96-466
Nos. 96-466 and 96-467
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL ADAIR ELLENBURG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County
of
Missoula, the Honorable John W. Larson, Judge Presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry G. Sehestedt, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Robert L. Deschamps III, County Attorney; Fred Van Valkenburg,
Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 4, 1997
Decided:June 11, 1997
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In proceedings before the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County,
Michael
Adair Ellenburg was convicted of two separate offenses of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense.
Ellenburg appeals from those convictions, raising issues reserved pursuant to 46-
12-
204(3), MCA. We affirm.
The issues are:
1. What is the effect of legislative silence concerning mental state in the
felony
provision of 61-8-714, MCA, on the status of DUI, fourth or subsequent offense, as
an absolute liability offense?
2. Does suspension of a driver's license pursuant to the implied consent law
followed by criminal prosecution arising from the same conduct violate the Double
Jeopardy clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions?
On January 12, 1996, Ellenburg was charged with four offenses said to have
occurred on December 30, 1995: DUI, driving after being declared a habitual traffic
offender, driving with a suspended or revoked license, and felony intimidation. On
March 4, 1996, he was separately charged with a DUI offense alleged to have occurred
on February 5, 1996.
Ellenburg moved to dismiss the January 12 charges on grounds including those
raised in this appeal. His motion was denied by written opinion and order. He
later pled
guilty to the first three offenses charged on January 12, reserving the right to
appeal the
two issues here presented pursuant to 46-12-204(3), MCA. In exchange for
Ellenburg's
plea, the State agreed to dismiss the intimidation charge and to recommend specific
sentences with respect to the other charges.
Ellenburg also pled guilty to the March 4 DUI charge, after having
unsuccessfully
moved for its dismissal. He reserved, however, the right to appeal the issue set
forth
here as Issue 1.
Following entry of judgments in both cases, Ellenburg filed notices of appeal.
Inasmuch as the same issues are raised, the appeals have been consolidated.
Standard of Review
The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of
law.
State v. Hansen (1995), 273 Mont. 321, 323, 903 P.2d 194, 195. Our standard of
review is plenary; we review the decision to determine whether the conclusion of law
is
correct. Hansen, 903 P.2d at 195.
Issue 1
What is the effect of legislative silence concerning mental state in the felony
provision of 61-8-714, MCA, on the status of DUI, fourth or subsequent offense, as
an absolute liability offense?
Section 61-8-714, MCA, sets forth the penalties for conviction of DUI.
Ellenburg
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was sentenced under subsection (4) thereof:
On the fourth or subsequent conviction, the person is guilty of a
felony offense and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less
than 1 year or more than 10 years and by a fine of not less than $1,000 or
more than $10,000. Except as provided in subsection (8), notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary providing for suspension of execution of a
sentence imposed under this subsection, the imposition or execution of the
first 6 months of the imprisonment sentence imposed for a fourth or
subsequent offense may not be suspended.
Section 61-8-714(4), MCA.
Citing the 45-2-104, MCA, requirement that absolute liability may only be
imposed for a felony offense if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose absolute liability, Ellenburg points out that while
61-8-
714(4), MCA, does not mention a required mental state, neither does it clearly
indicate
a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability. He argues that there is no
clearly-
indicated legislative intent to impose absolute liability for fourth or subsequent
conviction
of DUI, as is required under 45-2-104, MCA.
Ellenburg's argument is without merit. It fails to recognize that in the DUI
convictions here appealed, while Ellenburg was sentenced pursuant to 61-8-714(4),
MCA, the statute defining the offense is 61-8-401, MCA. That statute clearly
states,
and has since 1987, that "[a]bsolute liability as provided in 45-2-104 will be
imposed for
a violation of this section." Section 61-8-401(7), MCA.
Ellenburg contends that the absolute liability provision of 61-8-401(7), MCA,
applies only to misdemeanor DUI charges which existed at the time the absolute
liability
provision was adopted in 1987. The 61-8-714(4), MCA, felony penalty for fourth or
subsequent offense DUI was enacted as part of Ch. 447, L. 1995.
Section 61-8-401(7), MCA, does not, by its terms, limit absolute liability to
misdemeanor DUI offenses, and Ellenburg has not demonstrated any good reason to "read
in" such a limitation. Nor does Ellenburg contend that the lack of reference to
absolute
liability in the misdemeanor DUI penalty provisions of 61-8-714, MCA, prohibits
imposition of absolute liability for misdemeanor DUI offenses. We conclude that,
under
61-8-401(7), MCA, absolute liability is imposed for both felony and misdemeanor DUI
convictions.
In denying Ellenburg's motion to dismiss, the District Court referred to this
Court's opinion in State v. McDole (1987), 226 Mont. 169, 734 P.2d 683. On appeal,
Ellenburg argues that this Court erred in McDole in concluding that 45-2-104, MCA,
did not apply to the motor vehicle code in general and to DUI in particular.
However,
given the above statutory analysis, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize McDole.
Our
decision in this case is based on the language of the statutes themselves, not on
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McDole.
We hold that legislative silence concerning mental state in the felony
provision of
61-8-714, MCA, has no effect on the status of DUI, fourth or subsequent offense, as
an absolute liability offense pursuant to 61-8-401(7), MCA.
Issue 2
Does suspension of a driver's license pursuant to the implied consent law
followed
by criminal prosecution arising from the same conduct violate the Double Jeopardy
clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions?
When he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test in connection with the
incidents
which formed the basis of the January 12, 1996 charges against him, Ellenburg's
driver's
license was suspended pursuant to 61-8-402, MCA. He appealed to this Court. We
affirmed the suspension of Ellenburg's driver's license in Ellenburg v. Montana
Dept. of
Justice (Mont. 1996), 929 P.2d 861, 53 St.Rep. 1398.
Ellenburg claims that the license suspension and the subsequent DUI prosecution
violate the Double Jeopardy clauses of both the Montana and the United States
Constitutions. He argues that he has been prosecuted for two offenses arising out
of the
same transaction and that the "same elements" test from Blockburger v. United States
(1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306, applies in making the double
jeopardy determination.
This Court soundly rejected application of the Blockburger test to a similar
double
jeopardy claim in City of Helena v. Danichek (1996), 277 Mont. 461, 922 P.2d 1170.
Like Ellenburg, Danichek argued that constitutional protections against double
jeopardy
prohibited him from being criminally prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle under
the
influence of alcohol following suspension of his driver's license for refusing a
breathalyzer test. We denied Danichek's claim.
Danichek violated 61-8-402, MCA (1993), by refusing the police
officer's request to submit to a breathalyzer test. He violated 61-8-401,
MCA (1993), by driving a vehicle upon the public ways of the state while
under the influence of alcohol. The conduct that triggered the violation of
-402 was separate and distinct from the conduct that triggered the
violation of -401. Danichek exhibited two different courses of conduct
and committed two different offenses. Danichek's argument that the
implied consent law only becomes operative when a DUI violation occurs
is shortsighted. A person who violates -402 has his or her license
immediately suspended regardless of whether or not he or she is subse-
quently convicted of the DUI violation. The license suspension is imposed
for refusing the sobriety test and not for the DUI offense.
Danichek, 922 P.2d at 1174. Ellenburg acknowledges the Court's holding in Danichek,
but nonetheless asks the Court to revisit the issue and hold, in contravention of
that
opinion, that Blockburger is the correct analysis and that a double jeopardy
violation
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occurred here. We decline to do so. Danichek is this Court's official pronouncement
that suspension of a driver's license followed by a DUI prosecution does not violate
state
or federal constitutional provisions regarding double jeopardy.
Affirmed.
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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