Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co.

No. 80-476

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982

DOROTHY BARPqEYEF?, DAVID AND SHARON
COOK, KEVIN AND JANICE COUGHLIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

THE MONTANA POWER COIQANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial ~istrict,
In and for the County of Missoula
Honorable John Henson, Judge presidinq
Counsel of Record:

For Appellants:
Williams Law Firm, Missoula, Montana
Shelton C. Williams ar(sued, l\lissoula,Montana
Richard Ranney argued, Missoula, Montana
Noel K . Larrivee argued, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent :
Garlinaton, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, Montana
Gary L. Graham argued, Missoula, Montana
Sherman V. Lohn argued, Missoula, Montana

- -

Submitted: U c t o b e r 2b, 1982

Decided: January 17, 1983

Filed: 'JAil i 1983
l a
Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e
Court.

P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from a n a d v e r s e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment
entered thereon by the Fourth J u d i c i a l District Court of the

S t a t e o f Montana. W af f i r m .
e

On J u l y 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 , a g r a s s and f o r e s t f i r e b u r n e d a l a r g e a r e a

i n what is known as P a t t e e Canyon a d j a c e n t t o M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a .

P r o p e r t y damage resulting from t h e f i r e gave impetus to these

a c t i o n s f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e Montana Power Company. T r i a l of the
a c t i o n s commenced J u l y 8 , 1 9 8 0 and c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r
1 2 , 1 9 8 0 , d u r i n g w h i c h p e r i o d t h e r e were t h i r t y - t h r e e trial days.

A v e r d i c t was r e n d e r e d i n f a v o r of t h e d e f e n d a n t and j u d g m e n t was
entered on that verdict on September 17, 1980. Pos t - t r i a l

m o t i o n s were h e a r d and d e n i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on November

7 , 1980. On December 3 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a n o t i c e of

appeal.
Numerous issues a r e presented on a p p e a l . Since the first

issue concerns sufficiency of the evidence, we begin with a
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s case. Testimony is n e c e s s a r i l y
capsulized and, because s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence is raised and

factual issues were resolved in favor of the Montana Power
Company, the facts set f o r t h a r e presented i n a posture most
favorable t o defendant.
The p o w e r l i n e , h e r e i n q u e s t i o n , was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h t h r e e

wires on the upper level and a n e u t r a l wire a s h o r t d i s t a n c e
below. A t the t i m e i n q u e s t i o n , a n o l d c o n t r o l c a b l e was b e i n g
removed and a new f i g u r e e i g h t c o n t r o l c a b l e had b e e n i n s t a l l e d .
The old control cable was attached to the poles by ropes.
The w e s t and c e n t e r - p h a s e wires were n o t e n e r g i z e d ; t h e e a s t -

phase w a s hot. The new c o n t r o l c a b l e had a m i n i m a l c u r r e n t , and
t h e o l d c o n t r o l c a b l e and t h e n e u t r a l wire were n o t e n e r g i z e d .
The evidence disclosed that power outages had been

experienced prior to t h e fire. A t one p o i n t , a power company
serviceman found that the o l d c o n t r o l c a b l e had contacted the
east-phase conductor. To eliminate future problems, the old
c o n t r o l c a b l e was l o w e r e d . Following lowering of the cable the

power outages continued but were experienced less frequently.
The temperature at the time of the fire was about 94°F.
T h e r e was a wind b l o w i n g i n t h e a r e a of t h e o r i g i n of the f i r e

f r o m west t o e a s t . V a r i o u s estimates were g i v e n a b o u t t h e o r i g i n
p o i n t o f t h e f i r e , v a r y i n g from f i f t y t o e i g h t y f e e t from a p o i n t

on the ground directly beneath the closest phase of the

powerline.
S h o r t l y before t h e f i r e , witnesses observed c h i l d r e n i n t h e

general a r e a who were noted to be playing with firecrackers.

Post-fire investigation revealed a matchbook and match, and a

cigarette lighter in the area where the fire originated.
Plaintiffs sought to establish that the old control cable

made contact with the east-phase conductor , thereby emitting
s p a r k s which caused t h e f i r e . P l a i n t i f f s e s t a b l i s h e d burn-marks

or arc-marks on the east-phase conductor a t approximately the

center of the span to the west of the fire origin area.
Both s i d e s produced expert testimony. Plaintif fsl expert

testimony sought t o prove t h a t sparks generated by d e f e n d a n t ' s

powerline caused the f i r e . Defendant's expert testimony refuted
t h i s c o n t e n t i o n by o f f e r i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e a r c - m a r k s existed

prior to the d a y when the fire started and f u r t h e r sought to

p r o v e t h a t a n y s p a r k s p r o d u c e d by c o n t a c t b e t w e e n t h e e a s t - p h a s e
conductor and the control c a b l e would not maintain sufficient

heat i n t e n s i t y to i g n i t e a f i r e a t t h e p o i n t of o r i g i n of the
f i r e i n question.
The i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e :
(1) W h e t h e r t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e ver-

dict?
(2) Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i m a r y e x p e r t w i t n e s s s h o u l d have
b e e n p e r m i t t e d to t e s t i f y and w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r u l i n g s

p e r t a i n i n g to h i s t e s t i m o n y ?
(3) Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o e x c l u d e w i t n e s s e s ?
 (4) Was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r c o m m i t t e d by a l l o w i n g o p i n i o n e v i -
d e n c e o f two l a y w i t n e s s e s ?
(5) Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g to o r d e r t h e p r o d u c -

tion of statements given before trial by two witnesses?

(6) Was error committed in instructing the jury?
(7) W h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g
t o g r a n t a new t r i a l o n t h e b a s i s of n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e ?

SUFFICIENCY -OF THE -EVIDENCE
-- ---- ---- --- -- - -- -- - -

M o t i o n s t o s e t a s i d e j u r y v e r d i c t s as n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e

e v i d e n c e a r e p r o p e r o n l y when t h e r e is a c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e of a n y

c r e d i b l e evidence i n support of the verdict. A l l e v i d e n c e and

a l l i n f e r e n c e s drawn t h e r e f r o m m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d i n a l i g h t most

favorable to the adverse party. The c o u r t s w i l l e x e r c i s e the

greatest self-restraint i n interf e r i n g with the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

mandated processes of jury decision. Jacques v. Montana
N a t i o n a l Guard ( 1 9 8 2 ) , -- -- Mont . - - , 649 P.2d 1 3 1 9 , 1 3 2 5 - 1 3 2 6 ,

I f t h i s r e c o r d c o n t a i n s a d m i s s i b l e p r o b a t i v e e v i d e n c e t o sup-

port defendant on either absence of n e g l i g e n c e or f a i l u r e of

p r o x i m a t e c a u s e , t h e v e r d i c t c a n n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a s u f f i c i e n c y

basis. Here, defendant offered expert testimony which, if
believed, would permit the jury to find for defendant. The

question then c e n t e r s on the admissibility of that testimony.

ADMISSIBILITY -OF -DEFENDANT'S--EXPERT -TESTIMONY
- -- - - - -- -- -- - - --- - -- -- --
- -
Defendant produced Harry Czyzewski, as i t s p r i n c i p a l e x p e r t

witness. Mr. Czyzewski s t e s t i m o n y r e s u l t e d in several allega-
t i o n s of e r r o r p r e s e n t e d on t h i s a p p e a l .
Through M r . Czyzewski, defendant offered testimony t h a t the

arc-marks f o u n d on t h e e a s t - p h a s e c o n d u c t o r e x i s t e d p r i o r to t h e
date upon w h i c h the subject f i r e occurred. The b a s i s of the
testimony involved application of a "corrosion analysis. "

P l a i n t i f f o b j e c t e d t o t h i s t e s t i m o n y on t h e b a s i s t h a t c o r r o s i o n
analysis was not recognized by the scientific community.
The p e r s o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of t h e e x p e r t are w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d
in the record. Mr. Czyzewski has a master's degree in
m e t a l l u r g i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g and h a s worked as a n i n d e p e n d e n t con-

s u l t a n t s i n c e 1946. H e is a f e l l o w o f t h e A m e r i c a n I n s t i t u t e of
C h e m i s t s ; h e h a s won d e s i g n a t i o n as t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l e n g i n e e r of
the year i n Oregon; h e was t h e f i r s t c h a i r m a n of t h e combined

Northwest Regional Industrial and Minerals Conference; he has

authored o r co-authored a s e r i e s of t e c h n i c a l p a p e r s on c o r r o s i o n
t h a t were p u b l i s h e d or were d e l i v e r e d n a t i o n a l l y a t t h e N a t i o n a l
A s s o c i a t i o n of Corrosion Engineers.

P a r t of t h e a n a l y s i s accomplished under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of

t h e w i t n e s s involved c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e c o r r o s i o n f i l m on t h e

arc-marks found on the east-phase conductor and on the old

control cable directly west of the fire-origin area. Mr.

C z y z e w s k i t e s t i f i e d t h e r e were numerous s c i e n t i f i c a r t i c l e s con-

s i d e r i n g c o r r o s i o n r a t e s and t h a t h e , p e r s o n a l l y , had l o n g y e a r s
o f e x p e r i e n c e i n e x a m i n i n g c o r r o s i o n f i l m s and c o r r o s i o n c h a r a c -

teristics. Based upon t h e f o u n d a t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t p e r m i t t e d
t h e w i t n e s s to conclude t h a t t h e arc-marks on t h e l i n e s p r e d a t e d
the Pattee Canyon fire. This t e s t i m o n y was not rebutted by
t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d by p l a i n t i f f s .
P l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e a r e a of c o r r o s i o n a n a l y s i s is n o t

g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d o r r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e s c i e n t i f i c community and
t h a t a n y t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g c o r r o s i o n a n a l y s i s is too s p e c u l a -

t i v e t o be a d m i s s i b l e . P l a i n t i f f s f u r t h e r argue t h a t t h i s w i t -
ness ' testimony was received upon insufficient foundation.

Rule 702, M.R.Evid., g o v e r n s a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x p e r t testi-
mony. It provides:

" I f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l or o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d
k n o w l e d g e w i l l a s s i s t t h e t r i e r of f a c t t o
u n d e r s t a n d t h e e v i d e n c e or t o d e t e r m i n e a f a c t
i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d a s a n e x p e r t by
k n o w l e d g e , s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g o r edu-
c a t i o n may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e form o f a n
o p i n i o n or o t h e r w i s e ."
At one time before expert testimony was received, the courts

r e q u i r e d t h a t f o u n d a t i o n be l a i d showing t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y to be

offered involved a f i e l d of s c i e n c e w h i c h had gained "general
acceptance" by the scientific community. See Frye v. United
States (D.C.Cir. 1 9 2 3 ) , 293 F . 1 0 1 3 .
T h e r e h a s b e e n a t r e n d t o l i b e r a l i z e t h e a d m i s s i o n of e x p e r t

testimony and the rule enunciated in - -.r y.
F e has been eroded.
Weinstein states:
"Viewed a g a i n s t t h i s b a c k g r o u n d , R u l e 7 0 2 's
f a i l u r e t o incorporate a general s c i e n t i f i c
acceptance standard, and the Advisory
Committee's N o t e ' s f a i l u r e to even mention t h e
F r y e case m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t . The
sii<-nce o f t h e r u l e and i t s d r a f t e r s s h o u l d be
r e g a r d e d as t a n t a m o u n t t o a n a b a n d o n m e n t o f
the general acceptance standard." (footnote
omitted) 3 J . W e i n s t e i n and M . Berger,
W e -i n s t e i n ' s--E.v i--e-- e ~ 1 7 0 2 [ 0 3 ] , a t 702-16.
-- - -
-. - d nc

W e h o l d t h a t t h e g e n e r a l a c c e p t a n c e r u l e is n o t i n c o n f o r m i t y

w i t h t h e s p i r i t o f t h e new r u l e s of e v i d e n c e . W agree with the
e
philosophy articulated in United States v. Baller (4th Cir .
1 9 7 5 ) , 519 F.2d 4 6 3 , c e r t . d e n . 4 2 3 U.S. 1 0 1 9 , 96 S.Ct. 4 5 6 , 46

L.Ed.2d 391, wherein the circuit court of appeals said:
"Deciding w h e t h e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s have been
m e t is n o r m a l l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e
t r i a l judge. A b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y o f r e s u l t or
unanimity of scientific opinion is not
required for admissibility. ' E v e r y u s e £ u l new
development must have its f i r s t day i n c o u r t .
And c o u r t r e c o r d s a r e f u l l o f t h e c o n f l i c t i n g
o p i n i o n s o f d o c t o r s , e n g i n e e r s , and a c c o u n -
t a n t s , t o name j u s t a few of t h e l e g i o n s o f
expert witnesses. I Unless an exaggerated
p o p u l a r o p i n i o n of t h e a c c u r a c y of a par-
t i c u l a r t e c h n i q u e makes i t s u s e p r e j u d i c i a l
o r l i k e l y t o m i s l e a d t h e j u r y , it is b e t t e r t o
a d m i t r e l e v a n t s c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e i n t h e same
m a n n e r as o t h e r e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y and allow i t s
w e i g h t t o be a t t a c k e d by c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n and
refutation." ( C i t a t i o n s omitted .) 519 F.2d
a t 466.
I n Steward v. Casey ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 1 8 5 , 5 9 5 P.2d 1176,
t h i s Court s a i d :
" . . .
the
R u l e 7 0 5 , Mont .R.Evid. , m a n d a t e s t h a t
opinion of a qualified expert is
a d m i s s i b l e , and i f o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l b e l i e v e
t h e o p i n i o n is n o t f o u n d e d on s u f f i c i e n t d a t a ,
cross-examination is t h e s h i e l d to guard
a g a i n s t unwarranted o p i n i o n s .
a t 1 9 3 , 5 9 5 P.2d a t 1 1 8 0 .
. ." 1 8 2 Mont.

We find M r . Czyzewski's t e s t i m o n y to have been s u f f i c i e n t l y

f o u n d a t i o n e d to f o r e c l o s e a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused

its discretion in overruling plaintif fs' objections. The
s e a r c h i n g and a d e p t c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n by p l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l p r o -
vided sufficient assurance that this jury was not necessarily

misled o r confused.

Plaintiffs also allege error resulting from the trial
court I s r e c e p t i o n o f e v i d e n c e from M r . Czyzewski r e g a r d i n g w h a t

was t e r m e d "vibration tests." The b a s i s of p l a i n t i f f s 1 objec-

t i o n s i s t h a t t h e t e s t s were p e r f o r m e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s s u b s t a n -
tially dissimilar at the time of test from the conditions

e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e f i r e .

The o p i n i o n e x p r e s s e d by M r . Czyzewski was t h a t u n d e r wind-
i n d u c e d c o n d i t i o n s , c o n t a c t be tween t h e e a s t - p h a s e c o n d u c t o r and
t h e c o n t r o l c a b l e would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t to a c h i e v e . The w i t -

n e s s c o n c e d e d t h a t h i s t e s t showed it was p o s s i b l e f o r t h e l i n e s
t o contact.

The c o u r t , r u l i n g on p l a i n t i f f s 1 o b j e c t i o n , noted t h a t the
l i n e s were t h e same, t h e p o l e s t r u c t u r e s were t h e same and t h e
b a s i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n was t h e same. The c o u r t f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d

t h a t t h e r e were some d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s b u t t h a t t h e d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s

c o u l d be a d e q u a t e l y t r e a t e d on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n .

The c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which a n e x p e r i m e n t i s cond u c t e d need
not be identical t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of an

accident. Were s u c h a r e q u i r e m e n t en£ o r c e d a n e x p e r i m e n t would

seldom, if ever, be admissible. If the conditions of an
e x p e r i m e n t a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o t h e a c t u a l o c c u r r e n c e and

t h e experiment w i l l a s s i s t t h e jury i n more i n t e l l i g e n t l y con-
sidering the issue, t h e n i t s h o u l d be p e r m i t t e d . Variations in
c o n d i t i o n s may s i m p l y go to t h e w e i g h t of t h e t e s t i m o n y and a r e
properly explored on cross-examination. Breimon v. General
M o t o r s C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 8 Wash.App. 7 4 7 , 509 P.2d 398. There
was no a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n committed by t h e trial court here,

when M r . Czyzewski was p e r m i t t e d t o t e s t i f y r e g a r d i n g h i s v i b r a -
t i o n test.

P l a i n t i f f s f u r t h e r a l l e g e e r r o r i n b e i n g u n d u l y r e s t r i c t e d by

t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t h e i r v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n t e s t i n g t h e foun-
dation for Mr. Czyzewski ' s t e s t i m o n y . However, we h a v e a l r e a d y
r u l e d t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y was a d m i s s i b l e w i t h t h e f o u n d a t i o n p r e -

sent in this record. Furthermore, the foundation for this

witness I s t e s t i m o n y was a d e q u a t e l y e x p l o r e d i n the very lengthy
and adroit cross-examination conducted by p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel.

P l a i n t i f f s argue e r r o r i n the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l to p e r m i t
the use of certain exhibits during Mr. Czyzewski's cross-
examination. I n r e v i e w i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a d m i s s i o n

of i l l u s t r a t i v e e x h i b i t s , w e m u s t a c c o r d g r e a t d e f e r e n c e to t h e

trial court's discretion. Brown v. North American Mfg. Co.

( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 9 8 , 5 7 6 P.2d 711.
E x h i b i t 16A, o f f e r e d b y p l a i n t i f f s , was a c h a r t of weather

service records. T h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t i n a c c u r a c i e s i n t h e c h a r t
to justify the t r i a l c o u r t r u l i n g denying u s e of the exhibit.

The subject matter contained in the exhibit was adequately
covered during the cross-examination.
P l a i n t i f f s a l s o a t t a c k t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g which r e f u s e d

t o a d m i t p l a i n t i f f ' s e x h i b i t s 27AI 27B, and 27C. These e x h i b i t s

were p r e p a r e d by a l a w s t u d e n t employed by p l a i n t i f f s . This stu-

d e n t had a b a c h e l o r ' s d e g r e e i n b u s i n e s s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , b u t no

d e g r e e i n a n a r e a of s c i e n c e . D e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n was p r e m i s e d
upon t h e w i t n e s s ' s l a c k of f o u n d a t i o n t o g i v e s c i e n t i f i c c o n c l u -
s i o n s contained i n t h e e x h i b i t s and f o r t h e f u r t h e r r e a s o n t h a t

t h e e x h i b i t s were n o t s u m m a r i e s w h i c h were a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r R u l e
1 0 0 6 , M.R.Evid. The t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e s o u r c e m a t e r i a l

from which the exhibits were compiled constituted sufficient
proof and t h e e x h i b i t s t h e m s e l v e s were c u m u l a t i v e ; f u r t h e r , t h e
e x h i b i t s were p o t e n t i a l l y misleading. We find that the trial

court properly exercised i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a d m i s s i o n to

these offered exhibits.
Mr. C z y z e w s k i was p a i d $189,000 for services performed in

connection with this litigation. Defendant o f f e r e d proof that

$51,600 o f t h e c h a r g e was f o r c o s t i n p r e p a r i n g , g i v i n g d e p o s i -
t i o n s , and a n s w e r i n g i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . P l a i n t i f f s s o u g h t to prove
t h a t t h e s e c o m p u t a t i o n s were i n e r r o r . P l a i n ti f f s again offered
a c h a r t , p r e p a r e d b y a law s t u d e n t , which was i d e n t i f i e d a s e x h i -
b i t 28B. O b j e c t i o n w a s made by d e f e n d a n t on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e
u n d e r l y i n g d o c u m e n t s had b e e n p l a c e d i n e v i d e n c e and t h e e x h i b i t

was c u m u l a t i v e . The o b j e c t i o n was s u s t a i n e d . W e f i n d no abuse

of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t o f the trial c o u r t a s d e f e n d a n t had

adequate o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u l l y e x p l o r e a l l of these f a c t s during
Mr. Czyzewski's cross-examination.

EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
..

P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g to

exclude witnesses pursuant to plaintiffst motion requesting

s e q u e s t r a t i o n of w i t n e s s e s . A f t e r o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t s and a f t e r

t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of approximately sixteen witnesses, plaintiffs

f i l e d t h e i r motion. The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n on t h e b a s i s it

was u n t i m e l y .
R u l e 6 1 5 , M.R.Evid., p r o v i d e s f o r t h e s e q u e s t r a t i o n of wit-
n e s s e s upon m o t i o n o f a n y p a r t y . The r u l e d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e when

t h e demand m u s t be made. Here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e
motion came too late when made after sixteen witnesses had

already testified. We find this to be a proper exercise of

d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . Additionally, t h e w i t n e s s e s who
testified following filing of the motion had been thoroughly

d e p o s e d and t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a v e n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d p r e j u d i c e as a

r e s u l t of f a i l u r e to s e q u e s t e r the w i t n e s s e s .
ADMISSIBILITY OF LAY TESTIMONY
- -
Plaintiffs c l a i m error in the trial court having received
i n t o e v i d e n c e o p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y from two l a y w i t n e s s e s . I n eva-
luating the t e s t i m o n y of t h e s e w i t n e s s e s w e m u s t be g u i d e d by
R u l e 6 1 , M.R.Civ.P., which p r o v i d e s i n p a r t :
". . . The c o u r t a t e v e r y s t a g e o f t h e p r o -
c e e d i n g m u s t d i s r e g a r d a n y e r r o r or d e f e c t i n
t h e p r o c e e d i n g which d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s . "
D e f e n d a n t p r e s e n t e d o n e O l a f Krook who t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw

a p e r s o n r u n f r o m t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e f i r e a t a time he f i r s t

noticed smoke at the point of the fire's origin. He also
testified that he had heard firecrackers and he thought some
" k i d " had s t a r t e d t h e f i r e w i t h a f i r e c r a c k e r . This testimony

is lacking i n probative value. However, i n view of t h e volumi-

nous record i n t h i s case, w e f i n d t h a t any e r r o r i n admitting

such evidence was harmless.
Defendant also o f f e r e d the t e s t i m o n y of a Mr. Cameron, who

l i v e d o n P a t t e e Canyon D r i v e b e l o w t h e f i r e a r e a . Cameron s t a t e d

h e o b s e r v e d a r e d p i c k u p n e a r t h e o r i g i n of t h e f i r e . He stated

that t h e p i c k u p was s t o p p e d abruptly at the roadblock; that a

male person jumped from the back of the pickup, ducked down

b e h i n d some c a r s , and r a n down t h e r o a d . P o l i c e were manning t h e
roadblock. Cameron then testified, over objection, that it
a p p e a r e d t o him a s t h o u g h t h e p e r s o n was t r y i n g to h i d e from t h e

police. A g a i n , t h i s t e s t i m o n y i s c o n c l u s o r y and o f l i t t l e p r o b a -
t i v e value. However, as i n t h e case of M r . K r o o k ' s t e s t i m o n y , we

f i n d t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h i s e v i d e n c e to h a v e b e e n h a r m l e s s i n v i e w

of the extensive record i n t h i s case.
FAILURE TO ORDER PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES -STATEMENTS
--
-- - --
-- .
-

P l a i n t i f f s u r g e e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to o r d e r

p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s of S u s a n S o l i s and C h a r l e s B a s a c h e r .
A s t a t e m e n t was g i v e n by S u s a n S o l i s o n S e p t e m b e r 8, 1 9 7 7 , on

b e h a l f of defendant. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s also i n t e r v i e w e d t h e

witness. A t time o f trial, t h i s w i t n e s s was i n t e r v i e w e d s e p a r a -
t e l y by t h e c o u r t who e x p l a i n e d h e r r i g h t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e

statement. D e f e n d a n t a g r e e d t h a t i f S u s a n S o l i s wanted a c o p y of
h e r s t a t e m e n t , s h e would be e n t i t l e d t o i t and t h a t i f s h e wished
t o g i v e a copy t o c o u n s e l f o r p l a i n t i f f , s h e had a r i g h t to d o
so. A f t e r a f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n t h e w i t n e s s s a i d she d i d n o t want a
copy of her statement. During cross-examination s h e tes t i £ i e d
t h a t s h e had s e e n a copy o f t h e s t a t e m e n t and r e v i e w e d i t p r i o r
to h e r testimony.

Rule 612, M . R . ~ v i d . , p r o v i d e s :

"If a witness uses a writing t o refresh h i s
memory f o r t h e p u r p o s e of t e s t i f y i n g , e i t h e r
" ( 1 ) while t e s t i f y i n g , o r
 " ( 2 ) b e f o r e t e s t i f y i n g , i -- t h e - c-u r t i n i t s
f -- o- -
d---s c --- i--n ----r m i n e s - i t --s n-e c e s s a r y i n tF6
i ret o
.
dete i
i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e , a n a d v e r s e p a r t y is
entitled"tbhave'75Z w r i t i n g produced a t t h e
h e a r i n g , to i n s p e c t i t , t o c r o s s - e x a m i n e t h e
w i t n e s s t h e r e o n , and t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o e v i -
dence t h o s e p o r t i o n s which r e l a t e t o t h e
testimony of the witness.
-
. ." (Emphasis
added. )
In t h i s case, the t r i a l court advised the witness t h a t she

was e n t i t l e d t o a c o p y of h e r s t a t e m e n t and s h e s t a t e d s h e d i d
n o t wish to have t h e s t a t e m e n t . The p l a i n t i f f s had s o u g h t p r o -
duction of the statement before trial pursuant to Rule 34,

M.R.Civ.P. Discovery was denied, N o e r r o r is c l a i m e d i n d e n y i n g

discovery.
The c o m m i s s i o n comment t o R u l e 6 1 2 , M.R.Evid. , provides in

p a r t as f o l l o w s :

". . . T h e r e are no cases i n Montana w h i c h
h a v e s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t w i t h t h e r i g h t of t h e
a d v e r s e p a r t y t o g a i n a c c e s s or t o u s e t h e
w r i t i n g u s e d t o r e f r e s h memory. The r i g h t i s
mentioned i n S t a t e v. Watkins, - r a , 156 sup-
Mont. a t 4 6 2 , and S t a t e v . L a F r e n i e r e , s u p r a ,
1 6 3 Mont. a t 2 5 . A l l o w i n g a p a r t y to demand
t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a w r i t i n g used to r e f r e s h a
witness' memory b e f o r e t e s t i f y i n g i s con-
s i s t e n t w i t h Montana l a w t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t
s u c h a w r i t i n g would be d i s c o v e r a b l e i n c i v i l
cases u n d e r R u l e 3 4 ( a ) ( l ) , M.R.Civ.P., and i n
c r i m i n a l cases u n d e r R.C.M. 1947, s e c t i o n
95-1803(c). . ."
Rule 612, s p e c i f i c a l l y g r a n t s the t r i a l court d i s c r e t i o n i n
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a s t a t e m e n t used t o r e f r e s h r e c o l l e c t i o n m u s t

be given to a n a d v e r s e p a r t y . Under the facts t h a t we have
h e r e i n o u t l i n e d no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n was c o m m i t t e d by t h e t r i a l

c o u r t i n d e n y i n g access to p l a i n t i f f s .
A Mr. B a s a c h e r a l s o g a v e a s t a t e m e n t to d e f e n d a n t . This wit-
n e s s r e r e a d t h e s t a t e m e n t s e v e r a l weeks b e f o r e t r i a l b u t s t a t e d
it did not refresh h i s recollection. The s t a t e m e n t d i d n o t f a l l
w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f R u l e 612 and t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err i n
r e f u s i n g its production.
ALLEGED INSTRUCTION ERRORS

P l a i n t i f f s claim e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o g i v e a
res i p s a l o q u i t u r i n s t r u c t i o n . P l a i n t i f f s r e l y upon t h i s C o u r t ' s
r e c e n t d e c i s i o n i n Tompkins v. N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i o n T r u s t Company
of Helena ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - - . Mont . -- , 6 4 5 P.2d 4 0 2 , 39 S t . R e p . 845.
I n t h e Tompkins case w e h e l d t h a t , where t h e e v i d e n c e d i s c l o s e d

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s e s , t h e g i v i n g o f a res i p s a
instruction was not foreclosed. However, we recited the
f o l l o w i n g e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e :

" ( 1 ) I t may be i n f e r r e d t h a t harm s u f f e r e d b y
t h e p l a i n t i f f is c a u s e d by n e g l i g e n c e of t h e
d e f e n d a n t when: ( a ) t h e e v e n t is o f a k i n d
which o r d i n a r i l y does not o c c u r i n t h e absence
of negligence; ( b ) o t h e r responsible causes ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f and
t h i r d p e r s o n s , are s u f f i c i e n t l y e l i m i n a t e d by
t h e e v i d e n c e ; and ( c ) t h e i n d i c a t e d n e g l i g e n c e
is w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d u t y
to the p l a i n t i f f
St.Rep. a t 849.
...
" 645 P.2d a t 4 0 6 , 39

I n T o m p k i n- ,
s t h e p r i n c i p l e d e b a t e concerned t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
o f s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) as quoted above. Here we f i n d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s

of s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) are not f u l f i l l e d . T h i s is n o t a n e v e n t which

o r d i n a r i l y d o e s n o t o c c u r i n t h e a b s e n c e of n e g l i g e n c e . In t h i s

case, a fire started f i f t y to e i g h t y f e e t from t h e c l o s e s t of
defendant's lines. W e a r e unable to l o o k a t t h e p h y s i c a l f a c t s
o f t h i s a c c i d e n t and s a y t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of a f i r e s p e a k s of
n e g l i g e n c e on d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r t .
I n Tompkins, d e f e n d a n t was a t t h e c o n t r o l s of an a i r p l a n e

which c r a s h e d c a u s i n g t h e d e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h . W e simply held t h a t

such an event, that is t h e c r a s h i n g o f an a i r p l a n e , s p e a k s of
n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e p i l o t .

I n t h e case a t b a r , w e a r e n o t a b l e to l o o k a t t h e p h y s i c a l
facts and say that a fire, not physically connected with
defendant's line, s p e a k s of n e g l i g e n c e o n t h e p a r t of d e f e n d a n t

i n c o n s t r u c t i o n o r m a i n t e n a n c e of i t s l i n e . Therefore, the event
i n q u e s t i o n is n o t o f t h e k i n d c o n t e m p l a t e d by t h e f i r s t s u b s e c -
tion of the rule enunciated in the -
Tompkins case. The trial
court did not err in failing to g i v e a res ipsa instruction.
Plaintiffs' a s s i g n as e r r o r t h e refusal of the trial court

to give a number of proposed instructions dealing with the

N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c S a f e t y Code. The N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c S a f e t y Code
was a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e and t h e j u r y had a l l s e c t i o n s o f the
code b e f o r e them. The court did not err in failing to give
instructions regarding s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s of the code. General

i n s t r u c t i o n s were s u f f i c i e n t i n v i e w of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e code
i t s e l f was a d m i t t e d i n e v i d e n c e and was a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e j u r y ' s

perusal.

Appellants object to court's i n s t r u c t i o n no. 22 c o n t e n d i n g
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n i n t e r p r e t i n g s e c t i o n 69-4-201, MCA,

which adopts the National Electrical Safety Code in Montana.

S e c t i o n 69-4-201, MCA, p r o v i d e s :

"The n a t i o n a l e l e c t r i c a l s a f e t y c o d e s t a n d a r d s
s h a l l govern a l l f u t u r e c o n s t r u c t i o n involving
wires f o r p o w e r , heat, light, telephone,
t e l e g r a p h , or s i g n a l t r a n s m i s s i o n o r r e c e p -
tion. Except as provided i n 69-4-203,
electrical construction of overhead and
underground electrical supply and com-
m u n i c a t i o n l i n e s i n t h e s t a t e s h a l l be i n con-
f o r m i t y with the r u l e s set f o r t h i n t h e
n a t i o n a l e l e c t r i c a l s a f e t y code approved by
t h e A m e r i c a n n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s i n s t i t u t e as
p u b l i s h e d b y t h e i n s t i t u t e o f e l e c t r i c a l and
e l e c t r o n i c engineers . The n a t i o n a l e l e c t r i c a l
s a f e t y code s h a l l f u r n i s h c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a n -
d a r d s and s h a l l be e n f o r c e d b y t h e p u b l i c
s e r v i c e commission."
The court instructed the jury, in instruction no. 22, as
follows:

"You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c a l
S a f e t y Code h a s b e e n a d o p t e d b y s e c t i o n
69-4-201, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n s u b s t a n c e
t h a t a l l e l e c t r i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of o v e r h e a d
a n d u n d e r g r o u n d e l e c t r i c a l s u p p l y and com-
m u n i c a t i o n l i n e s i n t h e s t a t e s h a l l be i n con-
formity with the r u l e s set f o r t h i n the
National Electric S a f e t y Code. In all
respects other than construction, the National
E l e c t r i c S a f e t y Code is e v i d e n c e o f a s t a n d a r d
o f care t o be c o n s i d e r e d by you a l o n g w i t h a l l
t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d r e l a t i n g to t h e
s t a n d a r d of care.
" I f you f i n d from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t a p a r t y to
t h i s a c t i o n c o n d u c t e d h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f i n
v i o l a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e , you a r e i n s t r u c t e d
t h a t s u c h c o n d u c t was n e g l i g e n c e as a m a t t e r
of l a w .

"However, i n t h i s a c t i o n , a v i o l a t i o n of l a w
i s o f no c o n s e q u e n c e u n l e s s it was a p r o x i m a t e
c a u s e of a n i n j u r y found by you to h a v e b e e n
s u f f e r e d by t h e P l a i n t i f f s .

"The d u t y o f care w i t h which a n e l e c t r i c power
company is c h a r g e d c o n s i s t s n o t o n l y i n t h e
p r o p e r i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ,
b u t i n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e t h e r e o f i n a s a f e con-
 d i t i o n a t a l l times and p l a c e s and u n d e r t h e
c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r case
Even i f a t t h e o u t s e t of t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of
.
t h e e q u i p m e n t t h e company may h a v e b e e n
e n t i r e l y f r e e from f a u l t , yet, if under
changing circumstances, a hazardous c o n d i t i o n
a r o s e , n o n a c t i o n or t h e f a i l u r e t o a d e q u a t e l y
r e m e d y s u c h a c o n d i t i o n would c o n s t i t u t e
negligence. "

A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 69-4-201, MCA, incorporates
t h e e n t i r e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c a l S a f e t y Code and t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n

o f any p r o v i s i o n of t h e Code c o n s t i t u t e s n e g l i g e n c e p e r s e . On

t h e o t h e r hand, respondent contends t h a t o n l y c o n s t r u c t i o n stan-
d a r d s were s p e c i f i c a l l y a d o p t e d by t h e s t a t u t e and t h e r e f o r e t h e

b a l a n c e of t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c S a f e t y Code c r e a t e s o n l y e v i -
dence of a standard of care to be considered in determining
negligence.

We find the trial court's c o n s t r u c t i o n of 69-4-201, MCA, to

be a reasonable one. The s t a t u t e o n l y s p e c i f i c a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e s
construction standards. In the a b s e n c e of specific statutory

incorporation, t h e p r o v i s i o n s of the National Electrical Safety

Code c a n o n l y f u r n i s h e v i d e n c e of a s t a n d a r d o f c a r e . W e af firm
t h e g i v i n g of i n s t r u c t i o n no. 22.

P l a i n t i f f s a l s o a l l e g e error i n t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to g i v e

t h e i r p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 , which s t a t e d t h a t t h e c o n t r o l
c a b l e s i n q u e s t i o n were w i t h i n t h e "communication l i n e " def i n i -

t i o n o f t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i c S a f e t y C o d e ' s " l i n e of s i g h t " r u l e .
However, this f a c t was d i s p u t e d . Defendant o f f e r e d testimony
t h a t t h e c o n t r o l cable was n o t w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e " l i n e of

s i g h t " r u l e , and i f t h i s t e s t i m o n y were b e l i e v e d b y t h e j u r y , the
c o d e r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o would h a v e no a p p l i c a t i o n . Therefore, the
trial court properly r e f used plaintiffs' instruction No. 17

which mandated the jury find the control cable to be a line
w i t h i n t h e c o d e ' s " l i n e of s i g h t " r u l e .
W e f i n d t h a t a l l a s p e c t s of p l a i n t i f f s ' t h e o r y were s u b m i t t e d

t o t h i s j u r y u n d e r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n , and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s
s u b m i t t e d by t h e c o u r t were c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t s of t h e l a w .
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
 A f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e t r i a l , on S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e

plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59,

M,R.Civ.P. The b a s i s f o r a new t r i a l was newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i -

dence in the form o f t e s t i m o n y of one M. C. Bowman, of Ronan,

Montana. Af t e r hearing arguments concerning the propriety of

g r a n t i n g t h e new t r i a l and a f t e r a l l o w i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y in full

from M r . Bowman, the trial court denied t h e motion for a new

trial.

The p r e r e q u i s i t e s for granting a new t r i a l on t h e b a s i s of

newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e a r e s e t f o r t h i n K e r r i g a n v . Kerrigan

( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 5 Mont. 1 3 6 , 139 P.2d 5 3 3 , and K a r t e s v. Kartes (1977)

1 7 5 Mont. 210, 573 P.2d 191. They a r e : (1) t h a t t h e evidence

m u s t h a v e come t o t h e knowledge of t h e a p p l i c a n t s i n c e t h e t r i a l ;

(2) that it was n o t want of d i l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e moving

p a r t y which resulted in the evidence failing to come to l i g h t
e a r l i e r ; ( 3 ) t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e is s o m a t e r i a l t h a t i t would prob-

a b l y p r o d u c e a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t upon a n o t h e r t r i a l ; ( 4 ) t h a t the
evidence is n o t m e r e l y c u m u l a t i v e ; (5) that the application is

s u p p o r t e d by a n a£ f i d a v i t ; ( 6 ) t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e m u s t n o t be s u c h

as will only tend to impeach the credibility of a witness.

The trial court found t h a t the t e s t i m o n y of Mr. Bowman was

n o t s o m a t e r i a l t h a t it would p r o b a b l y p r o d u c e a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t

a t trial. A r e v i e w of M r . Bowman's testimony r e v e a l s t h a t t h e r e

are serious concerns regarding his credibility and the foun-

dational basis for his testimony. He s t a t e d he d i d n o t recall

t h e vantage p o i n t from which he watched the f i r e . A t t i m e s he

positioned himself where he could not have seen the fire.

Furthermore, he s t a t e d t h a t he c o u l d n o t s e g r e g a t e what he p e r -

s o n a l l y knew from t h a t which he had g a r n e r e d from media r e p o r t s .

Although M r . Bowman's t e s t i m o n y is o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f to show

that defendant's powerline started the fire, his testimony as

presented t o t h e t r i a l judge is s o l a c k i n g i n i t s p e r s u a s i v e n e s s

that we find no a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n on the trial court's part

when i t found t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y would n o t l i k e l y p r o d u c e a d i f -
ferent result.
T h i s c a s e was more t h a n a d e q u a t e l y t r i e d b y c o u n s e l f o r a l l
parties. T r i a l c o u n s e l a r e t o be commended f o r t h e h i g h d e g r e e

of p r o f e s s i o n a l competence d i s p l a y e d i n t h i s c a s e . The t r i a l was
l o n g and d i f f i c u l t . N o t r i a l of s u c h c o m p l e x i t y and l e n g t h c a n

be perfect. However, here we have a record t h a t reveals not

o n l y a h i g h d e g r e e of c o m p e t e n c e on t h e p a r t of counsel, but
o u t s t a n d i n g work by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . W e may n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e

r e s u l t , b u t t h e p a r t i e s had a f a i r t r i a l w i t h a r e c o r d a s f r e e of

error as is possible to deliver in our system of justice.
W affirm.
e

We concur:

Honorable John h i . McCarv~l,D i s t r i c t
Judge, s i t t i r g i t ? place of I d r . Justi-ce
Johr C. Sheehy.

Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea a n d Honorable J o h n M. McCarvel, D i s t r i c t
Judge, d i s s e n t and w i l l f i l e w r i t t e n d i s s e n t s later.