Easley v. Burlington Northern Railroad

No. 88-255
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

WAYNE EASLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant.,
-vs-
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD, J.P. SMITH,
INDIVIDUALLY, JOHN CATTLE, INDIVIDUALLY,
and DOES I THROUGH XX,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jerry R. Bechhold, Rozeman, Montana
For Respondent :
Moulton, Bellingham, Law Firm; K. Kent Koolen,
Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 1, 1988
Decided: October 13, 1988

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Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.

Wayne Easley and his attorney Jerry R. Bechhold appeal
a decision of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin
County, granting Burlington Northern Railroad's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), M.R.Civ.P., and imposing
Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P. sanctions in the amount of $1,500.
Respondent raises the question of whether or not the
appellant properly and timely preserved all issues for
appeal. Having examined the record and the law on the issue,
we find the appeal is untimely and we are without
jurisdiction to hear it.
On October 5, 1983, Wayne Easley, an employee of
Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) was injured when struck by
a piece of metal from a spike mall. As a result of his
injury Mr. Easley retained counsel to negotiate a settlement
with BN to compensate him for his injuries. A£ter
approximately two and one-half years, negotiations culminated
in a settlement payment to Mr. Easley of $55,000 in exchange
for a release of all claims arising from the accident and his
resignation from employment with BN. This settlement
agreement was signed on May 5, 1986. The release
specifically states:
[I] release and forever discharge
Burlington Northern Railroad Company, and
all other parties whomsoever, from all
claims and liabilities of every kind or
nature, INCLUDING CLAIMS FOR INJURIES, IF
ANY, WHICH ARE UNKNOWN TO ME AT THE
PRESENT TIME, arising out of an accident
on or about October 5, 1983, at or near
Blossburg, Montana. ..
Shortly thereafter on July 15, 1986, appellant was
injured in a motorcycle accident. As a result of x-rays
taken at that time, appellant purportedly learned he had a
crushed vertebrae and degenerative changes in a vertebral
disc. At some point between the accident and September 30,
1986, appellant contacted attorney Bechhold. On October 2,
1986, attorney Bechhold filed a four count complaint in the
District Court naming BN and three of its employees as
defendants. The complaint alleged two counts of negligence
against BN arising from the October 5, 1983 accident, one
count of bad faith for BN's negotiation of the settlement
agreement, and one count of "Negligence and Wanton and
Reckless Disregard for Plaintiff's Wellbeing" against
employee John O'Dell for failing to "care for Plaintiff's
injuries quickly." The complaint also sought punitive
damages in the sum of $1,000,000 against BJ and $1,000,000
t
against O'Dell.
Respondent BN moved for dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. The respondent's brief
opposing attorney Bechhold's motion to withdraw requested the
court to impose Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P. sanctions. The motion to
dismiss was heard in open court on January 29, 1987 and the
court issued its order granting the motion to dismiss on
March 16, 1987.
The court found the complaint sought relief for the
injury sustained on October 5, 1983 and that all claims
arising from the accident were covered by the release
executed May 5, 1986. The court found no grounds in the
complaint for setting aside the release and that if the
release were set aside, the "plaintiff's claims would lie
only under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) .. .'
I
Under FELA the "plaintiff would have no claim against the
individual employees [named as defendants], would not have a
claim of punitive damages against the railroad, and would not
have a claim based on any covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. "
The court then imposed $1,500 in Rule 11 sanctions for
failure to properly research the matter or file the complaint
under FELA. Further, the court found the appellant failed to
explain why the release executed five months before the
filing of the action was not binding on the parties.
Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration of
defendant's motion for sanctions. The motion was briefed by
the parties and heard in open court on April 2, 1987. The
court allowed appellant's counsel ten days to file a final
brief. The court stated it would then reconsider its ruling
on the motion to dismiss and sanctions. On January 26, 1988,
the court issued its order denying reconsideration of
defendant's motion for sanctions.
A motion for reconsideration, while not specifically
referred to in Rule 59 (g), M. R.Civ.P., has been equated to a
motion to alter or amend a judgment. Pursuant to this rule a
party shall serve notice of a Rule 59(g) motion not later
than ten days after service of the notice of the entry of the
judgment. Appellant complied with this portion of the
statute. The statute goes on to provide, however, that
should the court fail to rule on the motion within the 45-day
period (as delineated in Rule 59(d)) the motion shall be
deemed denied. Rule 59(d) provides the 45-day period begins
to run from the time the motion is filed. Rule 5 (a)(4),
M.R.App.P., further provides that the time for filing appeals
in civil cases, where a Rule 59 (g) motion to alter or amend
the judgment is filed, shall run for all parties from the
entry of the order granting or denying the motion, or if
applicable, from the time such motion is deemed denied at the
expiration of the 45-day period established in Rule 59(d).
This Court found in Mortensen Construction Co. v . Burlington
Northern, Inc., (Mont. 1985), 708 P.2d 1006, 1007, 42 St.Rep.
1693, 1700, that the time limit contained in Rule 59(d)
invokes a mandatory time limit.
As Rule 59(g) clearly states that Rule 59(d) applies,
we find the 45-day period commenced running on March 24,
1987, when appellant filed his motion for reconsideration of
defendant' s motion for sanctions. The 45-day period expired
on May 8, 1987, and appellant had 30 days from that date in
which to file his notice of appeal. Appellant filed his
notice of appeal, however, on February 17, 1988. We
therefore dismiss the appeal as untimely pursuant to Rule
59 (g), M.R.Civ.P.
This Court also notes that when an attorney files a
complaint without researching the facts or the law, as was
apparent in this case, District Courts have the authority to
impose Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P., sanctions.
i

Appeal dismissed.

We concur: A
'