No. 8 6 - 2 6 9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
CITY OF BILLINGS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
RODNEY 0 SKURDAL,
.
Defenda.nt and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honors-ble G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Rodney 0 Skurdal, pro se, Gillette, Wyoming
.
For Respondent:
Bonnie J. Sutherland, City Attorney's Office,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 4, 1 9 8 6
Decided: November 18, 1986
Clerk
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Rodney Skurdal was charged with the misdemeanor crimes
of speeding, foreign license plates, foreign driver's li-
cense, no proof of insurance, and obstructing a peace offi-
cer. A jury trial was held in the District Court of the
Thirteenth Judicial District and Mr. Skurdal was found guilty
of all charges. Mr. Skurdal appea.led. We affirm.
The issues presented to us are:
1. Were Mr. Skurdal's constitutional rights violated by
requiring him to carry a motor vehicle license, a driver's
license, and proof of vehicle insurance?
2. Was Mr. Skurdal's right to counsel violated?
3. Was Mr. Skurdal brutalized or threatened by the city
police?
4. Were Mr. Skurdal's constitutional rights violated
when he was not given a Miranda warning after he was stopped?
5. Was there an unlawful search of Mr. Skurdal prior to
placing him in the police station holding cell?
6. Is radar an appropriate device for measuring the
speed of vehicles?
7. Was Mr. Skurdal denied his right to a jury trial?
8. Did the state courts have jurisdiction over this
matter? Is the collection of fines by paper money in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution? Is the "unlimited
taxation by the use of paper money" unconstitutional?
On May 29, 1985, Rodney Skurdal was driving his automo-
bile south along Regal Street in Billings, Montana. Officer
Ness of the Billings Police Department was operating a sta-
tionary radar gun out of the driver's window of his police
vehicle on Regal. Street. At approximately 9:28 p.m., Officer
Ness observed Mr. Skurdal's vehicle approach him and estimat-
ed Mr. Skurdal's vehicle speed to be at least 35 miles per
hour. The posted speed limit on Regal Street is 25 miles per
hour. Officer Ness clocked Mr. Skurdal's vehicle at 38 miles
per hour on his radar unit.
Officer Ness pulled Mr. Skurdal over and informed Mr.
Skurdal that he had been speeding. Officer Ness then asked
Mr. Skurdal for his driver's license, driver's registration,
and proof of insurance. Mr. Skurdal asked Officer Ness by
what authority he was asking for this information. Officer
Ness informed Mr. Skurdal that he was a police officer for
the City of Billings and that he had the authority to ask for
such information. Mr. Skurdal refused to give the items to
Officer Ness and handed Officer Ness a "Public Servant's
Questionnaire" and asked him to fill it out. Officer Ness
refused to fill out the form and again asked for Mr.
Skurdal's driver's license, registration, and proof of insur-
ance. Mr. Skurdal refused to hand over the requested items,
saying that the Constitution did not require him to do so.
Officer Ness called for a back-up officer and a short
time later Officer Lueck of the Billings Police Department
arrived. After Officer Lueck arrived, Officer Ness once
again asked Mr. Skurdal for his driver's license, registra-
tion, and proof of insurance. Mr. Skurdal again refused to
supply the requested information, so Officer Ness advised him
that he was under arrest for obstructing a peace officer.
Officers Ness and Lueck then pulled Mr. Skurdal out of his
vehicle as Mr. Skurdal refused to voluntarily get out of the
car and locked his hands around the steering wheel.
After the officers removed Mr. Skurdal from the car,
they handcuffed him, put him in Officer Ness' police vehicle,
took him to the police station and read him his Miranda
rights. While riding the elevator to the third floor of City
Hall where the police station is located, Officer Lueck
turned Mr. Skurdal toward the elevator wall and removed his
wallet to get his identification and to check for any weap-
ons. After checking the wallet, Officer Lueck took the
driver's license and returned the wallet to Mr. Skurdal.
Mr. Skurdal was issued traffic citations for speeding,
carrying a foreign driver's license, having foreign license
plates, and having no proof of insurance. In addition, Mr.
Skurdal was issued a complaint for obstructing a peace
officer.
On April 1, 1986, the jury in the District Court trial
found Mr. Skurdal guilty on all charges. Mr. Skurdal then
appealed to this Court.
Were Mr. Skurdal's constitutional rights violated by
requiring him to carry a motor vehicle license, a driver's
license, and proof of vehicle insurance?
Mr. Skurdal claims that the State of Montana cannot
regulate his right to use and own a vehicle by requiring
vehicle licenses, driver's licenses, and proof of vehicle
insurance. This Court has previously addressed this issue:
The United States Supreme Court in 1837 recognized
that state and local governments possess an inher-
ent power to enact reasonable legislation for the
health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public.
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co. (1837),
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 L.Ed. 773. This Court has
also recognized that such a police power exists
even though the regulation may frequently be an
infringement of individual rights. State v.
Rathbone (1940), 100 Mont. 225, 241, 100 P.2d 86,
92. See also, State v. Penny (1910), 42 Mont. 118,
111 P. 727. Regulations that are formulated within
the state's police power will be presumed reason-
able absent a clear showing to the contrary.
Bettey v. City of Sidney (1927), 79 Mont. 314, 319,
257 P. 1007, 1009. ...
We have previously recognized the power of the
State to regulate licensing of drivers in the
interests of public safety. Sedlacek v. Ahrens
(1974), 165 Mont. 479, 483, 530 P.2d 424, 426.
State v. Deitchler (1982), 201 Mont. 70, 72-73, 651 P.2d
We conclude that Mr. Skurdal has not shown tha-t
S 61-3-301 (I), MCA, (which requires license plates),
S 61-5-102(1), MCA, (which requires a driver's license), or
S 61-6-302 (4), MCA, (which requires proof of insurance) , are
unreasonable. We hold that Mr. Skurdal's constitutional
rights were not violated by requiring him to carry a motor
vehicle license, a driver's license, and. proof of vehicle
insurance.
I1
Was Mr. Skurdal's right to counsel violated?
Mr. Skurdal claims that he was denied his Sixth Arnend-
ment right to counsel. However, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that Mr. Skurdal raised this issue at the
District Court level where he appeared pro se. This Court
has consistently held that normally objections which are
urged for the first time on appeal will not be considered by
this Court. Mont. Ass'n of Underwriters v. State, etc.
(1977), 172 Mont. 211, 218, 563 P.2d 577, 581. We point out
that the record shows that Mr. Skurdal discharged his origi-
nal court appointed counsel and did not seek additional
counsel. We conclude that this issue was not raised at the
District Court and thus is not properly before us.
I11
Was Mr. Skurdal brutalized or threatened by the city
police?
Mr. Skurdal alleges that he was threatened and brutal-
ized by the Billings police when he was arrested. Apparent-
ly, Mr. Skurdalts assertions arise from the removal of his
wallet while he was riding the elevator to the police sta-
tion. Mr. Skurdal presented no evidence in the court pro-
ceedings below which support these claims. We hold that Mr.
Skurdal has not presented any credible evidence that suggests
he was threatened or brutalized by the Billings police.
IV
Were Mr. Skurdal's constitutional rights violated when
he was not given a Miranda warning after he was stopped?
Mr. Skurdal contends that his constitutional rights were
violated when Officer Ness stopped him for speeding and did
not give him the Miranda warning. The United States Supreme
Court has held that there must be a custodial interrogation
before the Miranda warning need be given. Custodial interro-
gation does not occur at a traffic stop based upon: (1) the
rountineness of the questions; (2) the generally brief deten-
tion; and (3) the fact that such stops are in the public
view. Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct.
3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. Accordingly, we hold that Mr.
Skurdalts constitutional rights were not violated when Offi-
cer Ness stopped him for speeding and did not give him the
Miranda warning.
Was there an unlawful search of Mr. Skurdal prior to
placing him in the police station holding cell?
Mr. Skurdal claims that the officers performed an ille-
gal search upon him when he was patted down prior to being
placed in the police station holding cell and that the offi-
cers needed a search warrant prior to the pat down. This
Court has stated:
It is well settled that law enforcement officers
may make a full body search pursuant to a lawful
arrest for the purposes of protecting themselves or
seizing evidence of the crime. Section 95-702,
R.C.M.1947; Kotwicki, supra; United States v.
Robinson (1973), 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38
L.Ed.2d 427.
State v. Cripps (1978), 177 Mont. 410, 420, 582 P.2d 312,
Officer Ness had probable cause to arrest Mr. Skurdal
for obstructing a peace officer and Officer Ness complied
with $ 46-6-106, MCA, the procedure for making an arrest
without a warrant. We hold that the search of Mr. Skurdal
was not illegal or unconstitutional.
VI
Is radar an appropriate devise for measuring the speed
of vehicles?
Mr. Skurdal challenges the validity of the use of radar
to measure the speed of vehicles. The Montana legislature
has recognized radar as an acceptable means of measuring
speed. Section 61-8-702, MCA, provides:
The speed of any motor vehicle may be measured by
the use of radio microwaves or other electrical
device. The results of such measurements shall be
accepted as evidence of the speed of such motor
vehicle in any court or legal proceedings where the
speed of the motor vehicle is at issue.
Officer Ness testified that his radar unit was used correctly
and was operating properly on the night in question. Mr.
Skurdal failed to present any evidence which challenged the
validity of the use of radar. Consequently, the evidence
submitted by the state regarding the use of radar is suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the statute. We therefore
affirm the District Court on this issue.
VI I
Was Mr. Skurdal denied his right to a jury trial in City
Court?
Mr. Skurdal contends that he was denied his right to a
jury trial in City Court. Section 46-17-201, MCA, states
that a trial by jury may be waived in City Court if the
consent of both parties is expressed in court. In this case,
we do not have a copy of the City Court transcript. No
evidence has been presented suggesting that Mr. Skurdal
demanded a jury trial at the City Court level. In addition,
this issue was not raised at the District Court level.
Therefore, this issue is not properly before us.
VIII
The last three issues that Mr. Skurdal raises will be
consolidated. Did the state court have jurisdiction over
this matter, even though the court requires the payment of
fines with money? Is the collection of fines by paper money
in violation of the United States Constitution? Is the
"unlimited taxation by the use of paper money"
unconstitutional?
The r e c o r d does n o t demonstrate t h a t M r . Skurdal has
been r e q u i r e d t o make payment o f a n y t y p e by t h e u s e o f p a p e r
money. Mr. S k u r d a l may pay his fines o r other c o s t s by
s i l v e r , such a s q u a r t e r s o r f i f t y c e n t pieces. A basis for
these three issues i s not present. T h e r e f o r e , w e need n o t
c o n s i d e r t h e t h r e e i s s u e s c o n s o l i d a t e d above.
For t h e above reasons, w e a f f i r m t h e decision of the
D i s t r i c t Court i n f u l l .
W e Concur: