THE VAUGHAN AND TELEGRAPH.
Supreme Court of United States.
*263 Mr. Samuel E. Lyons, contra.
*264 Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 25th of October, 1864, the steam propeller Mary Vaughan left the city of Troy for a voyage on the Hudson River to the city of New York. She had in tow two canal-boats laden with cargoes of barley under the deck and hoop-poles upon the deck. The boats were lashed, one on each side of the propeller. The canal-boat R.M. Adams was fastened to the starboard side, and the canal-boat Sherman Lewis upon the port side. They were attached to the propeller by towing lines. The propeller was about sixty tons burden, and ninety feet in length by seventeen wide.
The steamboat Telegraph left her dock at the city of New York about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day on a voyage up the river to Newburg, having in tow three large heavy freight barges, to wit, the Minnesink lashed to her port side, the Dutchess to her starboard side, and the Insurance lashed to the stern of the starboard barge, Dutchess.
On the morning of the next day, between two and four o'clock A.M., just below Butter Hill, the barge Minnesink, on the larboard side of the Telegraph, and the canal-boat Sherman Lewis, on the port side of the Vaughan, came in collision, whereby the Sherman Lewis was torn from her fastenings to the propeller, swung round crosswise of the river, and across the bow of the Telegraph and her barges, and was so much injured that shortly afterwards she filled and sunk in water from one to two hundred feet deep, carrying down her under-deck cargo with her.
The barley belonged to J. & O. Lynch, of Buharnois, Canada, and was shipped by them from St. Timothy, Canada, in the boat in which it was lost. The boat was bound to Albany or New York. The bill of lading was given to the owners, and by them indorsed as follows: "Deliver to the order of Gordon, Bruce & McAuliffe. O. & J. Lynch." *265 Gordon, Bruce & McAuliffe were a firm of the city of New York. The bill of lading was then placed in the hands of Gordon & Co., and by them, at the request of the shippers, forwarded to the consignees. Upon receiving it Gordon & Co., as the agents of the consignees, advanced upon it $29.50 for the premium of insurance upon the barley; the entire arrangement with the shippers was made by Gordon & Co. as such agents. They had special authority to advance upon this particular barley by drafts at thirty days upon the consignees, and so advised the shippers before the bill of lading was forwarded.
This libel was filed by the consignees. It alleged that the disaster was caused "by the negligence, want of proper skill, and improper conduct of the persons navigating the said propeller, or by the negligence, want of proper skill, and improper conduct of the persons navigating said steamboat, or by their joint negligence, fault, and improper conduct."
In the District Court both the claimants excepted to the libel; the claimant of the Vaughan upon the grounds that the particular facts upon which the imputation of fault was founded were not set forth, and that the allegations were not sufficient to entitle the libellants to a decree; the claimant of the Telegraph upon the same grounds, and the further ground that a libel against both vessels jointly could not be maintained. The exceptions were overruled. The court decreed against both vessels, and the claimants of both appealed to the Circuit Court.
The appeals found in the record are wholly silent as to these exceptions. It does not appear that they were brought to the attention of the Circuit Court, or that it took any action whatever upon the subject. The appeals from the Circuit Court to this court are confined to the merits of the case. Neither of them contains any reference expressly, or by implication, to the exceptions. Under these circumstances they must be held to have been conclusively waived by the respondents. To consider them here would be to exercise the appellate power of this tribunal in reviewing the *266 action, not of the Circuit, but of the District Court. This we have no power to do. The exceptions must, therefore, be laid out of view.
It was insisted in the argument here by the counsel for the Vaughan that the consignees had no title to the barley, and hence cannot maintain this libel for its loss. The converse of this proposition is too clear to require discussion. The transfer of the bill of lading carried the legal title with it. The authority of Gordon & Co. to draw on the consignees for advances upon receiving the bill of lading, and the actual payment by them as such agents of the premium for insurance, show such to have been the intention of the parties.
The presumption of title in the transferee of a bill of lading which the law raises upon the transfer is, in this case, fully sustained by the facts developed in the proofs.[*] But aside from the special circumstances referred to, we have no doubt of the right of the consignees as such to maintain this proceeding. The question is not an open one in this court. In Houseman v. The Schooner North Carolina,[] Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We consider it well settled in admiralty proceedings that the agent of absent owners may libel either in his own name as an agent, or in the name of his principals, as he thinks best... . And that the consignees had such an interest in the whole cargo that they may lawfully proceed in this case, not only for what belonged to them, and was shipped on their account, but for that portion also which was shipped by Porter as his own and consigned to them." In McKinlay v. Morrish,[] it was said, "Whatever may be the uncertainty concerning the consignee's right to sue in a court of law, from the conflicting decisions to be found on that right, there is none that he may sue in a court of admiralty in the United States."
This brings us to the consideration of the merits of the case.
*267 The District Court held that both vessels were in fault. The Circuit Court came to the same conclusion, and affirmed this part of the decree of the District Court. These concurring judgments are primâ facie to be deemed correct. Our examination of the evidence apart from this consideration has led our minds to the same results. Where the collision occurred the channel was straight, wide, and deep. The night was calm and clear. It was near the end of the ebb tide. No disturbing element was present. The circumstances were as favorable as possible for each vessel to pass the other with its tows in safety. Without the grossest negligence or mismanagement there could be neither peril nor disaster. Yet there was a disaster; and the colliding vessels came together with such violence that the canal-boat was wrecked and sunk. Neither vessel had a lookout. The pilot and engineer of the Vaughan were inexperienced and incompetent. There was at the time no one on the deck of the Telegraph but the captain. The pilot had gone below. The engine was in charge of a fireman. Other special faults in the conduct of each vessel are imputed, and we think the evidence establishes them. The vessels are antagonists, and one remarkable feature of the case is the zeal and ability with which the counsel of each has attacked the other and labored to defend his own. In the former both have been successful; in the latter neither. The evidence is to a large extent confused and contradictory. It could serve no useful purpose to analyze and discuss it. It is sufficient to remark that we could add nothing to the clear and able opinion of the judge of the District Court, by whom this part of the case was there disposed of. We concur in the views which he expressed.
In the District Court it was held that the proper rule of damages where a cargo is lost in transitu by a collision, or other tort, is the value of the goods at the time and place of shipment. It was conceded that upon the breach of a contract for the delivery of goods at a particular place the measure of damages is the full value of the goods at such place. Both propositions are correct and are well settled in *268 our jurisprudence. The place of shipment was a port in Canada, and the value of the barley there when shipped was found to have been 70 cents per busbel, amounting in the aggregate, with interest, to $2436. The estimate was made in the currency of Canada, which was equivalent in value to the gold coin of the United States. It was admitted that the decree was solvable in legal tender notes, which were then largely depreciated, but it was held that this was an incident of the suit in the forum where it was brought, and that the result was unavoidable. In the Circuit Court the same rule of damages was applied, but the decree gave the value of the Canada currency in legal tender notes. These notes have since largely appreciated, so that while the libellants would, under the decree of the District Court, if it had been paid when rendered, have received much less than the estimated value of the barley, they will now, if the decree of the Circuit Court be affirmed, receive much more.
It is clear that if the decree of the Circuit Court had been paid when it was rendered the result to the respondents would have been the same as if the decree of the District Court had been then affirmed and paid in specie. Upon the rule of damages applied by both courts as respects the kind of currency in which the value of the barley was estimated the libellants were entitled, upon the plainest principles of justice, to be paid in specie or its equivalent. The hardship arising from the decree before us is due entirely to the delay in its payment which has since occurred, and the change which time and circumstances have wrought in the value of the legal tender currency. The decree was right when rendered, and, being so, cannot now be disturbed. It is unnecessary to pursue the subject further. The decree, in the particular under consideration, presents the same question which was decided by this court in the case of Knox v. Lee.[*] There the court instructed the jury that in assessing the plaintiff's damages they might take into account the fact that the judgment could be paid in legal tender notes. This *269 court upon error affirmed the correctness of that instruction. The authority of that case is conclusive of the question here under consideration.
DECREE AFFIRMED.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting.
I dissent, and am authorized to say that my brothers CLIFFORD and FIELD also dissent, from so much of the opinion just read as relates to the measure of indemnity for the loss of the barley.
We agree that the loss was through the fault of both boats, and that the libellants were entitled to indemnity; and we agree further that the measure of this indemnity was the value of the barley at the time and place of shipment; and that this value was $2436 in gold. The decree of the District Court, rendered on the 21st day of February, 1868, was for this sum, with interest, making the whole amount of the decree $2924.20.
On appeal, the Circuit Court held that in order to give full indemnity to the libellants, the value in gold must be converted into its equivalent in legal tender notes on the day of shipment. At that time this currency was so much depreciated that $100 in gold were worth $201 in notes. The $2436 in gold, were, therefore, converted into their equivalent in note dollars, making the sum of $4896.36. The decree of the District Court was accordingly reversed, and a decree was entered, on the 26th of March, 1870, for the last-named sum and interest, in all $6515, with costs.
This was much more than indemnity at the date of the decree, and the injustice is still more apparent at this time, when the value of the notes has so much appreciated that the affirmance of the decree of the Circuit Court gives the libellants almost double indemnity.
This case strikingly illustrates the evil consequences of rendering judgments payable in legal tender currency. Hardly anything fluctuates in value more than such judgments. Every day witnesses a change. The judgment debtor gains by depreciation and loses by appreciation.
Doubtless, if the legal tender clauses of the Currency Acts *270 are constitutional, such judgments may be rendered; but there is nothing in those acts which requires that judgments for damages estimated in coin shall be entered otherwise than for coin. On the contrary, we have decided in several cases[*] that judgments for coin debts may be rendered payable in coin. In the present case the amount of indemnity was ascertained in gold, and, in our judgment, the decree should have been for that amount payable in coin. This would have done exact justice between the parties and would have been in harmony with the principles of the cases referred to. It would have given indemnity, and not double indemnity.
NOTES
[*] Grove v. Brien, 8 Howard, 439; Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 Id. 107.
[] 15 Peters, 49.
[] 21 Howard, 355.
[*] 12 Wallace, 457.
[*] Cheang-kee v. United States, 3 Wallace, 320; Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Id. 245; Butler v. Horwitz, 1b. 259; Trebilecek v. Wilson, 12 Id. 687.