96-344
No. 96-344
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
DANIEL OROZCO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
RICK DAY, Director off the Department of
Corrections and Human Services, MIKE
MAHONEY, Section Warden, MYRON BEESON,
Section Warden, CANDYCE NEUBAUER,
Classification Manager, DAVE LANNING,
Unit Manager, MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND HUMAN SERVICES, MONTANA
STATE PRISON.
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
In and for the County of Powell,
The Honorable Ted L. Mizner, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Daniel Orozco, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Respondents:
Lois Adams, David L. Ohler, Diana P. Leibinger,
Attorneys at Law, Department of Institutions,
Helena, Montana
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (1 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
Submitted on Briefs: October 10, 1996
Decided: March 10, 1997
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Daniel Orozco (Orozco), appearing pro se, appeals from the
opinion and order of the Third Judicial District Court, Powell
County, dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. We affirm in part, reverse in part
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the
Department of Corrections and the individual defendants are not
"persons" under 42 U.S.C. 1983?
2. Did the District Court err in concluding that the
individual defendants have qualified immunity?
Factual and Procedural Background
Orozco is an inmate at the Montana State Prison (MSP). On
March 26, 1995, Unit Manager Dave Lanning notified Orozco, via a
document entitled "Due Process Notifications," that an ongoing
investigation indicated that he was involved in a conspiracy to
traffic drugs within the MSP. The notice further stated that a
classification hearing would be held to address Orozco's custody
level and job assignment and that Orozco could present evidence on
his own behalf at the hearing. On the same day, Orozco was placed
in temporary lock-up in maximum security for investigation purposes
pursuant to MSP Policy No. 15-002.
Orozco was not provided with a hearing investigator to assist
in his defense at the classification hearing held on March 28,
1995. As a result of the hearing, Orozco was reclassified to
maximum security and was unable to continue earning thirteen days
per month good time credits.
Orozco subsequently filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights
action against Rick Day, Director of the Department of Corrections;
Mike Mahoney, Section Warden; Myron Beeson, Section Warden; Candyce
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (2 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
Neubauer, Classification Manager; Dave Lanning, Unit Manager for
Close Unit One; the Department of Corrections (Department); and the
MSP. Orozco requested a declaratory judgment that the defendants
had violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to assign
a hearing investigator to assist in his defense during the
classification hearing which could, and did, result in his
inability to continue to earn thirteen days per month good time
credits. He also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction
requiring the defendants to adequately train and supervise
personnel in established policy and discipline personnel for
failure to comply with such policy; to place him back in the
general prison population; and to credit him with thirteen days per
month good time which was lost due to his placement in maximum
security. Finally, Orozco requested an award of money damages
against each of the defendants.
The defendants moved to dismiss Orozco's complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The District Court held a hearing in
December of 1995 and, thereafter, granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss. Orozco appeals.
Additional facts are set forth below where necessary to our
resolution of the issues.
Standard of Review
The District Court dismissed the entirety of Orozco's
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. In evaluating a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts are required to construe a
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court
should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears that the
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts which
could be proved in support of the claims. Loney v. Milodragovich,
Dale & Dye, P.C. (1995), 273 Mont. 506, 509, 905 P.2d 158, 160.
The issues Orozco raises on appeal assert error in the
District Court's conclusions of law. We review a district court's
conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation
of the law is correct. Werre v. David (1996), 275 Mont. 376, 385,
913 P.2d 625, 631.
Discussion
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the
Department and the individual defendants are not
"persons" under 42 U.S.C. 1983?
Orozco based his claim against the Department and each
individual defendant on 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (3 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
In order to prevail on a 1983 claim, the plaintiff must
establish:
(1) a violation of rights protected by the [United
States] Constitution or created by federal statute, (2)
proximately caused (3) by conduct of a "person" (4)
acting under color of state law.
Crumpton v. Gates (9th Cir. 1991), 947 F.2d 1418, 1420.
The District Court concluded that the Department and the
individual defendants are not "persons" within the meaning of
1983. Orozco contends that the court erred.
Department of Corrections
The United States Supreme Court has held that municipalities
and local government units are among those "persons" to whom 42
U.S.C. 1983 applies. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Serv. (1978), 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d
611, 635. States and other governmental entities, on the other
hand, are considered "arms of the state" and, as a result, they are
not "persons" within the meaning of 1983. See Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police (1989), 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304,
2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 57. The exclusion of states and "arms of the
state" from the term "person" contained in 1983 is based on the
immunity from suit provided to states by the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
The Department is an entity within the executive branch of
government in the State of Montana (State). See 2-15-102(4) and
2-15-2301, MCA. Thus, it is a governmental entity which is
considered an "arm of the state" and not a "person" for 1983
purposes. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70.
Orozco argues that 2-9-305(2), MCA, required him to join the
Department in this action and, therefore, that the District Court
erred in concluding that it was not a proper 1983 defendant. The
Department did not respond to Orozco's argument but, in any event,
Orozco misreads the statute.
Section 2-9-305(2), MCA, requires governmental entity
employers to defend and indemnify employees sued for misconduct
committed in the course and scope of the employees' office or
employment, including employees against whom a 1983 action is
brought. It does not refer to, or require, joinder of a
governmental entity when an employee of that entity is sued. See
2-9-305(2), MCA. Although the heading of 2-9-305, MCA,
contains the language "Governmental entity to be joined as
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (4 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
defendant," nothing in the text of the statute relates to or
supports that portion of the heading. We have held that the text
of the statute takes precedence over the title in matters of
statutory interpretation. See ISC Distrib., Inc. v. Trevor (1995),
273 Mont. 185, 196, 903 P.2d 170, 177.
Orozco's contention that, under 2-9-305(2), MCA, the
Department was a proper party in his 1983 action is also without
merit. The statute addresses actions brought against employees; it
does not relate to the propriety or impropriety of suing
governmental entities, and the law is clear that 1983 does not
apply to arms of the state. See 2-9-305(2), MCA; Will, 491 U.S.
at 70.
We hold that the District Court correctly concluded that the
Department is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
1983.
Individual Defendants
State officials sued for money damages in their official
capacities also are not "persons" within the meaning of 1983,
because the suit is not a suit against the state officials, but is
a suit against the officials' offices. Therefore, an action for
money damages against a state official in his or her official
capacity is no different than a suit against the state itself.
Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
State officials are "persons" within the meaning of 1983,
however, if sued for money damages in their individual capacities
for actions taken under color of state law. See Trout v. Bennett
(1992), 252 Mont. 416, 425, 830 P.2d 81, 85-86 (following Hafer v.
Melo (1991), 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301). Orozco
argues on appeal that, because he sued the individual defendants in
their individual capacities, the District Court erred in concluding
that the individual defendants are not "persons" under 1983.
Generally, where state officials are sued for damages under
1983, it is presumed that the officials are sued in their
individual capacities. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, Idaho (9th Cir. 1994), 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (citation
omitted).
Any other construction would be illogical where the
complaint is silent as to capacity, since a claim for
damages against state officials in their official
capacities is plainly barred.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at 1284. In cases where the
complaint does not clearly specify whether state officials are sued
in their individual or official capacities, the course of the
proceedings will indicate the type of liability sought to be
imposed. Larez v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1991), 946 F.2d
630, 640 (citation omitted).
Here, Orozco's complaint does not clearly indicate in which
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (5 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
capacity he sued the individual defendants. The caption of the
complaint, in which the individual defendants' names are followed
by an identification of their positions within the Department or at
the MSP, suggests that Orozco sued them in their official
capacities. In addition, the complaint contains a section entitled
"DEFENDANT'S [sic]" which sets forth the name of each defendant and
his or her position, followed by a description of the defendant's
official duties.
On the other hand, Orozco's complaint also contains
indications that Orozco intended to sue the individual defendants
in their individual, rather than their official, capacities. For
example, the complaint asserts that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar actions against officials who, acting under color of state law,
deprive a plaintiff of constitutionally protected rights. This
assertion appears to reflect an awareness by Orozco that, while
Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state officials sued in
their official capacity (see Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71), it "provides
no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had
deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law"
(see Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974), 416 U.S. 232, 237, 94 S.Ct. 1683,
1687, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, 97).
Orozco's complaint also states that the individual defendants
are "not entitled to the protection of the good faith immunity."
Such a defense for the individuals named in Orozco's complaint only
becomes an issue, however, when they are sued in their individual
capacities, because personal immunity defenses may be asserted only
by officials sued in their personal, rather than their official,
capacities. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. Thus, the reference in
Orozco's complaint to personal immunity defenses suggests an intent
to sue the defendants in their individual capacities. Otherwise,
inclusion of such a reference would be meaningless.
Orozco's complaint further states that the defendants "acted
with malicious intent, outside [the] scope of their authority." In
this regard, Orozco's complaint is similar to those in Scheuer,
where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants acted
intentionally, recklessly, willfully and wantonly either under
color of state law or outside the scope of their authority. See
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 235. Faced with such allegations in the
context of a trial court's decision to dismiss the complaints at
the pleading stage, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrated that they were seeking to
impose individual liability on the named defendants. Scheuer, 416
U.S. at 238.
Orozco's complaint does not clearly and consistently establish
whether he is suing the individual defendants in their official or
individual capacities. We conclude, however, that a fair reading
of the complaint suggests an intent by Orozco to sue the individual
defendants in their individual capacities. We hold, therefore,
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (6 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
that the District Court erred in concluding at the pleading stage
of this case that the individual defendants were not "persons"
under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
2. Did the District Court err in concluding that the
individual defendants have qualified immunity?
The District Court also concluded that the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Orozco contends
that the court erred in this conclusion as well.
We recently discussed qualified immunity at length in Boreen
v. Christensen (Mont. 1996), 930 P.2d 67, 53 St.Rep. 1450.
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
discretionary functions from civil damages "'insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.'" Boreen, 930 P.2d at 70 (quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald
(1982), 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396). "Qualified
immunity 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.'" Boreen, 930 P.2d at 70 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant (1991),
502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 596).
Courts apply a two-pronged test in determining whether an
official is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the court must
determine whether a clearly established right has been violated;
and second, the court must determine whether a reasonable person or
official would have known that his or her conduct violated that
right. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press (1995), 271 Mont. 209,
216, 896 P.2d 411, 415 (citation omitted).
The threshold inquiry in applying the qualified immunity test,
therefore, is whether the constitutional right allegedly violated--
here, an alleged right to due process arising from a liberty
interest in accumulating good time credits--was clearly established
at the time of the conduct giving rise to the litigation. See
Boreen, 930 P.2d at 70. Relying on Remington v. Dep't of Corr. &
Human Serv. (1992), 255 Mont. 480, 844 P.2d 50, the District Court
concluded that Orozco did not have a liberty interest in good time
credits which implicated due process concerns.
In Remington, inmate Daniel Remington petitioned this Court
for habeas corpus relief, contending that the Department violated
his right to due process by denying him good time credits for
successfully completing correspondence courses. Remington, 844
P.2d at 52. We noted that, if a liberty interest in good time
credits exists, due process concerns arise in order "'to insure
that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.'"
Remington, 844 P.2d at 52 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell (1974), 418
U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951). In
determining whether a liberty interest existed, we stated that
[a] liberty interest is created when the legislature
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (7 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
expressly mandates to an agency the performance of some
activity to be carried out within specific parameters
which include definitions, criteria, and mandated
"shalls."
Remington, 844 P.2d at 52 (citing Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat (1981), 452 U.S. 458, 466, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465, 69
L.Ed.2d 158, 166). We then scrutinized 53-30-105, MCA (1991),
which authorized the Department to adopt rules concerning the
dispensation of good time credits. We concluded that 53-30-105,
MCA (1991), did not contain definitions, criteria or mandates for
the good time rules it directed the Department to adopt and, as a
result, the Department "has virtually unfettered discretion in
establishing the rules which will govern the dispensation of 'good
time' credits to prisoners." Remington, 844 P.2d at 52. In light
of that virtually unfettered discretion, we held that MSP inmates
do not have a liberty interest in good time credits which raises
due process concerns. See Remington, 844 P.2d at 53.
Subsequent to Remington, the United States Supreme Court
changed its focus in defining state-created liberty interests in
Sandin v. Conner (1995), 515 U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d
418. The Supreme Court reflected that, post-Wolff, it had departed
from determining whether the state had created an interest of "real
substance" and focused, instead, on whether states had gone beyond
issuing mere procedural guidelines and used "'language of an
unmistakably mandatory character' such that the incursion on
liberty would not occur 'absent specified substantive predicates.'"
Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2298 (citation omitted). Noting that the
post-Wolff "mandatory language/substantive predicate" focus had
served as a disincentive for states to codify prison management
procedures in the interest of uniform treatment and led to the
involvement of courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, the
Supreme Court concluded that it was time to return to the "interest
of 'real substance'" approach to due process established in Wolff.
Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2298-2300.
In Wolff, a Nebraska prison inmate sued under 1983, alleging
that prison disciplinary proceedings which could result in the loss
of good time violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 553. Several Nebraska statutes were
relevant to whether a due process liberty interest existed in good
time. The first required good time allowances in specified amounts
for good behavior and mandated reducing an inmate's term of
commitment by the amount of accumulated good time for parole
eligibility purposes. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546 n. 6. It also
provided that good time reductions of an inmate's term could be
forfeited or withheld by the head of the prison on the basis of an
inmate's misconduct after the inmate "ha[d] been consulted
regarding the charges of misconduct." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546 n. 6.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (8 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
Under a different statute, "flagrant or serious misconduct" could
result in both forfeited or withheld good time credits, affecting
the term of confinement, and disciplinary segregation affecting
only conditions of confinement. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546-47. Prison
officials had adopted written regulations setting forth policies
and procedures for controlling misconduct and imposing discipline.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 548-53.
The United States Supreme Court noted at the outset that,
while an incarcerated person's "rights may be diminished by the
needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner
is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is
imprisoned for crime." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555. Thus, the
protection afforded by the Due Process Clause extends to inmates of
state prisons, but it can be limited by institutional needs and
objectives. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
The Supreme Court observed that Nebraska had provided a
statutory right to good time credits and had specified that such
credits could be forfeited only as a sanction for serious
misbehavior. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. On that basis, the Supreme
Court concluded that Nebraska had created an interest of real
substance "embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty'" which
entitled Nebraska prison inmates to minimum due process procedures
appropriate under the institutional circumstances to insure that
the state-created right to good time was not abrogated arbitrarily.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently applied the Sandin/Wolff "interest of real substance"
approach to due process inquiries with regard to state-created
rights in Gotcher v. Wood (9th Cir. 1995), 66 F.3d 1097. There,
Norman Gotcher, a Washington prison inmate, alleged in a 1983
action that Washington Department of Corrections employees failed
to afford him due process in prison disciplinary hearings; his
claim was premised on an asserted liberty interest in receiving
good time credits. Gotcher, 66 F.3d at 1098-99. The federal
district court relied on the "mandatory language/substantive
predicate" analysis in concluding that Gotcher did not have a
liberty interest in receiving good time. See Gotcher, 66 F.3d at
1098, 1100.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. It noted that
Washington's statutes regarding good time credits were
indistinguishable from those enacted in Nebraska and held by the
Supreme Court in Wolff to create a liberty interest. Gotcher, 66
F.3d at 1100. Because the Supreme Court had abandoned the
"mandatory language/substantive predicate" analysis in Sandin and
returned to the Wolff principles, the Ninth Circuit held that the
federal district court erred in concluding that no liberty interest
in good time credits existed. Gotcher, 66 F.3d at 1100-1101.
Our holding in Remington that MSP inmates do not have a
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (9 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
liberty interest in good time credits predated Sandin and was
premised on the "mandatory language/substantive predicate" analysis
of state-created rights. See Remington, 844 P.2d at 52-53. In
light of Sandin and Gotcher, it is clear that Remington must be,
and is hereby, overruled insofar as it applied that analysis. As
a result, we must determine whether Orozco had a liberty interest
in good time credits under the Sandin/Wolff due process principles.
Section 53-30-105, MCA (1993), provided:
(1) The department of corrections and human services
shall adopt rules providing for the granting of good time
allowance for inmates employed in any prison work or
activity. . . . The good time allowance shall operate as
a credit on the inmate's sentence as imposed by the
court, conditioned upon the inmate's good behavior and
compliance with the rules made by the department or the
warden.
. . . .
(2) In the event of . . . a violation of the rules
prescribed by the department or warden, the inmate may be
punished by the forfeiture of part or all good time
allowances.
This statute mandated rules granting good time for work activity as
a credit on an inmate's sentence. Consistent with this statute,
the Department adopted Policy No. 505, which required that good
time allowances provide a credit on the inmate's sentence as
imposed by the court. The policy clarified when good time accrual
begins and set forth the circumstances, including an increase in
custody classification, which could result in the loss of the
opportunity to earn, or a reduction of, good time credits.
By these legislative and administrative actions, the State
created a right to good time as a direct credit to inmates'
sentences. As in Wolff, the good time provisions contained in both
53-30-105, MCA (1993), and Policy No. 505 directly affect the
duration of inmates' confinement at the MSP. Applying the
Sandin/Wolff due process analysis, we conclude that the State had
created an interest of real substance sufficiently embraced within
Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" so as to entitle Orozco to due
process procedures appropriate under institutional circumstances.
See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. As a
result, we hold that the District Court erred in determining that
no liberty interest existed in this case.
The existence of a liberty interest giving rise to due process
requirements is not dispositive, however, of the qualified immunity
issue presently before us. As discussed above, our threshold
inquiry in addressing qualified immunity is whether the due process
right arising from Orozco's liberty interest in good time credits
was clearly established at the time of the individual defendants'
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (10 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
conduct which gave rise to this action. See Boreen, 930 P.2d at
70. We hold that it was not.
We decided Remington in 1992 and held therein--on the basis of
the Supreme Court's "mandatory language/substantive predicate"
analysis--that Montana inmates do not have a liberty interest in
good time credits. See Remington, 844 P.2d at 53. The
classification hearing which resulted in Orozco losing the
opportunity to earn additional good time credits, and which he
alleges violated his due process rights, occurred on March 28,
1995. Remington was the controlling Montana case on Montana
statutes and Department policies relating to good time on the date
of Orozco's hearing. As of that date, then, no Montana case
recognized a state-created due process liberty interest in good
time credits.
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not decide Sandin, in which it
returned to the Wolff "interest of real substance" principles,
until June 19, 1995, nearly three months after Orozco's
classification hearing. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2293. The Ninth
Circuit followed with Gotcher in October of 1995. See Gotcher, 66
F.3d at 1097. Even assuming those cases interpreted statutes and
policies identical to Montana's and determined on such bases that
an interest of real substance in good time credits existed which
gave rise to due process requirements before those credits could be
withheld, the cases postdated the conduct of the individual
defendants which allegedly violated Orozco's due process rights in
the present case. We conclude, therefore, that the liberty
interest in good time credits which gives rise to Orozco's due
process rights here was not clearly established at the time of his
classification hearing. As a result, we further conclude that the
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from
liability for civil damages. See Boreen, 930 P.2d at 75.
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court was correct in so
concluding.
As previously mentioned, the District Court dismissed the
entirety of Orozco's complaint--which sought not only money
damages, but also declaratory and injunctive relief--pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. The District Court correctly dismissed
the Department from the entirety of Orozco's 1983 suit because it
is an arm of the State and, therefore, not a "person" within the
meaning of 1983. In addition, the District Court correctly
dismissed the damage claim against the individual defendants based
on qualified immunity. Given Orozco's liberty interest in
accumulating good time credits, however, we conclude that the
District Court improperly dismissed Orozco's complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., with regard to the declaratory and
injunctive relief requested under 1983. See Loney, 905 P.2d at
160. As a result, it is necessary to remand for further
consideration of remaining issues, including what "process" was
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (11 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM
96-344
"due" Orozco before his opportunity to earn good time credits was
withdrawn and whether Orozco received the process due him. These
issues, insofar as they relate to Orozco's declaratory and
injunctive relief claims, have not been addressed by the District
Court because of the early stage at which the District Court
dismissed the entirety of Orozco's complaint and the reasons
underlying that dismissal.
For these reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-344%20Opinion.htm (12 of 12)4/11/2007 2:43:37 PM