97-151
No. 97-151
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
BALYEAT LAW, P.C., as Trustee,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
LINDA JO HATCH,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Teton,
The Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Regan Whitworth; Balyeat Law Offices, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
John M. Morrison; Meloy & Morrison, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997
Decided: July 23, 1997
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant Balyeat Law (Balyeat) appeals from the order of the Ninth Judicial
District Court, Teton County, granting respondent Linda Jo Hatch (Hatch) summary
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judgment on the basis of res judicata. We affirm.
We address the following issue on appeal:
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment on the basis of res
judicata and dismissing Balyeat's complaint for collection of a debt when Balyeat had
previously brought an action against Hatch for collection of a debt arising from the
same
incident?
Factual and Procedural History
Linda Jo Hatch and her son Carson Hatch were injured in a car accident and were
subsequently treated at Community Medical Center of Missoula (CMC) periodically
between November 10, 1992 and February 4, 1994. On June 13, 1994, Balyeat filed a
complaint as trustee for CMC in Missoula Justice Court against Hatch for a debt for
services rendered by CMC to Hatch and her son in the amount of $2,400. Default
judgment was entered and Hatch paid the debt in full.
On July 28, 1995, Balyeat filed a second complaint against Hatch in Teton
County.
Balyeat asked for judgment in the amount of $3,612 for goods and services provided to
the Hatches by CMC during the same period of time in which CMC provided the services
which were the subject of the first debt collection action. The Justice Court
granted
Hatch summary judgment and dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata. The
parties stipulated to a de novo review by the Ninth Judicial District Court which
likewise
dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata. Balyeat appeals from that
judgment.
Discussion
The standard of review of a summary judgment ruling is de novo. Motaire v.
Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d
154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. When
we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as
applied by the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone
County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In Bruner, we set forth our
inquiry:
The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving
party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine
issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact do
not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations
made by a district court as to whether the court erred.
Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903 (citations omitted). In the instant case, the parties do
not
dispute any issues of material fact. Balyeat disputes only the District Court's
legal
determination that the final judgment in the Missoula County Justice Court matter is
res
judicata as to the second debt action.
The doctrine of res judicata bars issues and claims litigated in a former
action as
well as issues and claims which might have been litigated in the former action.
Mills v.
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Lincoln County (1993), 262 Mont. 283, 864 P.2d 1265. This Court has established that
the doctrine of res judicata bars a party from relitigating a matter that the party
has
already had the opportunity to litigate. " 'Once there has been a full opportunity
to
present an issue for judicial decision in a given proceeding . . . the determination
of the
court in that proceeding must be accorded finality as to all issues raised or which
fairly
could have been raised . . . .' " Mills, 864 P.2d at 1267 (citing First Bank v.
District
Court (1987), 226 Mont. 515, 519-20, 737 P.2d 1132, 1134-35).
A resolved claim will be res judicata as to subsequent claims if: (1) the
parties are
the same; (2) the subject matter is the same; (3) the issues are the same and relate
to the
same subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are the same in reference
to the
subject matter and issues. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C. (1995), 273
Mont. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, 161.
Balyeat argues that res judicata cannot bar its present debt collection action
because the subject matter is different from the initial debt collection action in
the
Missoula County Justice Court. It claims that because the first debt covered medical
services and the second debt covers mostly expert testimony costs and the debts had
different account numbers, that the subject matter in the two actions is different.
Balyeat relies on Berlin v. Boedecker (1994), 268 Mont. 444, 887 P.2d 1180, as
authority for the proposition that separate contracts do not present the same subject
matter. By analogy, Balyeat argues that debts with different account numbers do not
present the same subject matter. In Berlin, one lawsuit was brought by the Berlins
against Boedecker and his company for breach of contract, fraud and breach of
fiduciary
duties in connection with a contract for acquisition of certain oil and gas leases.
Berlin,
887 P.2d at 1184. Berlins brought a second lawsuit against Boedecker and his company
for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to reveal conflicts of interest in a
different
investment transaction. This Court held that the subject matter of the two
contracts was
not the same for the following reasons:
The contracts in the two actions were separate and the contracts' values
differed. The locations of the oil and gas interests in the contracts also
differed. Finally, the tortious conduct alleged by appellants in the present
action differed from that in the [first action], involving a different
fraudulent scheme.
Berlin, 887 P.2d at 1185.
We agree with Hatch that Berlin is distinguishable. In contrast to Berlin, the
first
and second actions brought by Balyeat both involve whether and to what extent Hatch
is
liable to Balyeat for services provided by CMC. The services in question were
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provided
in connection with one car accident. The services giving rise to both debt
collection
actions were rendered in the same time period and CMC was aware of the entire debt at
the time of the first action. For the above reasons, we hold that the subject
matter of the
two actions is the same.
The remaining requirements for res judicata have also been met. The parties in
this action are the same as the parties in the Missoula County Justice Court
action. The
issue in this matter, whether Hatch owes amounts claimed due, is the same as the
issue
in the previous action and, as we have said, relates to the same subject matter. The
capacities of the persons in this action are the same as the capacities of the
identical
persons in the previous action: Balyeat, as assignee\trustee for CMC, claims Hatch,
as
an individual, is indebted to it for medical services provided by its assignor to
Hatch.
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata bars not only subsequent litigation of
previously litigated subject matter and issues, but also litigation of subject
matters and
issues which could have been litigated in the prior proceeding. Loney, 905 P.2d at
161.
No evidence was presented showing that Balyeat lacked the opportunity to litigate
all
claims incurred by CMC during the period from November 10, 1992 to February 4,
1994, for services provided to the Hatches when Balyeat commenced its Missoula County
Justice Court action in June, 1994.
Accordingly, we conclude that Balyeat's second debt collection action is barred
by
res judicata. Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
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