No. 92-382
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
ANNA RUTH SCOFFIELD,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
LINDSEY DENNIS SCOFFIELD,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Beaverhead,
The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Vincent J. Kozakiewicz, Attorney at Law,
Dillon, Montana
For Respondent:
John Warren, Schulz, Davis & Warren,
Dillon, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 1992
Decided: May 1 8 , 1 9 9 3
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Lindsey Scoffield appeals from a supplemental decree of
dissolution entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of
Montana, on March 20, 1992. Lindsey contends that the ~istrict
Court abused its discretion when it ordered him to assume all
marital debts, including debts incurred by his spouse on behalf of
her children from a prior marriage. Additionally, Lindsey asserts
that the court erred when it denied his request to modify the
allocation of proceeds f r o m the sale of the parties1 cattle. We
affirm.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
required appellant to assume all marital debts, including debts
incurred by respondent on behalf of her children from a prior
marriage?
2. Did the District Court err when it denied appellant Is
request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the
parties1 cattle?
Anna Ruth Scoffield, age 32, and Lindsey Dennis Scoffield,
age 31, were married in Abilene, Texas, on March 2, 1985. There
were no children born of this marriage, although Anna has two
children from a previous marriage.
On March 13, 1991, Anna filed a petition to have the parties1
marriage dissolved. A dissolution proceeding was held on May 16,
1991. At the proceeding, Lindsey expressly agreed to assume all
marital debts in exchange for the court's denial of maintenance and
attorney fees to Anna.
On July 1, 1991, the District Court entered its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution. The court
ordered the parties to equally divide their marital property.
Additionally, the court ordered ~indsey to assume and pay all
existing marital debts, and denied Anna's request for maintenance
and attorney fees. Finally, the court directed the parties to sell
the cattle they owned and to divide the proceeds equally.
In August 1991, the parties entered into an arrangement
concerning the cattle that differed from the July 1, 1991,
dissolution decree. Rather than sell the cattle and divide the
proceeds equally, as required by the decree, the parties agreed
that Lindsey would pay Anna $4600 for her interest in the cattle.
Lindsey paid Anna $3000 in cash, and delivered a $1600 promissory
note, due on April 1, 1992. On January 10, 1992, Lindsey sold the
cattle to a third party; however, he did not recover the amount per
head that he anticipated.
During the year following the July 1, 1991, decree, Lindsey
refused to pay the majority of the parties existing marital debts.
Anna responded by moving that the District Court find Lindsey in
contempt. On March 6, 1992, the court held a hearing on the
contempt motion. Duringthe hearing, Lindsey made two arguments to
the District Court concerning the marital property division.
First, Lindsey acknowledged that he agreed to assume the
marital debts; however, he asserted that he should not have to pay
the debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from her
previous marriage because they were not marital debts.
Second, Lindsey requested the court to modify the allocation
of the cattle proceeds in light of the actual sale price of the
cattle. He reminded the court that the dissolution decree required
an equal division of cattle proceeds; and he explained to the court
that as a result of a contract concerning the cattle that he made
with Anna subsequent to the decree, he received less than 50
percent of the cattle proceeds.
On March 20, 1992, the District Court amended and supplemented
the July 1, 1991, dissolution decree. In the supplemental decree,
the court entered a judgment against Lindsey far $1019.16, which
represented the amount of marital debts. The court specifically
listed the accounts Lindsey was obligated to assume and limited
those accounts to debts incurred as of May 16, 1991, the date of
the parties1 dissolution proceeding. These accounts included debts
incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from a prior marriage.
The court stayed the execution of the judgment upon the condition
that Lindsey pay to Anna monthly installments until the judgment of
$1019.16 is paid in full.
In the March 20, 1992, order, the court also denied Lindsey's
request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the
cattle. The court concluded that the parties were bound by their
own agreement regarding the value of the cattle. ~ i n d s e yappeals
from the March 20, 1992, order.
On appeal, Lindsey contends that (1) the court abused its
discretion when it required Lindsey to assume responsibility for
debts incurred by Anna on behalf of h e r children from a prior
marriage; and (2) the court erred when it refused to modify the
allocation of proceeds, in light of the actual sales price of the
cattle.
I
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it required
appellant to assume all marital debts, including debts incurred by
respondent on behalf of her children from a prior marriage?
Lindsey acknowledges on appeal that he expressly agreed to
assume all marital debts; however, he contends that the District
Court abused its discretion when it required him to assume the
debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from a prior
marriage. Lindsey asserts that d e b t s i n c u r r e d on behalf of a
spouse's children from a previous marriage are not marital debts.
Because Lindsey expressly agreed to assume Ifallof the marital
debts" in exchange for the court's denial of maintenance and
attorney fees to Anna, our analysis need not focus on whether
Lindsey is statutorily and/or legally obligated to assume the debts
incurred by his spouse on behalf of her children from a prior
marriage. Nor is it necessary to ascertain for whose benefit those
debts were incurred. For purposes of this appeal, we limit our
analysis to whether the debts at issue are "marital debts." If
they are, then Lindsey is obligated by his own agreement to pay for
them.
The Montana Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 5 40-1-101 to 40-4-225,
MCA, neither defines nor refers to the term "marital debt."
Moreover, few Montana cases, if any, specifically define "marital
debt." Yet a definition of "marital debt" is essential in a
dissolution proceeding because in order for trial courts to
"equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets,"
as courts are statutorily required to do by 5 40-4-202, MCA, courts
must first ascertain the partiest assets and liabilities prior to
apportionment. In reMarriageofDimberger (1989), 237 Mont 398, 401, 773
P.2d 330, 332. Courts must know the definitional parameters of the
term "marital debtB1 that courts can make fair marital property
so
divisions. Only by knowing what to include as "marital debt,"
before balancing a partiest assets and liabilities, can a court
make a fair marital property apportionment.
Montana is not alone in its lack of a definition for vlmarital
debt. " Other states have acknowledged that the term "marital debt"
is not defined in their state code or in court opinions, although
the word appears regularly in dissolution documents. The Missouri
Court of Appeals explains in the case In re Marriage of Welch (Mo. App.
In the debt oriented society now prevailing, the term
"marital debts" is found in nearly every dissolution case
filed. The term is found in the pleadings, separation
agreements, court orders and judgments, and in the
appellate court decisions. Yet, the term "marital debt"
never appears in the d dissolution of Marriage Act,"
5 452.300, et seq., and certainly is never defined.
Although the Missouri Revised Statutes do not define the term
"marital debt,It they do define its converse, "marital property.
In Welch, the Missouri Court of Appeals relied on the statutory
definition of "marital propertyu as a helpful starting point for
defining "marital debt." According to the Court of Appeals,
" '[m]arital property is 'all property acquired by either spouse
subsequent to the mam'age . . . . I 11 Welch, 795 s.w.2d at 643
(interpreting Missouri Revised Statutes, S 452.330.2). The Court
of Appeals held that "it follows, therefore, that 'marital debt' is
ordinarily 'debt incurred subsequent to the marriage.l8* Welch, 795
S.W.2d at 643.
Although Montana's statutory definition of marital property is
broader than Missouri's, it also includes property acquired by
either party during the marriage. See 5 40-4-202, MCA. Since the
definition for marital property in Montana includes all property
acquired by either party during the marriage, it follows,
therefore, that "marital debtu may be defined as all debt incurred
by either party during the marriage.
The disputed debts in this case were medical debts incurred on
behalf of Anna's children. They were incurred while Lindsey and
Anna were married. Specifically, they were incurred during 1990
and in the spring of 1991, which was subsequent to the date of Anna
and ~ i n d s e 'ys marriage on March 2, 1985, and prior to May '16, 1992,
the date of the parties1 marriage dissolution. Pursuant to our
definition that marital debt is all debt incurred by either party
during the marriage, we conclude that the medical debts incurred by
Anna on behalf of her children during the course of the partiest
marriage are marital debts.
Because Lindsey expressly agreed to assume all marital debts,
and the court accepted Lindseyf promise in exchange for the denial
s
of maintenance and attorney fees to Anna, Lindsey is obligated to
pay for a11 marital debts, including the debts incurred by Anna on
behalf of her children from a prior marriage.
When reviewing a division of marital property case, the
standard of review employed by this Court is whether the lower
court abused its discretion when it fashioned the marital property
distribution, InreMarriageofDanelson (1992), 253 Mont. 310, 317, 833
P.2d 215, 220. The lower court is obligated to seek a fair marital
property division using reasonable judgment and common sense.
Danehon, 833 P . 2d at 220. When a District Court judgment is based
upon substantial credible evidence, this Court will not alter that
judgment unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Dimbe~er
(19891, 773 P.2d at 332.
We conclude that the lower court exercised reasonable judgment
when it balanced the economic consequences of Lindsey's assumption
of all marital debts against the economic burden of maintenance and
attorney fees. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion when it ordered Lindsey to assume all marital debts.
I1
Did the District Court err when it denied appellant's request
to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the partiesf
cattle?
Lindsey asserts that as a result of the actual sales price of
the cattle, he received less than 50 percent of the cattle
proceeds; and t h a t this r e s u l t was in contravention of t h e c o u r t ' s
order to equally divide the proceeds. On appeal, Lindsey contends
that the District Court erred when it denied his request to modify
the allocation of cattle proceeds. Contrary to Lindsey's
assertion, we find no abuse of court discretion.
Lindsey relies on I re Mamizge o Berthiaume (1977), 173 Mont
n f . 421,
567 P.2d 1388. In Berthiaume, we held that a trial court abuses its
discretion when it makes a finding that property should be divided
equally and then subsequently makes a disparate award. However,
unlike the situation in Berthiaume, where the court acted in
contravention of its findings, the District Court in the present
case did not act contrary to its finding that the parties should
divide the cattle proceeds equally, The court ordered the parties
to sell the cattle and equally divide the proceeds. It was Lindsey
and Anna who devised their own means for accomplishing their
obligation to sell and equally divide the cattle proceeds.
P a r t i e s are free to contract with one another, and ~indseyand
Anna entered into a valid contract regarding the cattle. When
Lindsey requested the lower court to modify the allocation of
cattle proceeds in light of the actual sales price of the cattle,
he was, in effect, asking the court to invalidate the parties1
contract. This Court has held that a party to an agreement which
has been performed for some length of time is estopped to deny its
validity. Iiz re Mam'age o Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 727 P.2d 512.
f
Therefore, we conclude that the lower court did not err when it
bound the parties to their own agreement and refused to modify the
allocation of proceeds.
Lindsey and Anna satisfied their obligation under the decree
to sell the cattle and equally divide the proceeds when they agreed
to have Lindsey buy out Anna's interest before selling the cattle
to a third party. The fact that Lindsey paid Anna for more than 50
percent of the actual value of the cattle was a result of his own
agreement with his wife, not the court's decree. Therefore, we
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when
it refused to amend the allocation of cattle proceeds. We affirm
the District Court decision.
We concur: