IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 38380
JOHN N. BACH, ) 2012 Opinion No. 2
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: January 6, 2012
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
WAYNE DAWSON, )
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Defendant-Appellant, )
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and )
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KATHERINE D. MILLER, aka )
KATHERINE M. MILLER, individually & )
dba R.E.M. and CACHE RANCH; ALVA A. )
HARRIS, individually & dba SCONA, INC., )
a sham entity; JACK LEE MC LEAN; BOB )
FITZGERALD, individually & dba CACHE )
RANCH; OLY OLESON; BOB BAGLEY & )
MAE BAGLEY, husband and wife; BLAKE )
LYLE, individually & dba GRANDE )
TOWING, and also GRANDE BODY & )
PAINT; GALEN WOELK & CODY )
RUNYAN, individually and dba RUNYAN & )
WOELK; ANN-TOY BROUGHTON; )
MARK LIPONIS; EARL HAMLIN; STAN )
NICKELL; BRET & DEENA R. HILL; )
DOES 1 through 30, inclusive, )
)
Defendants. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Teton County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge.
Renewal of judgment, affirmed.
Jared M. Harris of Baker & Harris, Blackfoot, for appellant.
John N. Bach, Driggs, pro se respondent.
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GUTIERREZ, Judge
Wayne Dawson appeals from the district court’s renewal of judgment, arguing that the
motion to renew judgment was outside of the five-year period allowed under Idaho law. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Beginning in 2002, John N. Bach, as sole plaintiff, was involved in a multi-party lawsuit
against several defendants, including Dawson. On February 23, 2004, the district court entered
an amended default judgment in favor of Bach and against Dawson. The district court did not
certify the partial judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as a final and appealable
order. It was only after other defaults and final dispositions had been made as to all the parties in
the lawsuit that the district court issued a final judgment, which incorporated the default
judgment entered against Dawson. This occurred on February 11, 2005.
On February 2, 2010, Bach filed a motion to renew the judgment entered on February 11,
2005, pursuant to Idaho Code sections 10-1110 and 10-1111. Dawson objected to the motion
and asked the district court to find that the motion to renew was untimely. Dawson argued that
because the default judgment against him was entered on February 23, 2004, Bach’s motion in
2010 occurred nearly six years later and well outside the five-year period available to renew
judgment under the statutes. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the
controlling judgment was the final judgment entered in 2005, not the interlocutory default
judgment entered in 2004. Dawson moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied.
Dawson timely appeals and asks this Court to hold that the default judgment entered in 2004 was
the controlling judgment for purposes of renewal under sections 10-1110 and 10-1111.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This case involves whether the district court applied the correct legal standards in regards
to the application of a statute. The interpretation of a statute and its application to particular facts
is a question over which this Court exercises free review. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd.
of Comm’rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). We must ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature, reading the statute as a whole. Id. Where the statutory
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language is clear, the plain meaning of a statute will prevail. Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho
879, 881, 231 P.3d 524, 526 (2009). If the statute is ambiguous, we construe it according to the
legislative intent, determined by looking not only at the literal words of the statute, but also the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the public policy behind the statute, and its
legislative history. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d
655, 658 (2006).
B. “Judgment” for purposes of renewal under Idaho Code sections 10-1110 and
10-1111
Idaho Code section 10-1110 provides that when a judgment is recorded with the county
recorder, from the time of that recording the judgment becomes a lien upon all real property of
the judgment debtor in that county. The “lien resulting from recording of a judgment . . .
continues five (5) years from the date of the judgment . . . .” I.C. § 10-1110 (emphasis added).
Idaho Code section 10-1111(1) allows a court to renew, upon a motion, an unsatisfied judgment
at any time prior to the expiration of the judgment lien created by section 10-1110. It further
provides: “The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same manner as the original
judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for five (5) years from the date of
judgment.” I.C. § 10-1111(1). In short, a civil judgment--whether or not a lien is actually
recorded--will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that expiration,
makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by the court. See Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho
800, 802, 964 P.2d 667, 669 (Ct. App. 1998) (section 10-1111 provides for renewal of
judgments, not just judgment liens).
Dawson argues that the “judgment” was the default judgment entered on February 23,
2004, and that it expired prior to Bach’s motion to renew. Bach argues to the contrary: he
asserts the “date of judgment” was February 11, 2005, when the district court entered the final
judgment in the multi-party dispute.
The term “judgment” is not defined in the statutes at issue, so we look to the definitions
of the term found in both Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) and Idaho case law. Rule 54(a)
defines a judgment as a separate document without conclusions of fact or law, but merely stating
the relief to which a party is entitled. It is a final judgment, according to that rule, if it is either
(1) entered as to all claims in the case or (2) if it is certified as final under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) as to some parties in a case, but not all of them. Similarly, our case law states
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that a “judgment” is a final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.
Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 867, 55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002); see also
Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 217, 159 P.3d 851, 854 (2007) (A final judgment is an “order
or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and
represents a final determination of the parties’ rights.”).
As a judgment must function by its character as a final determination of the parties’ rights
in a lawsuit, whether a document is a court order or a “judgment” has long been held to be
determined not by the document’s title, but by its contents. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable
Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 620, 226 P.3d 1263, 1267 (2010); Watson, 144 Idaho at 217, 159 P.3d
at 854; Camp, 137 Idaho at 867, 55 P.3d at 321. For example, in Watson, the trial court, within
the course of a single case, entered a 2003 “judgment,” which quieted title of property to the
parties as tenants in common, and a 2005 “judgment,” which entered an amount of damages in
favor of the defendant on a consolidated claim and resolved the entire dispute. Watson, 144
Idaho at 217, 159 P.3d at 854. The defendant/respondent on appeal made a jurisdictional
argument that the 2003 judgment was not timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded
that by its content, rather than title, the 2003 judgment did not finalize the rights and obligations
of the parties and was best characterized as an interlocutory judgment, requiring certification
pursuant to Rule 54(b) in order to be appealable and start the clock for time to appeal. Watson,
144 Idaho at 217, 159 P.3d at 854. As the 2003 judgment was not certified, the 2005 judgment,
which was in fact a final determination of the case, was timely appealed and the 2003 judgment
was deemed included within that appeal. Id. at 218, 159 P.3d at 855. For comparison, in Wilson
v. Bivins, 113 Idaho 865, 866, 749 P.2d 4, 5 (Ct. App. 1988), this Court held a default judgment,
entered as to one but not all of the defendants in a case, was not a final, appealable judgment.
Rather, we concluded the partial default judgment fell within the ambit of Rule 54(b) and unless
it was certified by the trial court to be final as provided by that rule, it was not appealable under
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. Wilson, 113 Idaho at 866, 749 P.2d at 5.
Accordingly, we conclude that default judgments, which only partially adjudicate the
controversy in a multi-party case, are not “judgments” for purposes of considering the time for
renewal under sections 10-1110 and 10-1111 because, by their nature, they are not final
determinations of the rights and obligation of all parties in the dispute. Though the cases noted
above speak in the context of an appeal, we find the practice of looking at whether an order is a
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final judgment for appeal purposes also serves the purpose of determining whether a judgment is
subject to renewal under sections 10-1110 and 10-1111. As these sections are akin to a statute of
limitations of an enforceable judgment, what constitutes a “judgment” should be based on a final,
appealable (and hence, enforceable) order in the case. That policy is aptly demonstrated by a
multi-party case such as this, where entries of default and amended default “judgments” have
occurred over the span of a few years, and confusion about when a particular party’s judgment
was entered could easily emerge. In the situation with multiple parties or claims, a “judgment”
on a default as to one party may occur by way of a Rule 54(b) certification, but where that does
not happen, a “judgment” for purposes of renewal is that order of the court which resolves the
issues in a case and ends the lawsuit. Any interlocutory judgments, as stated in Watson, are
thereby incorporated.
Accordingly, it is clear that Bach’s motion to renew was timely because it was filed
within five years after the entry of the final judgment on February 11, 2005. Although the
amended default judgment entered on February 23, 2004, resolved all disputes between Bach and
Dawson, and awarded damages to Bach, it did not include a certificate of final judgment under
Rule 54(b) and did not resolve all claims in the case. Instead, all claims as to all parties were
addressed and finalized in the final judgment entered on February 11, 2005. Notwithstanding the
title of the defaults entered as “judgments” throughout the case proceedings, it is apparent by the
contents of the final judgment that it was the final determination of the rights and obligations of
the parties in the case and, therefore, is the judgment subject to renewal.
III.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the district court applied the correct legal standards in regards to Idaho
Code sections 10-1110 and 10-1111 when granting Bach’s motion to renew the judgment and in
denying the motion to reconsider. Therefore, the renewal of judgment is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING CONCUR.
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