No. 85-034
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
HARRY C A I N , d / b / a CAIN ELECTRIC,
P l a i n t i f f and R - e s p o n d e n t ,
CLEATUS G. STEVENSON, d / b / a STEVENSON
a n d SONS CONSTRUCTION,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of R o s e b u d ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Herndon, H a r p e r & Munro; R o d n e y T. Hartman, B i l l i n g s ,
Montana
F o r Respondent:
C l a r e n c e B e l u e , H a r d i n , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : J u l y 11, 1 9 8 5
Decided: S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1985
Filed: str i ~4 f985
M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
H a r r y Cain ( r e s p o n d e n t ) f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n o n September
9, 1983, in the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial
District, seeking damages for injuries he received while
w o r k i n g a s an e l e c t r i c a 1 s u b c o n t r a c t o r f o r C l e a t u s S t e v e n s o n
(appellant) . The j u r y awarded r e s p o n d e n t $107,999.77. This
appea 1 f o l l o w e d .
Respondent was the electrical subcontractor on a
six-plex apartment building under construction in Ashland,
Montana. A p p e l l a n t was t h e owner o f t h e b u i l d i n g and t h e
general contractor. Respondent was hired to complete the
"rough-in" e l e c t r i c a l work. H e f u r n i s h e d h i s own t o o l s and
worked u n d e r h i s own t i m e s c h e d u l e .
By December 1 5 , 1982, t h e day o f t h e a c c i d e n t , respon-
dent had been working at the construction site for
approximately t h r e e days. On t h a t d a y h e came t o work w i t h
his employee, Jim Miller. The w e a t h e r was v e r y cold and
t h e r e was snow and i c e on t h e g r o u n d .
The s p l i t - l e v e l b u i l d i n g u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n d i d n o t h a v e
steps from t h e ground level t o the second f l o o r where re-
spondent was working. The second floor entrance was
approximately 3 to 4 feet above the ground s o respondent
propped h i s own 4 - f o o t ladder against t h e wall. Respondent
u s e d t h e l a d d e r t o e n t e r and e x i t t h e b u i l d i n g s e v e r a l t i m e s
t h a t morning. A t a b o u t 10:OO a.m., he attempted t o e x i t t h e
building but found his l a d d e r t o be missing. T h e r e was a
c o n c r e t e c i n d e r b l o c k p l a c e d below t h e e n t r a n c e which some o f
t h e w o r k e r s used a s a s t e p . Respondent s t e p p e d down on t h e
c i n d e r block. The b l o c k was c o v e r e d w i t h i c e , causing h i s
foot t o slip. He fell, h i t t i n g h i s b u t t o c k s on t h e b l o c k .
Pain i n h i s l o w e r back and b u t t o c k s r e s u l t e d . The p a i n d i d
n o t s u b s i d e and h e was f o r c e d t o l e a v e work e a r l y .
The pain continued for three weeks, at which time
respondent saw a d o c t o r who r e f e r r e d him t o a n o r t h o p e d i c
specialist. Two days after consulting the specialist,
s u r g e r y was p e r f o r m e d f o r what r e s p o n d e n t u n d e r s t o o d t o b e a n
excision of a ruptured disc.
This action followed. On December 6, 1984, a jury
v e r d i c t was r e n d e r e d f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t 82 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t
and r e s p o n d e n t 18 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t . Respondent was awarded
$107,999.77. The District Court entered judgment on the
verdict. Appellant r a i s e s t h e following issues:
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was i n e r r o r i n r u l i n g
that the safe place to work statutes, 55 50-71-201 and
50-71-202, MCA, create a duty running from a general
contractor/owner to a s u b c o n t r a c t o r when the subcontractor
r e t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o l o v e r h i s means o f a c c e s s t o t h e
b u i l d i n g where h e works.
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was i n e r r o r i n r u l i n g
t h a t r e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t h a v e t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g damages by
medical e x p e r t testimony.
3. Whether the District Court was in error in not
r e d u c i n g t h e j u r y ' s award o f damages by t h e j u r y ' s finding of
c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f r e s p o n d e n t .
SAFE PLACE TO WORK
It i s well e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t an e m p l o y e r must
provide employees with a safe place to work. Section
50-71-201, MCA. This obligation has been extended from
g e n e r a 1 c o n t r a c t o r s t o employees o f s u b c o n t r a c t o r s when t h e
g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r c o n t r o l s job s a f e t y o r has a non-delegable
duty of safety a r i s i n g out of contract. Stepanek v. Kober
Construction (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 51, 38 St.Rep. 385.
Shannon v . Howard S . W r i g h t C o n s t . Co. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 269,
593 P.2d 438. However, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s o b l i g a t i o n
does n o t extend from g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r s t o s u b c o n t r a c t o r s
b e c a u s e s u b c o n t r a c t o r s a r e a b l e t o c o n t r o l and i n f l u e n c e t h e
s a f e t y o f t h e i r work p l a c e .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n s t r u c t e d on t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work
law found i n §§ 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA:
50-71-201. Employer t o f u r n i s h and
r e q u i r e s a f e t y d e v i c e s and p r a c t i c e s .
~ v ; r employe; s h a l l f u r n i s h d p l a c e o f
~
is sa e .. *
e m ~ l o v m e n t which - - f - f o r e m ~ l o v e e s
4
t h e r e i n and s h a l l f u r n i s h and u s e and
r e q u i r e t h e use o f such s a f e t y d e v i c e s
and s a f e g u a r d s and s h a l l a d o p t a n d u s e
s u c h p r a c t i c e s , means, m e t h o d s , o p e r a -
t i o n s , and p r o c e s s e s a s a r e r e a s o n a b l y
a d e q u a t e t o r e n d e r t h e p l a c e o f employ-
ment s a f e and s h a l l d o e v e r y o t h e r t h i n g
reasonably necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e l i f e
and safety of employees. [emphasis
added]
50-71-202. Employer t o p r o v i d e and
m a i n t a i n s a f e p l a c e o f employment. (1)
An e m p l o y e r who i s t h e owner o r lessee o f
any r e a l p r o p e r t y i n t h i s s t a t e s h a l l n o t
construct o r cause t o b e constructed o r
m a i n t a i n e d a n y p l a c e o f employment t h a t
i s unsafe.
( 2 ) Every e m p l o y e r who i s t h e owner o f a
p l a c e o f employment o r lessee t h e r e o f
s h a l l r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n t h e same a s t o
r e n d e r it s a f e .
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e s a f e p l a c e t o work s t a t u t e s
o n l y a p p l y t o s i t u a t i o n s where t h e c l a i m p r e s e n t e d i s b r o u g h t
by a n employee o f a s u b c o n t r a c t o r and t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r
has control over safety. Respondent was not in an
employer-employee s i t u a t i o n b e c a u s e h e was a s u b c o n t r a c t o r .
Therefore, the safe place t o work instructions should not
have b e e n g i v e n .
W e must d e t e r m i n e i f t h e language o f § 50-71-201, MCA,
"a p l a c e o f employment which i s s a f e f o r e m p l o y e e s , " i n c l u d e s
s u b c o n t r a c t o r s i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f empl-oyees. W e b e l i e v e it
does.
I t was t h e i n t e n t o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o i n c l u d e c o n t r a c -
t o r s i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f "employee." S e c t i o n 92-411, R.C.M.
(1947). We have a l r e a d y determined that $ S 50-71-201 and
50-71-202, MCA, were intended to cover employees of
subcontractors. Stepanek, supra. If a subcontractor is
incorporated then the subcontractor indivj-dually is an
employee o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n and i s c o v e r e d . However, u n d e r
appellant's rationale, if the subcontractor is not
i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e n h e i s n o t a n employee and i s n o t c o v e r e d .
We cannot believe t h i s was t h e intent of the Legislature.
S e c t i o n 50-71-202, MCA, makes no m e n t i o n o f " e m p l o y e e s , "
but simply requires employers to provide a safe place of
employment. L i k e w i s e , t h e e m p h a s i s i n S 50-71-201, MCA, is
on t h e " p l a c e o f employment" r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t a t u s o f t h e
worker. Respondent, a s a s u b c o n t r a c t o r , was e n t i t l e d t o a
safe place to work. The District Court did not err by
instructing the jury on S $ 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA.
MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e
damages by expert medical testimony. Respondent did not
produce a medical expert at trial, and appellant made a
motion for directed verdict. The trial c o u r t denied the
motion. A p p e l l a n t m a i n t a i n s t h i s was e r r o r .
The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n f o r d i r e c t e d
verdict. A c l a i m a n t i s competent t o t e s t i f y a s t o h i s p a s t
and p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n . R e s p o n d e n t ' s t e s t i m o n y was s u f f i c i e n t
for the jury to determine whether there was an injury.
However, respondent's testimony, standing alone, is not
s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e permanency where d i s p u t e d a n d where n o t
a p p a r e n t from t h e i n j u r y i t s e l f . Likewise, l a y testimony i s
not sufficient t o e s t a b l i s h cause f o r those aspects of an
injury not apparently related t o t h e accident i n question.
I n Zegman v . State (N.Y. 1 9 7 9 ) , 416 N.Y.S.2d 505, this
r u l e was s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s :
... c l a i m a n t was c l e a r l y c o m p e t e n t t o
t e s t i f y t o h e r p a s t and p r e s e n t c o n d i -
tion. (Vincent-Wilday, I n c . v . S t r a i t ,
273 App.Div. 1 0 5 4 , 79 N.Y.S.2d 811.) The
C o u r t d o e s n o t however c o n s t r u e s u c h
testimony a s sufficient t o establish
e i t h e r t h e permanency o f t h e i n j u r y o r
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of future pain. [cita-
t i o n s omitted]
Zegman, 416 N.Y.S.2d a t 506.
Not all injuries require medical expert testimony to
p r o v e permanency o r c a u s a t i o n . I t h a s been held t h a t medical
testimony is not necessary t o prove permanent injuries or
their cause where the nature of the injury is such that
laymen c a n p l a i n l y see, o r i n f e r from t h e i n j u r y , i t s cause
and that it w i l l be permanent, such as loss of a limb.
R e s p o n d e n t ' s b a c k i n j u r y was n o t s u c h an i n j u r y .
C o r y e l l v. Conn (Wis. 1 9 7 9 ) , 276 N.W.2d 723, addresses
t h e i s s u e o f permanency o f i n j u r i e s a s f o l l o w s :
Where, a s h e r e , a n i n j u r y i s s u b j e c t i v e
and a layman c a n n o t know i f it w i l l
continue, e x p e r t medical testimony i s
n e c e s s a r y w i t h r e g a r d t o permanency and
f u t u r e p a i n and s u f f e r i n g . D i e m e l v.
W e i r i c h , 264 W i s . 265, 268, 58 N.W.2d 651
(1953).
'. .. Only a m e d i c a l e x p e r t i s q u a l i f i e d
t o e x p r e s s an o p i n i o n t o a m e d i c a l cer-
t a i n t y , o r b a s e d on m e d i c a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s
( n o t mere p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) , a s t o w h e t h e r
t h e pain w i l l continue i n t h e future,
a n d , i f s o , f o r how l o n g a p e r i o d it w i l l
SO continue.
N.W.2d a t 652-653.
.. .' I d . a t 268, 58
Corye 11,
I n t h e s i m i l a r c a s e o f C l i f f o r d v. Opdyke (N.J. 1978),
383 A.2d 749, the court found t h a t p r e s e n t i n g t h e i s s u e o f
permanent injury to the jury was p r e j u d i c i a l l y erroneous:
The q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r o g n o s i s o f an
i n j u r y and p r o b a b l e p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y
i s one n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f
expert medica 1 opinion (except for
disabilities which are apparent to a
layman, such as an amputated body
member). And the burden of proving such
permanency by competent medical testimony
rests of course with plaintiff.
Clifford, 383 A.2d at 752.
The trial court presented to the jury the issue of
permanent injury in instruction number 26. Appellant object-
ed. Because of inadequate proof to support the instruction,
it was error to give it. There must be a new trial, but only
on the issue of damages.
Finally, respondent was found to be 18 percent
negligent, however, the trial judge failed to reduce his
award by this amount. The new damage award shall be reduced
by 18 percent, pursuant to S 27-1-702, MCA.
The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for a new
trial on damages only.
We concur:
n