No. 02-225
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 326
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GARY LACASELLA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Ed McLean, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Mark E. Jones, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Pam Bucy,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 29, 2002
Decided: December 19, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The Appellant, Gary Lacasella, was charged with driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI) and driving with his license
suspended in Missoula County Justice Court. He pled guilty to the
charges and reserved the right to appeal the Justice Court’s denial
of his motion to suppress evidence, which he based on an
allegation that the arresting officer had no particularized
suspicion for stopping him. The District Court for the Fourth
Judicial District in Missoula County denied his appeal and motion
to suppress and returned his case to the Justice Court for
sentencing. Lacasella appeals the District Court’s ruling. We
reverse the Order of the District Court.
¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred
when it denied Lacasella’s motion to suppress evidence that he
alleges was obtained following an illegal investigatory stop.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 At around 11:00 P.M., on February 18, 2001, Missoula County
Sheriff’s Deputy Michael Dominick was on routine patrol near
Marvin’s Bar when he observed a red Ford pick-up truck pull onto
Highway 93. He noted that the vehicle appeared to have no front
license plate and had a broken spare tire carrier. After following
the vehicle onto westbound Interstate 90, he initiated an
investigatory stop to determine if the vehicle was being driven on
a state highway in violation of § 61-3-301, MCA, which requires
that license plates be conspicuously displayed on both the front
and rear of a vehicle.
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¶4 The pick-up truck was being driven by Gary Lacasella. As
Deputy Dominick approached the vehicle, Lacasella stepped out of
the vehicle and appeared to be unsteady on his feet. Deputy
Dominick informed Lacasella he had stopped him because he did not
have a license plate on the front of his vehicle. At that time
Lacasella showed Deputy Dominick his license plate, which was taped
to the lower driver’s side corner of his front windshield. Deputy
Dominick explained that the license plate was required to be
mounted on the front bumper of the vehicle. He observed that
Lacasella smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, appeared confused
and had difficulty removing his driver’s license from his wallet.
¶5 Deputy Dominick returned to his patrol car and performed a
record check, which revealed that Lacasella’s license had been
revoked and he had two prior DUIs. Based upon his observations and
the record check, he requested that Lacasella perform a field
sobriety test. When Lacasella performed poorly, he was arrested
for DUI and driving with a suspended or revoked license.
¶6 On February 20, 2001, Lacasella was charged with one count of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, third offense, in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA; and one
count of driving while license suspended or revoked in violation of
§ 61-5-212, MCA. On June 29, 2001, Lacasella filed a motion to
suppress all of the evidence that was gathered after the
investigatory stop. He contended that the traffic stop was illegal
because his license plate was properly displayed and that Deputy
Dominick did not have particularized suspicion a crime had been or
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was being committed. The Justice of the Peace denied his motion
and concluded that a plain reading of § 61-3-301, MCA, provided the
necessary particularized suspicion because Lacasella’s license
plate was not attached to the front of his vehicle. On August 14,
2001, Lacasella pled guilty to the charges and he reserved the
right to appeal the Justice Court’s denial of his motion to
suppress to the District Court.
¶7 Lacasella appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court in
Missoula County on October 22, 2001. He argued that § 61-3-301,
MCA, does not mandate that a vehicle’s front license plate be
secured to the vehicle’s front bumper. He maintained that the
manner in which his license plate was displayed in the windshield
of his truck satisfied the plain language of § 61-3-301, MCA.
Therefore, he contended that Deputy Dominick’s investigatory stop,
which was based entirely on the lack of a license plate on the
front bumper of his vehicle, was illegal.
¶8 On December 6, 2001, the parties stipulated that three
pictures taken of the front of Lacasella’s vehicle accurately
reflected the manner in which the license plate had been located
and taped to the window on the night Lacasella was stopped. Those
pictures show that the license plate was secured with duct tape to
the lower driver’s side corner of the front windshield of
Lacasella’s truck.
¶9 On February 28, 2002, the District Court held that the inside
of the front windshield of a pick-up truck did not constitute the
“front” of the vehicle, and that the license plate was not
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“unobstructed from plain view” when displayed in the window of a
vehicle because glare could prevent the license plate from being
viewed at night. Furthermore, the court stated that even if
Deputy Dominick had seen the plate in the window, he was permitted
to make an investigatory stop to ensure the plate was “securely
fastened” to the vehicle as required by the law. Consequently, the
District Court denied Lacasella’s motion to suppress and returned
the case to the Justice Court for sentencing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Our standard of review of a district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress is whether the court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous and whether those facts were correctly applied as
a matter of law. State v. Williams (1995), 273 Mont. 459, 462, 904
P.2d 1019, 1021. A court’s findings are clearly erroneous if they
are not supported by substantial evidence, the court has
misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or our review of the
record convinces us that a mistake has been committed. State v.
Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 9, 291 Mont. 77, ¶ 9, 966 P.2d 137, ¶ 9.
Interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law
which we review to determine whether the district court’s
conclusions are correct. State v. Price, 2002 MT ___, ¶ 15, ___
Mont. ___, ¶ 15, 50 P.3d 530, ¶ 15(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶11 Did the District Court err when it denied Lacasella’s motion
to suppress evidence that he alleges was obtained following an
illegal investigatory stop?
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¶12 Lacasella contends that the District Court erred when it held
that his license plate was not conspicuously displayed on the front
of his vehicle pursuant to § 61-3-301, MCA, and concluded that
Deputy Dominick had particularized suspicion that Lacasella was
engaged in criminal conduct. He maintains that the manner in which
his license plate was displayed complies with § 61-3-301, MCA;
therefore, the stop was unlawful and all evidence gathered after
the stop must be suppressed. He also challenges the District
Court’s conclusion that even if the plate was visible, Deputy
Dominick could lawfully make an investigatory stop to determine
whether the plate was securely fastened to the vehicle.
¶13 The State argues that Lacasella’s licence plate was not
conspicuously displayed on the “front” of the vehicle because the
inside of the windshield is in the center of the vehicle.
Furthermore, the State argues that Deputy Dominick’s inability to
see the license plate is proof that the license plate was not in
plain view at night. Therefore, Lacasella was in violation of the
law and the stop was warranted. Alternatively, the State contends
that Deputy Dominick had particularized suspicion to initiate a
stop because he could not see the license plate displayed in
Lacasella’s window when he observed his vehicle pull onto Highway
93. Because the information relevant to determination of
particularized suspicion is that information which is known to the
officer at the time the stop is initiated, the State argues that
Deputy Dominick lawfully stopped Lacasella to determine whether his
vehicle was properly registered, and that the observations made
while Deputy Dominick approached Lacasella broadened the scope of
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the stop to include particularized suspicion that Lacasella was
driving under the influence of alcohol.
A. Section 61-3-301, MCA.
¶14 Whether particularized suspicion existed in this case first
requires us to determine whether Deputy Dominick and the District
Court correctly interpreted § 61-3-301, MCA. When interpreting
statutes, this Court’s only function is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. State v. McNally, 2002 MT ___, ¶ 19,
___ Mont. ___, ¶ 19, 50 P.3d 1080, ¶ 19 (citations omitted).
Construction of a statute requires this Court “simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms
or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been
inserted.” Section 1-2-101, MCA.
¶15 Section 61-3-301, MCA, provides:
a person may not operate a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of Montana unless the vehicle is properly
registered and has the proper number of plates
conspicuously displayed, one on the front and one on the
rear of the vehicle, each securely fastened to prevent it
from swinging and unobstructed from plain view . . . .
¶16 The purpose of requiring a license plate to be conspicuously
displayed on the front and rear of a vehicle is to enable law
enforcement officers to ascertain whether a vehicle that is
approaching or being followed is properly registered. The State
asks this Court to conclude that the “front” of a vehicle, as used
in § 61-3-301, MCA, is limited to the front bumper and grill of a
vehicle. However, common sense indicates that such a narrow
definition of front in this context makes conduct that complies
with the purpose of the statute illegal. The law simply requires
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that license plates be visible from both the front and the rear of
a vehicle. The photographs of Lacasella’s vehicle demonstrate that
his license plate was visible from the “front” of the vehicle and
could be seen by an approaching vehicle. We conclude that the
manner in which Lacasella displayed his license plate complied with
§ 61-3-301, MCA’s, requirement that a license plate be displayed on
the front his pick-up truck.
¶17 Lacasella also contends that the District Court erred when it
concluded that his license plate was not “conspicuously displayed”
in compliance with § 61-3-301, MCA. He argues that the pictures
stipulated to by the parties clearly indicate that his plate was
“conspicuously displayed.” The State argues that a license plate
displayed behind a windshield is not unobstructed from plain view.
It maintains that a license plate set inside a windshield is not
readily visible at night because the glare from headlights diminish
the ability of an observer to see the plate, as demonstrated by
this case.
¶18 The pictures stipulated to by the parties show that the
windshield was clear and the license plate was visible through it.
The District Court speculated that it was highly unlikely that a
law enforcement officer would be able to see the license plate at
night because the glare of headlights would obscure it from plain
view. However , there is no evidence that the plate was obscured
by glare on the night in question. Although a court is permitted
to make reasonable inferences from the facts, it is not permitted
to assume facts not in evidence. Therefore, we conclude that
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Lacasella’s license plate was clearly and conspicuously displayed
and unobstructed from plain view.
B. Particularized Suspicion
¶19 Montana recognizes a narrow exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches and seizures
“which allows a law enforcement officer to briefly detain and
question an individual without probable cause if the officer
suspects the individual has committed or is in the process of
committing an offense.” State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 11, 291
Mont. 77, ¶ 11, 966 P.2d 137, ¶ 11 (citing Terry v. Ohio (1986),
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889). Montana has codified
this exception at § 46-5-401, MCA:
Investigative Stop. In order to obtain or verify an
account of the person’s presence or conduct or to
determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer
may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in
circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that
the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.
¶20 Whether “particularized suspicion” exists is determined in
light of the totality of the circumstances. Henderson, ¶ 12
(citing State v. Gopher (1981), 193 Mont. 189, 631 P.2d 293. The
totality of the circumstances takes the officer’s knowledge and
training into consideration. Henderson, ¶ 12 (citing Gopher, 193
Mont. at 193, 631 P.2d at 295). A particularized suspicion does
not require that the officer be certain that an offense has been
committed. Henderson, ¶ 12. The State has the burden to show: 1)
objective data from which an experienced officer can make certain
inferences; and 2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing or was a witness to
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criminal activity. Kleinsasser v. State, 2002 MT 36, ¶ 12, 308
Mont. 325, ¶ 12, 42 P.3d 801, ¶ 12 (citing Gopher, 193 Mont at 194,
631 P.2d at 296).
¶21 In Henderson, a law enforcement officer made an investigatory
stop because he could not read the letters of a temporary vehicle
registration through the vehicle’s tinted windows. We concluded
that the inability of an officer to see a registration sticker
because it was displayed behind a tinted car window was sufficient
to give rise to particularized suspicion that the vehicle was not
properly registered and justified an investigatory stop.
Henderson, ¶ 14. Because the defendant did not respond to the
officer’s attempt to stop him for over two blocks, the scope of the
officer’s inquiry broadened to include particularized suspicion
that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence. Henderson,
¶ 15. In Henderson, we declined to address the issue of whether
the temporary registration was “clearly displayed” in compliance
with Montana law. Henderson, ¶ 14. We noted that the State
produced substantial evidence that the officer who initiated the
investigatory stop could not view the letters on the temporary tag
because of the dark tinted windows. Henderson, ¶ 14. In fact, the
officer needed artificial illumination to read the tag through the
window when he inspected the vehicle in spite of the fact the stop
was made in broad daylight. Henderson, ¶ 14. Consequently, we
concluded that the District Court misapprehended the effect of the
evidence when it found that the officer had no reasonable grounds
to suspect that an offense was being committed and reversed its
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decision to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
traffic stop. Henderson, ¶ 16.
¶22 The State argues that Henderson provides binding precedent in
the present case because, like Henderson, Deputy Dominick could not
see Lacasella’s license plate and, therefore, had a particularized
suspicion that the vehicle was being driven on state highways in
violation of § 61-3-301, MCA. Furthermore, the State argues that
the observations Deputy Dominick made when Lacasella stepped from
his vehicle broadened the scope of the stop to include
particularized suspicion that Lacasella was illegally driving while
under the influence of alcohol, similar to the defendant’s delayed
response to the officer’s lights in Henderson.
¶23 Henderson can be distinguished from the instant case for a
number of reasons. First, we have concluded that the manner in
which Lacasella’s license plate was displayed in this case complies
with Montana law , whereas we declined to make that determination
in Henderson. We also note that the window in Henderson was so
darkly tinted artificial illumination was required to read the
letters in broad daylight - the law enforcement officer could not
see the vehicle registration. In this case, the pictures indicate
that the window was not tinted and the license plate was clearly
visible from the outside. Given the benefit of the doubt, Deputy
Dominick did not see the license plate. Even if the State’s
contention that glare could obscure the license plate from plain
view at night is true, it produced no evidence that glare obscured
the license plate from plain view in this case. Therefore, unlike
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Henderson, the plate in the present case could be seen by a law
enforcement officer.
¶24 Another important distinction between Henderson and the
present case is the officer’s understanding and application of the
law to the facts. In Henderson, the officer’s understanding of
Montana law, was correct and he pulled the vehicle over because he
could not see the temporary registration through the vehicle’s
tinted window. Lacasella contends that a law enforcement officer’s
belief that a person is involved in wrongdoing which is based upon
a misunderstanding of the law cannot constitute particularized
suspicion for a constitutional investigatory stop.
¶25 The State responds that what is known by the officer at the
time of the stop dictates whether particularized suspicion existed
and that particularized suspicion does not require certainty on the
part of the officer that a crime has been committed. It argues
that Deputy Dominick did not see a front license plate when
Lacasella entered Highway 93. Therefore, based on what he knew at
the time he initiated the stop, he had a reasonable suspicion that
Lacasella was operating his vehicle in violation of § 61-3-301,
MCA.
¶26 There is a legal distinction between a mistake of fact and a
mistake of law. Deputy Dominick’s knowledge of the law and his
perception of the facts based upon that understanding is the
question before this Court. This Court has not had the opportunity
to consider whether particularized suspicion can exist when an
investigatory stop is made based on a mistaken view of the law.
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¶27 The incident report filed by Deputy Dominick states: “I
observed that the truck had no front license plate . . . he showed
his front plated [sic] that he had setting in his windshield. I
explained to him it needed to be mounted on the front bumper.” The
State’s response to Lacasella’s motion to suppress provides:
“Deputy Dominick stopped the vehicle, which was driven by the
Defendant, Gary Lacasella, and informed him that he had stopped him
for not having his license plate mounted on his front bumper.” It
is clear from the report that Deputy Dominick believed that § 61-3-
301, MCA, required a license plate to be mounted to the bumper.
Furthermore, arguments made in the District Court indicate that
Deputy Dominick believed that only the bumper and grill constitute
the “front” of a vehicle, and a license plate mounted elsewhere did
not comply with the law. It is clear that Deputy Dominick, the
State and the District Court misapprehended § 61-3-301, MCA.
¶28 In United States v. Lopez-Soto (9th Cir. 2000), 205 F.3d 1101,
a California law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle because he
believed that the law required the registration sticker to be
displayed in a vehicle’s rear window. The officer pulled behind
and along the side of the vehicle to determine if a registration
sticker was properly displayed. The officer initiated an
investigatory traffic stop after determining there was no
registration sticker displayed in the rear window. California law,
however, required that the sticker be displayed on the front window
of the vehicle. The Ninth Circuit stated:
the traffic stop in the case before us was not
objectively grounded in the governing law. . . .This
cannot justify the stop under the Fourth Amendment. Nor
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is it possible to justify the stop objectively . . . with
the facts available to Officer Hill when he made the
stop: in his mistaken belief that Baja California law
required the registration sticker to be visible from
behind, Officer Hill did not check the windshield for the
sticker. The information that he did gather - that there
was no sticker on the rear or left windows - did not make
it any less likely that Lopez-Soto was operating his car
in conformity with the law.
We have no doubt that Officer Hill held his mistaken view
of the law in good faith, but there is no good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do not
act in accordance with governing law. [citation omitted]
To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of
the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive
for police to make certain that they properly understand
the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.
Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106.
¶29 In United States v. Twilley (9th Cir. 2000), 222 F.3d 1092,
1096, the Ninth Circuit revisited its holding in Lopez-Soto and
stated that:
A suspicion based on such a mistaken view of the law
cannot be the reasonable suspicion required for the
Fourth Amendment, because ‘the legal justification [for a
traffic stop] must be objectively grounded.’ [citation
omitted]. In other words, if an officer makes a traffic
stop based on a mistake of law, the stop violates the
Fourth Amendment.
While the officer need not perfectly understand the law
when he stops the vehicle, his observation must give him
an objective basis to believe that the vehicle violates
the law.
¶30 These cases stand for the proposition that observations made
by an officer who does not understand the law are not objectively
grounded in the law and, therefore, cannot be the basis for
particularized suspicion. In Lopez-Soto, the officer’s
observations were limited to those facts which he thought were
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legally relevant pursuant to his understanding of the law. The
Ninth Circuit held that those facts, which were based on a
misapprehension of the law, could not give rise to a suspicion that
the vehicle was in violation of the law and were not objectively
grounded in the law. Similarly, Deputy Dominick thought that
Montana law required a license plate to be displayed on Lacasella’s
bumper. Furthermore, he believed that the front of the vehicle was
limited to the front bumper and grill of the vehicle. Based on
this misunderstanding, he had no reason to look at Lacasella’s
windshield for a license plate and the State produced no evidence
that he did.
¶31 The data upon which particularized suspicion was founded in
this case was gathered based upon a clear misapprehension of the
law. Deputy Dominick thought that Montana law required a license
plate to be mounted on either the bumper or the grill of
Lacasella’s truck. The State produced no evidence that Deputy
Dominick looked at Lacasella’s windshield. Furthermore, based on
his misunderstanding of the law, Deputy Dominick would have had no
reason to look at the windshield once he determined there was no
license plate on the bumper of the vehicle. However, the fact that
there was no license plate on the bumper of Lacasella’s vehicle
provides no objective basis that the law was being violated. The
pictures of the truck suggest that Deputy Dominick could have seen
the license plate if he had looked at the window as well as the
bumper of the vehicle.
¶32 Based on the facts presented in this case, we conclude that
the observations made by Deputy Dominick were not objectively
15
grounded in Montana law because they were based upon a
misunderstanding of the law. Therefore, Deputy Dominick did not
have the objective data necessary to justify an investigatory stop.
We hold that the investigatory stop made by Deputy Dominick was
unlawful and that the evidence obtained subsequent to that stop
should have been suppressed.
¶33 Finally, Lacasella maintains that the District Court erred
when it held that even if Deputy Dominick had seen the license
plate mounted on the windshield he was permitted to make an
investigatory stop to determine if it was securely fastened. Law
enforcement is not permitted to make an investigatory stop unless
an officer observes objective data that gives rise to an inference
that an individual is involved in wrongdoing. To hold as the
District Court did would justify the investigatory stop of every
vehicle in Montana. We conclude that the District Court erred when
it held that if Deputy Dominick had seen the license plate in the
window, he was permitted to make an investigatory stop to determine
if the license plate was securely fastened.
¶34 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Order of the
District Court which denied Lacasella’s motion to suppress and
remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
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Justice W. William Leaphart dissenting.
¶35 I dissent.
¶36 Section 61-3-301, MCA, requires that a vehicle have the proper
number of plates “conspicuously displayed, one on the front and one
on the rear of the vehicle . . . .” The Court, relying on daytime
pictures in which the plate, taped to the windshield, was visible
from outside the car, concludes that there was no evidence that the
plate was obscured by glare on the night in question. Finally the
Court reasons that, due to Officer Dominick’s mistaken belief that
a license plate had to be displayed on the bumper, he “had no
reason to look at the windshield.”
¶37 “Conspicuous” is defined as follows: “Easy to notice; obvious
. . . noticeable.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, Third Edition, 1992. If the license plate had been
displayed in a conspicuous position, it would have been obvious and
noticeable to Officer Dominick without his having “to look for it.”
Officer Dominick’s report indicates that, “I observed that the
truck had no front license plate . . . .” This is uncontroverted
evidence that the plate was not conspicuously displayed on the
night in question. Officer Dominick had particularized suspicion
to initiate a stop of Lacasella’s vehicle. I would affirm the
decision of the District Court.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray concurs in the dissent of Justice
Leaphart.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
Justice Jim Rice dissenting.
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¶38 I join Justice Leaphart’s dissent and also dissent because I believe the Court has
erroneously interpreted the statute at issue.
¶39 Section 61-3-301, MCA, requires that a vehicle must have “the
proper number of plates, conspicuously displayed, one on the front
and one on the rear . . . .” The Court reasons that our only
function when interpreting statutes “is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature,” and concludes that the statute “simply
requires that license plates be visible from both the front and the
rear of the vehicle.”
¶40 First, our duty in interpreting statutes is to apply the plain
meaning, if unambiguous. Here, it is not necessary to discern
legislative intent or otherwise look beyond the words of § 61-3-
301, MCA. The plain meaning of the words requires a license plate
to be conspicuously displayed “on the front” of the vehicle. The
statute does not create a test for visibility from the front of a
vehicle. It requires attachment of the plate “on the front.”
Lacasella’s plate was not attached “on the front” of his pick-up
truck, and he therefore violated the statute. I would affirm.
_________________________________
Justice
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