Roberts v. Morin

No. 81-448

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN

1982

STANLEY J. ROBERTS and DONNA J .
ROBERTS,

P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,

MARY JANE BORIN,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The Honorable
J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For A p p e l l a n t :

J e f f r e y H. Langton, Hamk?ton, Montana

For Respondent :

M o r a l e s , V o l i n k a t y & H a r r , M i s s o u l a , Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1982

Decided: May 1 3 , 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

Appellants, S t a n l e y and Donna R o b e r t s , brought this

s u i t i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,

i n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , t o o b t a i n r e l i e f from t h e

forfeiture of their real estate contract with rsspondent,

Mary J a n e M o r i n , or, in the alternative, t o o b t a i n damages

f o r b r e a c h of that contract. After a nonjury trial, the

District Court entered judgment in favor of Morin and

awarded her the property and attorney fees in the amount

requested. The c o u r t t h e r e a f t e r e n t e r e d an amended judgment

jiving the Robertses a credit for expenses incurred in

making improvements to the property while they were in

possession. The R o b e r t s e s a p p e a l from t h e amended j u d g m e n t .

M o r i n ' s p r e d e c e s s o r , Morin Lumber Company, o r i g i n a l l y

sold the subject property i n 1974 t o a Mr. Woolhiser by a

c o n t r a c t f o r deed. The s a l e s p r i c e was $ 9 , 5 0 Q . A downpay-

rnent o f $8(ZI0 was made, l e a v i n g a balance of $8,9(ZI0 p a y a b l e

at 8% i n t e r e s t in monthly installments of $72.78 until

S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 , a t which t i m e t h e f u l l b a l a n c e , includ-

i n g i n t e r e s t , was t o become d u e .

The c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e d , in part, t h a t i n t h e event of

b u y e r ' s b r e a c h and c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e b r e a c h f o r s i x t y d a y s

Lollowing w r i t t e n n o t i c e of breach m a i l e d , " t o t h e buyer a t

1318 Defoe Street, Missoula, Montana, return receipt

r e q u e s t e d , o r such o t h e r a d d r e s s a s t h e buyer s h a l l p r o v i d e

t o t h e s e l l e r from t i m e t o t i m e , " the s e l l e r could, at his

option, declare a f o r f e i t u r e and retake possession of the

p r o p e r t y o r pursue a l l o t h e r remedies a v a i l a b l e a t law.

The c o n t r a c t a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y

in any litigation would be entitled to attorney f e e s and
costs of suit and that no assignment would be permitted

without the s e l l e r ' s w r i t t e n consent.

Not l o n g a f t e r W o o l h i s e r entered into the contract,

he assigned his interest to Albert and Emma R o b e r t s , the

p a r e n t s of S t a n l e y R o b e r t s , The a s s i g n m e n t was c o n s e n t e d t o

by Morin Lumber Company. Later, i n December 1 9 7 6 , A l b e r t

and Emma R o b e r t s a s s i g n e d t h e c o n t r a c t t o t h e i r s o n S t a n l e y

and his w i f e Donna. At t h e t i m e of t h i s assignment, the

principle balance due to Morin was $8,299.36. Mor i n ' s

predecessor consented t o t h i s assiynment. While a p p e l l a n t s

owned the property, they resided there and made various

improvements, which the court determined to be valued at

$4,981.

On October 12, 1977, appellants entered into a

contract for the s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y t o Warren and K a t h y

Iverson. The contract provided that the Iversons would

assume the Robertses' obligations to Morin and that upon

completion of the Iversons' obligations to the Robertses,

the Robertses would assign their interest in the Morin

contract to the Iversons. Pursuant to this agreement an

a s s i g n m e n t of c o n t r a c t was drawn up t o be p l a c e d i n escrow

and a c o n s e n t t o a s s i g n m e n t was drawn and s i g n e d by Morin

and p l a c e d i n escrow with t h e assignment. Morin was a w a r e

a t t h i s t i m e t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were s e l l i n g t o t h e I v e r s o n s

on a s e p a r a t e c o n t r a c t ,

Unknown t o t h e R o b e r t s e s t h e t i t l e company m i s t a k e n l y

filed the a s s i g n m e n t of record before delivering t h e con-

tract and related papers to escrow. Further, the escrow

agent of the parties treated the contract as presently

a s s i g n e d and s e t up s e p a r a t e e s c r o w f i l e s f o r t h e R o b e r t s -
I v e r s o n c o r l t r a c t and t h e Iversori-Morin contract. The r e s u l t

was that t h e I v e r s o n s made payments through escrow t o the

R o b e r t s e s and p a y m e n t s t h r o u g h e s c r o w t o Morin.

P e r s o n a l and f i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s b e s e t t h e I v e r s o n s i n

1979, resulting in their separation and falling behind on

t h e e s c r o w payments. The I v e r s o n s m i s s e d a payment t o Morin

e a r l y i n 1 9 7 9 , b u t no a c t i o n was t a k e n on t h e p a r t o f Morin

t o e n f o r c e t h e t i m e of the essence clause i n the contract.

The I v e r s o n s ' l a s t payment t o Morin was on J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 .

Morin s e n t a n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t t o t h e I v e r s o n s a t 1 3 1 8 Defoe

S t r e e t a f t e r t h e I v e r s o n s m i s s e d t h e i r payment. L a t e r , upon

expiration of the sixty-day default period, Morin sent a

n o t i c e of forfeiture to the Iversons at the Defoe Street

address and took possession. Meanwhile, the Robertses,

though having trouble with the t i m e l i n e s s of the payments

from t h e I v e r s o n s , r e c e i v e d payments u n t i l J u l y 1 9 8 0 .

Morin s e n t no n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t o r f o r f e i t u r e t o t h e

Robertses, nor did the I v e r s o n s inform t h e Robertses t h a t

they had defaulted on the Morin contract until July or

August 1980. On A u g u s t 18, 1980, the Robertses' attorney

requested a statement of the balance due from Morin's

a t t o r n e y and o f f e r e d to cure the default. T h i s o f f e r was

rejected. On S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , R o b e r t s e s ' attorney sent a

written tender of payment to Morin and to her attorney,

offering to pay the amount in default and related costs

t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e o f t h e l a s t payment by
Iversons t o the d a t e of tender, a total of $7,552.61 plus

i n t e r e s t , i n e x c h a n g e f o r a d e e d from Morin. T h i s o f f e r was

r e j e c t e d , b u t t h e amount o f t h e o f f e r was n o t d i s p u t e d .

On S e p t e m b e r 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e R o b e r t s e s commenced s u i t
t o compel lvlorin t o a c c e p t t h e i r t e n d e r and d e l i v e r h e r d e e d ,

o r f o r damages. Throughout t h e proceedings, Hobertses have

o f f e r e d t o pay t h e a b o v e - s t a t e d amount,

The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w :

1. Were the Robertses e n t i t l e d to notice prior to

Morin d e f a u l t i n g t h e I v e r s o n c o n t r a c t ?

2. Once t h e R o b e r t s e s had n o t i c e o f t h e d e f a u l t and

offered to tender full compensation to Morin, should the

t r i a l c o u r t have d e n i e d a f o r f e i t u r e of t h e c o n t r a c t ?

The first issue presented by appellants is w h e t h e r

t h e y were e n t i t l e d t o n o t i c e p r i o r t o Morin d e f a u l t i n g t h e

Iverson contract. The contract provides that notice of

d e f a u l t be s e n t t o t h e " b u y e r " a t 1 3 1 8 D e f o e . Morin i n t e r -

preted this t o Inean t h a t n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t had t o be s e n t

only to the a d d r e s s of the "buyer" named in the original

contract, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e assignments. The p r o b l e m w i t h

t h i s type of notice is t h a t it f a i l s in t h i s situation to

take i n t o account the Robertses i n t e r e s t i n the property.

A l t h o u g h t h e r e is no s p e c i f i c c a s e o r s t a t u t e d e a l i n g

d i r e c t l y w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n , t h e r e is an a n a l o g y i n t h e l a w

t h a t p r o v i d e s a s u f f i c i e n t r a t i o n a l e f o r n o t i c e t o be g i v e n

in this instance. In Chambers v. Cranston (1976), 16

Wash.App. 5 4 3 , 558 P.2d 2 7 1 , i t was h e l d :

"The p u r c h a s e r i n an e x e c u t o r y r e a l e s t a t e
c o n t r a c t h a s a n i n t e r e s t which h e c a n mort-
g age Sigman v . Stevens-Norton, Inc. 70
inJash,2d 9 1 5 , 425 P.2d 8 9 1 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; N e l s o n v .
B a i l e y , 54 Wash.2d 1 6 1 , 338 P.2d 757, 73
A. L . R , 2d 1400 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
I f t h e purchaser has
mortgaged h i s i n t e r e s t , t h e mortgagee i s
e n t i t l e d t o n o t i c e of f o r f e i t u r e i f t h e
s e l l e r knows o f t h e m o r t g a g e , and t h e m o r t -
g a g e e h a s t h e r i g h t t o t e n d e r payments t o t h e
s e l l e r necessary t o protect h i s security,
i.e., t o keep t h e c o n t r a c t i n e f f e c t . " 558
P.2d a t 273.
S e e a l s o , MacFadden v . Walker ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 97 C a l . R p t r . 537, 488

P.2d 1353.

The situation presented here and the situation

p r e s e n t e d above a r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i s s i m i l a r . Here, t h e

R o b e r t s e s a s s i g n e d t h e d u t y o f p a y i n g on t h e Morin c o n t r a c t

to the Iversons but did not assign their interest to the

Iversons. Further, the Iversons did not "assume" in the

s t r i c t l e g a l sense the contract of the Robertses but merely

agreed, in writing, to pay Morin d i r e c t l y t h e amount that

t h e R o b e r t s e s had been i n i t i a l l y paying according t o t h e i r

c o n t r a c t assignment. The f a c t t h a t t h e a s s i g n m e n t was d u l y

r e c o r d e d by t h e t i t l e company d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e i n t e n t o f

the parties, and i t h a s no l e g a l e f f e c t on t h e t r a n s a c t i o n

itself. 66 Am.Jur.2d R e c o r d s and R e c o r d i n g Laws, sec. 98.

The i m p o r t a r l t s i m i l a r i t y l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t h e r e ,

a s i n Chambers, supra, t h e r e was a r e t a i n e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e

land. In Chambers, the court held that because Citizens

S a v i n g s and Loan A s s o c i a t i o n was t h e m o r t g a g e e i t had ". . .
t h e r i g h t t o n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t and t o an o p p o r t u n i t y t o k e e p

the contract in effect . . ." 558 P.2d a t 274. The R o b e r t s e s

s h o u l d h a v e had t h a t same o p p o r t u n i t y . They were e n t i t l e d

to a n o t i c e of default because they retained an interest,

similar to a mortgagee's interest, in the property, and

Morin was a w a r e o f t h a t i n t e r e s t .

The second issue is whether the trial court should

have denied a forfeiture when the Robertses offered to

tender full compensation to Morin. A discussion of this

issue should be premised with the statement that "equity

abhors forfeitures." Yellowstone County v. Wight (1944) ,

115 Mont. 4 1 1 , 1 4 5 P.2d 516; Sharp v. Holthusen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -
Mont. ,
- 616 P.2d 374, 37 S t . R e p . 1651. Here, there are

both s t a t u t o r y and e q u i t a b l e r e a s o n s t o d e n y f o r f e i t u r e o f

the contract.

Montana h a s a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e d e a l i n g with forfei-

ture. S e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, provides:

"-l i e f f r o m f o r f e i t u r e .
R e- Whenever by t h e
terms of an o b l i g a t i o n a p a r t y t h e r e t o i n c u r s
a f o r f e i t u r e or a l o s s i n the nature of a
f o r f e i t u r e by r e a s o n o f h i s f a i l u r e t o comply
w i t h i t s p r o v i s i o n s , h e may b e r e l i e v e d
t h e r e f r o m upon m a k i n g f u l l c o m p e n s a t i o n t o
the other party, except i n case of a grossly
negligent, w i l l £u l , o r fraudulent breach of
duty."

This Court h a s i n t e r p r e t e d s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, in

numerous c a s e s . I n Yellowstone County v. Wight, supra, we

" S e c t i o n 8 6 5 8 , R e v i s e d C o d e s [now 28-1-104,
MCA] , was e n a c t e d f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f o b l i g o r s
w h o s e f a i l u r e t o p u n c t u a l l y p e r f o r m would
r e s u l t i n l o s s t o them i n t h e m a t t e r s i n
r e s p e c t t o which t h e y have c o n t r a c t e d . The
i n t e n t i o n of t h e Legislature i n enacting t h e
s t a t u t e was t h a t i t s h o u l d b e o p e r a t i v e a n d
t h a t it s h o u l d be g i v e n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t
when t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n a n y c a s e g a v e i t
application. The i n t e n t i o n o f t h e l a w u n d e r
t h i s s t a t u t e is t h a t a f o r f e i t u r e should n o t
be n e e d l e s s l y e n f o r c e d . The c o u r t s h a v e
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a s t h e p o l i c y o f law i n t h e
absence of s t a t u t e . The r u l e a s i t h a s f o u n d
e x p r e s s i o n i n c o u r t d e c i s i o n s g e n e r a l l y is
t h a t b o t h i n l a w and i n e q u i t y f o r f e i t u r e s
a r e abhorred." 1 4 5 P.2d a t 518.

See a l s o , P a r r o t v. Heller ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 212, 5 5 7 P.2d

819, and S h a r p v. Holthusen, supra, for a reaffirmation of

t h e above s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

The D i s t r i c t Court ruled t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s had n o t

appealed to the conscience of t h e c o u r t and cited section

28-1-104, IvlCA, and F r a t t v . Daniels-Jones ( 1 9 1 3 ) , 47 Mont.

4 8 7 , 1 3 3 P. 700, a s a u t h o r i t y . The C o u r t i n F r a t t c o n c l u d e d

that to invoke the anti-forfeiture statute a party must
appeal to the conscience of a c o u r t of equity. While t h i s

Inay indeed be true, the philosophy of the law since the

r u l i n g i n F r a t t h a s changed d r a m a t i c a l l y . What a p p e a l s t o

t h e conscience of a court i n e q u i t y i n 1913 is n o t neces-

s a r i l y t h e same a s w h a t a p p e a l s t o t h e c o n s c i e n c e o f a c o u r t

of e q u i t y i n 1982. I n 1913, t h e l e g a l concept t h a t e q u i t y

abhors forfeitures was in its infancy, Presently, the

c0ncep.t is one that is considered axiomatic. Under the

p r e s e n t s t a t e o f t h e law and t h e c u r r e n t interpretation of

s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, F r a t t v. Daniels-Jones, supra, i s no

longer t h e proper authority.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o r u l e d t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were

grossly negligent and therefore unable t o avail themselves

the use of section 28-1-104, MCA, for failing to remain

a b r e a s t of Iversons' delinquency. T h e r e is n o t h i n g in the

r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g t h e r u l i n g t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were g r o s s l y

negligent in their duty under the terms o f the contract.

The f a c t t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were h a v i n g trouble collecting

from t h e Iversons does not necessarily impute to them the

k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e I v e r s o n s h a d d e f a u l t e d o n t h e i r M o r i n ob-

ligation. Indeed, w i t h o u t n o t i c e from Morin t h a t a d e f a u l t

existed, they could not have been expected to correct the

default, Also, t h e r e c o r d s h o w s t h a t upon l e a r n i n g o f the

default, they immediately contacted their attorney, asked

lvIorin for a payoff figure, and made a written offer to

perform. Morin, through her attorney, rejected t h i s offer.

A s f o r Morin's reasons behind t h e r e j e c t i o n , she t e s t i f i e d :

"Q, Now, t o y o u r k n o w l e d g e , d o e i t h e r you o r
your a t t o r n e y o b j e c t t o t h e amount o f f e r e d ?
O r you j u s t o b j e c t e d t o t a k i n g a n y a m o u n t o f
money? A. I j u s t objected. I j u s t wanted
t h e house.
 IlQ. To your knowledge h a s t h e p r o p e r t y
a p p r e c i a t e d i n v a l u e s i n c e i t was s o l d i n
1 9 7 4 ? A, Yes, i t ' s a much b e t t e r p r o p e r t y
now." ( E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d .)

There are instances where a party who fails to

perform cannot utilize section 28-1-104, MCA, but this is

n o t one of t h o s e i n s t a n c e s , W f i n d t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were
e

not grossly negligent in their duty to Morin and clearly

f a l l w i t h i n t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA.

The a p p l i c a t i o n o f e q u i t y t o d e n y f o r f e i t u r e h a s b e e n

u s e d by t h i s C o u r t and c o u r t s o f other jurisdictions. In

State ex rel. Howeth v . D. A. D a v i d s o n & Co. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163

Mont. 3 5 5 , 517 P,2d 7 2 2 , we s t a t e d :

" E q u i t y w i l l i n t e r c e d e i n c a s e s where f o r f e i -
t u r e of t h e p u r c h a s e r ' s e q u i t a b l e t i t l e is
p r o v i d e d by t h e p u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t i n t h e
e v e n t of h i s d e f a u l t . If the defaulting
p u r c h a s e r c a n make a showing t h a t he i s
e q u i t a b l y e n t i t l e d t o s u c h r e l i e f and t h a t
h i s b r e a c h o f d u t y was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t ,
willful or fraudulent, the courts w i l l , in
proper cases, relieve the defaulting
p u r c h a s e r from t h e f o r f e i t u r e . " 517 P.2d a t
730.

The Supreme C o u r t o f Hawaii i n J e n k i n s v. Wise (Haw,

1 9 7 8 ) , 574 P.2d 1337, s t a t e d :

". . . A c c o r d i n g l y , where t h e v e n d e e ' s b r e a c h
h a s n o t been due t o g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e , o r t o
d e l i b e r a t e o r b a d - f a i t h c o n d u c t , on h i s p a r t ,
and t h e v e n d o r c a n r e a s o n a b l y and a d e q u a t e l y
be c o m p e n s a t e d f o r h i s i n j u r y , c o u r t s i n
equity w i l l generally grant relief against
f o r f e i t u r e and d e c r e e s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e o f
t h e agreement.
574 P.2d a t 1 3 4 1 .
[Citations omitted.] . . ."
Also, in MacFadden v. Walker ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 97 Cal ,Rptr.

537, 4 8 8 P.2d 1353, t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court h e l d :

". . . A s we p o i n t e d o u t i n t h e B a r k i s c a s e ,
allowing t h e d e f a u l t i n g vendee t o c u r e h i s
d e f a u l t and p e r f o r m t h e c o n t r a c t may o f t e n be
the f a i r e s t solution, for the unjust enrich-
ment o f t h e v e n d o r t h a t i s p r e c l u d e d by
 r e s t i t u t i o n of t h e e x c e s s of p a r t payments
o v e r t h e damages c a u s e d by t h e b r e a c h may
b e a r l i t t l e o r no r e l a t i o n t o t h e f o r f e i t u r e
imposed on t h e v e n d e e i f h i s r i g h t t o p e r f o r m
t h e c o n t r a c t is t e r m i n a t e d . 'A vendee i n
d e f a u l t who is s e e k i n g t o k e e p t h e c o n t r a c t
a l i v e , however, is i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o
s e c u r e r e l i e f t h a n one who is s e e k i n g t o
r e c o v e r back t h e e x c e s s o f what h e h a s p a i d
o v e r t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e t h e v e n d o r
t h e b e n e f i t of h i s b a r g a i n a f t e r performance
under t h e c o n t r a c t h a s t e r m i n a t e d . In the
l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n i t may be s o d i f f i c u l t t o
compute t h e v e n d o r ' s damages t h a t t h e v e n d e e
w i l l be u n a b l e t o p r o v e t h a t t h e v e n d o r w i l l
be u n j u s t l y e n r i c h e d by a l l o w i n g him t o k e e p
a l l t h e money t h a t h a s been p a i d ...
I II 488
P.2d a t 1 3 5 6 .

Here, e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e invoked t o a c h i e v e a j u s t

result.

The equitable reasons to deny forfeiture are quite

apparent. In comparing the equities of this case, the

D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e one v e r y important f a c t o r .

The factor not included in the comparison was that Morin

would receive the property, not at i t s 1974 v a l u e , but at

its g r e a t l y increased 1982 v a l u e . Morin's predecessor in

i n t e r e s t s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e o r i g i n a l buyer f o r $9,500

in 1974. By the time the Robertses sold the property in

1977, the value had increased to $23,@0O. If Morin were

allowed to keep -the property, she would not only have

received $2,027.21, or 21 percent of the original sales

price, but s h e would be e n h a n c e d by t h e i n c r e a s e d v a l u e o f

the property.

On t h e o t h e r hand, the R o b e r t s e s would retain only

t h e arnount r e c e i v e d on t h e I v e r s o n s c o n t r a c t , amounting t o

about $7,080. Though the Robertses may have recovered

r o u g h l y 47 p e r c e n t of t h e i r o r i g i n a l e q u i t y , t h e y have been

denied t h e b e n e f i t of t h e increased v a l u e of t h e property.

By a p p l y i n g s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, t o deny a f o r f e i -
t u r e , and by r e q u i r i n g t h e R o b e r t s e s t o make f u l l payment o f

t h e b a l a n c e of t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t t o Morin, t h e e q u i t l e s

i n t h i s case a r e resolved--that i s , Morln r e c e i v e s t h e bene-

f i t of the original contract, and t h e R o b e r t s e s r e t a i n t h e

l a n d , l e s s t h e l r payment t o Morin. Further, the Robertses

a r e o b l i g a t e d t o Morin f o r any e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by Morin

reiatlny t o the Iversons' possession of the property. This

would consist of utility expenses, maintenance expenses,

r e p a i r e x p e n s e s and d e l i n q u e n t t a x e s . It d o e s n o t include,

however, any i m p r o v e m e n t s made by Morin w h i l e this action

was p e n d i n g . S e e , L a r r y C. lverson, Inc. v. Bouma (1981),

- Mont . -, 639 P.2d 47, 38 S t .Rep. 1911.

Morln i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s .

The judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court is reversed, and

the cause is remanded to the District Court for further

proceedings consistent with t h i s opinion.

W e concur:

a&&,@-
Chief J u s t i c e c-e&s?,