No. 87-451
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1988
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
THE DIVISION OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR & INDUSTRY, an agency of
the State of Montana,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow,
The Honorable Frank Davis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Burgess, Joyce & Whelan; Frank Burgess and Thomas F.
Joyce argued, Butte, Montana
For Respondent:
Steven J. Shapiro argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: May 10, 1988
Decided: June 7 , 1988
Filed:
t.lUN 7'
Clerk
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
Weis, a chiropractic doctor licensed in the state of
Montana, appeals the declaratory judgment entered by the
Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, finding
that the Division of Workers1 Compensation properly exercised
its delegated authority by enacting administrative rule
24.29.806, A.R.M. .
(1986) This rule restricts medical
evaluation of a physical impairment to those with a doctor of
.
medicine (M.D ) degree.
We affirm.
The issues raised and argued on appeal are:
1. Whether the Montana state legislature intended to
restrict the making of an "impairment rating" to licensed
medical physicians (M.D. 's) by enacting 37-71-122, MCA
(1985)?
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the
Division of Workers' Compensation properly exercised its
rulemaking authority when promulgating administrative rule
24.29.806, A.R.M., which restricts medical evaluations of a
physical impairment to those who hold a doctor of medicine
(M.D.) degree and are licensed as a physician to practice
medicine in the state of Montana?
In 1972, the Division of Workers' Compensation enacted
what is now rule 24.29.806, A.R.M. This rule provides that
"[mledical evaluations to determine physical impairment shall
only be done by qualified medical physicians," and that the
Division must be advised of "all evaluations of impairment by
physicians." An impairment rating is a medical determination
of a person's physical limitations caused by an injury and
which helps to establish a person's benefits under the
Workers' Compensation program. As initially enacted, the
terms "medical doctors" and "doctors" were used instead of
physicians.
In 1981, the Montana state legislature enacted §§
39-71-121 and -122, MCA, which define disability and
impairment as they are used in determining whether a person
has suffered a compensable, work related injury. The
essential difference between the two definitions for the
purpose of this action is that " [a]n impairment rating is
purely a medical determination" whereas " [dlisability is not
a purely medical condition." The 1987 Montana state
legislature repealed these two definitional statutes and in
their place enacted § § 39-71-701, -702 and -703, MCA, which
continues to provide that the determination of the three
types of disability--temporary total, permanent total and
permanent partial--must be supported by a preponderance of
"medical evidence."
From December, 1972, when the rule first went into
effect, until December 14, 1982, when the Workers'
Compensation Court decided Rookhuizen v. Pierce Packing Co.,
Docket No. 382-118, chiropractors rated impairments of
injured workmen. In Rookhuizen, the Workers' Compensation
Court held that " [a]n impairment rating is a medical
determination and only a person licensed - practice medicine
to
can make a medical determination" (emphasis in original).
Docket No. 382-118, at 6. The court thus held that since §
37-12-102, MCA, declares that a chiropractor does not
practice medicine and § 37-12-104 (I), MCA, forbids a
chiropractor from practicing medicine, a chiropractor cannot
render an impairment rating. Docket No. 382-118, at 9. As a
result of the Rookhuizen decision, the Division of Workers'
Compensation and the Workers' Compensation Court refuses to
accept impairment ratings from chiropractors. Weis, a
chiropractor licensed in the state of Montana, appealed this
decision in District Court in June, 1986.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the
Montana state legislature intended to restrict the making of
an "impairment rating" to licensed medical physicians
(M.D. Is) by enacting S 39-71-122, MCA? Upon review of the
statutes and legislative history, we hold that the
legislature did intend for only licensed medical physicians
to render the impairment ratings necessary for an injured
worker to recover under the Workers' Compensation program.
In 1986, when this action was filed, the statute in
effect was S 39-71-121, MCA, which stated "[aln impairment
rating is purely a medical determination." The legislature
repealed this statute in 1987. The applicable statutes in
effect now are §§ 39-71-701, -702 and -703, MCA, which
require that disabilities be supported by a "preponderance of
medical evidence." Despite the changes in the statutes, the
dispositive issue of whether the legislature intended to
restrict the making of impairment ratings to licensed medical
physicians by the use of the word "medical" is still before
this Court.
When interpreting the word "medical" in the above
statutes, this Court must adhere to the legislative intent to
determine whether "medical" includes only licensed medical
physicians or, as Weis argues, whether it includes everyone
trained in treating body or mental disorders, which would
necessarily include, for example, chiropractors, osteopaths
and optometrists. - Section 1-2-102, MCA; Montana Tavern
See
Ass'n. v. State -- ex rel. Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 1986), 729
P.2d 1310, 1316, 43 St.Rep. 2180, 2185; Missoula County v.
American Asphalt, Inc. (Mont. 1985), 701 P.2d 990, 992, 42
St.Rep. 920, 922.
The first step in determining the legislative intent is
to examine the plain meaning of the words used in the
statute. Montana Tavern Ass'n., 729 P.2d at 1316, 43
St.Rep. at 2185; Missoula County, 701 P.2d at 992, 42 St.Rep.
at 922; State - -
ex rel. Sol v. Bakker (1982), 199 Mont. 385,
390, 649 P.2d 456, 459. Webster's Dictionary defines medical
as "of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or the
practice of medicine." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 737 (1984). Upon reviewing 5 37-12-104, MCA,
which addresses the rights and limitations governing the
practice of chiropractic, the definition of "medical" appears
clearer. This statute specifically states that chiropractors
"shall not in any way imply that they are regular physicians
or surgeons. They shall not ... practice medicine or
surgery or osteopathy . .
. . I Section 37-12-104 (1), MCA.
'
The plain meaning of the word as defined by Webster in
conjunction with S 37-12-104(1) makes it clear that
legislators intended to allow only licensed medical
physicians to render impairment ratings.
The legislative history further supports this
conclusion. In 1981, Senator Bill Norman introduced Senate
Bill 128 and stressed that "[i]t is necessary to understand
the concept of impairment. This is a medical
.
determination.. . " House Labor and Employment Relations
Committee Minutes, at 1 (February 17, 1981). In 1987,
Senate Bill 315 was introduced primarily to help "to insure
that the workers' benefits are provided swiftly and surely
. . .. Senate Business and Labor Committee, at 1 (March 9,
"
1987). During the March 9 meeting of the Senate's Business
and Labor Committee, a representative of the Montana
Chiropractor Association supported reformation of Montana's
Workers' Compensation laws but suggested an amendment to the
bill to allow other health care professionals, not just
medical doctors, to render impairment ratings. The
Association's representative recognized that the bill as
written allowed only medical doctors to render impairment
ratings and therefore suggested an amendment that would, for
example, replace "physician" with "primary health care
provider" and define "medical evidence" as "the testimony of
a physician or other licensed practitioner of one of the
healing arts." Senate Business and Labor Committee, Exhibit
5 (March 9, 1987).
The legislators had these proposed amendments before
them but chose not to incorporate the suggested changes of
the Montana Chiropractor Association in the enacted version
of Senate Bill 315. The legislative history of this bill thus
further supports our conclusions that the word "medical" in
this instance refers only to licensed medical physicians.
The interpretation of 'medical1 as used in this statute does
not, as Weis argues, prevent injured claimants from seeking
treatment from a chiropractor, osteopath, or other licensed
practitioner engaged in the healing arts.
The second issue raised and argued on appeal is whether
the District Court erred in finding that the Division of
Vlorkers' Compensation properly exercised its rulemaking
authority when promulgating administrative rule 24.29.806,
A.R.M. (1986). This rule restricts medical evaluations of a
physical impairment to those who hold a doctor of medicine
(M.D.) degree and are licensed as a physician to practice
medicine in the state of Montana. When interpreting a
statute, this Court will give deference to the agency charged
with its interpretation, unless the interpretation produces
an absurd result. Montana Tavern Ass'n., 729 P . 2 d at 1316;
State - -
ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Midland Materials Co.
(1983), 204 Mont. 65, 70, 662 P. 2d 1322, 1325. As evident
from the foregoing discussion, the Division of Workers'
Compensation interpretation o f rule 24.29.806, A.R.M., is not
absurd. After consideration of the legislative intent and
the plain meaning o f the word "medical," w e hold that the
District Court did not err in finding that the Division of
Workers' Compensation properly enacted administrative rule
24.29.806.
A£ f irmed.
/