c NO. 91-608
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
JUDY LORENE WHIRRY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
HARRY FRANKLIN SWANSON,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead,
The Honorable Leif B. Erickson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
George B. Best, Attorney at Law, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Richard DeJana, Attorney at Law, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 30, 1992
Decided : August 24, 1992
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an Order of the Eleventh Judicial
District Court, Flathead County, granting defendant/respondentls
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissing the action with
prejudice. We affirm.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that res judicata
barred the action before it?
2. Did the District Court's application of res judicata
violate Whirryls right to due process?
ABC Collectors brought an action in justice court against
appellant Judy Whirry (Whirry) for payment of a medical debt owed
by Whirry. Whirry filed an answer in which she admitted receiving
the medical services and not paying for them. Whirry also filed a
third-party complaint against Harry Swanson (Swanson) alleging that
she incurred the medical debt as a result of injuries received in
an automobile accident in which Swanson was negligent; on that
basis, she asserted that Swanson was solely liable for any judgment
against her. Whirry subsequently moved for summary judgment
against Swanson on her third-party complaint. The court granted
summary judgment to Whirry.
Whirry then filed a complaint in District Court seeking
recovery for all damages she incurred through the negligent and
reckless misconduct of Swanson during the same accident. Swanson
filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Dismissal
claiming Whirry's District Court action was barred by her summary
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judgment i n j u s t i c e c o u r t . The D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d Swanson1s
motions and dismissed t h e matter w i t h prejudice on October 3 0 ,
1991, Whirry appealed.
D i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n concluding t h a t res j u d i c a t a b a r r e d
t h e action before i t ?
The ~ i s t r i c Court determined t h a t t h e f o u r c r i t e r i a n e c e s s a r y
t
f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of res j u d i c a t a were m e t and t h a t t h e j u s t i c e
c o u r t n e c e s s a r i l y determined Swanson's n e g l i g e n c e i n order t o
a s s i g n l i a b i l i t y f o r W h i r r y r s medical b i l l s . Whirry a r g u e s t h a t
none of t h e res judicata criteria were met and that t h e justice
c o u r t w a s n o t a c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n a s a l s o r e q u i r e d
for a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s j u d i c a t a . Her arguments are w i t h o u t m e r i t .
The p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s j u d i c a t a i s t h a t
a p a r t y i s p r o h i b i t e d from r e l i t i g a t i n g a m a t t e r t h a t t h e p a r t y h a s
a l r e a d y had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o l i t i g a t e . Higham v. C i t y of Red
Lodge (1991), 247 Mont. 400, 807 P.2d 195. Four s u b s t a n t i v e
c r i t e r i a f o r res j u d i c a t a must be met: t h e p a r t i e s o r t h e i r p r i v i e s
must be t h e same; t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of t h e a c t i o n must be t h e
same; t h e i s s u e s must be t h e same and r e l a t e t o t h e same s u b j e c t
matter; and t h e c a p a c i t i e s of t h e persons must be t h e same i n
r e f e r e n c e t o the s u b j e c t matter and t o t h e i s s u e s . F i l l e r v.
Richland County (lggl), 2 4 7 Mont. 285, 8 0 6 P.2d 537. Finally,
a l t h o u g h o f t e n l e f t u n s t a t e d , t h e c o u r t making t h e judgment must be
a c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n . Hughes v. S a l o (1983), 2 0 3
Mont. 5 2 , 659 P.2d 270, c i t i n g Southern P a c i f i c R . Co. v. United
S t a t e s (1897), 168 U . S . 1, 48-49, 18 S.Ct. 1 8 , 27, 4 2 L.Ed. 355,
377.
The four criteria required for res judicata are met here.
First, the parties are the same in both actions insofar as Whirry
filed against Swanson on both occasions. The fact that the justice
court action also involved another party is not relevant since
there is no requirement for perfect identity of all parties.
Second, the subject matter of both of Whirry's complaints against
Swanson is the same, namely, the accident caused by Swanson's
alleged negligence and Swanson's liability for Whirry's resulting
damages. The fourth required criterion is also satisfied: Whirry
was the tort plaintiff and Swanson the tort defendant in both
actions involving the parties and both acted in their individual
capacities.
The third res judicata criterion--whether the issues are the
same--is the key element here. In order to determine that the
criterion is met, the fundamental or essential question involved in
the second case must have been raised and determined in the first
case. Baertsch v. County of Lewis and Clark (1986), 223 Mont. 206,
727 P.2d 504.
In her justice court complaint against Swanson, Whirry claimed
that: (1) she and Swanson were involved in an automobile accident
in 1989; (2) the accident was caused by Swanson's negligence; (3)
the negligence caused her damage and injury; and (4) as a result,
Swanson was solely responsible for the medical services debt she
incurred as an outgrowth of the accident. The justice court
granted Whirry's motion for summary judgment on her claim against
Swanson.
Whirryls District Court complaint asserts that the same
accident occurred, that Swansongs negligence and recklessness
caused the accident, that she was injured, and that she incurred
medical expenses and other damage as a result. She prays for
compensation for all injuries, detriment and damage.
It is clear that the essential and fundamental issue in both
Whirry complaints against Swanson is Swansonls negligence in
causing the accident and Whirryvsinjuries. Determination of this
issue is dispositive in both actions. The issue of Swanson's
negligence having been raised and determined in Whirryls justice
court action, we conclude that the identity of issues required for
application of res judicata is met.
Whirry also argues that justice court was not a court of
competent jurisdiction for xes judicata purposes because it could
not grant her relief for the total damages she suffered as a result
of Swanson's negligence. She cites no authority for this position.
Therefore, we note only the general rule that:
[Wlhere a plaintiff who has a claim which in its entirety
exceeds in amount the courtls jurisdiction brings an
action and recovers judgment for an amount within the
courtlsjurisdiction, he is, by operation of the judgment
precluded from thereafter maintaining an action for the
balance of his claim, even though the court rendering the
former judgment had no authority to give a judgment upon
this balance.
Whirry ' s "court of competent juri~diction~~
argument is, in
reality, a fairness argument for which she relies on Boucher v.
Dramstad (D. Mont. l98l), 522 F. Supp. 604. Her reliance on Boucher
is misplaced.
Boucher originally involved an action under the Montana Tort
Claims Act. Following an unfavorable result on appeal based on a
somewhat technical rule of law addressed for the first time in that
case by this Court, Boucher filed a federal civil rights action
based on the same facts as his state court claim. The defendants
raised res judicata as a bar.
The federal district court noted a difference of opinion among
the Circuit Courts of Appeal on the question of whether res
judicata barred a 1983 action in federal courts where the
constitutional claims underlying the action could have been raised
in an earlier state court proceeding, but were not. Citing the
Ninth Circuit's rule that res judicata would bar Boucher's 5 1983
action, the federal district court nonetheless found that, on the
facts before it, application of the doctrine of res judicata would
result in manifest unfairness to the plaintiff. Boucher, 522
F.Supp. at 607. The court expressed its concern that res judicata
would result in plaintiff never having had an opportunity to have
his claim evaluated by a court.
Neither the facts nor the law in Boucher is applicable here.
Most importantly, Whirry has had an opportunity to have her claim
of negligence against Swanson evaluated; indeed, she prevailed on
that claim in justice court. Thus, even if "manifest unfairness"
were the test for application of res judicata by this Court, that
test would not be met here. In addition, it must be noted that the
Boucher court relied on federal cases, cases neither controlling
nor persuasive under the facts before us. We conclude that the
justice court was a court of competent jurisdiction for determining
Whirry's third-party claim against Swanson.
We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that
res judicata barred the action before it.
Did the District Court's application of res judicata violate
Whirry's right to due process?
Whirry argues that the District Court violated her right to
due process by denying her right to raise issues and litigate her
action, to prove liability, and to prove the extent of her damages.
Whirry relies on our conclusion in Boyer v. Kargacin (1982), 202
Mont. 54, 656 P.2d 197, that a grant of summary judgment to
plaintiff in that case foreclosed the opportunity for a hearing on
the merits of defendant's case and violated his right to due
process. Bover is inapposite here.
In Bover, the plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining
order against defendant who parked his car across the ingress to
plaintiff's business. The temporary order evolved into a
continuing restraining order. On appeal of that order, this Court
upheld the order but remanded with directions to expedite the trial
of the cause for damages. On remand, the district court granted
plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of defendant's liability
due to its misinterpretation of our instructions on remand; the
court believed that we had already resolved the issue of liability
in plaintiff's favor. On the second appeal, we reversed,
concluding that defendant had had no opportunity to be heard on the
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issue of liability and, therefore, that his right to due process
was violated.
In Bover, the issue of defendant's liability was never heard
or resolved on the merits at any stage. Here, plaintiff pleaded
Swanson's negligence in justice court and moved for and was granted
summary judgment on that basis.
Whirry is correct that she may have had a more extensive
recovery had she filed her action in the District Court in the
first instance. But she chose to file against Swanson in justice
court for the total amount of $470.80. The justice court
ultimately entered final judgment in Whirryls favor. To allow her
to file another action based on the same facts for additional
damages would permit her to relitigate her case. Due process does
not require such a result. We hold that the District Court's
application of res judicata did not violate Whirryls right to due
process.
Af finned.
We concur: /
chief Justice
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting.
I dissent. The pursuit of justice has always been a pursuit
of fairness within logical parameters. Today's decision instead
ignores this goal of jurisprudence and reflects inherent
unfairness. The majority opinion fails to recognize a crucial
factor in res judicata determination--that the previous judgment be
made on the merits. Instead, it subjects itself to the ease of a
deficient four-prong test with no concern for logic or fairness.
The majority simply states four requisite criterion for the binding
effect of res judicata and satisfies itself without a deeper
inspection of the larger issues of justice underlying the
plaintiff's claim. Most jurisdictions require that prior judgments
be on the merits.
Furthermore, this case was tried in Justice Court. Thus, with
no record before it, the District Court had no means of recognizing
exactly what was adjudicated on the merits. It could not have
known at all whether or not the case was tried on the merits. At
most, the District Court was presented with a general ruling from
below, not enough to substantiate a summary judgment ruling on res
judicata.
The majority's result deprives the plaintiff of a full and
fair adjudication of her rightful allegation against the defendant.
Its ruling today is facially insufficient to pretend to support
traditional notions of justice. I would reverse the District
Court's ruling and remand for a proper determination of the
plaintiff's claim.
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler dissenting.
I also dissent from the opinion of the majority. I concur
with Justice Hunt's conclusion that the majority decision is unfair
and does not serve the purposes for which the principle of resjudicata
was established. However, the majority opinion is also legally
incorrect.
The majority concedes that in order to prove that Whirry's
claim is barred by resjudicata Swanson had to establish, among other
things, that the issues adjudicated in the Justice Court were the
same issues that Whirry sought to adjudicate in the District Court.
Swanson also had to establish that the prior judgment came from a
court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, neither element was
proven.
Whirry's action in the Justice Court was solely for the
purpose of seeking indemnity for a medical bill from one of the
health care providers who had treated her. In the District Court,
she sought damages for the remainder of her medical expenses, loss
of wages and future earning capacity, pain and suffering, loss of
her established course of life, and punitive damages. These claims
all presented issues different from those which were litigated in
the Justice Court action. Additionally, there was no proof by the
defendant, nor any basis in the pleadings for establishing that the
Justice Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate these additional
claims had they been presented. Pursuant to 5 3-10-301(l) (c), MCA,
justice courts, at the time that this case was litigated, could not
consider claims based on injury to the person where the amount in
dispute exceeded $3500. In order to grant judgment on the
pleadings, it had to be plain from the pleadings that plaintiff's
claim did not exceed that amount in order to establish that the
Justice Court had jurisdiction to consider all the issues raised in
the District Court action.
The majority concludes that:
It is clear that the essential and fundamental issue
in both Whirry complaints against Swanson is Swanson's
negligence in causing the accident and Whirry's injuries.
Determination of this issue is dispositive in both
actions. The issue of Swanson's negligence having been
raised and determined in Whirry's justice court action,
we conclude that the identity of issues required for
application of res judicata is met.
The majority's conclusion confuses res judicata with collateral
estoppel. The fact that one issue (negligence) was resolved in the
previous action does not bar consideration of issues which were not
resolved in a subsequent action. It simply means that the
defendant is collaterally estopped from denying liability in the
second action. The fact that the issue of negligence was
previously raised and determined does not address the issue of
Whirry's damages and should not preclude her from raising those
issues in a court of competent jurisdiction.
I agree that the majority's conclusion is unfair. However, I
also conclude that it is legally and logically indefensible, and
therefore, dissent from the majority opinion.
August 24, 1992
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:
George B. Best
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 278
Kalispell, MT 59903
Richard DeJana
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1757
Kalispell, MT 59903-1757
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
S T A m O F MQNTANA
BY:
Depu