No. 01-671
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 112
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAMES MATHIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-01-98,
The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James Mathis (pro se), Jackson, Wyoming
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Kirsten LaCroix, Deputy
County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 17, 2002
Decided: April 25, 2003
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 After receiving a citation for speeding in a construction zone, Appellant James Mathis
challenged the constitutionality of § 61-8-314, MCA, contending that the provision
unlawfully delegated legislative authority to an administrative agency and/or private party.
The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, rejected Mathis’s
constitutional challenge and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Mathis moved for a directed
verdict following the close of the State’s case-in-chief. The District Court denied Mathis’s
motion and the jury subsequently convicted Mathis of the offense. Mathis appeals from the
District Court’s conclusions regarding the constitutional issues and from its denial of his
motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
¶2 Mathis raises the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Does § 61-8-314, MCA, unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to an
administrative agency or private party?
¶4 2. Did the District Court err when it denied Mathis’s motion for a directed verdict
based on insufficiency of the evidence?
BACKGROUND
¶5 Prior to September 2000, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) contracted with
ECM, Inc., to perform construction on Interstate 90 east of Missoula, Montana. ECM
subcontracted to Alpine Construction, Inc., its duty to post construction and reduced speed
limit signs in the construction zone. Alpine Construction, Inc., posted temporary signs
alerting motorists to the construction which lay ahead approximately 8250 feet prior to where
2
ECM commenced work. The speed limit signs gradually reduced the speed of traffic from
seventy-five miles per hour to thirty-five miles per hour nearest the work area. At the end
of the construction zone, a sign indicated a return to the normal seventy-five mile per hour
speed limit.
¶6 On September 6, 2000, a Montana Highway Patrol officer encountered Mathis’s
vehicle traveling fifty-three miles per hour in the thirty-five mile per hour zone on Interstate
90 near Turah, Montana. Therefore, the officer issued Mathis a speeding ticket pursuant to
§ 61-8-314, MCA. Mathis subsequently pled not guilty in the Missoula County Justice Court
and moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that (1) § 61-8-314, MCA,
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive branch and/or to private
parties and (2) the DOT and/or private contractor did not follow proper procedure to reduce
the speed limit in the construction zone. The Justice Court denied Mathis’s motion and a
jury convicted Mathis of the offense on February 20, 2001. On March 2, 2001, Mathis
appealed the conviction to the District Court.
¶7 In District Court, Mathis moved to dismiss the charge on the same grounds. On May
17, 2001, the District Court denied Mathis’s motion and the case proceeded to trial. Mathis
moved for a directed verdict following the State’s presentation of its case-in-chief. The
District Court denied Mathis’s motion and the jury convicted Mathis of the offense on May
31, 2001. On July 30, 2001, Mathis filed a notice of appeal challenging the District Court’s
conclusions with regard to the constitutionality of § 61-8-314, MCA, and its denial of his
motion for a directed verdict.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law. We review a district court’s
application of the Constitution to determine if it is correct. State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 321,
¶ 14, 292 Mont. 192, ¶ 14, 974 P.2d 1132, ¶ 14. It is the duty of courts, if possible, to
construe statutes in a manner that avoids unconstitutional interpretation. Stanko, ¶ 15. We
review a district court’s decision to deny a criminal defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Billedeaux, 2001 MT 9, ¶ 8, 304 Mont. 89, ¶ 8, 18 P.3d
990, ¶ 8.
DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE
¶9 Does § 61-8-314, MCA, unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to an
administrative agency or private party?
¶10 Section 61-8-314, MCA, provides, in pertinent part:
(3) The speed limit in a construction zone or in a work zone must be set
by the department of transportation or the local authority based on traffic
conditions or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance, or survey
project.
(4)(a) If the department of transportation, the local authority, the utility
company, or the private contractor determines, based on traffic conditions or
the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project, that
special speed limits in work zones or construction zones are warranted, then
the department, the local authority, the utility company, or the private
contractor shall post signs that:
(i) conform to the department of transportation’s manual on uniform
traffic control devices;
4
(ii) indicate the boundaries of the construction zone and the work zone;
and
(iii) display the speed limit in effect within both zones.
....
(5) (a) A person convicted of a traffic violation in a work zone is guilty
of a misdemeanor. Upon arrest and conviction, the person shall be punished
by a fine of not less than double the penalty provided for the violation in part
7 of this chapter.
(b) A person convicted of a traffic violation in a construction zone is
guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon arrest and conviction, the person is subject to
the penalty provided for the violation in part 7 of this chapter.
¶11 Mathis contends that the Legislature cannot delegate law-making functions, such as
the establishment of speed limits, to an administrative agency or private party. Mathis admits
that the Legislature can delegate ministerial functions so long as it provides clear standards
and guidelines to the implementing entity. Mathis argues that § 61-8-314, MCA, fails to
articulate the requisite guidelines, vesting “unbridled discretion” in the DOT. Accordingly,
Mathis insists that we must strike § 61-8-314, MCA, down as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority.
¶12 The State argues that § 61-8-314, MCA, articulates “specific standards for the DOT
or other entities performing roadwork to follow when reducing speed limits in a construction
zone.” According to the State, the Legislature expressed such standards by requiring the
entity to affix speed limits in accordance with the “traffic conditions or the condition of the
construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project.” Therefore, the State concludes that
5
§ 61-8-314, MCA, sufficiently satisfies the requirements imposed upon the Legislature for
delegating ministerial functions.
¶13 The District Court concluded that § 61-8-314, MCA, is constitutional in that it sets
forth, with reasonable clarity, the limitations on the DOT’s discretion in setting speed limits
in construction and work zones and does not delegate the establishment of a crime to either
the DOT or private contractors.
¶14 Article III, Section 1, of the Montana Constitution provides:
Separation of powers. The power of the government of this state is
divided into three distinct branches–legislative, executive, and judicial. No
person or persons charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to
one branch shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
¶15 We have previously held that the authority to establish speed limits is legislative in
nature. See Lee v. State (1981), 195 Mont. 1, 8, 635 P.2d 1282, 1286; Stanko, ¶ 28. The
Legislature may constitutionally delegate its legislative functions to an administrative agency,
but it must provide, with reasonable clarity, limitations upon the agency’s discretion and
provide the agency with policy guidance. In re Petition to Transfer Territory, 2000 MT 342,
¶ 13, 303 Mont. 204, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d 447, ¶ 13. In Bacus v. Lake County (1960), 138 Mont.
69, 78, 354 P.2d 1056, 1061, we stated the rule as follows:
The law-making power may not be granted to an administrative body
to be exercised under the guise of administrative discretion. Accordingly, in
delegating powers to an administrative body with respect to the administration
of statutes, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule
for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled
discretion with regard thereto, and a statute or ordinance which is deficient in
this respect is invalid. In other words, in order to avoid the pure delegation of
6
legislative power by the creation of an administrative agency, the legislature
must set limits on such agency’s power and enjoin on it a certain course of
procedure and rules of decision in the performance of its function; and, if the
legislature fails to prescribe with reasonable clarity the limits of power
delegated to an administrative agency, or if those limits are too broad, its
attempt to delegate is a nullity.
On the other hand, a statute is complete and validly delegates
administrative authority when nothing with respect to a determination of what
is the law is left to the administrative agency, and its provisions are sufficiently
clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and
obligation.
¶16 In Duck Inn, Inc. v. Montana State Univ. (1997), 285 Mont. 519, 949 P.2d 1179,
Montana State University–Northern (“Northern”) rented its facilities to private persons and
organizations for parties, reunions, conventions, and receptions in order to generate
supplemental revenue. The Duck Inn, a local Montana corporation, filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment and application for preliminary injunction against Northern. The Duck
Inn argued, in part, that the statute permitting Northern to lease its facilities to private parties
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to an administrative agency.
¶17 The relevant portion of the statute in question provided that the regents of the
Montana university system may:
rent the facilities to other public or private persons, firms, and
corporations for such uses, at such times, for such periods, and at such rates
as in the regents’ judgment will be consistent with the full use thereof for
academic purposes and will add to the revenues available for capital costs and
debt service[.]
7
Section 20-25-302(5), MCA (1993). Duck Inn argued that the “consistent with the full use
thereof” language vested legislative authority in the regents without specific guidelines for
implementing the powers.
¶18 We rejected Duck Inn’s constitutional challenge. In so doing, we concluded:
[I]t is clear that § 20-25-302, MCA (1993), is not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the board of regents. The policy
underlying the statute is set forth in the statute; that policy is to increase
revenues available for the capital costs of, and debt service on, campus
facilities. The implicit, but clear, rationale behind the statute is to minimize
the tax support necessary to fund units of the Montana university system by
leasing campus facilities. Likewise, § 20-25-302, MCA (1993), expressly
constrains the leasing of such facilities by mandating that the leasing must be
consistent with full use of the facilities for the academic purposes for which
they were established. Here, this constraint on the board of regents is the
“standard” or “guide” required . . . for a proper legislative delegation of power.
The Duck Inn contends, in this regard, that the “regents’ discretion”
language contained in § 20-25-302, MCA (1993), provides insufficient limits
on the legislative delegation of power. It provides no legal authority for its
position, however, and we conclude that the regents’ discretion is sufficiently
limited by the statutory requirements that the leasing be consistent with the full
use of the facilities for academic purposes and produce revenues for capital
costs or debt service.
Duck Inn, Inc., 285 Mont. at 525-26, 949 P.2d at 1183.
¶19 Based on the same analysis employed in Duck Inn, Inc., we conclude that § 61-8-314,
MCA, does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to an administrative body or
private party. Here, the implicit, but clear, rationale behind the statute is to protect drivers
and workers in construction and work zones. The penalty for committing a traffic offense
in a work zone, “not less than double the penalty” for similar offenses committed outside the
confines of a work zone, lends credence to the implicit policy rationale.
8
¶20 Contrary to Mathis’s suggestion, § 61-8-314, MCA, does not grant unfettered
discretion to establish traffic regulations in construction and work zones. Rather, § 61-8-
314, MCA, requires the respective entity to establish speed limits in construction and work
zones “based on traffic conditions or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance,
or survey project.” Construction and work zones on Montana highways presumably
encompass a diverse set of driving conditions. Because of this, establishing the speed limit
for every construction project would be an impractical, if not impossible, task for the
Legislature. Enumerating every possible factor which might impact construction zone safety
would be similarly unrealistic. Therefore, it makes sense to delegate these duties to the
entities most familiar with the nuances of each project.
¶21 Mathis cites several cases in which we struck down delegating statutes as
unconstitutional. Admittedly, the distinction between an unconstitutional versus a
constitutional delegation appears slight in some circumstances. However, “[t]he
constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed, and every intendment
in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Ingraham v. Champion Intern. (1990), 243 Mont. 42, 47, 793 P.2d 769, 772. Mathis simply
has not overcome his burden on appeal to establish the unconstitutionality of § 61-8-314,
MCA, beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the above
caveat placed upon local entities sufficiently limits the entities’ discretion such that the
prescription does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The
District Court did not err in rejecting Mathis’s constitutional challenge to § 61-8-314, MCA.
9
¶22 As an aside, Mathis contends that, regardless of our holding with respect to an
administrative agency, Ingraham prohibits legislative delegation to a private party. In
Ingraham, we noted that the Legislature delegated “absolute discretion” to a private party.
We observed that, if the Legislature had delegated legislative authority to an administrative
agency, it would have had to prescribe standards and guides for the grant of that power. In
Ingraham, however, the Legislature provided no guidance when it delegated to a private
entity. While we concluded that the Legislature could not do this, we did not preclude the
delegation based on the entity’s status as a private party–we did so based on the delegation
of “absolute discretion.” Consequently, Ingraham simply concludes that when delegating
legislative authority to a private party, the Legislature cannot ignore the limitations required
of it when delegating to an administrative agency.
ISSUE TWO
¶23 Did the District Court err when it denied Mathis’s motion for a directed verdict, based
on insufficiency of the evidence?
¶24 When the evidence in a criminal case is insufficient to support a guilty verdict, the
court may, either on its own motion or on motion of the defendant, dismiss the action and
discharge the defendant. Section 46-16-403, MCA. A defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict if reasonable persons could not conclude from the evidence, taken in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Billedeaux,
¶ 8. Therefore, a directed verdict of acquittal is appropriate only when there is no evidence
to support a guilty verdict. Billedeaux, ¶ 8.
10
¶25 The parties agree that the State had to prove, among other things, that the DOT and
private parties complied with the provisions of § 61-8-314, MCA, to obtain a conviction for
speeding in a construction zone. Mathis contends that the State failed to prove the requisite
compliance beyond a reasonable doubt. First, Mathis states that a private party, not the DOT
or local authority, established the relevant speed limits in violation of § 61-8-314(3), MCA.
Second, Mathis notes that § 61-8-314(4), MCA, requires the posting of signs to indicate the
boundaries of a construction zone. Mathis maintains that the parties failed to post signs
indicating the commencement of a construction zone.
¶26 As indicated above, § 61-8-314(3), MCA, provides that “[t]he speed limit in a
construction zone or in a work zone must be set by the department of transportation or the
local authority based on traffic conditions or the condition of the construction, repair,
maintenance, or survey project.” Mathis insists that this provision grants authority to
establish speed limits exclusively to the DOT or local authority, not to a private entity as
occurred here. However, § 61-8-314(4)(a), MCA, provides in relevant part:
If the department of transportation, the local authority, the utility
company, or the private contractor determines, based on traffic conditions or
the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project, that
special speed limits in work zones or construction zones are warranted, then
the department, the local authority, the utility company, or the private
contractor shall post signs . . . .
¶27 A statute must be read and considered in its entirety and the legislative intent may not
be determined from the wording of any particular section or sentence, but only from a
consideration of the whole. State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175, 184,
11
500 P.2d 921, 926-27. Stated another way, we will read and construe a statute as a whole
to give effect to a statute’s purpose and avoid an absurd result. S.L.H. v. State Compensation
Mut. Ins. Fund, 2000 MT 362, ¶ 17, 303 Mont. 364, ¶ 17, 15 P.3d 948, ¶ 17.
¶28 Above, we recognized the Legislature’s implicit concern for safety embodied in
§ 61-8-314, MCA. To this end, the Legislature delegated the requisite authority to the most
informed parties. While § 61-8-314(3), MCA, contemplates the establishment of speed
limits by the DOT or local authority, § 61-8-314(4), MCA, incorporates private entities’
specialized judgment. To interpret § 61-8-314, MCA, so narrowly as to limit the task solely
to the DOT and local authority, would render § 61-8-314(4), MCA, meaningless and
propagate an absurd result.
¶29 Further, there is substantial evidence in the record to establish that the private parties
undertook the requisite action pursuant to a contract with the DOT. Shawn Hollenback,
operations manager for Alpine Construction, Inc., testified that the DOT provides
independent contractors with various traffic regulation plans, plans which the DOT develops,
for construction and work zones. Hollenback testified that the DOT instructs the
independent contractors to implement the plan which best “fits the situation.” Hollenback
testified that the independent contractors selected the DOT signing plan, a plan which
provides for speed limit reductions, which applied to the area in question. For the foregoing
reasons, we hold that the District Court did not err when it denied Mathis’s motion for a
directed verdict with regard to § 61-8-314(3), MCA.
12
¶30 Next, Mathis contends that the State failed to show that the DOT and/or private
parties strictly complied with the requirements of § 61-8-314(4), MCA. Section 61-8-314(4),
MCA, provides that if it is determined that special speed limits in construction or work zones
are warranted, the determining entity must post signs that:
(i) conform to the department of transportation’s manual on uniform
traffic control devices;
(ii) indicate the boundaries of the construction zone and the work zone;
and
(iii) display the speed limit in effect within both zones.
¶31 At trial, Dan Bisom, supervisor of the traffic data collection section of the DOT,
testified that the DOT notified ECM that they had to comply with the guidelines in the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”) to insure workers’ safety. In fact,
the employment contract entered into evidence as executed by DOT and ECM provides that
“[a]ll traffic control must be done in accordance with the MUTCD . . . .” Bisom testified
that his maintenance department would notify him if the signs failed to comply with DOT
guidelines. Bisom further testified that nobody notified him of any problems with the signs
at the area in question. Additionally, Hollenback testified that the signing plan utilized in
the area in question conformed to the MUTCD.
¶32 Mathis argues that the parties failed to comply with § 61-8-314(4)(ii), MCA, because
they did not post a sign indicating the boundaries of the construction zone. Mathis suggests
that a sign stating “construction zone begins here,” or something of that nature, must be
displayed to comply with § 61-8-314(4)(ii), MCA.
13
¶33 Mathis offers no authority in support of his position. It is important to point out that
Mathis was charged with speeding in a construction zone, not speeding in a work zone. The
Legislature has expressly defined the two zones differently and has provided for separate
penalties for violations which occur within each zone. As for notification of the
commencement of a construction zone, § 61-8-314(4)(ii), MCA, simply provides that the
entity shall post signs that “indicate the boundaries of the construction zone.” Section
61-8-314(4)(ii), MCA, does not require that this indication come in the form of a
“construction zone begins here” sign. The District Court acknowledged this fact upon
consideration of Mathis’s motion for a directed verdict. It denied Mathis’s motion, in part,
based on its conclusion that whether signing “indicates the boundaries of the construction
zone” is a determination of fact, subject to the jury’s consideration.
¶34 As for what the jury had to consider on the issue, Hollenback testified about the signs
erected in the construction area. Hollenback testified that a lane closure sign indicated the
closing of the right lane one mile prior to the lane closure. Two thousand feet beyond that,
a sign indicated a right lane closure in one-half mile. Nine hundred feet later, the parties
posted a “Reduced Speed Ahead” sign. Three hundred and thirty feet beyond that, a “Fines
Double in Work Zones” sign was displayed. A sixty-five mile per hour speed limit sign was
posted three hundred and thirty feet beyond the “Fines Double” sign. Three hundred and
thirty feet later, the parties posted an arrow board directing traffic to the appropriate lane.
From there, signs incrementally reflected a reduction in speed to fifty-five, forty-five, and
thirty-five. As drivers exited the construction area, they passed two additional directives, an
14
“End of Work Zone” sign and a “Resume Speed” sign. Mathis did not call any witnesses on
his behalf. Instead, Mathis challenged the State’s witnesses on cross-examination and then
moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief.
¶35 Based on the foregoing, we hold that reasonable persons could conclude from the
evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution, that the State proved the
elements of the offense, including compliance with § 61-8-314, MCA, beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, Mathis was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the District
Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion.
¶36 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
15
Justice W. William Leaphart dissenting.
¶37 I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that § 61-8-314, MCA, does not unconstitu-
tionally delegate legislative authority to an administrative agency or private party.
¶38 Mathis argues that this statute unconstitutionally delegates a law-making function to
an administrative agency and also to a private party. He argues that, although the legislature
may delegate “ministerial functions,” it cannot delegate “law-making functions.” Setting
speed limits, he asserts, is a law-making function. Additionally, he argues that even when
delegating ministerial functions, the legislature must provide standards and guidelines, and
in this case, the statute gives the DOT “unbridled discretion.”
¶39 The State argues that the statute lays out an “implicit but clear,” policy rationale of
protecting highway workers’ safety. It argues that the parameters of the statute are clear; the
entity setting the speed limit must base it on “traffic conditions or the condition of the
construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project.” The State asserts that each
construction project in Montana provides a unique set of conditions and the legislature
desired to “allow those closest to the project to limit the risk to highway workers by reducing
the speed limit.”
¶40 The District Court concluded that § 61-8-314, MCA, was constitutional in that it set
forth, with reasonable clarity, the limitations on the DOT’s discretion in setting speed limits
in construction and work zones and did not delegate the establishment of a crime to either
the DOT or private contractors.
¶41 Article III, Section 1, of the Montana Constitution provides:
16
Separation of powers. The power of the government of this state is divided
into three distinct branches–legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or
persons charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as
in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
¶42 The legislature may constitutionally delegate its legislative functions to an
administrative agency, but it must provide, with reasonable clarity, limitations upon the
agency’s discretion and provide the agency with policy guidance. In re Petition to Transfer
Territory, 2000 MT 342, ¶ 13, 303 Mont. 204, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d 447, ¶ 13. A statute is complete
and validly delegates administrative authority when nothing with respect to a determination
of what is the law is left to the administrative agency, and its provisions are sufficiently
clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and obligations. White v.
State (1988), 233 Mont. 81, 88, 759 P.2d 971, 975 (quoting Huber v. Groff (1976), 171
Mont. 442, 457, 558 P.2d 1124, 1132).
¶43 We have previously held that the authority to set speed limits is legislative in nature.
Lee v. State (1981), 195 Mont. 1, 8, 635 P.2d 1282, 1286 (“[t]he authority conveyed upon
the attorney general [to set speed limits in accordance with federal requirements] is clearly
an impermissible delegation of legislative authority”). See also State v. Stanko, 1998 MT
321, ¶ 28, 292 Mont. 192, ¶ 28, 974 P.2d 1132, ¶ 28 (Montana’s “basic rule” statute
“impermissibly delegates the basic public policy of how fast is too fast on Montana’s
highways to ‘policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis’”).
17
¶44 In Lee, the statute at issue required the attorney general to “declare by proclamation,”
the speed limit “whenever the establishment of such a speed limit by the state is required by
federal law as a condition to the state’s continuing eligibility to receive [federal highway]
funds.” Section 61-8-304, MCA (1979). We concluded that the statute was a “blatant
handover of the sovereign power of this state to the federal jurisdiction,” based on the
mandatory nature of the statute. Lee, 195 Mont. at 9, 635 P.2d at 1286. The attorney general
had no discretion nor any factors to consider in setting the speed limit. The statute simply
required that the attorney general set the speed limit to whatever was mandated by federal
law. We noted that in other states where similar legislation was upheld, “either the
legislature pegged the speed limit, or the power granted to a state official or body to adopt
speed limits was couched in permissive instead of mandatory terms.” Lee, 195 Mont. at 9,
635 P.2d at 1286.
¶45 Section 61-8-314(3), MCA, requires the DOT or a local authority to set the speed
limit “based on traffic conditions or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance,
or survey project.” It does not suffer from the same mandatory requirement held
unconstitutional in Lee. The statute lays out factors for the DOT or local authority to
consider. The question remains whether these factors are “sufficiently clear, definite, and
certain to enable the agency to know its rights and obligations.” White, 233 Mont. at 88, 759
P.2d at 975.
¶46 In Douglas v. Judge (1977), 174 Mont. 32, 39, 568 P.2d 530, 534, we held a statute
unconstitutional which authorized the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation to make
18
loans to farmers and ranchers “for any worthwhile project . . . .” There, the statute clearly
gave uncontrolled discretion to the Board to make loans.
¶47 In White, the legislation at issue, House Bill 700, enacted in 1987, expanded the
powers of the Montana Science and Technology Development Board (the Board) by
providing the Board with bonding authority to raise money for certain types of “technology
investments,” and to then invest a percentage of the funds raised in certified Montana capital
companies that make technology investments. White, 233 Mont. at 83-84, 759 P.2d at 972.
The plaintiffs argued that HB 700 granted the Board too much discretion because there were
no standards or rules from the legislature to guide the Board in making technology
investments. White, 233 Mont. at 87-88, 759 P.2d at 975.
¶48 This Court contrasted HB 700 with the legislation which was held constitutional in
Huber. In Huber, the plaintiff asserted that the legislature was too vague in defining
“persons and families of lower income,” when granting the power to assist those persons in
obtaining housing. This Court held that the statutory definition provided an objective
standard for the Board to follow when exercising its power. “The size of the family, total
income available for housing, availability and cost of housing and ability to enter the housing
market at the ‘going rate’ were all objective criteria requiring only observation and
arithmetical calculation.” White, 233 Mont. at 89, 759 P.2d at 976. In contrast, HB 700 did
not “rise to the level of the objective criteria offered in Huber.” White, 233 Mont. at 90, 759
P.2d at 976. The statute stated that technology investments be made “upon favorable
determination by the board” of such factors as the relevance of the proposed project to the
19
purposes of the statute, the prospects for collaboration between public and private sectors,
the prospects for achieving commercial success, the quality of the specific product and
methodology proposed and the availability of matching funds. The Court concluded that
these factors “are more akin to general policy considerations underlying the entire technology
investment program.” White, 233 Mont. at 90, 759 P.2d at 976.
¶49 In 1990, we concluded that a section of the Workers’ Compensation Act which
required a claimant and insurer to agree to convert benefits into a lump sum before
application for lump sum conversion could be made was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority. Ingraham v. Champion International (1990), 243 Mont. 42, 793 P.2d
769. We noted that the legislature could “deny completely any authority to an insurer, a
worker, or the department to apply for or to allow lump-sum conversion of workers’
benefits.” Instead, the legislation delegated an “absolute discretion to the insurer (with
whom a worker agrees) as to whether a lump-sum conversion of . . . benefits will be
converted.” We stated that, “[h]ad the legislature conferred the authority solely upon the
administrative agency, the legislature would have been required to lay down the policy or
reasons behind the statute and to prescribe standards and guides for the grant of the power
to the agency.” Ingraham, 243 Mont. at 48, 793 P.2d at 772. We concluded that “[t]he
power of the legislature to prescribe the amounts, time and manner of payment of workers’
compensation benefits, which as we said at the outset of this paragraph is not doubted, has
been delegated in subdivision (2), § 39-71-741, MCA, to others. This the legislature may
not do.” Ingraham, 243 Mont. at 48, 793 P.2d at 772.
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¶50 Here, the standards and guides set out in the statute are more like the general policy
standards in White. The traffic conditions and the condition of the construction, repair,
maintenance, or survey project are not objective criteria “requiring only observation and
arithmetical calculation.” Individuals assessing these criteria could easily come up with
differing opinions on the appropriate speed limit, resulting in an “ad hoc and subjective
basis” for setting speed limits in construction zones. These standards are too broad and
result in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
¶51 Additionally, the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to a private
party. Although subsection (3) states that the speed limit “must be set” by the DOT,
subsection (4) goes on to state that the DOT, “the local authority, the utility company, or the
private contractor,” may determine that special speed limits are warranted in a work or
construction zone. If one of the entities listed determines that special speed limits are
warranted, the statute then mandates that the entity post signs that conform to specific
requirements. This grants the utility company and/or the private contractor the power to set
the speed limit in the work or construction zone and is, consequently, an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority.
¶52 The State argues that “the instances are manifold of delegations of legislative
authority to private entities for important governmental functions,” and cites § 53-30-601,
MCA, for support. Section 53-30-601, MCA, declares the policy rationale that recognizes
the benefits of confining convicted persons in private correctional facilities. Granting
authority to private entities to house prisoners who have already been convicted in a court
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of law of crimes enacted by the legislature is far different than granting authority to a private
party to set a speed limit which may result in criminal charges. The first is a ministerial
function, while the second is a law-making function. As we said in Ingraham, “[t]his the
legislature may not do.” Ingraham, 243 Mont. at 48, 793 P.2d at 772.
¶53 Consequently, because subsections (3) and (4) of § 61-8-314, MCA, contain an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, I would conclude that § 61-8-314, MCA,
as a whole is unconstitutional.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
Justice James C. Nelson joins in the dissent of Justice Leaphart.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler dissenting.
¶54 I join Justice Leaphart's dissent from the Court's conclusion that § 61-8-314, MCA,
does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to an administrative agency. I differ
only with his conclusion in ¶ 51 that subsection (4) of that statute grants a private contractor
the authority to "set the speed limit in the work or construction zone." For reasons set forth
below, I conclude that the statute delegates that authority only to the Department of
Transportation or a local governmental authority.
¶55 I also dissent with the majority's conclusion that the District Court did not error when
it denied the Defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the
evidence.
¶56 The parties agree, and the majority correctly concludes, "that the state had to prove,
among other things, that the DOT and private parties complied with the provisions of § 61-8-
314, MCA, to obtain a conviction for speeding in a construction zone." ¶ 25. However, the
majority then ignores the most basic rule of statutory construction by ignoring the expressed
language of the statute and omitting the obligations that have been inserted. See § 1-2-101,
MCA.
¶57 Section 61-8-314(3), MCA, states that:
The speed limit in a construction zone or in a work zone must be set by the
Department of Transportation or the local authority based on traffic conditions
or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance or survey project.
¶58 Subparagraph (4)(a) allows a contractor to "post signs" but provides no authority for
the contractor to set the speed limit. Nor is that authority provided in any other part of § 61-
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8-314, MCA. The statute reserves that authority to the Department of Transportation or "the
local authority."
¶59 Here, the State failed to offer evidence that the Department of Transportation set the
speed limit. In fact, the only evidence offered suggests that it did not do so. The State's
principle witness, its supervisor of traffic data collection, testified that he had no knowledge
of the DOT establishing any speed limit at the point in question and documents submitted
as exhibits suggest that the private contractor in fact established a speed limit different than
that recommended by the Department of Transportation.
¶60 Section 61-8-314(4)(ii), MCA, requires that the signs which are posted in a
construction zone "indicate the boundaries of the construction zone. . . ." The signs posted
in this construction zone did not do so. The majority goes to great lengths in ¶ 34 of its
Opinion to indicate all of the signs posted prior to and after the construction zone. However,
strikingly absent is any reference to signs which indicated the boundaries of the construction
zone. The Department of Transportation and its contractor simply did not comply with that
requirement of § 61-8-314, MCA.
¶61 Finally, § 61-8-314(4)(iii), MCA, requires the DOT or its contractor to "display the
speed limit in effect within [the construction zone]." Also conspicuous by its absence is any
reference in ¶ 34 of the majority Opinion to speed limit signs located within the construction
zone. Based on the record before us, there were none.
¶62 The majority criticizes the Defendant, James Mathis, for not offering authority in
support of his argument that the State Department of Transportation failed to comply with
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the provisions of § 61-8-314, MCA. However, the plain language of the statute speaks for
itself. No further authority is necessary. Based on the undisputed facts and the plain
language of the statute, the Department of Transportation and its contractor failed to comply
with its terms.
¶63 For the reasons set forth in Justice Leaphart's Opinion, with the noted exception, I
dissent from the majority's conclusion that § 61-8-314, MCA, did not unconstitutionally
delegate legislative authority to an administrative agency. For the reasons set forth in this
Opinion, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that the State proved that the DOT and its
contractor complied with the provisions of § 61-8-314, MCA, and that it, therefore, proved
the necessary elements of its charge against the Defendant, James Mathis.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
Justice James C. Nelson joins ¶¶ 55 through 62 of the foregoing dissent.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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