t a t e may have proven t h e a s s o c i a t i o n of t h e t h r e e
women, i t d i d n o t p r o v e t h a t H a r r i s and Gunsch w e r e t h e
principal actors i n the theft.
The t a k i n g of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i s governed by t h e p r o v i -
s i o n s o f Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid.:
"Judicial notice - facts.
of
" ( a ) Scope o f r u l e . This r u l e governs j u d i c i a l
n o t i c e of a l l f a c t s .
" ( b ) Kinds o f f a c t s . A f a c t t o be j u d i c i a l l y
n o t i c e d must be one n o t s u b j e c t t o r e a s o n a b l e
d i s p u t e i n t h a t i t i s e i t h e r (1) g e n e r a l l y
known w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of
t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r ( 2 ) c a p a b l e of a c c u r a t e and
r e a d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n by r e s o r t t o s o u r c e s whose
accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.
" ( c ) When d i s c r e t i o n a r y . A c o u r t may t a k e j u d i -
c i a l n o t i c e , whether r e q u e s t e d o r n o t .
" ( d ) When mandatory. A c o u r t s h a l l take judi-
c i a l n o t i c e i f r e q u e s t e d by a p a r t y and s u p p l i e d
with t h e necessary information.
" ( e ) O p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d . A p a r t y i s en-
t i t l e d upon t i m e l y r e q u e s t t o an o p p o r t u n i t y t o
b e h e a r d a s t o t h e p r o p r i e t y of t a k i n g j u d i c i a l
n o t i c e and t h e t e n o r of t h e m a t t e r n o t i c e d . In
t h e a b s e n c e of p r i o r n o t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e q u e s t
may be made a f t e r j u d i c i a l n o t i c e h a s been t a k e n .
" ( f ) Time of t a k i n g n o t i c e . J u d i c i a l n o t i c e may
be t a k e n a t any s t a g e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g .
" ( g ) I n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. In a c i v i l action or
proceeding, t h e c o u r t s h a l l i n s t r u c t t h e jury t o
a c c e p t a s c o n c l u s i v e any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d .
In a criminal case, the court s h a l l i n s t r u c t the
j u r y t h a t i t may, b u t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o , a c c e p t
a s c o n c l u s i v e any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d . "
W e c a n f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n
t o t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e f a c t of t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t
H a r r i s and Gunsch, e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c -
t i o n on j u d i c i a l n o t i c e . W e c o n s i d e r i n i t i a l l y j u s t what
was j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d - - t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t H a r r i s and
Gunsch. he f a c t of t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e s e women was n o t
" s u b j e c t t o r e a s o n a b l e d i s p u t e " and, moreover, t h e f a c t of
t h e c h a r g e s was c a p a b l e of " a c c u r a t e and r e a d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n
by r e s o r t t o s o u r c e s whose a c c u r a c y c a n n o t be r e a s o n a b l y
questionedv--namely, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e s which c o n t a i n e d
t h e o r i g i n a l c o p i e s of t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e two p r i n c i p a l s .
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t we a r e d i s c u s s i n g t h e f a c t o f
t h e c h a r g e s h e r e and n o t t h e i r v a l i d i t y .
Even i f t h e t a k i n g of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i n any way t a i n t e d
t h e f a i r n e s s of d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l , any t a i n t would be e l i m i -
n a t e d by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n t o t h e j u r y . The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t i t was a l l o w e d t o a c c e p t a s
c o n c l u s i v e any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d b u t t h a t it was n o t
r e q u i r e d t o do s o . See Rule 201 ( g ) , Mont. R . Evid. Having
drawn t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p l e a d i n g s which had been
j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d , t h e c o u r t made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n was n o t b i n d i n g on t h e j u r y and t h a t t h e y c o u l d
d i s r e g a r d t h e f a c t of t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t H a r r i s and
Gunsch. I t was t h e n t h e j u r y ' s p r e r o g a t i v e t o a c c e p t o r
r e j e c t t h e j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c e d f a c t s a s e v i d e n c e , and w e w i l l
n o t d i s t u r b i t s d e c i s i o n . S t a t e v . McKenzie, s u p r a ; S t a t e v .
S t o d d a r d ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 402, 4 1 2 P.2d 827.
A s t o H a r t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t
proof t h a t t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s found a t Mann c r e d i t J e w e l e r s
w e r e h e r s , we f i n d h e r argument more s p e c i o u s t h a n r e a l .
The g i s t of t h e c l a i m i s t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t e r r e d i n
t
taking j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of defendant's a l i a s e s , thereby
e x p l a i n i n g why t h e name on t h e f i n g e r p r i n t c a r d was " ~ h i r l e y
c h i t t e n d e n " w h i l e t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s were t h o s e of d e f e n d a n t ,
"~hirleyHart." The State relied on the testimony of finger-
print expert, Herbert Bruning. He testified that the finger-
prints removed from the glass in Mann Credit Jewelers were
those of Shirley Busby Hart a/k/a Chittenden.
When defendant married, she changed only her name, not
her fingerprints. Referring again to Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid.,
we can determine that the fact of defendant's other used
names is not subject to reasonable dispute in that they
would be "capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably ques-
tioned," i.e., her birth certificate, marriage certificate,
baptismal records, etc. We recognize that there are facts
which, "from motives of policy, the law requires a court to
judicially notice, or have knowledge of, but of which, in
reality, it is ignorant." Holtz v. Babcock (1963), 143
Mont. 341, 390 P.2d 801. When facts are not subject to
reasonable dispute, such as in this case, the District Court
saves time and money for all parties by taking judicial
notice of those facts. See Commission Comment, Rule 201,
Mont.R.Evid.
Any merit this argument may have is further diminished
when considered in the light of June Carranza's eyewitness
identification of defendant as the third woman in the store.
The fingerprints were taken from the wineglasses Carranza
had shown defendant. When these two pieces of evidence are
considered together, we can see very little merit to the
claim that the judge should not have taken judicial notice
of the fact of defendant's aliases, thereby explaining the
discrepancies between the name on the fingerprint card and
the current name of defendant.
F i n a l l y , defendant claims generally t h a t t h e r e w a s
i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o uphold h e r c o n v i c t i o n . After a
r e v i e w o f t h e e v i d e n c e i n f a v o r of t h e v e r d i c t and a r e v i e w
of a p p l i c a b l e law, w e f i n d f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e f o r t h e
j u r y t o d e c i d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s on May 2 4 , 1979,
were i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a h y p o t h e s i s of innocence.
Mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e s c e n e of t h e t h e f t , o r even f a i l u r e
t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h a t h e f t which someone i s aware i s t a k i n g
p l a c e , i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o h o l d one a c c o u n t a b l e a s a p r i n -
c i p a l t o t h e crime. P e o p l e v. Durham ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 74 C a l . R p t r .
262, 449 P.2d 198. F u r t h e r , t h e a c t o r need n o t t a k e p a r t i n
t h e o v e r t a c t o f t h e t h e f t , o r t h e a c t u a l t a k i n g , t o be
found g u i l t y . P e o p l e v. C o l e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 50 I l l . A p p . 3 d 133, 7
I11.Dec. 848, 365 N.E.2d 133. Although mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e
s c e n e of t h e c r i m e and t h e f a i l u r e t o d i s a p p r o v e o r oppose
t h e c r i m e do n o t make a p e r s o n l i a b l e , t h e s e f a c t o r s may be
c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y , a l o n g w i t h o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s which
may i n d i c a t e whether t h e p e r s o n i n some way a i d e d i n t h e
commission of t h e c r i m e . See P e o p l e v . Nugara ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 39
I11.2d 482, 236 N.E.2d 693, c e r t . d e n i e d , 393 U.S. 925, 89
S.Ct. 257, 21 L.Ed.2d 261; P e o p l e v. C r u t c h e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 72
Ill.App.3d 239, 28 I11.Dec. 404, 390 N.E.2d 571.
Where t h e e v i d e n c e d i s c l o s e s , a s i t d o e s i n t h i s c a s e ,
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had a n a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h t h e p r i n c i p a l s of
t h e crime ( P e o p l e v. C o l e , s u p r a ; P e o p l e v . C r u t c h e r , s u p r a ) ,
t h a t t h e defendant's conduct a f t e r t h e t h e f t i s compatible
w i t h t h e view t h a t s h e was f l e e i n g t h e s c e n e ( P e o p l e v .
P e n d l e t o n ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 75 I l l . A p p . 2 d 314, 2 2 1 N.E.2d 1 1 2 ) r that
t h e d e f e n d a n t d i v e r t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e c l e r k a t t h e
e x a c t t i m e t h e t h e f t t o o k p l a c e (Snyder v. ~ommonwealth
(1961), 202 Va. 1009, 1 2 1 S.E.2d 4 5 2 ) , and t h a t t h e fiefen-
d a n t made no e f f o r t t o a p p r i s e t h e c l e r k o r t h e a u t h o r i t i e s
of t h e f a c t of t h e t h e f t which had o c c u r r e d w i t h i n a few
f e e t of h e r ( P e o p l e v. C r u t c h e r , s u p r a ) , we become convinced
t h a t t h e j u r y had more t h a n ample e v i d e n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
guilt. The c h a i n of e v i d e n c e i s a s e r i e s of c i r c u m s t a n c e s :
p r e s e n c e , d i v e r s i o n , s i l e n c e , a s s o c i a t i o n and f l i g h t . These
e l e m e n t s of t h e S t a t e ' s proof p r e s e n t a f o r m i d a b l e and
unbroken c h a i n o f f a c t s and e v e n t s . The e v i d e n c e w a s
s u f f i c i e n t , and t h e c a s e p r o p e r l y s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y .
PRESENCE DURING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
H a r t c l a i m s t h a t h e r a b s e n c e d u r i n g t h e f i n a l s t a g e of
j u r y s e l e c t i o n v i o l a t e d h e r due p r o c e s s r i g h t s and c o n f r o n t a -
t i o n r i g h t s under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , she
c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e had a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d r i g h t t o
be p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s of t h e j u r y .
I n making t h i s argument, H a r t c i t e s Snyder v . Massa-
c h u s e t t s ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674,
f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a d e f e n d a n t h a s a r i g h t t o be
p r e s e n t a t a l l s t a g e s o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s where fundamental
f a i r n e s s m i g h t be t h w a r t e d by h e r a b s e n c e . See S t a t e v .
P e t e r s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642. This Court has
h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s are n o t v i o l a t e d when t h e
m a t t e r s handled d u r i n g h i s o r h e r a b s e n c e were p u r e l y l e g a l .
S t a t e v. P e t e r s , supra. H a r t a r g u e s , however, t h a t t h e
peremptory c h a l l e n g e s s t a g e of p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s i s n o t a
purely legal exercise. She c i t e s a n Idaho d e c i s i o n a s
persuasive authority f o r the r u l e t h a t v o i r d i r e jury selec-
t i o n p r o c e s s i s a v i t a l s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a t which
defendant's presence i s e s s e n t i a l . I d a h o v . Carver ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,
94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676. F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t a l s o con-
tends that her failure to object or protest her absence did
not result in a waiver of the right. (See State v. Reed
(1922), 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756, wherein we held that the
right to be present at all crucial stages of the proceedings
is a nonwaivable right.)
We are of the opinion, however, that the act of peremptorily
challenging the jury is a wholly legal exercise and defendant's
absence from that stage of the proceedings is in no way
violative of defendant's rights. Idaho v. Carver, supra, is
not properly relied on by defendant. In that case, defendant
was not present at any time during the selection of the jury
that ultimately tried him. In this case, however, the
record reflects that Hart was absent only during the peremp-
tory challenges. Although defendant's presence may be
crucial during the voir dire questioning of the jury, the
-
act of the peremptory challenge of jurors is a pro forma
execution of the decisions formulated during questioning.
The absence of defendant was not injurious to either her
right of due process or her right of confrontation.
JURY INSTRUCTION
Defendant's final assignment of error is directed at
the District Court's refusal of her proposed Instruction No.
9, regarding the credibility of witness identification
testimony. That proposed instruction is set forth below:
"Identification testimony is an expression of
belief of impression by the witness. Its value
depends on the opportunity the witness had to
observe the offender at the time of the offense
and to make reliable identification later.
"In appraising the identification testimony of
a witness, you should consider the following:
"(1) Are you convinced that the witness had a
capacity and adequate opportunity to observe the
offender?
"Whether t h e w i t n e s s had a n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y
t o o b s e r v e t h e o f f e n d e r a t t h e t i m e of t h e o f -
f e n s e w i l l be a f f e c t e d by s u c h m a t t e r s a s how
l o n g o r s h o r t a t i m e was a v a i l a b l e , how f a r o r
c l o s e t h e w i t n e s s was, how good w e r e l i g h t i n g
c o n d i t i o n s , whether t h e w i t n e s s had o c c a s i o n t o
see o r know t h e p e r s o n i n t h e p a s t .
" ( 2 ) A r e you s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
made by t h e w i t n e s s s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e o f f e n s e
was a p r o d u c t o f h i s own r e c o l l e c t i o n ? You may
t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t b o t h t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e i d e n -
t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which
t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was made.
" I f t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e w i t n e s s may have
been i n f l u e n c e d by c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e
d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t e d t o him f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
you s h o u l d s c r u t i n i z e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h
g r e a t c a r e . You may a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e l e n g t h of
t i m e t h a t e l a p s e d between t h e o c c u r r e n c e of t h e
c r i m e and t h e n e x t o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e w i t n e s s
t o see t h e d e f e n d a n t , a s a f a c t o r b e a r i n g on t h e
r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . "
The S t a t e o b j e c t e d t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n b e c a u s e i t had
been o f f e r e d w i t h o u t any a u t h o r i t y . On a p p e a l d e f e n d a n t
does n o t argue t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o r r e c t statement
of t h e law b u t o n l y t h a t s h e was e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n
on t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e
of fender.
Two p o i n t s s u s t a i n o u r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no r e v e r -
s i b l e e r r o r i n t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o g i v e
H a r t ' s j u r y I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9. F i r s t of a l l , t h e r e c o r d
shows t h a t t h e j u r y was t o l d by t h e judge i n I n s t r u c t i o n No.
"You a r e t h e s o l e judges of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of
a l l t h e w i t n e s s e s who have t e s t i f i e d i n t h i s
c a s e , and of t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i -
mony. A w i t n e s s i s presumed t o speak t h e t r u t h ;
b u t this presumption may be r e p e l l e d by t h e
manner i n which h e t e s t i f i e s , by t h e n a t u r e of
h i s t e s t i m o n y , o r by e v i d e n c e a f f e c t i n g h i s c h a r -
a c t e r f o r t r u t h , honesty o r i n t e g r i t y , o r h i s
m o t i v e s , o r by c o n t r a d i c t o r y e v i d e n c e ; and i n
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i -
mony of any w i t n e s s , you have a r i g h t t o c o n s i d e r
t h e a p p e a r a n c e of e a c h w i t n e s s on t h e s t a n d , h i s
manner of t e s t i f y i n g , h i s a p p a r e n t candor o r l a c k
of c a n d o r , h i s a p p a r e n t f a i r n e s s o r l a c k of f a i r -
ness, his apparent intelligence or lack of intel-
ligence, his knowledge -
and-means of knowledge -
on
the subject upon which he testifies, together
with all the other circumstances appearing in
evidence on the trial." (Emphasis added.)
We are persuaded that the jury was properly and ade-
quately instructed on the credibility of all witnesses,
including that of the eyewitness, June Carranza.
We also feel that the circumstances do not dictate the
giving of Hart's proposed instruction. Such an instruction
may be proper, if not mandatory, in certain cases. The
necessity of this type of instruction is especially clear
when there is only a single eyewitness's unsubstantiated
testimony which identifies the offender. United States v.
Masterson (9th Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 30. But in the case
before us, June Carranza's testimony was corroborated by the
presence of defendant's fingerprints on the wineglasses.
Although the fingerprints are not without dispute, we find
that even given that dispute as valid, they are sufficiently
supportive of Carranza's testimony to amply justify the
refusal of defendant's proposed Instruction No. 9.
We conclude, therefore, that the conviction of Shirley
Hart should be affirmed.
$his cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981.
V
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a separate opinion later.
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