No. 86-287
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
IN THE MATTER OF
W.J.H., a youth.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Hill,
The Honorable B.W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale, Warner, Martin & Kaze; John
Warner argued, Havre, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
John Paulson, Asst. Atty. General, Helena
David G. Rice argued, County Attorney, Havre, Montana
Leslie C. Taylor argued, Dept. of SRS, Helena, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Richard P. Bartos argued, Office of Public Instruction,
Helena, Montana
Bruce W. Moerer argued, School Boards Assoc., Helena,
Montana
Submitted: F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 1987
Decided: A p r i l 30, 1987
Filed: APR 3 0 198z
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Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This appeal arises from an order entered by the
District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District in and for
Hill County. The District Court, acting as a Youth Court,
ordered a youth's high school district to pay a segment of
the daily cost associated with the placement of the Youth in
an out-of-state program. The School District appeals. We
reverse.
On August 14, 1985, the Hill County Youth Court
committed W.J.H. (hereinafter Youth) to the Hennepin County
Sexual Offenders Program located in Minnetonka, Minnesota.
The court committed the Youth for a period of 180 days
subject to further commitment at the court's discretion. At
the time of his commitment, the Youth was seventeen years of
age and was a resident of Hill County School District No. 16A
(School District).
As of the date of the Youth's commitment, the Minnesota
program charged $145 per day per person. In its commitment
order, the Youth Court ordered that the bulk of these charges
be shared by Hill County and the Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services (SRS). However, because this program
designated $48 of the daily charges as education costs, the
Youth Court ordered that that part of this daily expense be
paid by the School District.
The School District received no notice of and did not
attend the hearing which resulted in the August 14 order.
Upon learning of the order the School District filed a
petition with the Youth Court to vacate that portion of the
order requiring it to pay the daily $48 education expense.
The Youth Court stayed that portion of its order during the
pendency of this action.
On February 10, 1986, the Youth Court issued an order
extending the Youth's commitment in the Minnesota program.
Again the School District received no prior notice of and did
not participate in the hearing.
On April 3, 1986, the Youth Court formally held a
hearing on the School District's responsibility to pay the
program's education expenses. In its order issued April 14,
1986, the Youth Court noted that it had placed this Youth in
the Minnesota program pursuant to the Interstate Compact for
the Placement of Children, S 41-4-101, MCA. Pursuant to this
Interstate Compact, the Youth Court designated Hill County as
the "sending agency" which rendered the County primarily
responsible for the support and maintenance of the Youth
during the period of placement. However, the Youth Court
held that other agencies were legally responsible for payment
of a share of those costs and that it had the authority to
identify and designate those other agencies. Exercising this
authority, the court then held the School District legally
responsible for the education expenses associated with the
placement of this Youth.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the Youth
Court erred in holding the School District legally
responsible for payment of the education costs associated
with the placement of this Youth.
The School District raises several allegations of
error, but because we find it dispositive, we will address
only the issue of whether the School District is legally
responsible for payment of the Youth's education costs.
The Youth Court held that the School District became
legally responsible for the Youth's education expenses as a
result of the enactment of Chapter 655, Laws of 1985, which
amended S 20-7-401, MCA. All parties agree that the Youth
Court misquoted the applicable statute. Chapter 655, Laws of
1985, amended not § 20-7-401, MCA, but § 20-5-311, MCA, which
is the statute covering payment of tuition costs of a high
school student who attends school outside his resident school
district. Section 20-7-401, MCA, is a definitional statute
identifying the various characteristics of special education
pupils. The parties had previously agreed that this Youth
did not qualify as a special education student. We agree
that 5 20-5-311, MCA, is the statute at issue in this case.
In pertinent part, S 20-5-311, MCA, provides:
(1) Any child may be enrolled in and
attend a high school outside of the high
school district in which he resides when
such high school is located in Montana or
in a county of another state that is
adjacent to the state of Montana. When a
parent or guardian of a child wishes to
have his child attend a school under the
provisions of this section, he shall
apply to the county superintendent of the
county of his residence before July 1 of
the school fiscal year for which he seeks
approval except in those cases when
substantial changes in circumstances
occurred subsequently to justify later
application. Such application shall be
made on a tuition agreement form supplied
by the county superintendent. The
trustees of the district of residence,
the trustees of the district in which the
child wishes to attend school, and the
county superintendent are the approval
agents for tuition to another high school
within the county. The county
superintendent of the county of residence
and the trustees of the district in which
the child wishes to attend school are the
approval agents for attendance outside
the county.
(2) (a)(i) The approval agents shall
approve a tuition application when a
child lives closer to a high school of
another district than any high school
located within his resident district or
when, due to road or geographic
conditions, it is impractical to attend
the high school nearest his residence.
(b) The approval agents shall approve a
tuition application when a child is
required to attend high school outside
the district of residence as the result
of an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction. For purposes of this
subsection (b), the following do not
apply:
(i) the prescribed geographic
relationship of the receiving district to
the district of residence in this
subsection (2) [ .]
Thus, looking to those paragraphs relevant in this
case, this statute covers different situations. Subsection
(1) and (2) (a) cover those situations where a child chooses
to attend a school outside his or her resident district while
subsection (2)(b) deals with a child required to attend an
out-of-district school pursuant to a court order.
Subsections (1) and (2)(a) contain important geographic
considerations. Subsection (1) states that a child may
attend an out-of-district school when such school is located
within this state or in a county of another state that is
adjacent to the state of Montana. And subsection (2)(a)
requires approval agents to approve a tuition application
when a child lives nearer a high school of another district
than any resident district high school.
The specific question raised on appeal is what effect
the language of subsection (2) (b)(i) has upon the geographic
considerations mentioned above. This paragraph was added in
1985 through enactment of Chapter 655, Laws of 1985. The
parties disagree whether this amendment now requires approval
agents to approve a tuition application regardless of where a
youth is placed.
SRS and Hill County assert that this language mandates
that approval agents approve a tuition application when, by
valid court order, a child is required to attend high school
outside his resident district; it matters not whether a court
places the child in a school farther away from his resident
district school nor does it matter whether a court places a
child outside this state or an adjacent state. The School
District disagrees, asserting that the language of (2)(b) (i)
affects only the requirement that approval agents determine
whether the child lives nearer the out-of-district school
than the district school. The School District contends that
the language in question does not affect the "adjacent
states" doctrine, so that approval agents are not required to
approve a tuition application if a child is placed outside
this state or an adjacent state. This question is of obvious
importance in this case where the child was placed in
Minnesota.
A reading of this statute does not plainly convey the
intent of the legislature; we find both sides present
plausible interpretations of the language in question. We
therefore turn to the rules of statutory construction to
determine legislative intent.
We first note that subsections (1) and (2) of
§ 20-5-311, MCA, are interdependent, at least to some degree.
Subsection (2) refers to approval agents who are defined only
in subsection (1). SRS correctly notes that the two
subsections pertain to different situations-- voluntary
attendance at an out-of-district school versus attendance at
an out-of-district school pursuant to court order.
Nevertheless, a reading of the entire statute at least
suggests that the two subsections should be read together.
Moreover, we find support for the School District's
position from related statutes. As noted, 5 20-5-311, MCA,
covers those situations in which a school district of a
child's residence is required to pay tuition if the child
attends a high school outside of his resident high school
district. Section 20-5-312, MCA, sets forth the method by
which the amount of the tuition that the resident school
district must pay is determined. In the event the child
attends a high school in a county of an adjoining state, the
legislature has, through 5 20-5-314, MCA, authorized the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction to negotiate the
amount of tuition. These reciprocal tuition agreements and
the authority to execute reciprocal tuition agreements are
only with "any state adjoining Montana to allow the eligible
children of Montana to attend school in the adjoining state
and to allow children of the adjoining state to attend school
in Montana." Section 20-5-314, MCA. This statute does not
authorize the State Superintendent to enter into a reciprocal
tuition agreement with a state not adjoining Montana. The
parties have not cited and we have not found any statutory
method to calculate the amount of tuition to be paid to a
school in another state not adjacent to Montana. In
construing legislation, this Court will attempt to harmonize
related statutes, giving effect to each. Montana
Contractors' Assn., Inc. v. Department of Highways (Mont.
1986), 715 P.2d 1056, 1058, 43 St.Rep. 470, 472; Crist v.
Segna (Mont. 1981), 622 P.2d 1028, 1029, 38 St.Rep. 150, 152.
SRS and Hill County, on the other hand, have presented
relevant legislative history which they contend convincingly
indicates legislative intent in support of their position.
Their historical evidence consists of two unsuccessful
legislative proposals, which, if passed, would have relieved
a local school district from payment of education expenses in
cases such as this. The second of these proposals was
introduced in 1985 as an attempted amendment to HB 608, the
bill which eventually amended S 20-5-311, MCA, by inserting
subsection (2)(b) . We have carefully considered the
arguments presented by these parties, and have concluded that
the defeat of a relevant amendment is of uncertain value in
interpreting legislation which was passed. As the Oregon
Court of Appeals stated in Oregon State Employees Assn. v.
Workers' Compensation Department (Or. 1981), 624 P.2d 1078,
1081:
An amendment to a statute may be defeated
for many reasons. The failure of the
legislature to pass a particular proposal
is of dubious value in interpreting the
legislation which was passed.
Finally, SRS relies on a New Jersey case, State in the
Interest of F.M. (N.J. 1979), 400 A.2d 576, in support of its
argument that the Youth Court has the authority to asses
education costs against the School District. In F. M. a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ordered an adjudicated
delinquent girl to be placed in a private special education
institution and ordered the school board of the child's
resident district to pay the costs. The school board moved
to vacate the order but the New Jersey Superior Court upheld
the order.
The Juvenile Court's authority in F.M. to assess
education costs against a school district derived from New
Jersey statutes which differed from our state statutes.
However persuasive the reasoning of a sister jurisdiction, we
are bound by the words of our statutes.
Accordingly, we hold that the Youth Court erred in
finding the School District legally responsible for this
Youth's education costs. We therefore reverse that portion
of the lower court's decision holding the School District
liable.