No. 81-445
IN THE SUPREME3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
ELIZABETH SCOTT PIERCE,
Petitioner and Respondent,
vs .
BRUCE CARROLL PIERCE Respondent and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula
Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Datsopoulos, MacDonald and Lind, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on briefs: January 12, 1982
Decided :
FEE 1 f tgq
Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.
On September 7 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f F r a n k l i n
County, Kentucky, d e c r e e d t h a t t h e m a r r i a g e o f B r u c e C a r r o l l
Pierce and E l i z a b e t h S c o t t Pierce b e d i s s o l v e d and t h a t
Elizabeth P i e r c e be given custody of t h e p a r t i e s 1 s i x year
o l d s o n , Jeremy. T h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t s from a d e c i s i o n by t h e
M i s s o u l a County D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t u n d e r f e d e r a l and s t a t e
law i t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h a t c h i l d c u s t o d y
determination.
Bruce and E l i z a b e t h Pierce w e r e m a r r i e d on March 21,
1 9 7 2 , i n F r a n k l i n County, Kentucky. On J u l y 23, 1 9 7 9 , t h e y
e n t e r e d i n t o a s e p a r a t i o n and p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t
whereby E l i z a b e t h was g i v e n c u s t o d y o f J e r e m y , and B r u c e was
given l i b e r a l v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . T h a t a g r e e m e n t was s u b s e -
q u e n t l y a p p r o v e d and a d o p t e d by t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t
i n i t s September 7 , 1979, d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e .
I n August, 1979, w i t h E l i z a b e t h ' s c o n s e n t , Bruce brought
Jeremy t o Montana. A s of t h e d a t e of t h i s appeal t h e p a r t i e s
d i s a g r e e d a s t o t h e n a t u r e and d u r a t i o n o f J e r e m y ' s v i s i t t o
Montana. I n t h e p l e a d i n g s Bruce a l l e g e d t h a t E l i z a b e t h
a g r e e d t o l e t Jeremy v i s i t f o r a n i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d , and
E l i z a b e t h a l l e g e d t h a t b e f o r e Jeremy l e f t , t h e y had a g r e e d
t o a s p e c i f i c d a t e on which Jeremy was t o b e r e t u r n e d b u t
t h a t Bruce f a i l e d t o a b i d e by t h e i r a g r e e m e n t .
One y e a r l a t e r , o n August 11, 1980, B r u c e f i l e d a
p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of c h i l d custody i n t h e Missoula
County D i s t r i c t C o u r t . B r u c e a l l e g e d t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n was
e s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n s (1)( a ) , (1)( b ) and (1)( d ) o f
s e c t i o n 40-4-211, MCA. I n an a f f i d a v i t f i l e d i n s u p p o r t of
h i s p e t i t i o n , Bruce s t a t e d t h a t h e had r e s i d e d i n M i s s o u l a ,
Montana, s i n c e August, 1979; t h a t Jeremy had been l i v i n g
w i t h him f o r t h e p a s t y e a r w i t h E l i z a b e t h ' s c o n s e n t ; and
t h a t Jeremy was a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l i n M i s s o u l a County.
I n a n i n i t i a l r e s p o n s e and c o u n t e r p e t i t i o n E l i z a b e t h
a l l e g e d t h a t t h e c o u r t must d e c l i n e t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n
o v e r t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n p e t i t i o n b e c a u s e Bruce had i m p r o p e r l y
r e t a i n e d Jeremy i n Montana a f t e r s h e r e q u e s t e d t h a t h e b e
returned t o her custody. I n a n amended r e s p o n s e and c o u n t e r -
p e t i t i o n E l i z a b e t h f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t Kentucky had c o n t i n u i n g
j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e c h i l d custody determination, a s w a s
e v i d e n c e d by a n O c t o b e r 8 , 1980, o r d e r from t h e F r a n k l i n
C i r c u i t C o u r t f i n d i n g Bruce i n c o n t e m p t of c o u r t f o r f a i l i n g
t o r e t u r n Jeremy t o E l i z a b e t h ' s c u s t o d y , and t h a t , b e c a u s e
Kentucky d e s i r e d t o e x e r c i s e i t s c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
t h e Montana c o u r t c o u l d n o t e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a c c o r -
d a n c e w i t h 28 USC §1738A, t h e " F u l l F a i t h and C r e d i t Given
t o C h i l d Custody D e t e r m i n a t i o n s " p r o v i s i o n o f t h e P a r e n t a l
Kidnapping P r e v e n t i o n A c t o f 1980. 1
A t E l i z a b e t h ' s r e q u e s t a n o r d e r was i s s u e d on March 1 0 ,
1981, d i r e c t i n g t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o communicate
d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e judge o f t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t of
Kentucky i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t
C o u r t d e s i r e d t o c o n t i n u e a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e
custody determination. On ~ p r i l , 1981, t h e D i s t r i c t
8
C o u r t r e c e i v e d a t e l e p h o n i c message from J u d g e S q u i r e N .
W i l l i a m s of t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t of F r a n k f o r t , Kentucky, i n f o r m i n g
t h e c o u r t t h a t Judge Williams agreed t h a t s i n c e t h e c h i l d
r e s i d e d i n Montana t h e c u s t o d y m a t t e r s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n e d
i n Montana. On A p r i l 1 3 , 1981, F r a n k l i n c i r c u i t C o u r t
Domestic R e l a t i o n s Commissioner, R o b e r t A. Bowman, l e f t a
message t h a t c o n t r a d i c t e d J u d g e W i l l i a m s ' e a r l i e r message.
J u d g e Henson of t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n a s k e d M r .
Bowman t o r e d u c e h i s o p i n i o n t o w r i t i n g , and i n a l e t t e r
a d d r e s s e d t o J u d g e Henson d a t e d A p r i l 27, 1981, M r . Bowman
s t a t e d t h a t it a p p e a r e d t h a t p r o p e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e
c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n l i e s i n Kentucky u n d e r t h e Uniform
C h i l d Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t .
On J u l y 27, 1981, J u d g e Henson h e a r d arguments from
c o u n s e l on t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s s u e . During t h e h e a r i n g
n e i t h e r p a r t y p r e s e n t e d any t e s t i m o n y t h r o u g h sworn w i t n e s s e s .
E l i z a b e t h ' s c o u n s e l d i d , however, s u b m i t s e v e r a l e x h i b i t s a s
e v i d e n c e t h a t Kentucky had c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . Exhibit
3 was a c e r t i f i e d copy of t h e contempt o r d e r i s s u e d by t h e
F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t on O c t o b e r 8 , 1980; E x h i b i t 4 was t h e
A p r i l 27, 1981, l e t t e r from M r . Bowman t o J u d g e Henson. At
t h e c l o s e o f argument J u d g e Henson r u l e d , as a m a t t e r of
l a w , t h a t t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n
over t h e cause. H e a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t h i s r u l i n g was n o t
i n t e n d e d t o b e a r e f l e c t i o n on t h e p a r t i e s .
On J u l y 31, 1981, J u d g e Henson i s s u e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t ,
c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment. Specifically, the court
found t h a t :
"3. I n r e s p o n s e t o i n q u i r y by t h e C o u r t ,
c o u n s e l f o r Respondent a d m i t t e d t h a t i n
December, 1 9 7 9 , Respondent r e f u s e d P e t i -
tioner's request t o return the child t o
h e r i n Kentucky. Respondent a l s o r e f u s e d
s u b s e q u e n t r e q u e s t s from P e t i t i o n e r f o r
t h e r e t u r n of t h e child.
"10. The F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t d e s i r e s
t o , and i s i n f a c t , a s s e r t i n g c o n t i n u i n g
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p a r t i e s , t h e minor
c h i l d , and t h i s c a u s e . "
The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t :
"2. Kentucky s t a t u t o r y and c a s e law p r o v i -
des t h e Franklin C i r c u i t Court with continu-
ing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p a r t i e s , t h e c h i l d
and t h i s c a u s e .
" 3 . The F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t i s a s s e r t i n g
i t s continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p a r t i e s ,
t h e c h i l d and t h i s c a u s e .
"4. S e c t i o n 28 U.S.C. 1738A, t h e P a r e n t a l
Kidnapping P r e v e n t i o n A c t o f 1 9 8 0 , d e n i e s t h i s
C o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e September
7 , 1979, F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t Decree.
"6. I t would b e p r o p e r f o r t h i s C o u r t t o
d e c l i n e t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h i s
c a u s e u n d e r t h e terms of t h e Montana Uniform
C h i l d Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t . "
I n a n August 27, 1981, o r d e r d e n y i n g Bruce P i e r c e ' s
m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e i t e r a t e d t h a t
28 USC §1738A, and s e c t i o n s 40-7-109 and 40-7-114, MCA, w e r e
t h e b a s e s upon which h e c o n c l u d e d t h a t no j u r i s d i c t i o n
e x i s t e d and t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n must b e d e c l i n e d .
The a p p e l l a n t , Bruce Pierce, r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g
i s s u e s on a p p e a l :
(1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g
a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n on t h e ground t h a t
Kentucky h a d , and d e s i r e d t o a s s e r t , c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n
u n d e r 28 USC §1738A?
(2) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l i n i n g t o
e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r modifi-
c a t i o n o f t h e Kentucky c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n on t h e ground
t h a t a p p e l l a n t had v i o l a t e d t h e t e r m s o f t h e Kentucky d e c r e e ?
F u l l F a i t h and C r e d i t L i m i t a t i o n s on Montana J u r i s d i c t i o n
P r i o r t o e n a c t m e n t o f 28 USC §1738A, i n Montana, Kentucky
and f o r t y - t w o o t h e r s t a t e s , t h e Uniform C h i l d Custody J u r i s -
d i c t i o n A c t ( U C C J A ) p r o t e c t e d one s t a t e ' s c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n from m o d i f i c a t i o n by c o u r t s o f a n o t h e r s t a t e . See,
e.g., sections 40-7-101, et. seq., MCA; Ky. Rev. Stat.
85403.400, et. seq. In Wenz v. Schwarz (1979), Mont.
- , 548 P.2d 1086, 36 St.Rep. 1360, this Court outlined
-
the two-part process required to determine whether Montana
has jurisdiction to modify another state's decree under the
UCCJA. That process required first, a determination that
Montana had jurisdiction under section 40-7-104, MCA, which
by reference incorporated the jurisdictional prerequisites
of section 40-4-211, MCA, and second, a determination that
the decree state no longer had jurisdiction or had declined
to exercise its jurisdiction.
Section 8 of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980 elevated the UCCJA jurisdictional standards to a federal
level. Custody determinations made in accordance with those
standards must now be given full faith and credit. The same
two-step decision-making process used under the UCCJA must
be followed in applying 28 USC 51738A(f).
The lower court correctly determined, under step 2 of
- -
the Wenz analysis, that if Kentucky had continuing jurisdiction,
such a finding would foreclose any need for the trier of
fact to ascertain whether Montana satisfied one of the
four alternate jurisdictional bases under section 40-4-211,
MCA. This Court finds no harm in the District Court's
inverted approach to the jurisdictional issue; however,
error does lie in the fact that the District Court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law are not supported by evidence.
Without benefit of either the affidavits required under
section 40-7-110, MCA, or an evidentiary hearing, the District
Court made conclusory findings that Kentucky's jurisdiction
did in fact continue and that Montana must decline to exercise
jurisdiction because appellant improperly retained the child
after a visit. A t a minimum, 28 U C § 1 7 3 8 ~ ( f ) e q u i r e s t h e
S r
t r i e r o f f a c t t o weigh t h e f a c t s v i s a v i s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
p r e r e q u i s i t e s e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e law of t h e d e c r e e s t a t e .
The law i s v e r y c l e a r : Kentucky's j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n t i n u e s
o n l y i f t h e c h i l d o r o n e c o n t e s t a n t s t i l l r e s i d e s i n Kentucky
- one of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a s e s of Ky. Rev. S t a t . §403.420(1)
and
is currently satisfied. 28 U C §1738A(d).
S Ky. Rev. S t a t .
§ 4 0 3 . 4 2 0 ( 1 ) , i d e n t i c a l f o r t h e most p a r t t o s e c t i o n 40-4-
2 1 1 , MCA, p r o v i d e s :
"403.420. P r e r e q u i s i t e s t o j u r i s d i c t i o n --
Commencement of p r o c e e d i n g . -- (1) A c o u r t
of t h i s s t a t e which i s competent t o d e c i d e
c h i l d c u s t o d y matters h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o
make a c h i l d c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n by i n i t i a l
o r modification decree i f :
" ( a ) T h i s s t a t e i s t h e home s t a t e of t h e
c h i l d a t t h e t i m e of commencement o f t h e pro-
c e e d i n g , o r had been t h e c h i l d ' s home s t a t e
w i t h i n s i x ( 6 ) months b e f o r e commencement o f
t h e p r o c e e d i n g and t h e c h i l d i s a b s e n t from
t h i s s t a t e b e c a u s e of h i s removal o r r e t e n -
t i o n by a p e r s o n c l a i m i n g h i s c u s t o d y o r f o r
o t h e r r e a s o n s , and a p a r e n t o r p e r s o n a c t i n g
a s parent continues t o l i v e i n t h i s s t a t e ; o r
"(b) I t i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d
t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n
b e c a u s e t h e c h i l d and h i s p a r e n t s , o r t h e c h i l d
and a t l e a s t one (1) c o n t e s t a n t , have a s i g n i -
f i c a n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s s t a t e , and t h e r e
i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s s t a t e s u b s t a n t i a l evi-
dence c o n c e r n i n g t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e
c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and p e r s o n a l r e l a -
tionships; o r
" ( c ) The c h i l d i s p h y s i c a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h i s
s t a t e and t h e c h i l d h a s been abandoned o r it
i s n e c e s s a r y i n a n emergency t o p r o t e c t t h e
c h i l d b e c a u s e h e h a s been s u b j e c t e d t o o r
threatened with mistreatment o r abuse o r i s
otherwise neglected o r dependent; o r
" ( d ) I t a p p e a r s t h a t no o t h e r s t a t e would
have j u r i s d i c t i o n under p r e r e q u i s i t e s sub-
s t a n t i a l l y i n accordance with paragraphs ( a ) ,
( b ) , o r ( c ) , o r another s t a t e has declined t o
e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e ground t h a t t h i s
s t a t e i s t h e more a p p r o p r i a t e forum t o d e t e r -
mine t h e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d , and it i s i n
t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t t h i s c o u r t
assume j u r i s d i c t i o n . "
E x c e p t i n g t h e e x h i b i t s p r e s e n t e d by r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l
d u r i n g argument on t h e l a w , t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e
lower c o u r t a s t o any f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n was t h e
a f f i d a v i t from Bruce P i e r c e which accompanied h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n
and temporary c u s t o d y p e t i t i o n . This evidence does n o t
conform t o any of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n
Ky. Rev. S t a t . 5 4 0 3 . 4 2 0 ( 1 ) . A s f o r t h e e x h i b i t s submitted
by r e s p o n d e n t , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t n e i t h e r t h e O c t o b e r ,
1980, contempt o r d e r n o r t h e l e t t e r from M r . Bowman s u p p o r t
a f i n d i n g of c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
c a n n o t i n f e r from e i t h e r of t h e s e e x h i b i t s t h a t t h e f a c t s
needed t o e s t a b l i s h j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o Ky. Rev. S t a t .
5403.420(1) a r e e x t a n t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t must make a
s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g , based on e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d and n o t
m e r e a l l e g a t i o n s , a s t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r b a s i s upon which t h e
decree s t a t e could lawfully continue t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e r r o r w a s f u r t h e r compounded by
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o u r t prematurely r e s o r t e d t o informal
communication w i t h t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t of Kentucky t o
f a c i l i t a t e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l decision-making p r o c e s s .
S e c t i o n 7 of t h e UCCJA, a f t e r which s e c t i o n 40-7-108(4) was
m o d e l l e d , does d i r e c t c o u r t s of one s t a t e t o communicate
w i t h c o u r t s i n a n o t h e r s t a t e when a n i n t e r s t a t e c u s t o d y
matter arises. However, such communication was i n t e n d e d t o
f a c i l i t a t e t h e d e c i s i o n a l p r o c e s s i n s i t u a t i o n s where i t h a s
been d e t e r m i n e d t h a t two s t a t e s have c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
and a d e c i s i o n must be made r e g a r d i n g which s t a t e i s t h e
most a p p r o p r i a t e forum t o a c t i n l i g h t of t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t
interests. The comment f o l l o w i n g UCCJA 57 s t a t e s :
"The p u r p o s e of t h i s p r o v i s i o n i s t o e n c o u r a g e
judicial r e s t r a i n t i n exercising jurisdiction
whenever a n o t h e r s t a t e a p p e a r s t o b e i n a b e t -
ter p o s i t i o n t o determine custody of a c h i l d .
- serves - - second check on jurisdiction
It as a
once the test of sections 3
---- or
14 has been met."
(Emphasis supplied.) Commissioner's Note, 9
U.L.A. 139 (master ed. 1979).
In that requirements of (c)(2) and (f) of the federal statute
are substantively equivalent to the tests required by UCCJA
sections 3 and 14, the District Court's attempt to informally
resolve possible interstate jurisdictional conflict was
untimely. The issue of whether it is appropriate to exercise
jurisdiction is secondary to, and distinct from, the issue
of whether jurisdiction lies.
In reapplying 28 USC §1738A, which by reference incorpora-
tes both Kentucky and Montana law, the trial court is directed
to hold a full evidentiary hearing to settle the jurisdiction
matter. The Wenz decisional mode should be followed, and
specific findings of fact as to jurisdictional basis should
be made. If the District Court choses to address the Wenz
steps in reverse order, it must address the question of
Kentucky's continuing jurisdiction systematically in light
of Ky. Rev. Stat. §403.420(1). If the lower court finds
that Kentucky is Jeremy's home state, it must conclude that
Kentucky has continuing jurisdiction and that Montana cannot
modify the Kentucky decree consistent with the provisions of
28 USC §1738A(f). If the lower court finds that, as the
present record indicates, Jeremy's home state is not Kentucky
2
but Montana, then the jurisdictional prerequisites of
subsections (a) and (d) of the Kentucky statute must be
automatically eliminated as possible bases for continuing
jurisdiction. Since there are no allegations to support
consideration of the "abandonment/emergency" alternative of
subsection ( c ) , it would then follow that the only logical
basis upon which the District Court could find continuing
jurisdiction is subsection (b), the "significant connection"
standard. Only if the District Court finds Kentucky has
jurisdiction, should it dispense with analysis of possible
jurisdiction in Montana and conclude that Montana has no
jurisdiction to modify the Kentucky decree.
If the District Court finds that Kentucky no longer has
jurisdiction under one of the enumerated bases, it must
determine whether Montana has jurisdiction under section 40-
4-211, MCA, which is incorporated by reference in section
40-7-104, MCA. If the lower court finds that Montana satisfies
any of these jurisdictional standards, it must find that,
under 28 USC §1738A(f) and sections 40-4-211 and 40-7-114,
MCA, Montana has jurisdiction to modify the Kentucky decree.
Only after such a finding is made should the District Court
focus on policy considerations as to whether Montana should
exercise its jurisdiction. It is then and only then that
the "forum non conveniens" and "clean hands" provisions
under state law come into play.
Discretion to Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction
As outlined above, the question of whether it is appropriate
for a state court to exercise its jurisdiction need only be
reached if a determination is made that Montana in fact has
jurisdiction. The finding of fact upon which the trial
judge relied in reaching his conclusion to decline jurisdiction,
that appellant wrongfully retained the child, is unsupported
by what little evidence there is in the record. Once again
referring to appellant's affidavit, appellant swore that
Jeremy had been in Montana since August, 1979, with respondent's
consent. Although appellant's counsel did concede during
argument that respondent made no request for the child's
return for five months after the child left Kentucky, at no
time during argument did counsel make an admission that
expressly contradicted his client's prior sworn statement;
moreover, respondent did not submit any sworn testimony that
refuted appellant's testimony. Counsel for appellant, at
the beginning of argument, made it quite evident that the
facts surrounding any alleged request were as yet disputed.
The exchange between the court and counsel at p. 25 of the
transcript does not constitute an admission as to improper
retention.
Additionally, the trial judge should not have relied
upon the Kentucky contempt order to determine the propriety
of appellant's conduct. The validity of that order may be
suspect under 28 USC §1738A(g) and KRS 5403.540. Both
sections provide that a state shall not exercise jurisdiction
if a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was
pending in the court of another state that is exercising
jurisdiction consistent with federal/UCCJ~ jurisdictional
standards. If the trial judge finds that Montana had juris-
diction to modify the decree on or before October 1, 1980,
it follows that the Franklin Circuit Court was acting in
contravention of federal and Kentucky law when it issued the
contempt order that effectively countermanded the temporary
custody order issued by the Montana District Court on
September 4th.
The comment following UCCJA section 8, after which
section 40-4-109, MCA, was modelled, states that "[tlhe
qualifying word 'improperly' is added to exclude cases in
which a child is withheld because of illness or other emergency
or - which there are other special justifying circumstances."
in
(Emphasis supplied.) Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 143
(master ed. 1979).
In determining whether the appellant "improperly retained
[Jeremy] after a visit," the trial judge should examine all
the circumstances surrounding the retention and not deem
appellant's action improper per se merely because respondent
may have requested immediate return of the child. While the
custodial parent's request should not be disregarded, neither
should the Court overlook the possibility that immediate
return upon request might unreasonably disrupt the child's
home and school life.
Finally, before the trial judge may conclude jurisdiction
must be declined, the trial court must balance the child's
best interests against the State's interest in avoiding
forum-shopping and parental kidnapping. Jurisdiction shall
not be declined unless the trial court determines that the
child's best interests will not be injured by such a decision.
The lower court's judgment is reversed, the order
vacated and the cause is remanded for evidentiary hearing
consistent with this opinion.
Provisions of 28 USC 81738A pertinent to this appeal
provide:
"81738A. Full faith and credit given to child
custody determinations.
"(a) The appropriate authorities of every
State shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided in
subsection (f) of this section, any child
custody determination made consistently with
the provisions of this section by a court of
another State.
" (b) As used in this section the term --
"(2) 'Contestant' means a person, including
a parent who claims a right to custody or
visitation of a child;
"(3) 'custody determination' means a judg-
ment, decree, or other order of a court pro-
viding for the custody or visitation of a
c h i l d , and i n c l u d e s permanent and temporary
o r d e r s , and i n i t i a l o r d e r s and m o d i f i c a t i o n s ;
"(4) 'home S t a t e ' means t h e S t a t e i n which,
immediately p r e c e d i n g t h e t i m e i n v o l v e d , t h e
child lived with h i s parents, a parent o r a
person a c t i n g a s parent, f o r a t l e a s t s i x
c o n s e c u t i v e months, and i n t h e c a s e of a
c h i l d l e s s t h a n s i x months o l d , t h e S t a t e i n
which t h e c h i l d l i v e d from b i r t h w i t h any o f
such p e r s o n s . P e r i o d s of temporary a b s e n c e
of any o f such p e r s o n s a r e c o u n t e d a s p a r t
o f t h e six-month o r o t h e r p e r i o d ;
" ( 5 ) ' m o d i f i c a t i o n ' and 'modify' r e f e r t o a
c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n which m o d i f i e s , r e p l a c e s ,
s u p e r s e d e s , o r o t h e r w i s e i s made s u b s e q u e n t
t o , a p r i o r custody determination concerning
t h e same c h i l d , whether made by t h e same c o u r t
o r not;
"(8) ' S t a t e ' means a S t a t e of t h e United
S t a t e s , t h e D i s t r i c t of Columbia, t h e Com-
monwealth of P u e r t o R i c o , o r a t e r r i t o r y o r
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
" ( c ) A c h i l d c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n made by
a c o u r t of a S t a t e i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n o n l y i f --
" ( 1 ) s u c h c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e
l a w o f s u c h S t a t e ; and
"(2) o n e of t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s i s m e t :
"(A) such S t a t e ( i ) i s t h e home S t a t e of t h e
c h i l d on t h e d a t e of t h e commencement of t h e
p r o c e e d i n g , o r ( i i ) had been t h e c h i l d ' s home
S t a t e w i t h i n s i x months b e f o r e t h e d a t e of t h e
commencement of t h e p r o c e e d i n g and t h e c h i l d
i s a b s e n t from s u c h S t a t e b e c a u s e of h i s re-
moval o r r e t e n t i o n by a c o n t e s t a n t o r f o r
o t h e r r e a s o n s , and a c o n t e s t a n t c o n t i n u e s t o
l i v e i n such S t a t e ;
" (B) ( i ) i t a p p e a r s t h a t no o t h e r S t a t e would
have j u r i s d i c t i o n under s u b p a r a g r a p h ( A ) , and
( i i )i t i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d
t h a t a c o u r t of such S t a t e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n
b e c a u s e ( I ) t h e c h i l d and h i s p a r e n t s , o r t h e
c h i l d and a t l e a s t one c o n t e s t a n t , have a
s i g n i f i c a n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h such S t a t e o t h e r
t h a n mere p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e i n such S t a t e , and
(11) t h e r e i s a v a i l a b l e i n such S t a t e s u b s t a n -
t i a l evidence concerning t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t
o r f u t u r e c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and p e r -
sonal relationships;
" (D) (i) it appears that no other State would
have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B),
( C ) , or (E), or another State has declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the
State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child, and (ii) it is in the best in-
terest of the child that such court assume
jurisdiction; or
"(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
"(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State
which has made a child custody determination
consistently with the provisions of this sec-
tion continues as long as the requirement of
subsection (c)(1) of this section continues
to be met and such State remains the residence
of the child or of any contestant.
"(f) A court of a State may modify a deter-
mination of the custody of the same child made
by a court of another State, if --
"(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child
custody determination; and
" (2) the court of the other State no longer
has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exer-
cise such jurisdiction to modify such deter-
mination.
" (g) A court of a State shall not exercise
jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
determination commenced during the pendency
of a proceeding in a court of another State
where such court of that other State is exer-
cising jurisdiction consistently with the
provisions of this section to make a custody
determination."
As the record stands, as of August 11, 1980, under
federal and state law, Montana was Jeremy's home state.
This Court is not persuaded by respondent's contention
that during the time a child is present in a state as a
result of acts in violation of an existing custody
decree, calculation of the six month period needed to
establish "home state" jurisdiction should be tolled.
Cf. Freeman v. Freeman (Ky. 1977), 547 S.W.2d 437.
Neither the language nor the legislative history of the
"home state" definitional subsection support such a
conclusion. See Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 123
(master ed. 1979). Facts relating to the improper
conduct of a petitioner should only be addressed in the
context of determining whether it is appropriate to
exercise jurisdiction once it has been determined that
Montana has jurisdiction.
Additionally, Wenz, supra, Marriage of Settle (1976),
276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962, 965, overruled in part, 291
Or. 363, 630 P.2d 353; Matter of Custody - -
of Ross (1981),
291 Or. 363, 630 P.2d 353, 358;~ruenig v. Silverman
-
(Ky. 1978), 563 S.W.2d 482; and - - v. - (Ky.App.,
Hook Hook
1977), 551 S.W.2d 818, at a minimum, would support a
finding that Montana has jurisdiction under either the
"home state" or "significant connection" standard of
section 3.
We Concur: