‘,
No. 91-335
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 6
STAIE OF MONTANA,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Madison,
The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding.
COIINSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jack H. Morris, Jardine & Morris, Whitehall, Montana
For Respondent:
Joseph P. Mazurek, Montana Attorney General, Patricia J. Jordan,
Assistant Montana Attorney General; Robert R. Zenker, Madison
County Attorney, Virginia City, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 3, 1999
Decided: January 11,200O
Filet1:
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.
81 Appellant Travis McLees, (Travis) appealsfrom the Order of the District Court of the
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Montana, Madison County, denying his motion to
suppressevidence and admitting evidence obtained in a searchof Travis’s apartment. We
reverse.
72 Did the District Court err in denying Travis’s motion to suppressevidence obtained
when his grandfather consentedto the warrantless search of Travis’s apartment?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
ll3 On November 25, 1995, the Madison County Sheriffs Department received reports
of two burglaries and thefts. Chief Deputy Sheriff, Merlin Ehlers (Deputy Ehlers)
investigated the break-ins, one at the Harrison school, the other at the studio of Michelle
Walker in Harrison, Montana. Travis had been at Walker’s studio the day before to deliver
wooden doll baseshis father had made for her. Walker indicated that while in her studio,
Travis had paid an unusual amount of attention to a stereo which was now missing. At the
time, Travis also had a pending chargein Gallatin County for the burglary of a Three Forks
school and was known to have broken into the Harrison school when he was a student there.
74 Deputy Ehlerswent to the home ofTravis’s mother, Jennifer Flesch (Flesch), in Pony,
Montana. Fleschtold Deputy Ehlers that Travis was living with his grandfather Earl McLees
(Earl) in Three Forks, Montana. Deputy Ehlers had known Earl for years and had been to
2
Earl’s home before on personal business. On November 26, 1995, Deputy Ehlers went to
Earl’s residence at 55 Frontage Road, in Three Forks, to look for Travis.
ll5 Upon arriving at Earl’s residence,Deputy Ehlers askedwhether Travis was staying
there. Earl informed Deputy Ehlers that Travis was living in the apartment which Earl
owned next door at 59 Frontage Road. Earl told Deputy Ehlers that Travis had slept in the
apartment the night before but had left that morning. Deputy Ehlers did not have a search
warrant but askedEarl if he could look in the apartmentfor possibleevidenceof the Harrison
school burglary. Earl and Deputy Ehlers went to the front door of the apartment, but found
it locked. BecauseEarl did not have a key to the front door, he and Deputy Ehlers went
around to the shop which adjoined the apartment from the rear. The two then entered the
apartment through an unlocked door leading from the shop to the apartment.
76 Upon entering the apartment, Deputy Ehlers noticed some drug paraphernalia and
what he believed to be items taken from the Harrison school. Ehlers then telephoned the
Gallatin County Sheriffs Office to have them send out an officer from that jurisdiction,
Three Forks Marshall, Keith King (Officer King) responded to the scene and entered the
apartment. At that time, Officer King and Deputy Ehlersdiscussedwhether they should have
a search warrant. Officer King returned to his office in Three Forks where he called the
Gallatin County Attorney’s office and received the opinion that based on Officer King’s
description of the situation, a consent search would be sufficient. During Officer King’s
absence,Deputy Ehlers stayed at the apartment to securethe site.
17 Officer King returned to the apartment with a consent-to-searchform, which Earl
signed. Deputy Ehlers and Officer King then searchedand photographedthe apartment, and
seized several items of evidence. A few days later, Deputy Ehlers returned without a
warrant, and Earl again allowed him to enter the apartment. A warrant for Travis’s arrest
was issuedon November 30, 1995,and Travis was arrestedseveralmonths later. Reserving
the right to appealthe denial of his motion to suppress,Travis pleadedguilty to two counts
of burglary, two counts of theft, and one count of criminal mischief.
ll8 Did the District Court err in denying Travis’s motion to suppressevidence obtained
when his grandfather consentedto the warrantless searchof Travis’s apartment?
19 The standardof review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppressis whether
the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly
applied as a matter of law. Stnte v. &gal (1997), 281 Mont. 250, 257, 934 P.2d 176, 180
(ovewuled inpart by State v. KunefA 1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556).
7llO “[Wlatrantless searchesconducted inside a home areper se unreasonable, ‘subject
only to a few specifically establishedand well-delineated exceptions.“’ State v. Hubbe
(1997), 286 Mont. 200,212,951 P.2d 971,978 (citing Katz v. United States(1967), 389 U.S.
347,357, 88 SCt. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576, 585). “One such exception is when the search
is conductedpursuant to a consentthat is freely and voluntarily given.” Hubbel, 286 Mont.
at 212, 951 P.2d at 978 (citing Sclzneclzlotlz Bustanzonte(1973), 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93
v.
S.Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 860). “[Wlhen the prosecution seeks to justify a
4
warrantless searchby proof of a voluntary consent,it is not limited to proof that consent was
given by the defendant, but may show that permission to searchwas obtained from a third
party who possessed
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises
or effects sought to be inspected.” State v. Sourenson(1979), 180 Mont. 269,275, 590 P.2d
136, 140 (citing UnitedStates v. A4atlock(1974), 415 U.S. 164, 171,94 S.Ct. 988,993,39
L.Ed.2d. 249-50). The Statehasthe burden of showing that the consentwas voluntary. Stnte
v. Kim (1989), 239 Mont. 189, 196,779 P.2d 512, 517.
711 The District Court found that Earl had “common authority to consent to a search of
the premises. [and] gavethat consentvoluntarily. .” Travis arguesthat Earl did not have
sufficient joint control over the apartment at 59 FrontageRoad to consentto the search. We
agree. As Travis points out, Earl’s residenceat 55 Frontage Road and the apartment at 59
Frontage Road are physically separatebuildings. Earl lived in his home but did not reside
in, and did not have a key to, Travis’s apartment. The record reflects that Earl would
sometimes enter the apartment to watch television with his son, Scott McLees (Scott), or
perhapsto wake Travis for work. Earl testified that he would knock and amrouncehimself
before entering the apartment.
712 In order to let Deputy Ehlers into the apartment, Earl had to take him around to the
back of the building, into the attachedworkshop and through an unlocked back door to the
apartment. Travis had been living in the apartmentwith Scott, his father, for approximately
six months and Scott had given him permissionto stay there while he was gone; this was an
5
agreement Earl was not involved in. Scott paid no rent to Earl and there was no rental
agreement. Scott usually residedin the apartmentbut was out of the state at the time and had
left the back door to the workshop unlocked becauseno one could ‘rind a key to it.
713 The Statearguesthat Earl’s consentwas valid becauseno landlord-tenantrelationship
existed between Earl and Travis; Travis’s living arrangementwas with Scott, not Earl, and
therefore Earl never relinquishedauthority or control of the apartment to him. It claims that
Travis was a temporary guest in Earl’s apartment, that he paid no rent or utilities, and that
he lived out of a duffel bag. The State also maintains that a special relationship between a
defendant and the owner of an apartment together with no formal landlord-tenant agreement
are “important benchmarks” under thesecircumstances. We note that the casescited by the
State for this proposition are not controlling, and they are distinguishable from the caseat
bar. None of the cited casesconcern one family member renting a separateresidence to
another, but rather reflect instanceswhere one family member has permitted another to stay
in their home as a guest. In all but one casecited by the State, (Adams v. State (Okla. Crim.
Ct. App. 1982), 645 P.2d 1028)(defendantstaying in sister’s garageapartment), the owner
of the home and the defendant lived together in the same residence. In People v. Lucero
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985), 720 P.2d 604, also cited by the State,the court relied on the fact that
there was no landlord-tenant relationship and no rent paid, referring to the defendant as a
“tenant at sufferance.” LLK~YO 606. However, asthe United StatesSupremeCourt pointed
at
out in Matlock,
[clommon authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property
interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the
third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant
historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the
property by personsgenerally havingjoint accessor control for most purposes,
so that it is reasonableto recognizethat any of the co-inhabitants has the right
to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumedthe
risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993, 39 L.Ed.2d at 250 n.7.
1714 In Matlock, the issuebefore the SupremeCourt was whether the third party who had
consentedto the searchof the bedroom where Matlock was staying had a relationship to the
room sufficient to make her consentvalid against Matlock. The Court found that the third
party’s consentto searchthe bedroom was sufficient where; 1) the room bore every evidence
that it was also occupied by a woman; 2) she indicated that she and Matlock slept in the
bedroom regularly, including that morning; 3) she told police that she and Matlock shared
a dresserin the room; and 4) she told police that the women’s clothing in the room was hers.
SeeMatlock, 415 U.S. at 161-172, 94 S.Ct. at 990-93,39 L.Ed.2d at 247-50.
115 We begin our analysis of whether Earl had authority to consent to the search of the
apartment, by noting that Travis claims Earl was coerced into giving his consent. After a
review of the record, however, we agree with the District Court that although Earl was
possibly intimidated and let Deputy Ehlers into the apartment “on a friendly basis,” there is
no evidenceto suggesthis consentwas coerced. As a result, we must analyze only whether
Earl’s consent to the search was valid at the time he permitted Deputy Ehlers to enter the
apartment.
716 In determining that Earl had “common authority to consent to a search of the
premises,” the District Court relied on the fact that Travis did not pay rent or utilities, did not
have a rental agreementwith Earl, did not furnish the apartment with his own property, and
kept his belongingsin duffel bagswhile his father’s personalbelongingswere in the dresser
drawers. Basedon thesefacts, the District Court found that “it is reasonableto concludethat
Travis assumedthe risk that his grandfather could and would asserthis own control over the
premises at any time Earl exercisedhis authority as owner, grandfather, and host to
enter the apartment at will regularly for a number of reasons- all known to Travis .”
l/17 We conclude that the evidence in the record is insufticient to show that Earl had
common authority over the apartment. Although Earl was the owner of the apartment, and
no rental agreementexistedbetween Travis and Earl, thesefactors do not create “mutual use
of the property,” or “joint access and control for most purposes,” which would create
common authority. Earl testified that he never went to the apartmentif Scott was not around.
He said he did not have free accessand would knock before he went in. Earl was obviously
not a cohabitant ofthe apartment, did not share in its use, and could not consent to a search
on that basis. Scott was the regular inhabitant of the apartment, and while he may have had
joint authority and control to consentto the search,Earl did not. We concludethat it was not
reasonable for the District Court to find that Travis “assumed the risk that Earl could and
would assert control over the premises at any time.” The State failed to meet its burden of
establishingthat Earl had common authority over Travis’s apartment. Unless Earl had other
“sufficient relationship” to the apartment, his consentwas invalid.
118 Earl testified that he, at times, gained accessto the apartment in order to visit with
Scott or to watch a ball game. The fact that Earl owned the apartment is not dispositive
where Travis, who was living in the apartment, had a reasonableexpectation of privacy.
Assuming Earl had authority to accessthe apartment for such purposes, it was limited to
those activities. SeeSol-renson,180 Mont. at 276,590 P.2d 141 (Authority of neighbor to
enter defendant’shome to water plants in defendant’s absencewas not authority to consent
to a searchof the home). Earl, therefore, did not possess “sufficient relationship” with the
a
apartment which would give him authority to consent to a search. Therefore, the District
Court erroneously concludedthat basedon thesefacts, Earl had common authority over the
apartment sufficient to consent to the search.
119 The State contends that even if Earl did not have authority to give consent,
representationsmade by Earl to the officers at the time of the search support a finding that
the officers believed Earl had authority to consent, even if he did not. They maintain that
under the doctrine of “apparent authority,” a searchis valid if consent is given by a person
who police reasonably, but mistakenly, believe hasjoint authority over the premises. This
issuewas first addressed the United StatesSupremeCourt in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990),
by
497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148.
g20 In Rodriguez, Gail Fischer told police that Rodriguez had assaultedher in a certain
apartment in Chicago, Illinois. Shereferred to this apartment as “our apartment” and said
that she had clothes and furniture there. She then traveled to the apartment with police,
unlocked the door with her key, and gave the officers permission to enter. The police didn’t
have an arrest warrant for Rodriguez, or a searchwarrant for the apartment. Upon entering
the apartment, the officers observed drugs and drug paraphernalia and found Rodriguez
asleepin the bedroom. There, they discovered more drugs, arrested Rodriguez, and seized
the drugs and paraphernalia. After being chargedwith possessionof a controlled substance
Rodriguez moved to suppressall evidence seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that
Fischer had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and therefore had no authority to
consentto the entry. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180, 110 S.Ct. at 2796-97, 111 L.Ed.2d at 155-
56.
72 1 Finding that Fischer had no “joint accessor control for most purposes,” the Supreme
Court explainedwhat it called the “general rule” with respectto what is necessaryto satisfy
the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment:
[i]t is apparentthat in order to satisfy the “reasonableness”requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government--
whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a
warrant, or the police officer conducting a searchand seizureunder one of the
exceptionsto the warrant requirement--is not that they always be correct, but
that they always be reasonable. [B] ecause many situations which confront
officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous,
room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must
10
be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability (citation omitted).
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86, 110 S.Ct. at 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 159-60
122 The majority then stated that it saw “no reasonto depart from this general rule with
respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a search,” and set forth a test for
determining the constitutional validity of a warrantless search pursuant to the consent
exception to the warrant requirement:
determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts availableto the officer at the moment. ‘warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the consenting party had
authority over the premises? If not, then the warrantless entry without
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the
search is valid.
Rodriguez, at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d at 161 (citation omitted).
723 Although this Court has previously examined the issue of third-party consent, the
doctrine of apparent authority as it applies to third-party consent searcheshas never been
substantively addressed in Montana. Travis argues that the warrantless search of the
apartment absent Earl’s actual authority to consent violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as under Article II. Sections 10 and 11 of the
Montana Constitution. “Because Montana’s unique constitutional schemeaffords citizens
broader protection of their right to privacy than does the Fourth Amendment to the United
StatesConstitution, we usually need not consider the Fourth Amendment issue.” Hubbel,
286 Mont. at 211, 951 P.2d at 977. However, becauseArticle II, Section 11 of the Montana
11
Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution, we analyze
most searchand seizurequestionsarisingunder Article II, Section 11 using traditional Fourth
Amendment principles. Siegd, 281 Mont. at 264, 934 P.2d at 184,
124 Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution provide:
Section 10. Right of privacy. The right of individual privacy is essentialto
the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest.
Art. II, Sec. 10, Mont.Const.
Section 11. Searches and seizures. The people shall be secure in their
persons,papers, homes and effects from unreasonablesearchesand seizures.
No warrant to searchany place, or seizeany personor thing shall issuewithout
describing the place to be searchedor the person to be seized, or without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
Art. II, Sec. 11, Mont.Const.
125 To determine whether there has been an unlawful search pursuant to Montana’s
Constitution, we look to two factors: (1) whether the person has an actual expectation of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable;and (2) the nature of
the state’s intrusion. Hubbel, 286 Mont. at 208, 951 P.2d at 975-76. “At the risk of
belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally
expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by warrant, and that
expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.” State V.
Sclzeetz, Mont. 41,48-49, 950 P.2d 722,726. “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth
186
Amendment’s prohibition againstunreasonable
searches seizuresis to protect the privacy
and
12
and security of individuals and safeguardthe sanctity of the home againstarbitrary invasions
by governmental officials.” Dorwart v. Caruwny, 1998MT 191,1]21,290 Mont. 196,121,
966 P.2d 1121,121.
726 The State does not claim that exigent circumstances existed which would have
prevented Ehlers from obtaining a searchwarrant prior to the entry and search of Travis’s
apartment. Courts have indicated the rationale behind the warrant requirement;
[t]he presenceof a searchwarrant servesa high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the
home a safehaven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The
right of privacy was deemedtoo precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
Sorrenson, 180 Mont at 274, 590 P.2d at 140. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to “deter future unlawful police conduct” by making evidence which the State obtains
through a searchand seizurein violation of the Fourth Amendment, inadmissablein criminal
proceedings. State v. Pipkin, 1998MT 143,l 12,289 Mont. 240,T 12,961 P.2d 733,l 12.
The result is that in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, a search made without a warrant is unlawful and any evidence which results
from the search should be suppressed. Pipkin, 7 12.
127 In adopting the apparent authority rule in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court explained
what the exclusionary rule provides under the Fourth Amendment;
[w]hat Rodriguez is assuredby the trial right of the exclusionary rule, where
it applies,is that no evidenceseizedin violation of the Fourth Amendment will
13
be introduced at his trial unlesshe consents. What he is assuredby the Fourth
Amendment itself, however, is not that no governmentsearchof his housewill
occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is
“unreasonable.. .”
Ro&iguez, 497 U.S. at 183-84, 110 S.Ct. at 2799, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 158.
There are various elements, of course, that can make a search of a person’s
house “reasonable” - one of which is the consentof the person or his cotenant
Here, we also have not held that the Fourth Amendment requires factual
accuracy.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185, 110 S.Ct. at 2799, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 159
The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant
becausethey reasonably(though erroneously)believe that the personwho has
consentedto their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when
they enter without a warrant becausethey reasonably (though erroneously)
believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.
Rodriguez,497U.S.at 186, llOS.Ct.at2800, 111 L.Ed.2dat 160.
128 In Montana, however, we analyze such a situation in light of our citizens’ enhanced
right to privacy. “[Elxcept in certain carefully defined classesof cases,a searchof property
without proper consent is ‘u727ws072nble unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant.” Do7wa7~~, 121 (emphasisadded). Unlike its federal counterpart,Article II, Section
10 protects againstinvasionsof privacy. Hawai’i, whose constitution also specifically grants
the right of privacy to its citizens has declined to follow Rodriguez, based on that
constitutional provision. In declining to adopt the doctrine of apparentauthority, the Hawai’i
Supreme Court stated;
[alllowing warrantless searchesof an individual’s home without the consent
of someoneauthorizedto give it, absentany exigent circumstances,would fly
14
in the face of this protection. Indeed, an invasion of privacy is no less of an
“invasion” if the governmental officials are “reasonable” in their mistaken
belief that the third party possesses authority to consent. This is because,
the
regardlessof whether the police actedin good faith, the individual’s “privacy”
is still invaded when the police searchhis or her personal belongings without
permission.
State v. Lopez (Haw. 1995), 896 P.2d 889, 902.
729 In Lopez, police were called to investigatea robbery at the houseof Daniel and Kelly
Hauanio. See Lopez, 896 P.2d at 893-95. Detective Guilleimo, who was assigned to
continue the investigation, later telephoned Kelly’s mother and told her he wanted to
interview Kelly and Daniel and go into the Hauanios’ house to continue the investigation.
Kelly’s mother told Detective Guillermo that the Hauanios were staying at a hotel in Hilo,
Hawai’i.
730 Without the Hauanios’ permission, Kelly’s mother volunteered to take Guillermo to
the house herself. Shemet him there and they enteredthrough a closed door which was not
able to be locked. While there Guillermo confiscated a cellophane container filled with
cocainewhich he found on the floor of the masterbedroom. Basedon this information alone,
the police obtained a warrant to search the Hauanios’ home. While executing the warrant,
police found evidence linking the Hauanios to a large cocaine delivery already under
investigation. The circuit court grantedthe Hauaniosmotion to suppressthe evidenceseized
by the police, concluding that the state had not establishedthat Kelly grantedher mother the
authority to consent to Guillermo’s entry. Becausethe entry was without consent, the
evidencehe recovered from the Hauanio housewas suppressed.Lopez, 896 P.2d at 896. On
15
appeal, the prosecution conceded that Kelly’s mother did not have “actual authority” to
consentto Detective Guillemro’s entranceinto the house,but argued that shehad “apparent
authority.” Lopez, 896 P.2d at 899.
131 The Supreme Court of Hawai’i declined to adopt the federal concept of apparent
authority from Rodriguez stating;
[o]ur willingness to afford greaterprotection of individual privacy rights than
is provided on the federal level arisesfrom “our view [that] the right to be free
of ‘unreasonable’searches seizuresunder article I, section 5 [which later
and
becamearticle I, section71of the Hawai’i Constitution is enforceableby a rule
of reason which requires that governmental intrusions into the personnl
pvivncy of citizens of this State be no greater in intensity than absolutely
necessmy. .” At this point, we simply cannot say that it is “necessary” to
allow third parties to consent to searches of an individual’s personal and
private belongings when they are devoid of any authority to do so. Our
constitution guaranteesmore to the citizens of the State of Hawai’i.
Lopez, 896 P.2d at 901-902 (emphasis in original).
732 Article I, section 7 of Hawai’i’s Constitution specifically protects against “invasions
of privacy.” Lopez, 896 P.2d at 897. We agreewith the Hawai’i court’s refusal to extend the
doctrine of apparent authority basedon this right to privacy. In light of Montana citizens’
similar increasedright to privacy under Article II, Sections 10 and 11, we now hold that for
third-party consentto be valid as againstthe defendant,the consentingparty must have actual
authority to do so. BecauseDeputy Ehlers’ searchof Travis’s apartment was not consented
to by an individual possessingactual authority, the searchviolated Article II, Sections 10 and
11 of the Montana Constitution. The evidence seizedin that searchshould be suppressed.
16
733 The State argued in the District Court that if Earl’s consent was invalid then the
evidence should be admitted under the “independent source” and “inevitable discovery”
rules. The District Court did not rule on these issues.
734 We reverse the judgment of the District Court as to the evidence obtained in the
warrantless searchof Travis’s apartmentandremand to the District Court for a detennination
of whether the evidenceis admissibleunder the independentsource or inevitable discovery
rules.
735 Reversed and remanded.
u 7 /&L&-i&-,
Justice
We Concur:
January 11,200O
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named:
JACK H MORRIS ESQ
JARDINE AND MORRIS
BOX 488
WHITEHALL MT 59759-0488
HON JOSEPH P MAZUREK ATTORNEY GENERAL
MIKE WELLENSTEIN ASSISTANT
2 15 NORTH SANDERS
HELENA MT 59620
ROBERT R ZENKER 32 ‘.
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
BOX 36
VIRGlNIA CITY MT 59755-0036
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA
BY: 06:
Deputy u