No. 95-024
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
JAMES EDWARD CHANCE, III,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CAROL THOMAS HARRISON and the
MONTANA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Samuel M. Warren, St. Peter & Warren, P.C.,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
Rex Palmer, Attorneys, Inc., P.C., Missoula,
Montana
Paulette Kohman, Montana Human Rights Commission,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 26, 1995
Decided: July 17, 1995
Filed:
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
James Edward Chance, III (Chance), appeals the decision of the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, denying his motion
for summary judgment. We affirm.
The sole issue on review is whether the District Court erred
in denying Chance's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the statute of limitations was equitably tolled.
Carol Thomas Harrison (Harrison) went to work for Chance in
September 1986. Harrison groomed and trained Chance's horses and
maintained and cleaned his barn. Harrison terminated her employ-
ment with Chance on March 17, 1987, following several alleged
incidents of sexual harassment.
On September 28, 1987, Harrison filed a civil suit in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, alleging various
torts against Chance. On October 18, 1989, the District Court
dismissed Harrison's claim. The court determined that all
allegations set forth in her complaint stemmed from the alleged
sexual harassment by Chance. The court went on to conclude that,
pursuant to § 49-2-509, MCA, a claimant alleging sexual harassment
must exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the Montana
Human Rights Commission. Because Harrison had not pursued her
administrative remedies with the Human Rights Commission, the
District Court dismissed her claim without prejudice.
Harrison appealed the District Court's decision to this Court.
In affirming the District Court, we concluded that 5 49-2-509, MCA,
provided Harrison's exclusive remedy. Harrison v. Chance (1990),
244 Mont. 215, 797 P.2d 200 (Harrison I). We noted, in dicta, that
due to the enactment of an amendment to § 49-2-509, MCA, between
the time Harrison terminated her employment with Chance and the
filing of her complaint in District Court, the 180-day statute of
limitation for filing a claim with the Human Rights Commission may
be equitably tolled. Harrison I, 797 P.2d at 208.
Harrison filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission on
December 20, 1990. The hearing examiner determined that, while
more than 180 days had elapsed since Harrison's discharge, the
statute of limitations was equitably tolled. The hearing examiner
relied on this Court's dicta in Harrison I in tolling the statute
of limitations.
Following a hearing, the hearing examiner held in favor of
Harrison, awarding over $43,000 in lost wages and other damages.
Chance appealed the decision of the Human Rights Commission to the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, arguing that
Harrison's claim was not timely filed and that the 180-day statute
of limitations should not have been equitably tolled. Chance moved
for summary judgment on these grounds. The court denied Chance's
motion for summary judgment, upholding the decision of the Human
Rights Commission. Chance appeals the denial of his motion for
summary judgment.
Did the District Court err in denying Chance's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations was
equitably tolled?
We review a district court's denial of a summary judgment
motion de nova. Summary judgment is proper only when there exists
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Minnie v.
City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 849 P.2d 212.
Chance argues that Harrison's claim with the Human Rights
Commission should have been time-barred because she did not file
her complaint within the 180-day statute of limitation. We
disagree.
On March 17, 1987, the date of Harrison's termination, an
appeal to the Human Rights Commission was not Harrison's exclusive
remedy. Pursuant to our decision in Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply
Company, Inc. (1987), 225 Mont. 380, 732 P.2d 1335, an individual
alleging sexual harassment could initiate proceedings directly in
the district court without first filing a complaint with the Human
Rights Commission. In Drinkwalter we stated:
If we were to decide the Human Rights Act provides the
sole and exclusive remedy for all claims arising out of
sexual harassment, we would also be imposing the 180 day
statute of limitation found in § 49-2-501(2), MCA, on
every possible remedy. We therefore find the
imposition of the 180 day statute of limitations to be
further proof of the legislature's intent that the Human
Riqhts Act not be the sole remedv for acts which also
qive rise to a cause of action independent of the
statute.
Drinkwalter, 732 P.2d at 1339 (emphasis added).
However, on April 16, 1987, after Harrison's termination but
prior to the filing of her initial complaint in District Court, a
legislative amendment of § 49-2-509, MCA, went into effect. The
amendment added the following provision to § 49-2-509, MCA:
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(7) The provisions of this chapter establish the
exclusive remedy for acts constituting an alleged
violation of this chapter, including acts that may
otherwise also constitute a violation of the discrimina-
tion provisions of Article II, section 4, of the Montana
constitution or 49-l-102. No other claim or request for
relief based upon such acts may be entertained by a
district court other than by the procedures specified in
this chapter.
This amendment effectively overruled this Court's decision in
Drinkwalter and mandated that the Human Rights Act was the sole and
exclusive remedy for a sexual harassment cause of action.
Harrison proceeded with her case in District Court. The
District Court dismissed her cause of action based on the amended
language of 5 49-z-509, MCA, set forth above. In affirming the
District Court's decision, we noted that Harrison might still be
able to instigate an action with the Human Rights Commission
despite the clear elapse of 180 days since the time of her
discharge. We stated:
In Erickson v. Croft (1988), 233 Mont. 146, 760 P.2d
706, this Court looked favorably upon the doctrine of
equitable tolling. Under that doctrine, the statute of
limitations may be tolled when a party reasonably and in
good faith pursues one of several possible legal remedies
and the claimant meets three criteria:
"(1) timely notice to the defendant within the
applicable statute of limitations in filing the
first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant in
gathering evidence to defend against the second
claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by
the plaintiff in fiiing the second claim."
Erickson, 233 Mont. at 150-51, 760 P.2d at 708. In
Erickson, we found no need to adopt equitable tolling
because the appellant failed to meet the first criteria;
the first claim did not give adequate notice of the
second claim. Erickson, 233 Mont. at 152, 760 P.2d at
709.
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Under the facts of this case, the doctrine of
equitable tolling may be appropriate if Harrison refiles
her claim with the Human Rights Commission. Unlike
Erickson, here the District Court claim may give Chance
adequate notice of a claim before the Commission.
Furthermore, in filing with the District Court, the
appellant appears to have relied reasonably and in good
faith upon this Court's holding in Drinkwalter. As a
case of first impression holding that the legislature
overruled Drinkwalter, this case should not prevent the
appellant from having her substantive claims heard by the
Human Rights Commission.
Harrison I, 797 P.2d at 208.
First, we note that at the time of the alleged torts, Harrison
had two legal remedies. Pursuant to our decision in Drinkwalter,
Harrison was entitled to file her claim in District Court or pursue
her administrative remedies with the Human Rights Commission.
Unlike our recent decision in Hash v. U.S. West (1994), 268 Mont.
326, 886 P.2d 442, Harrison reasonably and in good faith pursued
one of two potential legal remedies. We declined to apply the
doctrine of equitable tolling in Hash because at the time of Hash's
claim, the legislature had already amended 5 49-z-509, MCA, and
this Court had handed down its decision in Harrison I in which we
determined that the amended language of § 49-Z-509(7), MCA,
precluded bringing sexual harassment claims in district court.
Hash, 886 P.2d at 446. Therefore, Hash had only one legal remedy,
that being to file her claim with the Human Rights Commission.
Hash is thus clearly distinguishable from this case.
Harrison relied reasonably and in good faith on this Court's
holding in Drinkwalter. A review of our decision in Harrison I
reveals Harrison reasonably believed that the amended version of
§ 49-2-509, MCA, either was inapplicable to her claims or, if
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applicable, would not apply because the alleged torts occurred
before the effective date of the statute.
Harrison filed her initial claim within the applicable statute
of limitation. The final tort allegedly occurred on March 17,
1987, the day Harrison terminated her employment with Chance.
Harrison filed her complaint in District Court on September 28,
1987. Such a filing was weil within the applicable three-year tort
statute of limitations. Section 27-2-204, MCA. Chance argues
that, under Erickson v. Croft (1988), 233 Mont. 146, 760 P.2d 706,
Harrison had a duty to file her complaint within 180 days, the
statute of limitations applicable for a Human Rights Commission
claim.
Even if such an interpretation of Erickson is correct, we
conclude that Harrison satisfied the X8@-day filing requirement.
Prior to the amendments to § 49-z-509, MCA, Harrison was entitled
to file her complaint in District Court. Only after 5 49-2-509,
MCA, was amended was Harrison required to file with the Human
Rights Commission. The amendment to § 49-2-509, MCA, went into
effect on April 16, 1987. The 180-day statute of limitations
therefore commenced running on the effective date of the statute,
not on March 17, 1987. Harrison filed her initial claim in
District Court within 180 days of the April 16 effective date of
the amendment. Harrison therefore satisfied the Human Rights
Commission statute of limitation as well as the tort statute of
limitation.
A review of the record reveals that Chance was not prejudiced
in gathering evidence to defend against the claim filed with the
Human Rights Commission. Extensive discovery took place in
conjunction with Harrison's initial complaint filed in District
Court. Chance submitted depositions to the hearing examiner and
testified telephonically at the hearing. The record does not
support Chance's allegations that he was prejudiced by Harrison's
delayed filing with the Human Rights Commission.
Finally, it is clear to this Court that Harrison acted in good
faith in filing her claim with the Human Rights Commission.
Harrison justifiably relied on this Court's holding in Drinkwalter
in pursuing her District Court claim. After we determined that her
claim was subject to the amended version of 5 49-Z-509, MCA,
Harrison promptly filed her claim with the Human Rights Commission.
Harrison demonstrated reasonable conduct and good faith throughout
these proceedings.
We conclude that equitable tolling is applicable to the facts
and circumstances of this case and that Harrison has satisfied the
elements necessary to invoke equitable tolling as discussed in
Erickson. We therefore hold that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and Harrison is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. We affirm the decision of the District Court.
/
~/Justice
Chief
-LNe--
We concur:
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