NO. 95-524
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Stillwater,
The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Donald W. Molloy; Molloy Law Offices,
Billings, Montana
Adele P. Kimmel; Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondents:
Jeanne M. Bender, Patricia D. Peter-man;
Holland & Hart, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 25, 1996
Decided: July 24, 1996
Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of Court
Dan Kleinhesselink (Kleinhesselink) appeals from an order of
the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Stillwater County,
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. We reverse and remand.
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in
dismissing Kleinhesselink's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6),
M.R.Civ.P., on the basis that the exclusivity clause of the
Workers' Compensation Act bars his claims.
Kleinhesselink was employed by the Stillwater Mining Company
at the Stillwater Mine near Nye, Montana. He held various safety
positions, including Safety Coordinator. Kleinhesselink alleges
that, during his employment, employees of the Stillwater Mining
Company negligently disregarded safety and that such disregard
resulted in deaths and injuries at the mine. According to
Kleinhesselink, those deaths and injuries could have been avoided
if his safety recommendations had been followed.
Kleinhesselink further alleges that, due to the deaths and
injuries at the mine, he experienced guilt and suffered from
depression, chronic fatigue, insomnia, nausea, headaches, muscle
spasms and digestive problems. His request for Workers'
Compensation benefits was denied.
Kleinhesselink subsequently filed a complaint alleging two
counts of negligence against Chevron U.S.A., the Pittsburg &Midway
Coal Mining Company, Manville Mining and the Stillwater Mining
Company. All four defendants ultimately moved to dismiss
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Kleinhesselink's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Hereafter, we refer to the defendants
collectively as Chevron and consider the separate motions to
dismiss as one motion.
Chevron based its motion to dismiss solely on the exclusivity
clause of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), § 39-71-411,
MCA, arguing that "Montana law clearly holds that Kleinhesselink
cannot maintain negligence claims against his employer if his
employer has secured workers' compensation insurance." The
District Court agreed that the entirety of Kleinhesselink's
negligence action was barred by 5 39-71-411, MCA, and dismissed his
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Kleinhesselink appeals.
Did the District Court err in dismissing Kleinhesselink's
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), M.R.Civ.P., on the
basis that the exclusivity clause of the Workers'
Compensation Act bars his claims?
In reviewing a Rule 12(b) (6), M.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss,
courts are required to construe the complaint in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye,
P.C. (1995), 273 Mont. 506, 509, 905 P.2d 158, 160. Such a motion
has the effect of admitting as true all of the well-pleaded
allegations of fact in the complaint. Mogan v. City of Harlem
(1987), 227 Mont. 435, 437, 739 P.2d 491, 493. A complaint should
not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) (61, M.R.Civ.P., unless it
appears certain that the plaintiff will be unable to recover under
any set of facts which could be proven in support of his claim.
Moqan, 739 P.2d at 492-93. Rule 12(b) (6), M.R.Civ.P., motions to
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dismiss are viewed with disfavor and a complaint should be
dismissed only if the allegations in the complaint clearly
demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. Buttrell v.
McBride Land & Livestock (1976), 170 Mont. 296, 298, 553 P.Zd 407,
408 (quoting Wheeler v. Moe (1973), 163 Mont. 154, 160, 515 P.2d
679, 683).
In granting Chevron's motion, the District Court correctly
noted that "purely mental or emotional injuries" are not
compensable under the Act. & § 39-71-119(3), MCA; Stratemeyer v.
Lincoln County (1993), 259 Mont. 147, 855 P.2d 506 (Stratemever I).
It then concluded that "[t]he exclusivity clause [set forth at §
39-71-411, MCA] provides an employer is not liable for a covered
employment unless held liable under the Act." On those bases, the
court concluded that Kleinhesselink could neither recover under the
Act nor sue in tort and dismissed his complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The District Court's determination that Kleinhesselink's
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted as a result of the Act's exclusivity provision is a
conclusion of law. Loney,
See 905 P.2d at 161. We review a
district court's conclusion of law to determine if the
interpretation of the law is correct. Lonev, 905 P.2d at 161
(citation omitted).
Section 39-71-411, MCA, provides in pertinent part:
For all employments covered under the Workers'
Compensation Act or for which an election has been made
for coverage under this chapter, the provisions of this
chapter are exclusive. Except as provided in part 5 of
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this chapter for uninsured employers and except as
otherwise provided in the Workers' Compensation Act, an
employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the
death of or personal injury to an employee covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act or for any claims for
contribution or indemnity asserted by a third person from
whom damages are sought on account of such injuries or
death.
Approximately five months after the District Court dismissed
Kleinhesselink's complaint and Kleinhesselink filed his notice of
appeal, we decided Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (Mont. 1996), 915
P.2d 175, 53 St.Rep. 245 (Stratemever II), wherein we interpreted
the foregoing statute in the context of injuries excluded from
coverage under the Act. We give retroactive effect to judicial
decisions. Porter v. Galarneau (Mont. 1996), 911 P.2d 1143, 1150,
53 St.Rep. 99, 103. Therefore, Stratemever II is applicable to
this case even though it was not available to the District Court in
addressing Chevron's motion to dismiss Kleinhesselink's complaint.
The plaintiff in Stratemever II sued his employer in tort for
a mental injury excluded from coverage under the Act. See § 39-71-
119(3) (a), MCA; Stratemever II, 915 P.2d at 177. The district
court dismissed his complaint based, in part, on the exclusivity
provision of the Act, § 39-71-411, MCA. Stratemever II, 915 P.2d
at 176.
On appeal, we reviewed the history of the Act, emphasizing
that it was a compromise between industry and labor pursuant to
which workers received guaranteed no-fault recovery and industry
was relieved of the possibility of large damage awards in the tort
system. Stratemever II, 915 P.2d at 179 (citation omitted).
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The quid pro quo between employers and employees is
central to the Act; thus, it is axiomatic that there must
be some possibility of recovery by the employee for the
compromise to hold. The scope of immunity from tort
[liability] relates to the definition of injury under §
39-71-119, MCA.
Stratemever II, 915 P.2d at 179. Thus, injuries expressly excluded
from coverage under the Act by § 39-71-119, MCA, are also excluded
from the shield against tort liability provided to employers by the
exclusivity clause in § 39-71-411, MCA. See Stratemever II, 915
P.2d at 181. Because the plaintiff's ttmental-mentaltt injury was
excluded from coverage by 5 39-71-119(3) (a), MCA, we concluded that
the plaintiff was entitled to sue his employer in tort.
Stratemever II, 915 P.2d at 182.
We note that the plaintiff's alleged injuries in Stratemever
u and Kleinhesselink's alleged injuries in this case are not
identical. In Stratemever II, the plaintiff suffered a "mental-
mental" injury which, in statutory terms, is a mental injury
arising from emotional or mental stress. & Stratemever II, 915
P.2d at 180; § 39-71-119(3) (a), MCA. Here, Kleinhesselink alleges
both llmental-mental" and "mental-physical" injuries; in other
words, Kleinhesselink alleges mental, emotional and physical
injuries arising from emotional or mental stress caused by deaths
and injuries at the mine.
Section 39-71-119 (3) (a), MCA, excludes both physical and
mental conditions arising from emotional or mental stress from
coverage under the Act. Thus, Kleinhesselink is clearly precluded
from recovery under the Act for his alleged injuries. As a result,
our holding in Stratemever II that tort remedies are available to
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an employee whose injuries are excluded from coverage under the Act
pursuant to § 39-71-119, MCA, is equally applicable here. See
Stratemever II, 915 P.2d at 181-82. Accordingly, we hold that the
District Court erred in concluding that the Act's exclusive remedy
provision barred Kleinhesselink's negligence action in its entirety
and in dismissing his complaint under Rule 12(b) (6), M.R.Civ.P., on
that basis.
Reversed and remanded.
We concur.
Chief Justice
Justices
Justice Charles E. Erdmann dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion consistent
with my dissent in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (Mont. 1996), 915
P.2d 175, 53 St. Rep. 245.
Justice
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage joins in the foregoing dissenting
opinion.
Chief Justice