United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-20934.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION as Receiver for Western
Bank-Westheimer, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ENVENTURE V, Allen B. Daniels, and Don C. Horton, Defendants-
Appellants.
March 11, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") brought
suit on behalf of a failed bank to collect a debt owed the bank by
Enventure V, a Texas Limited Partnership ("Enventure"), Allen B.
Daniels ("Daniels"), and Don C. Horton ("Horton"). The court below
granted summary judgment in favor of the FDIC. The obligors have
appealed. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
On July 15, 1986, Enventure received a loan for $131,697.03
from Western Bank—Westheimer ("Western Bank"). Daniels and Horton,
in addition to being general partners in Enventure, also signed
continuing guaranties of Enventure's indebtedness on June 1, 1982.
On July 15, 1987, Enventure defaulted on the promissory note.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Enventure V, 868 F.Supp. 870, 873
(S.D.Tex.1994).
On October 1, 1987, the FDIC was appointed receiver for
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Western Bank after the bank was declared insolvent. On October 1,
1993, the FDIC initiated this action against Enventure, Daniels and
Horton to collect on the promissory note and guaranties. Id.
Following the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the FDIC, Enventure, Daniels and Horton (collectively
"appellants") appealed. The sole issue on appeal is whether the
six-year statute of limitations contained in the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA") has
expired and bars the FDIC from collecting on the promissory note.
DISCUSSION
FIRREA contains the applicable statute of limitations for
actions brought by the FDIC as receiver. Under FIRREA, the statute
of limitations on contract claims is the longer of "the 6-year
period beginning on the date the claim accrues" or "the period
applicable under state law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (emphasis
added). The statute of limitations begins to run on a contract
claim on the date the FDIC is appointed receiver or the date the
cause of action accrues, whichever is later. 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(14)(B).1
1
In relevant part, section 1821(d)(14) of FIRREA provides:
(A) Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the
applicable statute of limitations with regard to any
action brought by the Corporation as conservator or
receiver shall be—
(i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer
of—
(I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the
claim accrues; or
2
The FDIC contends that as a general rule this court uses Rule
6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to interpret statutes
of limitations. Rule 6(a) provides that in computing any period of
time "the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included [and]
[t]he last day of the period so computed shall be included."
FED.R.CIV.P. 6(a). The FDIC argues that since it was appointed
receiver on October 1, 1987, under Rule 6(a) that day is excluded
from the calculation of the limitations period, but October 1, 1993
is included in the calculation of the limitations period. Hence,
by filing the claim on the anniversary date of its appointment as
receiver, the FDIC contends its suit is within the six-year statute
of limitations period contained in § 1821(d)(14).
In support of the application of Rule 6(a), the FDIC cites
Lawson v. Conyers Chrysler, Plymouth, and Dodge Trucks, Inc., 600
F.2d 465 (5th Cir.1979) and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bledsoe,
989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.1993). In Lawson, this court interpreted the
statute of limitations contained in the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA") to determine whether a suit filed on the one-year
anniversary date of the sale at issue was barred by the statute of
(II) the period applicable under State law; ...
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which
the statute of limitations begins to run on any claim
described in such subparagraph shall be the later of—
(i) the date of the appointment of the Corporation
as conservator or receiver; or
(ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues.
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limitations contained in TILA. Under TILA, the statute of
limitation provides that "[a]ny action under this section may be
brought in any United States district court ... within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. §
1640(e).
In interpreting the statute of limitations, the court applied
Rule 6(a) and found that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by the
one-year statute of limitations contained in TILA because under
Rule 6(a), the "day of the transaction is excluded and the last day
of the period is included." Id. at 465. Therefore, the court
reasoned, since the purchase by the plaintiff occurred on January
31, 1977 and the suit was filed on January 31, 1978, the plaintiff
was not barred by the statute of limitations.
In Bledsoe, the court was required to determine the
appropriate statute of limitations period held by assignees of the
FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC"). In reaching its decision, the court stated the
following concerning FIRREA's statute of limitations:
In the instant cases ... the FSLIC was appointed receiver on
December 19, 1985. As the six year period began running on
December 19, 1985, the FDIC's claim filed on December 18,
1991, was filed one day before the expiration of the
limitations period, and thus was timely filed.
Id. at 809.
Although Lawson and Bledsoe are instructive, they provide
little support for the application of Rule 6(a) to § 1821(d)(14).
Lawson involved a statute of limitations which used the phrase
"within one year" as opposed to "beginning on the date" as
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contained in § 1821(d)(14)(A). The phrase "within one year" is
vague as to when the limitations period is to begin and end and
thus the court properly applied Rule 6(a) in determining the
calculation of the limitations period. Such is not the case with
the phrase "beginning on the date" which provides a specific
reference to the beginning of the limitations period.
Additionally, the statement cited from Bledsoe is not necessary to
the holding of the case and is confusing dicta at best.2
Rule 6(a) is a general statutory rule concerning the
computation of time. "A general statutory rule usually does not
govern if a more specific rule covers the case." Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir.1994); see Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1992, 104
L.Ed.2d 557 (1989); see also Union National Bank of Wichita v.
Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 41, 69 S.Ct. 911, 913, 93 L.Ed. 1190 (1949).
Generally, the court must "assume that "the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' " United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1793, 85 L.Ed.2d
64 (1985), quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82
S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962).
In § 1821(d)(14)(A), Congress provided that the limitations
period began "on the date the claim accrues." The use of the word
2
Compare the above quoted passage from Bledsoe with language
at the end of the Bledsoe opinion: "With the six year limitation
period beginning to run on December 19, 1985, the note would have
become stale on December 19, 1991. The FDIC's filing of this
action on December 18, 1991 was one day prior to the expiration
date and hence was timely." Id. at 811-12.
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"on" is clear and creates a more specific rule which overrides the
application of Rule 6(a). Therefore, because the FDIC was
appointed receiver on October 1, 1987, this day is included in the
calculation of the six-year limitations period, and thus the FDIC's
filing of the claim on October 1, 1993, is one day late.
Consequently, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations
contained in § 1821(d)(14), so that the FDIC's action must be and
is hereby dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is REVERSED AND RENDERED.
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