Cain v. Stevenson

No. 85-034 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 HARRY C A I N , d / b / a CAIN ELECTRIC, P l a i n t i f f and R - e s p o n d e n t , CLEATUS G. STEVENSON, d / b / a STEVENSON a n d SONS CONSTRUCTION, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of R o s e b u d , T h e H o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Herndon, H a r p e r & Munro; R o d n e y T. Hartman, B i l l i n g s , Montana F o r Respondent: C l a r e n c e B e l u e , H a r d i n , Montana S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : J u l y 11, 1 9 8 5 Decided: S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1985 Filed: str i ~4 f985 M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. H a r r y Cain ( r e s p o n d e n t ) f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n o n September 9, 1983, in the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, seeking damages for injuries he received while w o r k i n g a s an e l e c t r i c a 1 s u b c o n t r a c t o r f o r C l e a t u s S t e v e n s o n (appellant) . The j u r y awarded r e s p o n d e n t $107,999.77. This appea 1 f o l l o w e d . Respondent was the electrical subcontractor on a six-plex apartment building under construction in Ashland, Montana. A p p e l l a n t was t h e owner o f t h e b u i l d i n g and t h e general contractor. Respondent was hired to complete the "rough-in" e l e c t r i c a l work. H e f u r n i s h e d h i s own t o o l s and worked u n d e r h i s own t i m e s c h e d u l e . By December 1 5 , 1982, t h e day o f t h e a c c i d e n t , respon- dent had been working at the construction site for approximately t h r e e days. On t h a t d a y h e came t o work w i t h his employee, Jim Miller. The w e a t h e r was v e r y cold and t h e r e was snow and i c e on t h e g r o u n d . The s p l i t - l e v e l b u i l d i n g u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n d i d n o t h a v e steps from t h e ground level t o the second f l o o r where re- spondent was working. The second floor entrance was approximately 3 to 4 feet above the ground s o respondent propped h i s own 4 - f o o t ladder against t h e wall. Respondent u s e d t h e l a d d e r t o e n t e r and e x i t t h e b u i l d i n g s e v e r a l t i m e s t h a t morning. A t a b o u t 10:OO a.m., he attempted t o e x i t t h e building but found his l a d d e r t o be missing. T h e r e was a c o n c r e t e c i n d e r b l o c k p l a c e d below t h e e n t r a n c e which some o f t h e w o r k e r s used a s a s t e p . Respondent s t e p p e d down on t h e c i n d e r block. The b l o c k was c o v e r e d w i t h i c e , causing h i s foot t o slip. He fell, h i t t i n g h i s b u t t o c k s on t h e b l o c k . Pain i n h i s l o w e r back and b u t t o c k s r e s u l t e d . The p a i n d i d n o t s u b s i d e and h e was f o r c e d t o l e a v e work e a r l y . The pain continued for three weeks, at which time respondent saw a d o c t o r who r e f e r r e d him t o a n o r t h o p e d i c specialist. Two days after consulting the specialist, s u r g e r y was p e r f o r m e d f o r what r e s p o n d e n t u n d e r s t o o d t o b e a n excision of a ruptured disc. This action followed. On December 6, 1984, a jury v e r d i c t was r e n d e r e d f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t 82 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t and r e s p o n d e n t 18 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t . Respondent was awarded $107,999.77. The District Court entered judgment on the verdict. Appellant r a i s e s t h e following issues: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was i n e r r o r i n r u l i n g that the safe place to work statutes, 55 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA, create a duty running from a general contractor/owner to a s u b c o n t r a c t o r when the subcontractor r e t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o l o v e r h i s means o f a c c e s s t o t h e b u i l d i n g where h e works. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was i n e r r o r i n r u l i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t h a v e t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g damages by medical e x p e r t testimony. 3. Whether the District Court was in error in not r e d u c i n g t h e j u r y ' s award o f damages by t h e j u r y ' s finding of c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f r e s p o n d e n t . SAFE PLACE TO WORK It i s well e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t an e m p l o y e r must provide employees with a safe place to work. Section 50-71-201, MCA. This obligation has been extended from g e n e r a 1 c o n t r a c t o r s t o employees o f s u b c o n t r a c t o r s when t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r c o n t r o l s job s a f e t y o r has a non-delegable duty of safety a r i s i n g out of contract. Stepanek v. Kober Construction (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 51, 38 St.Rep. 385. Shannon v . Howard S . W r i g h t C o n s t . Co. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438. However, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s o b l i g a t i o n does n o t extend from g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r s t o s u b c o n t r a c t o r s b e c a u s e s u b c o n t r a c t o r s a r e a b l e t o c o n t r o l and i n f l u e n c e t h e s a f e t y o f t h e i r work p l a c e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n s t r u c t e d on t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work law found i n §§ 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA: 50-71-201. Employer t o f u r n i s h and r e q u i r e s a f e t y d e v i c e s and p r a c t i c e s . ~ v ; r employe; s h a l l f u r n i s h d p l a c e o f ~ is sa e .. * e m ~ l o v m e n t which - - f - f o r e m ~ l o v e e s 4 t h e r e i n and s h a l l f u r n i s h and u s e and r e q u i r e t h e use o f such s a f e t y d e v i c e s and s a f e g u a r d s and s h a l l a d o p t a n d u s e s u c h p r a c t i c e s , means, m e t h o d s , o p e r a - t i o n s , and p r o c e s s e s a s a r e r e a s o n a b l y a d e q u a t e t o r e n d e r t h e p l a c e o f employ- ment s a f e and s h a l l d o e v e r y o t h e r t h i n g reasonably necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e l i f e and safety of employees. [emphasis added] 50-71-202. Employer t o p r o v i d e and m a i n t a i n s a f e p l a c e o f employment. (1) An e m p l o y e r who i s t h e owner o r lessee o f any r e a l p r o p e r t y i n t h i s s t a t e s h a l l n o t construct o r cause t o b e constructed o r m a i n t a i n e d a n y p l a c e o f employment t h a t i s unsafe. ( 2 ) Every e m p l o y e r who i s t h e owner o f a p l a c e o f employment o r lessee t h e r e o f s h a l l r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n t h e same a s t o r e n d e r it s a f e . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e s a f e p l a c e t o work s t a t u t e s o n l y a p p l y t o s i t u a t i o n s where t h e c l a i m p r e s e n t e d i s b r o u g h t by a n employee o f a s u b c o n t r a c t o r and t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r has control over safety. Respondent was not in an employer-employee s i t u a t i o n b e c a u s e h e was a s u b c o n t r a c t o r . Therefore, the safe place t o work instructions should not have b e e n g i v e n . W e must d e t e r m i n e i f t h e language o f § 50-71-201, MCA, "a p l a c e o f employment which i s s a f e f o r e m p l o y e e s , " i n c l u d e s s u b c o n t r a c t o r s i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f empl-oyees. W e b e l i e v e it does. I t was t h e i n t e n t o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o i n c l u d e c o n t r a c - t o r s i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f "employee." S e c t i o n 92-411, R.C.M. (1947). We have a l r e a d y determined that $ S 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA, were intended to cover employees of subcontractors. Stepanek, supra. If a subcontractor is incorporated then the subcontractor indivj-dually is an employee o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n and i s c o v e r e d . However, u n d e r appellant's rationale, if the subcontractor is not i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e n h e i s n o t a n employee and i s n o t c o v e r e d . We cannot believe t h i s was t h e intent of the Legislature. S e c t i o n 50-71-202, MCA, makes no m e n t i o n o f " e m p l o y e e s , " but simply requires employers to provide a safe place of employment. L i k e w i s e , t h e e m p h a s i s i n S 50-71-201, MCA, is on t h e " p l a c e o f employment" r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t a t u s o f t h e worker. Respondent, a s a s u b c o n t r a c t o r , was e n t i t l e d t o a safe place to work. The District Court did not err by instructing the jury on S $ 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA. MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e damages by expert medical testimony. Respondent did not produce a medical expert at trial, and appellant made a motion for directed verdict. The trial c o u r t denied the motion. A p p e l l a n t m a i n t a i n s t h i s was e r r o r . The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n f o r d i r e c t e d verdict. A c l a i m a n t i s competent t o t e s t i f y a s t o h i s p a s t and p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n . R e s p o n d e n t ' s t e s t i m o n y was s u f f i c i e n t for the jury to determine whether there was an injury. However, respondent's testimony, standing alone, is not s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e permanency where d i s p u t e d a n d where n o t a p p a r e n t from t h e i n j u r y i t s e l f . Likewise, l a y testimony i s not sufficient t o e s t a b l i s h cause f o r those aspects of an injury not apparently related t o t h e accident i n question. I n Zegman v . State (N.Y. 1 9 7 9 ) , 416 N.Y.S.2d 505, this r u l e was s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s : ... c l a i m a n t was c l e a r l y c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y t o h e r p a s t and p r e s e n t c o n d i - tion. (Vincent-Wilday, I n c . v . S t r a i t , 273 App.Div. 1 0 5 4 , 79 N.Y.S.2d 811.) The C o u r t d o e s n o t however c o n s t r u e s u c h testimony a s sufficient t o establish e i t h e r t h e permanency o f t h e i n j u r y o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of future pain. [cita- t i o n s omitted] Zegman, 416 N.Y.S.2d a t 506. Not all injuries require medical expert testimony to p r o v e permanency o r c a u s a t i o n . I t h a s been held t h a t medical testimony is not necessary t o prove permanent injuries or their cause where the nature of the injury is such that laymen c a n p l a i n l y see, o r i n f e r from t h e i n j u r y , i t s cause and that it w i l l be permanent, such as loss of a limb. R e s p o n d e n t ' s b a c k i n j u r y was n o t s u c h an i n j u r y . C o r y e l l v. Conn (Wis. 1 9 7 9 ) , 276 N.W.2d 723, addresses t h e i s s u e o f permanency o f i n j u r i e s a s f o l l o w s : Where, a s h e r e , a n i n j u r y i s s u b j e c t i v e and a layman c a n n o t know i f it w i l l continue, e x p e r t medical testimony i s n e c e s s a r y w i t h r e g a r d t o permanency and f u t u r e p a i n and s u f f e r i n g . D i e m e l v. W e i r i c h , 264 W i s . 265, 268, 58 N.W.2d 651 (1953). '. .. Only a m e d i c a l e x p e r t i s q u a l i f i e d t o e x p r e s s an o p i n i o n t o a m e d i c a l cer- t a i n t y , o r b a s e d on m e d i c a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s ( n o t mere p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) , a s t o w h e t h e r t h e pain w i l l continue i n t h e future, a n d , i f s o , f o r how l o n g a p e r i o d it w i l l SO continue. N.W.2d a t 652-653. .. .' I d . a t 268, 58 Corye 11, I n t h e s i m i l a r c a s e o f C l i f f o r d v. Opdyke (N.J. 1978), 383 A.2d 749, the court found t h a t p r e s e n t i n g t h e i s s u e o f permanent injury to the jury was p r e j u d i c i a l l y erroneous: The q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r o g n o s i s o f an i n j u r y and p r o b a b l e p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y i s one n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f expert medica 1 opinion (except for disabilities which are apparent to a layman, such as an amputated body member). And the burden of proving such permanency by competent medical testimony rests of course with plaintiff. Clifford, 383 A.2d at 752. The trial court presented to the jury the issue of permanent injury in instruction number 26. Appellant object- ed. Because of inadequate proof to support the instruction, it was error to give it. There must be a new trial, but only on the issue of damages. Finally, respondent was found to be 18 percent negligent, however, the trial judge failed to reduce his award by this amount. The new damage award shall be reduced by 18 percent, pursuant to S 27-1-702, MCA. The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for a new trial on damages only. We concur: n