No. 00-432
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 150
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RICHARD LEE PRICE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable Marge Johnson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Carl B. Jensen, Jr., Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jim Wheelis,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney; John Parker, Deputy County
Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 21, 2002
Decided: July 2, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 By Information filed in the District Court for the Eighth
Judicial District in Cascade County, the Defendant, Richard Lee
Price, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI), a fourth or subsequent offense, and four misdemeanors:
failure to wear a seatbelt, driving while the privilege to do so is
revoked, failure to yield the right of way, and failure to exhibit
proof of insurance. Prior to trial, Price pled guilty to the
misdemeanors. Following a jury trial, Price was convicted of the
DUI charge and for that offense was sentenced to twelve months
imprisonment, and an additional four years of probation. For the
misdemeanors, the District Court fined Price and sentenced him to
two days in jail for driving with a revoked license and ten days in
jail for failure to exhibit proof of insurance. All sentences were
to run consecutively. The misdemeanor jail sentences were deemed
served because Price had served eighteen days in jail awaiting
trial. The District Court credited the remaining six days of time
served to Price's DUI sentence. Price appeals from his DUI
conviction and the District Court's application of time served. We
affirm both the conviction and the sentence of the District Court.
¶2 The following issues are presented on appeal:
¶3 1. Did sufficient evidence exist to support Price's DUI
conviction?
¶4 2. Did the District Court properly award credit for time
served?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2
¶5 On March 15, 1999, the State charged Price by Information with
one count of DUI, a fourth or subsequent offense, in violation of §
61-8-401, MCA (1997), as well as four misdemeanor offenses. In
support of the DUI charge, the State alleged that "Defendant
operated or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, a
1988 gray Chevrolet Beretta, on a way of this state open to the
public, Fourth Street North, while under the influence of alcohol."
The misdemeanors for which Price was charged included failure to
wear a seatbelt, driving while the privilege to do so is revoked,
failure to yield the right of way, and failure to exhibit proof of
insurance. All offenses were alleged to have occurred in Great
Falls, Montana, on March 5, 1999.
¶6 Price pled guilty to the misdemeanors prior to trial. The DUI
charge was tried before a jury on January 18, 2000. At trial, the
State first called Great Falls police officer Shane Sorenson as a
witness. Sorenson testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m. on
March 15, 1999, he was on duty in his patrol car when he observed
Price drive his vehicle from a stop sign and into the path of an
approaching vehicle, which struck Price's vehicle on the driver's
door. After the accident, Sorenson approached each vehicle to
check for possible injuries. Price informed Sorenson that his neck
hurt. Sorenson then crawled into the back seat of Price's vehicle
and immobilized Price's neck until medical personnel arrived.
¶7 Sorenson noticed that Price had alcohol on his breath and that
his speech was slurred. According to Sorenson, Price was asked by
medical personnel whether he had been drinking that night, and
Price responded affirmatively. Sorenson, however, was concerned
3
that Price's incoherence may have been caused by a possible
concussion given the nature of the accident.
¶8 Sorenson testified he then met with Price at the hospital
approximately forty-five minutes to an hour after the accident.
Sorenson noticed that Price's speech was still slurred, his eyes
appeared to be bloodshot, and he still smelled of alcohol. Price
was read his Miranda warning and given the Montana Implied Consent
Advisory. Although Price initially agreed to give a blood sample,
he subsequently refused citing his fear of needles. Price then
agreed to give a breath sample. However, after Sorenson retrieved
his portable breath tester, Price again refused, based on his
professed belief that breath tests were inaccurate. Sorenson then
issued Price a DUI citation "[g]iven the secondary indicators that
I observed, given the eyes being bloodshot and glazed, given the
incoherence and slurred speech, given the odor of the alcoholic
beverages, then the primary indicator being impaired judgment,
being that he pulled out directly in front of an oncoming vehicle
at night with it's [sic] headlights on . . . ." Sorenson did admit
that if Price had taken a breath test which produced negative
results for alcohol, he would not have issued Price a citation.
¶9 Price testified that when he pulled up to the stop sign prior
to the accident, he and his girlfriend, Shelly Simons, were
involved in an argument, and that out of frustration and anger, he
accelerated. Price testified that after the accident, everything
was a "blur," and that the impact of the collision caused his
slurred voice.
4
¶10 Price did admit that he had been drinking prior to the
accident. Price testified that at about 3:30 or 4:00 p.m., he and
Simons shared approximately three-quarters of a quart of beer.
Sometime later, Price drank what he characterized as "less than a
beer" at Jakers, a local restaurant and casino. At about 7:00
p.m., Price and Simons went to a friend's house, where they stayed
until about 9:00 p.m. At the friend's house, Price had a couple
more beers. In all, Price admitted to consuming the equivalent of
five beers in a six hour span. However, Price testified to his
belief that the alcohol did not affect his driving.
¶11 Two other witnesses testified. Simons, who was with Price at
the time of and preceding the accident, testified that Price's
voice was not "incoherent or slurred" before the accident. She
also testified that despite his consumption of alcohol, Price was
not intoxicated. The final witness at trial was Price's emergency
room physician, Dr. Betty Kuffel. Kuffel testified that when Price
arrived at the hospital, he was "completely restrained and smelled
of alcohol. He was cooperative. His speech was slurred and he
appeared intoxicated." She identified no medical condition such as
a head injury that would have accounted for Price's slurred speech.
¶12 Price filed a motion for a directed verdict based on his
contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. His motion was denied. The jury convicted Price of
DUI on January 18, 2000. On May 15, 2000, the District Court
sentenced Price to the Department of Corrections for twelve months,
followed by an additional four years of probation. For the
misdemeanors, the District Court imposed fines and sentenced Price
5
to two days in jail for driving with a revoked license and ten days
in jail for failure to exhibit proof of insurance. All sentences
were to run consecutively and the misdemeanor jail sentences were
deemed served because Price had already served eighteen days in
jail awaiting trial. The District Court then credited Price with
six days of time served toward his DUI sentence.
¶13 Price objected to the manner in which the District Court
awarded credit for time served, and requested full credit for time
served toward each charge for which he was held following his
arrest. On May 16, 2000, Price filed a Notice of Appeal. The
District Court issued a final written judgment on June 26, 2000.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury
verdict to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Merrick, 2000 MT 124, ¶ 7, 299 Mont. 472, ¶ 7, 2
P.3d 242, ¶ 7.
¶15 The District Court's award of credit for time served in this
case was based on a statutory interpretation. A statutory
interpretation is a conclusion of law, which we review to determine
whether the district court's interpretation of the law is correct.
State v. Sullivan (1994), 266 Mont. 313, 318, 880 P.2d 829, 832.
DISCUSSION
ISSUE 1
6
¶16 Did sufficient evidence exist to support Price's DUI
conviction?
¶17 Price contends that the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence to support his DUI conviction. Specifically, he argues
that Officer Sorenson's admission that he would not have cited
Price for DUI had he taken a breath test and tested negative was an
admission that there was insufficient evidence to convict.
¶18 The State asserts that there was sufficient evidence, without
a breath test, to convict Price of DUI. The State contends that
Sorenson's response was not an admission that the evidence was
insufficient, but simply a response to a hypothetical question.
The State asserts that the conviction in this case was supported by
a variety of factors, including Sorenson's observation of Price's
driving behavior, Price's incoherent and slurred speech, the odor
of alcohol on Price, Price's admission that he had been drinking,
Price's bloodshot eyes, and the emergency room physician's
observations.
¶19 In State v. Lias (1985), 218 Mont. 124, 127, 706 P.2d 500,
502, we explained the substantial evidence test:
In applying the substantial evidence test to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict, this Court is governed by established
principles. In applying the test the evidence is viewed
in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. The
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses are exclusively the province of the trier of
fact. If the evidence conflicts, it is within the
province of the trier of fact to determine which shall
prevail. The test is met if a reasonable mind would
accept the evidence as supporting the conclusion reached.
[Citations omitted.]
The manner in which a vehicle is driven can be evidence of driving
under the influence of alcohol. State v. Peterson (1989), 236
7
Mont. 247, 250, 769 P.2d 1221, 1223. The State is not required to
produce evidence of a quantifiable blood alcohol content to
demonstrate a defendant is under the influence of alcohol. See
generally State v. Brady, 2000 MT 282, ¶ 28, 302 Mont. 174, ¶ 28,
13 P.3d 941, ¶ 28 (stating in the context of a DUI case that "the
State is not obligated to supply any specific type of evidence: a
jury may consider the facts and circumstances of an accident and
the observations and opinions of witnesses, giving effect to the
evidence it finds credible.").
¶20 In this case, substantial evidence supported the jury's
verdict. Sorenson himself, who testified to investigating
"probably 30" DUI charges within the past year, witnessed Price's
driving behavior. Price recklessly entered an intersection from a
stop sign without regard to oncoming traffic. Following the
accident, Sorenson observed that Price's speech was incoherent and
slurred, and that he smelled of alcohol. Price himself admitted
that he had been drinking prior to the accident. The emergency
room physician testified that Price smelled of alcohol, his speech
was slurred and that he appeared intoxicated. Taken as a whole, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Price was driving under the influence of
alcohol. Therefore, the DUI conviction is affirmed.
ISSUE 2
¶21 Did the District Court properly award credit for time served?
¶22 The District Court sentenced Price to jail time for three
charges. For the misdemeanors, Price was sentenced to two days in
jail for driving with a revoked license and ten days for failure to
8
provide insurance. For the DUI conviction, Price was sentenced to
twelve months to the Department of Corrections. The District Court
ordered Price's sentences to run consecutively. To account for the
time Price spent in county jail awaiting trial, the District Court
credited Price with eighteen days of time served. The District
Court first applied Price's credit to the misdemeanor jail
sentences, a combined twelve days, and then applied the remaining
six days of credit toward the DUI sentence.
¶23 Price contends that the District Court erroneously applied §
46-18-403(1), MCA, the statute which requires credit for
incarceration prior to conviction. Price contends that the
District Court was required to grant him full credit for time
served on each sentence imposed. Therefore, according to Price,
not only should his two and ten day misdemeanor jail sentences have
been deemed served, but he should also have received an eighteen
day credit against his DUI sentence.
¶24 The State, on the other hand, contends that the District Court
correctly interpreted § 46-18-403(1), MCA, when it applied the
eighteen days of credit once against the total time to be served
for the three consecutive sentences. The State asserts that
awarding the full amount of time served toward each sentence, when
sentences run consecutively rather than concurrently, would lead to
an absurd result and is inconsistent with the approach uniformly
taken in other jurisdictions.
¶25 Section 46-18-403(1), MCA, provides:
Credit for incarceration prior to conviction. (1)
Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense and against
9
whom a judgment of imprisonment is rendered must be
allowed credit for each day of incarceration prior to or
after conviction, except that the time allowed as a
credit may not exceed the term of the prison sentence
rendered.
¶26 Statutory language must be construed according to its plain
meaning and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, no further
interpretation is necessary. Clarke v. Massey (1995), 271 Mont.
412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088. This Court must attempt to discern
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, § 1-2-102,
MCA; State v. Hubbard (1982), 200 Mont. 106, 111, 649 P.2d 1331,
1333, and construe each statute so as to avoid an absurd result
"and to give effect to the purpose of the statute." Infinity Ins.
Co. v. Dodson, 2000 MT 287, ¶ 46, 302 Mont. 209, ¶ 46, 14 P.3d 487,
¶ 46 (citing Christenot v. State, Dept. of Commerce (1995), 272
Mont. 396, 401, 901 P.2d 545, 548).
¶27 We conclude that Price's interpretation is not warranted by
the plain language of the statute and would result in a fundamental
unfairness in the administration of criminal sentencing among
similarly situated defendants. The Hawaii Supreme Court recently
stated the inherent problem:
Statutes giving credit for presentence confinement were
designed to ensure equal treatment of all defendants
whether or not they are incarcerated prior to conviction.
Granting presentence credit, therefore, seeks to place
an in-custody criminal defendant who cannot afford to
10
post bail in the same position as his counterpart with
bail money.
Once credit has been granted, no additional purpose
is served by granting a second or "double credit" against
a later consecutive sentence. Courts in other
jurisdictions having similar statutes agree that a
defendant who receives consecutive sentences is entitled
to presentence credit only once against the aggregate of
the consecutive terms, while a defendant sentenced to
concurrent terms in effect receives credit against each
sentence. [Citations omitted.]
State v. Tauiliili (Haw. 2001), 29 P.3d 914, 918. In addition to
the potential inequity foreseen by the Hawaii court, the statute
does not provide for repeated application of time served. It
simply requires that the defendant be credited with time served.
That is what was done in this case.
¶28 Price's interpretation of § 46-18-403(1), MCA, would also
defeat the Legislature's purpose for permitting consecutive
sentences. See § 46-18-401, MCA. As noted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court:
The state offered in its brief a situation where a
defendant is charged with multiple misdemeanors. In the
state's hypothesis, a criminal who is charged with 25
separate batteries and is in nine months pretrial custody
and then receives a nine months sentence on each count
consecutively would be immediately discharged if
multiple-time credits were to be allowed. While the
hypothesis cited is an example of logical overkill, we
consider it sufficiently persuasive to convince us that
good public policy comports with the meaning we give the
sentencing-credit statute.
State v. Boettcher (Wis. 1988), 423 N.W.2d 533, 539. Although in
this case the defendant had earned only eighteen days of
presentence credit, it is not unusual that defendants spend six
months to a year in jail awaiting trial in complex criminal cases.
We agree with the logic expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
11
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that § 46-18-403(1), MCA,
entitles defendants to credit for presentence incarceration only
once against the aggregate of all terms imposed when multiple
sentences are imposed consecutively.
¶29 Our interpretation of § 46-18-403(1), MCA, is consistent with
that uniformly followed in other jurisdictions which have
interpreted similar statutes. See, e.g., State v. Tauiliili (Haw.
2001), 29 P.3d 914, 918; Blankenship v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000), 763 A.2d 741; State v. Sanchez (Neb. Ct. App. 1994), 520
N.W.2d 33; State v. Percy (Vt. 1992), 612 A.2d 1119; People v.
Watts (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), 464 N.W.2d 715; State v. Miranda (N.M.
1989), 779 P.2d 224; State v. Cuen (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), 761 P.2d
160; State v. Riley (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), 761 S.W.2d 745; Nissel v.
Pierce (Or. 1988), 764 P.2d 224; Endell v. Johnson (Alaska App.
1987), 738 P.2d 769, 771; State v. Arcand (N.D. 1987), 403 N.W.2d
23; People v. Pluskis (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), 515 N.E.2d 480;
Schubert v. People (Colo. 1985), 698 P.2d 788; Effinger v. State
(Minn. 1986), 380 N.W.2d 483; State v. Decker (N.H. 1985), 503 A.2d
796; State v. Aaron (N.M. Ct. App. 1985), 703 P.2d 915; State v.
Jenkins (Kan. Ct. App. 1984), 690 P.2d 396; State v. Cruz-Mata
(Ariz. 1983), 674 P.2d 1368; State v. Hoch (Idaho 1981), 630 P.2d
143; Simms v. State (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), 421 N.E.2d 698; People v.
Brown (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), 107 Cal.App.3d 858; Commonwealth v.
Carter (Mass. App. Ct. 1980), 411 N.E.2d 184; People ex rel.
Bridges v. Malcolm (N.Y. 1978), 379 N.E.2d 156; State v. Richardson
(N.C. 1978), 245 S.E.2d 754; Wilson v. State (Wis. 1978), 264
N.W.2d 234; Cox v. State (Kan. 1974), 522 P.2d 173; Miller v.
12
State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), 297 So.2d 36; United States ex
rel. Derengowski v. United States Attorney Gen. (8th Cir. 1972), 457
F.2d 812; Holland v. State ( Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971), 284 A.2d
874; State v. Johnson (Iowa 1969), 167 N.W.2d 696.
¶30 In this case, Price was entitled to receive "credit for each
day of incarceration," and the District Court properly awarded
Price credit for each day served. Of the eighteen days of
presentence incarceration, twelve days were credited against the
sentences imposed for the two misdemeanor offenses. The District
Court then applied the remaining six days of pretrial incarceration
toward Price's DUI sentence. Therefore, Price was given "credit
for each day of incarceration" – no more, no less. Accordingly, we
conclude that the District Court's interpretation of the law
regarding credit for time served was correct.
¶31 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
13
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
14