NO. 82-194
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1983
R. PEYTON HOVEY,
petitioner and A p p e l l a n t ,
VS.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, LIQUOR
DIVISION, o f t h e S t a t e o f M o n t a n a ,
a n d LEE WILLIAMS, e t a l . ,
Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k
H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
J o h n W . Mahan a r g u e d , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a
C a r t e r P i c o t t e a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
For Respondents:
Mike G a r r i t y a r g u e d , Dept. of Revenue, Helena, Montana
submitted: January 1 4 , 1983
Decides: February 2 4 , 1 9 8 3
p- .-.
-
Filed:
I- t8 2 4 1983
-
-- C l e r k
Mr. J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s case comes t o t h i s C o u r t from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the
F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, Lewis and C l a r k C o u n t y . The D i s t r i c t
Court denied appellant's petition for a writ of mandate,
r e q u i r i n g t h e Department of Revenue ( D O R ) t o allow him to a p p l y
f o r o n e o f s i x new l i q u o r l i c e n s e s to be i s s u e d i n t h e B i l l i n g s
area. From t h a t d e n i a l t h i s a p p e a l was t a k e n .
I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 1 , s i x new f l o a t e r a l l b e v e r a g e l i q u o r l i c e n -
ses became a v a i l a b l e i n B i l l i n g s b a s e d on t h e s t a t i s t i c s c o m p i l e d
in the 1980 census. On October 5, 1981, appellant, Hovey,
a p p l i e d f o r o n e o f t h e s e l i c e n s e s to u s e i n h i s downtown B i l l i n g s
restaurant. Appellant's application was rejected by the
DOR o n O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1981. T h i s r e j e c t i o n was on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t
the appellant's place of b u s i n e s s was i n v i o l a t i o n of section
16-3-306, MCA, which prohibits liquor dispensing premises
( h e r e i n a f t e r premises) w i t h i n 600 f e e t o f churches or schools
when on t h e same s t r e e t , and t h e DORIS i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of that
s e c t i o n , s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 42.12.129, ARM.
On November 2, 1981, Hovey f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r an alter-
native writ of mandate in the District Court of the First
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y . On t h a t d a t e a n o r d e r
was s e c u r e d d i r e c t i n g t h e DOR t o r e v o k e i t s r u l i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t
was i n e l i g i b l e t o a p p l y f o r o n e of t h e s i x new l i c e n s e s o r i n t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e t o show c a u s e why t h a t r u l i n g had n o t b e e n r e v o k e d .
An initial hearing was held on the order to show cause on
November 9 , 1 9 8 1 . A subsequent hearing was o r d e r e d to be h e l d
February 4 , 1982, following a ruling issued by the Honorable
A r n o l d O l s e n i n t h e case of F l e t c h e r v. DOR, No. 47319, ( d e c i d e d
March 8 , 1 9 8 2 , L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y ) , which p r e s e n t e d a s i m i l a r
issue.
I n the i n t e r i m between t h e second h e a r i n g and t h e District
Court I s f i n a l d e c i s i o n , t h e a p p e l l a n t was a l l o w e d to p a r t i c i p a t e
i n t h e DOR a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g w i t h o t h e r a p p l i c a n t s . This
was o n l y t o e x p e d i t e matters i n case of a n a d v e r s e r u l i n g b y t h e
D i s t r i c t Court. The C o u r t ' s f i n a l o r d e r came down i n s u p p o r t of
t h e D O R ' s p o s i t i o n and a p p e l l a n t was d e n i e d a l i c e n s e .
The appellant is the owner of Cellar 301, a restaurant
l o c a t e d i n t h e o l d chamber b u i l d i n g o n t h e c o r n e r o f T h i r d Avenue
N o r t h and N o r t h 2 7 t h S t r e e t i n downtown B i l l i n g s . The r e s t a u r a n t
was o p e n e d i n 1977 w i t h its b u s i n e s s a d d r e s s being 2615 T h i r d
Avenue N o r t h . T h e r e a r e no d o o r s o n N o r t h 2 7 t h S t r e e t b e c a u s e
when the building was renovated, the appellant placed the
e n t r a n c e o n T h i r d Avenue.
The c h u r c h b u i l d i n g i n q u e s t i o n is t h e F i r s t C o n g r e g a t i o n a l
C h u r c h o f C h r i s t and i s l o c a t e d a t 310 N o r t h 2 7 t h S t r e e t . The
c h u r c h owns a l a r g e t r a c t o f l a n d w h i c h e x t e n d s to t h e i n t e r s e c -
tion where the appellant's restaurant is located. They have
g r a n t e d t h e C i t y o f B i l l i n g s a b u s s t o p a t t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , and
t h e C i t y h a s e r e c t e d and m a i n t a i n s s h e l t e r s o n t h e p r o p e r t y in
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e bus s t o p .
The issue to be determined by this Court is w h e t h e r the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f a p p e l l a n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of
mandate, on t h e grounds t h a t the b u i l d i n g i n which a p p e l l a n t ' s
r e s t a u r a n t is l o c a t e d , v i o l a t e s s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, and sec-
tion 42.12.129, ARM, the DOR's interpretation of the statute,
constitutes reversible error?
The a c t u a l t h r u s t of t h i s c a s e c e n t e r s a r o u n d a q u e s t i o n of
s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and w h e t h e r it was p r o p e r f o r t h e DOR to
d e n y t h e a p p e l l a n t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to a p p l y f o r o n e of t h e new
f l o a t e r a l l b e v e r a g e l i q u o r l i c e n s e s to be i s s u e d i n B i l l i n g s , o n
t h e g r o u n d s t h a t he is i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e "on t h e same s t r e e t "
requirement of s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, as i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e DOR
i n s e c t i o n 42.12.129, ARM. That regulation states:
"(1) I n o r d e r t o determine i f the p r o v i s i o n s
o f 16-3-306, MCA, a r e a p p l i c a b l e , t h e d e p a r t -
ment u t i l i z e s a t w o s t e p t e s t : (a) deter-
m i n a t i o n of s t r e e t of location; and (b)
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d i s t a n c e between e n t r a n c e
doors. ( 2 ) ( a ) A b u i l d i n g i s c o n s i d e r e d to
b e on e a c h s t r e e t t h a t a b u t s t h e b u i l d i n g and
appurtenant land. An a l l e y is g e n e r a l l y n o t
c o n s i d e r e d to be a s t r e e t u n l e s s it is used by
t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c as a p u b l i c t h o r o u g h f a r e
f o r vehicular travel. (b) I f t h e proposed
p r e m i s e s f o r l i q u o r s a l e s are n o t l o c a t e d o n
t h e same s t r e e t a s a p l a c e o f w o r s h i p o r
s c h o o l , t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 16-3-306, MCA, a r e
not applicable. I f the proposed premises a r e
o n t h e same s t r e e t , t h e n t h e s e c o n d s t e p of
t h e t e s t s , p r o v i d e d f o r i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) r is
utilized. ( 3 ) ( a ) I f t h e proposed premises
a r e o n t h e same s t r e e t , t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n
e n t r a n c e d o o r s is measured by a g e o m e t r i c
s t r a i g h t l i n e , r e g a r d l e s s of i n t e r v e n i n g p r o -
p e r t y and b u i l d i n g s . An e n t r a n c e i s con-
s i d e r e d t o be a means o f i n g r e s s to t h e
p r e m i s e s g e n e r a l l y used b y t h e p u b l i c . (b)
I f t h e d i s t a n c e is more t h a n 6 0 0 f e e t , t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f 16-3-306, MCA, a r e n o t a p p l i -
cable. I f t h e d i s t a n c e is l e s s t h a n or e q u a l
t o 600 f e e t , S e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA a p p l i e s . "
T h i s p a r t i c u l a r r e g u l a t i o n p l a c e s a c o r n e r b u i l d i n g on both
s t r e e t s on which it a b u t s r a t h e r t h a n o n l y on t h e s t r e e t w h e r e
i t s e n t r a n c e and a d d r e s s are l o c a t e d .
I n s u c h matters o f statutory interpretation, t h e c o u r t must
first look for the intention of the legislature in the plain
meaning of the words used, and may go no further when the
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e c a n be made from i t s w o r d s . Dunphy
v . Anaconda Company ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d 660; S t a t e v.
Hubbard ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 649 P.2d 1 3 3 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 1608.
The s t a t u t e i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r e s e n t case is s e c t i o n 16-3-306,
MCA, and r e a d s a s f o l l o w s :
" ( 1 ) E x c e p t as p r o v i d e d i n s u b s e c t i o n s ( 2 )
a n d ( 3 ) , no r e t a i l l i c e n s e may be i s s u e d p u r -
suant t o t h i s code to any b u s i n e s s o r
e n t e r p r i s e whose p r e m i s e s are w i t h i n 6 0 0 f e e t
o f and o n t h e same s t r e e t as a b u i l d i n g u s e d
e x c l u s i v e l y a s a church, synagogue, o r o t h e r
p l a c e o f w o r s h i p or as a s c h o o l o t h e r t h a n a
c o m m e r c i a l l y o p e r a t e d or p o s t s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l .
T h i s d i s t a n c e s h a l l be m e a s u r e d i n a s t r a i g h t
l i n e f r o m t h e c e n t e r of t h e n e a r e s t e n t r a n c e
o f t h e p l a c e o f w o r s h i p o r s c h o o l to t h e
n e a r e s t e n t r a n c e of t h e l i c e n s e e ' s p r e m i s e s .
This section is a limitation upon the
department s licensing authority.
" ( 2 ) However, t h e d e p a r t m e n t may r e n e w a
license f o r any e s t a b l i s h m e n t l o c a t e d in
v i o l a t i o n of t h i s s e c t i o n i f t h e l i c e n s e e d o e s
n o t relocate h i s e n t r a n c e s a n y c l o s e r t h a n t h e
e x i s t i n g e n t r a n c e s and i f t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t :
" ( a ) was l o c a t e d o n t h e s i t e b e f o r e t h e p l a c e
o f w o r s h i p or s c h o o l o p e n e d ; o r
" ( b ) was l o c a t e d i n a bona f i d e h o t e l ,
r e s t a u r a n t , or f r a t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n b u i l d i n g
a t t h e s i t e s i n c e J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 3 7 .
" ( 3 ) S u b s e c t i o n (1) d o e s n o t a p p l y to l i c e n -
ses f o r t h e s a l e o f b e e r , t a b l e w i n e , or b o t h
i n t h e o r i g i n a l p a c k a g e f o r o f f - p r e m i s e s con-
sumption." S e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA.
We a r e concerned h e r e w i t h s u b s e c t i o n o n e of the statute.
The phraseology of that subsection shows the intent of the
legislature. Where t h e p h r a s e "on t h e same s t r e e t " is viewed i n
conjunction with the second s e n t e n c e of subsection one, which
r e q u i r e s t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e p r e m i s e s and a c h u r c h or s c h o o l
t o be m e a s u r e d i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e from e n t r a n c e t o e n t r a n c e , it
is e v i d e n t that the l e g i s l a t u r e only intended t h i s s e c t i o n to
a p p l y w h e r e t h e e n t r a n c e s were on t h e same s t r e e t . T h e r e is no
reference to the abutting principal set out in the DOR1s
regulation. Thus, t h e i m p o r t of t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e is
plain and it can o n l y be applied where the entrances to the
buildings used as c h u r c h e s and the premises are "on the same
street."
F u r t h e r s u p p o r t is l e n t t o o u r c o n s t r u c t i o n of this statute
by t h e reenactment d o c t r i n e , as t h e D O R 1 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
s t a t u t e i s a p p a r e n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e way t h e s t a t u t e h a s
been administered s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1937. The a p p e l l a n t ,
d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g s , b r o u g h t i n e x a m p l e s of how e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n
s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s t o h i s had l i c e n s e s and were o p e r a t i n g . Also,
t h e case of F l e t c h e r v. DOR, s u p r a , which p r e s e n t e d almost the
i d e n t i c a l i s s u e was b e i n g l i t i g a t e d a t t h e same t i m e as t h i s p r o -
ceeding. The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n s t i p u l a t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a l l
the e x h i b i t s introduced i n the Fletcher case. Contained i n t h o s e
e x h i b i t s w a s a l e t t e r d a t e d J u l y 6, 1 9 7 1 , from J o s e p h T. Shea,
administrator of the old liquor control board, to the city
manager of Bozeman explaining that the "on the same street"
r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e n s e c t i o n 4-415, RCM, 1 9 4 7 , (now 16-3-306, MCA)
was i n t e r p r e t e d so t h a t it o n l y came i n t o p l a y when b o t h t h e p r e -
mises and c h u r c h had t h e i r a d d r e s s e s on t h e same s t r e e t . T h i s is
e x a c t l y how t h e appellant contends t h a t the s t a t u t e s h o u l d be
applied.
The r e e n a c t m e n t d o c t r i n e h a s b e e n r e c o g n i z e d i n Montana i n
t h e cases o f S t a t e ex r e l . Lewis and C l a r k County v . S t a t e Board
of Public Welfare ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 1 Mont. 2 0 9 , 3 7 6 P.2d 1002; Vgntura
9
v. Montana L i q u o r C o n t r o l Board ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. 2 6 5 , 1 2 4 P.2d
569. The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y e n a c t e d i n 1 9 3 7 . It
h a s b e e n amended t w i c e , f i r s t i n 1 9 7 5 , a t w h i c h t i m e i t s number
was also changed from section 4-415, RCM, 1947, to section
4-4-107, RCM, 1 9 4 7 , and most r e c e n t l y i n 1 9 8 1 t o i t s p r e s e n t v e r -
s i o n , s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA. Each v e r s i o n of t h e s t a t u t e main-
t a i n e d t h e o p e r a t i v e l a n g u a g e t h a t no l i c e n s e be i s s u e d "on t h e
same s t r e e t " and w i t h i n 600 f e e t o f a p l a c e o f w o r s h i p o r s c h o o l ,
and k e p t the same method of performing t h e m e a s u r e m e n t of the
distance.
B a s e d o n t h e l e t t e r from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e o l d l i q u o r
c o n t r o l board and t h e examples of o t h e r premises locations in
relation to churches and schools, introduced at trial, it is
a p p a r e n t t h a t p r i o r t o t h e D O R 1 s a t t e m p t to c h a n g e t h e meaning o f
" o n t h e same s t r e e t " it was i n t e r p r e t e d and a p p l i e d so t h a t t h e
s t a t u t e o n l y came i n t o p l a y when t h e p r e m i s e s ' and t h e c h u r c h e s '
o r s c h o o l s ' s t r e e t a d d r e s s e s were o n t h e same s t r e e t . It did not
a p p l y where, as i n t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e r e s t a u r a n t is o n T h i r d
Avenue N o r t h and t h e church is on t h e cross s t r e e t , N o r t h 2 7 t h
Street .
This Court, i n discussing the reenactment doctrine in the
past, has s t a t e d :
"The r u l e is t h a t i n a d o p t i n g a s t a t u t e t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e i s presumed to h a v e a c t e d w i t h
knowledge o f t h e p r e v i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n of
similar s t a t u t e s (United S t a t e s v. A l b r i g h t ,
D . C . , 234 F e d . 2 0 2 ) and t o h a v e a d o p t e d s u c h
c o n s t r u c t i o n ( U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Ryan, 284 U. S.
1 6 7 , 5 2 Sup. C t . 6 5 , 76 L. Ed. 2 4 4 . ) This
r u l e a p p l i e s n o t o n l y to A c t s p r e v i o u s l y
c o n s t r u e d by t h e c o u r t s , b u t h a s e q u a l a p p l i -
c a t i o n t o s t a t u t e s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t r u e d by t h e
e x e c u t i v e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e p a r t m e a t of t h e
government. ( 5 9 C. J. 1 0 6 4 . ) ' ' V&ntura v.
Montana L i q u o r C o n t r o l B o a r d , 1 1 3 Mont. a t
270-271.
T h i s p o s i t i o n is s t r e n g t h e n e d f u r t h e r by t h e h o l d i n g s o f t h e
f e d e r a l c o u r t s as e v i d e n c e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
c a s e of C o m m i s s i o n e r o f I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e v . Noel I s Estate
( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 678, 85 S.Ct. 1 2 3 8 , \4 L.Ed.2d 159, where the
court stated :
" [A] l o n g - s t a n d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n , a p p l y i n g to a s u b s t a n t i a l l y re-enacted
statute, is deemed to have received
c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and h a s t h e e f f e c t o f
law. See, e.g. N a t i o n a l Lead Co. v . U n i t e d
S t a t e s , 252 U.S. 1 4 0 , 1 4 6 , 40 S e c t . 237, 2 3 9 ,
6 4 L.Ed. 4 9 6 ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Dakota-Montana
O i l C o . , 288 U.S. 4 5 9 , 4 6 6 , 5 3 S . C t . 4 3 5 , 4 3 8 ,
77 L.Ed. 8 9 3 . " 380 U.S. a t 6 8 2 .
The opinion of the United States District Court i n Newman v.
Vessel Lady Arnnette (D S.C. 1979) 470 F.Supp. 520, further
clarifies and c o n c i s e l y states the r u l e s governing the present
s i t u a t i o n w h e r e it s t a t e s :
"The U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a s s t a t e d a s a
general p r i n c i p l e t h a t a long-standing ad-
ministrative interpretation applying to a
s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e e n a c t e d s t a t u t e is deemed to
h a v e C o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and h e n c e t h e
f o r c e and e f f e c t o f law, C. I . R. v . Noel's
Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 8 5 S.Ct. 1238, 14
L.Ed .2d 1 5 9 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Although t h i s p r i n c i p l e
i s more p e r s u a s i v e when it c a n be d e m o n s t r a t e d
t h a t C o n g r e s s was aware of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
c o n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e r e e n a c t m e n t ,
M i t c h e l l v. C. I . R . , 300 F.2d 5 3 3 ( 4 t h C i r .
1 9 6 2 ) , C o n g r e s s i o n a l a w a r e n e s s may be presumed
w h e r e , as h e r e , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n s t r u c -
tion is consistent and long-standing,
L o r i l l a r d v . P o n s , 434 U.S. 5 7 5 , 9 8 S . C t . 8 6 6 ,
55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978)r p a r t i c u l a r l y when
Congress has shown s p e c i f i c and repeated
i n t e r e s t i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y cons t r u e d
s e c t i o n s p r i o r to t h e reenactment." 470
F.Supp. a t 527.
Based o n t h e a b o v e - c i t e d principles, i t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e
long-standing interpretation of what constitutes "on the same
street" has the force and effect of l a w due to the repeated
r e e n a c t m e n t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , of the operative parts, without
change. Thus, it cannot be changed by administrative rein-
t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e s e c t i o n 4 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 9 , ARM, is i n v a l i d .
We therefore hold that a w r i t of mandate should have been
i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a l l o w i n g M r . Hovey to a p p l y f o r o n e
of t h e s i x new l i q u o r l i c e n s e s , b e c a u s e u n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e
of section 16-3-306, MCA, and its legislatively-approved
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , through repeated reenactment, he had m e t a l l t h e
requirements imposed by it. Where such requirements are m e t
there is a clear legal d u t y on the part of t h e DOR t o a l l o w
appellant t o apply, and w h e r e s u c h a d u t y e x i s t s , mandamus is
proper. C a i n v . D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h and E n v i r o n m e n t a l S c i e n c e s ,
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 448, 451, 582 P.2d 332. It is t r u e t h a t t h e
g r a n t i n g of a w r i t o f m a n d a t e i s a d i s c r e t i o n a r y a c t which w i l l
be upheld unless there is a showing that the District Court
abused its discretion. Cain v. Department of Health and
Environmental S c i e n c e s , supra. B u t , b a s e d o n t h e p l a i n i m p o r t of
the language of the s t a t u t e and the long-standing legislative
a c c e p t a n c e of t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p l a c e d o n i t , we b e l i e v e s u c h a
showing of a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n was made as t h e DOR had a l e g a l
duty due to these interpretations to allow Hovey to apply.
T h e r e f o r e , t h e j u d g m e n t of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is r e v e r s e d and
,-/
this cause remanded for the issuance of an.,,:%propriate w r i t .
//
Justice,
%~Adl*
C h i e f Justice
&!ii WLQ
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring:
I agree with the result of the majority opinion but not
in all that is said. I further emphasize that the handling
of the case of Fletcher v. DOR, supra, which case was being
processed through the District Court almost simultaneously
with this case, is hardly an example of even-handed treatment
by the agency.
In Fletcher v. DOR, a Bozeman liquor license applicant
was faced with virtually the same problem as exists in this
case. However, on March 8, 1982, the District Court for the
same First Judicial District (Judge Arnold Olsen presiding)
held the regulation involved here to be invalid. The agency
did not appeal from this ruling, the result being that the
applicant received the liquor license.
In arguing this appeal, counsel for the agency
acknowledged this inconsistency, but properly argued that he,
as one of the attorneys, is not responsible for the agency's
decisions. Nonetheless, someone in that agency, in deciding
not to appeal the Fletcher case, permitted a license to issue
by the simple expedient of ordering that the agency not
appeal from the District Court's ruling. Yet, in this case,
after obtaining a result 180 degrees from the decision in
Fletcher, the agency argues that the applicant should not be
permitted to apply for a license because of the proximity of
his establishment to a church.
The agency surely didn't think much of its regulation in
the Fletcher case if it decided not to take an appeal. It is
now more than a little inconsistent and more than a little
unfair for the agency to argue here that the agency
regulation should be given full force and effect. How can
the agency claim to be effectively enforcing statutes and
regulations under the police power of the State when - -
it took
- -- diametrically opposed position in the Fletcher case?
such a
This Court and most courts have been most reluctant to
apply equitable estoppel to a governmental agency, but
perhaps the time has come to rigorously apply this doctrine.
It may well be time for this Court to breathe more life into
this doctrine by rigorously applying it to governmental
agencies when grossly inequitable results may be the result
of not applying it.
I would apply a form of collateral estoppel or waiver in
*
m
this case. In the Fletcher case, the agency 42.12.129
A.R.M., the sa.me rule on which the District Court in this
case relied, on in refusing relief to the petitioner here.
And now, ' of course, the agency relies on this rule in
defending the appeal. I would not permit the agency to do
so. Once the 60 days expired for the agency to take its
appeal -in the Fletcher case, the agency effectively
acquiesced in a ruling that the rule was invalid.
The petitioner here had a right to hold the agency to
its acquiescence in the Fletcher case that the rule was
invalid. If invalid as to the Fletcher application, the rule
was also invalid as to the license application in this case.