No. 03-196
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 32
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM W. CAMERON, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDC 2002-093(C),
Honorable Kenneth R. Neill, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Daniel Donovan, Thompson, Potts & Donovan, P.C.,
Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jim Wheelis, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brant Light, County Attorney; Joel Thompson, Deputy County Attorney,
Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 29, 2003
Decided: February 15, 2005
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 William W. Cameron, Sr. (Cameron), appeals from a jury verdict rendered October
29, 2002, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, finding him guilty of sexual
assault. We affirm.
¶2 The following issues are presented for appeal:
¶3 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on
misdemeanor assault as a lesser included offense?
¶4 2. Did the District Court err in admitting a hearsay statement into evidence?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 Cameron attacked his granddaughter’s fourteen-year-old friend, T.P., at his home on
February 18, 2002. Cameron’s granddaughter and T.P. often went to Cameron’s to “hang
out.” T.P. considered herself close to Cameron, calling him “Grandpa.”
¶6 On this particular day, T.P. went to Cameron’s mobile home by herself because she
was bored. While T.P. was there, Cameron drank shots of vodka until he was admittedly
“really drunk.” No one else was in the residence.
¶7 After playing for a while with a pet bird, T.P. went to use the restroom. As she came
out of the hallway near the bathroom, Cameron pushed her through a doorway onto a bed.
Cameron grabbed her breasts, ripping her shirt. He licked her face and rubbed himself
against her, simulating intercourse. Cameron told her to remove her pants, but she refused.
T.P. managed to get out from under him and fell onto the floor. Cameron fell to the floor as
well, blocking her exit from the room. As T.P. was trying to get up, Cameron grabbed her
2
by the hair and pulled her toward his crotch, giving her a fellatiory directive. She pulled
back and escaped from the room.
¶8 T.P. subsequently ran and walked the eight miles back to her home, crying the entire
way. When T.P. arrived home, she changed clothes, wrapped a blanket around her and sat
on her porch, crying. Her sister, J.P., was home at the time, along with her boyfriend. J.P.’s
boyfriend went outside and asked T.P. what was wrong. T.P. asked for her sister. J.P. went
to T.P. on the porch, and T.P. clung to J.P., weeping. J.P. testified, “I have never been held
so tight in my life by her.”
¶9 During J.P.’s testimony, she described what happened next:
Q. [By the State] So how did you feel before [T.P.] said anything?
A. I got scared.
Q. So you were scared about--what were you scared about?
A. What she was going to say.
Q. What did she say?
A. I asked her what was wrong repeatedly. And she said that –
MR. VAN DER HAGEN [Defense Counsel]: We’re going to object to this as
hearsay.
MR. [sic] RIES [State]: It’s in the present impression, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Overruled.
Q. (BY MS. RIES) So you asked her repeatedly what was wrong?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What did she say?
A. She said, “Grandpa tried raping me.”
3
Q. “Grandpa tried raping me?”
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Did you know who she meant?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Who did she mean?
A. Bill Cameron.
¶10 J.P. told T.P. to call the police, which she did from her neighbor’s house. Officer
Pre’tat responded. He took photographs of T.P. depicting scratches on her face. J.P.
testified that T.P. also had scratches and bruises on her chest that she did not show to Officer
Pre’tat. T.P. gave the officer the stretched and ripped shirt that she had been wearing during
the incident with Cameron.
¶11 Cameron was charged with one count of felony sexual assault, two counts of
misdemeanor assault, and one count of unlawful restraint. Prior to trial, the State moved to
dismiss all counts except sexual assault, which the District Court granted.
¶12 During trial, Cameron submitted proposed jury instructions on misdemeanor assault
as a lesser included offense of sexual assault. The District Court denied the instruction.
Cameron was convicted of sexual assault, and he now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 We review criminal jury instructions to determine whether the instructions, as a
whole, fully and fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law. State v. Bowman, 2004 MT
119, ¶ 49, 321 Mont. 176, ¶ 49, 89 P.3d 986, ¶ 49. District courts have broad discretion in
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formulating jury instructions, and we review such formulations for abuse of discretion.
Bowman, ¶ 49.
¶14 This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State
v. Nolan, 2003 MT 55, ¶ 16, 314 Mont. 371, ¶ 16, 66 P.3d 269, ¶ 16; see also State v. Hope,
2001 MT 207, ¶¶ 9-11, 306 Mont. 334, ¶¶ 9-11, 33 P.3d 629, ¶¶ 9-11.
DISCUSSION
¶15 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on
misdemeanor assault as a lesser included offense?
¶16 Cameron’s challenge to the District Court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense begins with a preliminary argument concerning the tactics of the State.
Cameron notes that he had originally been charged with three misdemeanor offenses,
including misdemeanor assault, in addition to the felony sexual assault charge, but that the
State moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charges three days prior to trial, citing potential
double jeopardy concerns, and the District Court granted the motion. Cameron argues that
there was no actual double jeopardy problem with the charges against him, but, rather, the
State raised the double jeopardy issue as a “ruse” to cover its real purpose: to block
Cameron’s defense that he had committed only misdemeanor assault, and not felony assault.
Citing People v. Barton (Cal. 1995), 906 P.2d 531, 536, for the proposition that “neither the
prosecution nor the defense should be allowed, based on their trial strategy, to preclude the
jury from considering guilt of a lesser offense included in the crime charged,” Cameron
argues that the State acted improperly.
5
¶17 We do not disagree with Barton’s principle that the jury should not be precluded from
considering “a lesser offense included in the crime charged.” Whether misdemeanor assault
is, indeed, a lesser offense included within sexual assault is the central issue here. However,
Cameron is incorrect in asserting that the State acted improperly by dismissing the
misdemeanor charges simply to block Cameron’s strategy of seeking conviction of a lesser
offense–whether or not “double jeopardy” was the reason it sought dismissal of the charges.
“[T]hough the State may well have strategically avoided a double jeopardy defense by its
charging decision, there is no error in doing so. The State is vested with broad discretion in
making charging decisions.” State v. Matt, 2005 MT 9, ¶ 10, 325 Mont. 340, ¶ 10,
___P.3d___, ¶ 10. “[T]he rule of law we apply to alternative offenses is that of prosecutorial
discretion.” State v. Beavers, 1999 MT 260, ¶ 39, 296 Mont. 340, ¶ 39, 987 P.2d 371, ¶ 39.
“Where the facts of a case support a possible charge of more than one crime, the crime to be
charged is a matter of prosecutorial discretion.” State v. Fuqua, 2000 MT 273, ¶ 13, 302
Mont. 99, ¶ 13, 13 P.3d 34, ¶ 13 (citing Beavers, ¶ 39). Here, by deciding to dismiss the
misdemeanor charges, the State narrowed the case–the elements of the offenses and the range
of evidentiary proof necessary for conviction of a charged offense–and by so doing also
broadened the risk that Cameron would be acquitted of the single remaining charge, sexual
assault. Its decision to “put all of its eggs in one basket” is a strategical one that falls within
its discretion and is not improper. That does not mean, however, that the State can block a
jury instruction for an offense which was actually included within the remaining felony
offense, an issue to which we now turn.
6
¶18 Noting that § 46-16-607(2), MCA, requires a lesser included offense instruction to
be given “when there is a proper request by one of the parties and the jury, based on the
evidence, could be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense,”
Cameron argues that, under the evidence here, the jury could have concluded that he was
guilty of misdemeanor assault, and thus, an instruction was required. He offers that
misdemeanor assault, as defined both by subsection (a) and subsection (c) of § 45-5-201,
MCA,1 constitutes a lesser offense included within sexual assault, a felony, as that offense
is defined by § 45-5-502, MCA.2
¶19 An “included offense,” as defined by statute, means an offense which:
(a) is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged;
(b) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit
an offense otherwise included in the offense charged; or
1
45-5-201 Assault. (1) A person commits the offense of assault if the
person:
(a) purposefully or knowingly causes bodily injury to another;
...
(c) purposefully or knowingly makes physical contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with any individual.
2
45-5-502 Sexual assault. (1) A person who knowingly subjects another
person to any sexual contact without consent, commits the offense of sexual
assault.
....
(3) If the victim is less than 16 years old and the offender is 3 or
more years older than the victim or if the offender inflicts bodily injury
upon anyone in the course of committing sexual assault, the offender shall
be punished by life imprisonment or by imprisonment in the state prison for
a term of not less than 4 years, or more than 100 years and may be fined not
more than $50,000.
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(c) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
serious injury or risk to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser
kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
Section 46-1-202(9), MCA. Cameron concedes, pursuant to our decision in Beavers, which
explained that the term “facts” in subsection (a) of § 46-1-202(9), MCA, refers to the
statutory elements of the charged offense and not to the individual facts of the case, that
misdemeanor assault is not a lesser included offense of sexual assault under that subsection.
However, he argues that misdemeanor assault constitutes a lesser included offense of sexual
assault under either subsection (b) or subsection (c) of § 46-1-202(9), MCA. He correctly
notes that an offense may qualify as a lesser included offense under any of the three
subsections of § 46-1-202(9), MCA. See Beavers, ¶ 25. We begin with Cameron’s
arguments under subsection (c) of the statute, and then turn to his arguments under
subsection (b).
¶20 “Two criteria must be met before a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction. First, the offense must actually constitute a lesser included offense of the offense
charged, and, second, there must be sufficient evidence to support the included offense
instruction.” State v. Martinez, 1998 MT 265, ¶ 10, 291 Mont. 265, ¶ 10, 968 P.2d 705, ¶
10. Under the first criterion, Cameron argues that the misdemeanor assault “actually
constitutes” a lesser included offense under subsection (c) of § 46-1-202(9), MCA, because
the elements of that offense are similar to the elements of sexual assault and, thus, the
misdemeanor differs only by posing a “less serious risk.” Cameron reasons that sexual
assault involves a greater risk of both physical and psychological injury to the victim.
8
Although conceding that misdemeanor assault does not present a “lesser serious kind of
culpability” or “less serious injury” than sexual assault, Cameron notes our holding in State
v. Fisch (1994), 266 Mont. 520, 881 P.2d 626, wherein we concluded that subsection (c) is
“written in the disjunctive and with an ‘only’ qualifier. Thus, an included offense may differ
from the offense charged by way of a less serious injury or a less serious risk or a lesser kind
of culpability. In other words, an offense is an included offense under [subsection (c)], if
it differs from the charged offense in one, but only one, of the three ways set forth in the
subsection.” Fisch, 266 Mont. at 523, 881 P.2d at 628.
¶21 Comparing the elements, Cameron first notes that, as defined by § 45-5-502, MCA,
sexual assault occurs when a person “knowingly subjects another person to any sexual
contact without consent.” He further notes that the definition of “sexual contact” includes
the “touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of another . . . in order to
knowingly or purposely . . . cause bodily injury to or humiliate, harass or degrade another,”
§ 45-2-101(66)(a), MCA. Cameron then explains that misdemeanor assault, as defined under
subsection (1)(a) of § 45-5-201, MCA, is committed if a person “purposely or knowingly
causes bodily injury to another,” and thus, he asserts that the jury could have determined that
he had merely purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury to T.P. Likewise, Cameron
notes that misdemeanor assault, as alternatively defined under subsection (1)(c) of § 45-5-
201, MCA, is committed when a person “purposely or knowingly makes physical contact of
an insulting or provoking nature with any individual,” and thus, he asserts that the jury could
have determined that he had merely purposely or knowingly made physical contact of any
9
insulting or provoking nature upon T.P. Therefore, Cameron contends that misdemeanor
assault as defined under either subsection (1)(a) or subsection (1)(c) “actually constitutes”
an included offense to sexual assault.
¶22 Responding to Cameron’s argument, the State argues that the elements of the offenses
are not similar, and therefore, misdemeanor assault does not “actually constitute” an included
offense to sexual assault. The State first explains that § 45-2-101(66), MCA,3 contains not
one, but two different definitions of “sexual contact”–one which includes bodily injury or
humiliation as elements (subsection (a)), and one which does not (subsection (b)). The State
points out that, although Cameron’s argument compares the elements of misdemeanor assault
to the sexual contact definition in subsection (66)(a)–“cause bodily injury to or humiliate,
harass or degrade another”–the sexual assault charge against him did not allege that kind of
sexual contact. Rather, the Information alleged sexual assault by way of sexual contact as
defined by subsection (66)(b): “The above-named defendant knowingly subjected another
person, Jane Doe, to sexual contact without consent . . . by grabbing her breast and
simulating sexual intercourse on top of her.” Further, the District Court gave the jury an
instruction consistent therewith, a precise quote from subsection (66)(b), which stated that
“sexual contact” is the “touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of
another, directly or through clothing, in order to knowingly or purposely arouse or gratify
3
“Sexual contact” means touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of
the person of another, directly or through clothing, in order to knowingly or
purposely:
(a) cause bodily injury to or humiliate, harass or degrade another; or
(b) arouse or gratify the sexual response or desire of either party.
10
the sexual response or desire of either party.” Thus, the State argues, the sexual assault
charge as set forth in the Information and in the jury instructions included neither the element
of bodily injury, which Cameron compares to the definition of misdemeanor assault under
§ 45-5-201(1)(a), MCA, nor the element of touching intended to “humiliate, harass, or
degrade another,” which Cameron compares to the definition of misdemeanor assault under
§ 45-5-201(1)(c), MCA. Although these elements of misdemeanor assault are comparable
to those within the definition of sexual contact as set forth in subsection (66)(a), that
definition of sexual contact was not part of the charge filed here. The State further notes that
Cameron’s own proposed jury instructions were based solely on subsection (66)(b). Thus,
the State contends that misdemeanor assault as defined by either subsection (1)(a) or (1)(c)
of § 45-5-201, MCA, does not constitute an included offense of sexual assault because
neither subsection differs from sexual assault only in the respect that the former is “less
serious,” as Cameron asserts. Rather, the elements are dissimilar and do not overlap.
¶23 We agree with the State. Misdemeanor assault did not differ from sexual assault
“only in respect that a less serious” risk exists. The offense as charged in the Information
and stated by the jury instructions did not define sexual contact as including an element of
bodily injury or physical contact to humiliate, harass or degrade, but, rather, defined sexual
contact as touching to arouse or gratify the sexual response or desire of either party. Thus,
the “risk” was not the only difference between these crimes. Additionally, there is a clear
difference in the assailant’s intention.
11
¶24 In State v. Long (1986), 223 Mont. 502, 726 P.2d 1364, we addressed this issue under
prior law. Although both parties offer that Long is outdated in that it applied the
Blockburger4 test, which we have now abandoned, that case also entertained the same
arguments as offered by Cameron with regard to the offenses at issue here. We observed:
In order to adopt the defendant’s lesser included offense theory, this Court
must find that sexual contact and physical contact of an insulting or provoking
nature are interchangeable terms. This we will not do. The defendant’s
contentions that misdemeanor assault is a lesser included offense of sexual
assault is not supported by the law.
Long, 223 Mont. at 510, 726 P.2d at 1369. After examination of the current statutes, we
reach the same conclusion today about the elements of these offenses.
¶25 Cameron argues that the District Court erred by relying upon Long and Blockburger
and, further, by stating that it was denying the request for a lesser included offense
instruction because Cameron “didn’t offer any alternate explanation” as to what had
occurred. Cameron asserts that despite his right not to testify, the District Court “held it
against him.” Cameron does not cite any authority for this argument, but further, we do not
take from the District Court’s statements that it was basing its decision on Cameron’s
election not to testify. It was referring more generally to the lack of any evidence which
contradicted the State’s case. In any event, this Court affirms a district court’s ruling if it
reaches the correct result, even if it does so for the wrong reason. Ritchie v. Town of Ennis,
2004 MT 43, ¶ 8, 320 Mont. 94, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d 11, ¶ 8. Because the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Cameron’s request for a lesser included offense instruction,
4
Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.2d 306.
12
we conclude that the District Court’s ruling reached the correct result, even if based on an
incorrect rationale.
¶26 Lastly, Cameron argues that misdemeanor assault constitutes a lesser included offense
to sexual assault under § 46-1-202(9)(b), MCA, which provides that an “included offense”
is an offense which “consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged.” Cameron asserts
that an individual could cause bodily injury or could make physical contact of an insulting
or provoking nature–the elements of misdemeanor assault–as part of an “attempt” to commit
the charged crime of sexual assault. However, Cameron misreads the statutes. “A person
commits the offense of attempt when, with the purpose to commit a specific offense, he does
any act toward the commission of such offense.” Section 45-4-103(1), MCA. Further, a
person convicted of attempt is punishable in the same manner as for conviction of the offense
which was attempted. Section 45-4-103(3), MCA. Thus, the included offense here would
not be misdemeanor assault, but attempted sexual assault. Cameron did not seek an included
offense instruction for this felony.
¶27 Because we conclude that misdemeanor assault does not constitute an included
offense of sexual assault as charged here, we need not address Cameron’s argument, under
the second Martinez criterion, that sufficient evidence existed to support his request for a
jury instruction.
¶28 We review “whether the [jury] instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the
jury on the applicable law” and give district courts broad discretion in formulating such
instructions. State v. German, 2001 MT 156, ¶ 10, 306 Mont. 92, ¶ 10, 30 P.3d 360, ¶ 10.
13
Additionally, we have consistently held, a trial court “need not give an instruction on a lesser
included offense when there is no evidence to support it.” German, ¶ 11. Here, we conclude
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion and correctly instructed the jury, and,
consequently, that Cameron suffered no loss of constitutional rights.
¶29 2. Did the District Court err in admitting a hearsay statement into evidence?
¶30 As noted above, in the exchange between J.P. and the State’s attorney, the District
Court admitted into evidence T.P.’s hearsay statement, “Grandpa tried raping me.” Cameron
argues that T.P.’s statement was inadmissible as a prior consistent statement. The State
agrees but contends that the statement was admissible as an excited utterance. Both parties
agree that it does not fit within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule as
the State argued at trial.
¶31 The record is silent both as to the prosecution’s reason for offering the statement and
as to the court’s justification for admitting it. The statement clearly was not present sense
impression since it did not describe contemporaneous events. See Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid.
However, we will affirm a district court’s ruling even if it reached the correct result for the
wrong reason. Davis v. State, 2004 MT 112, ¶ 13, 321 Mont. 118, ¶ 13, 88 P.3d 1285, ¶ 13.
¶32 The State argues that the District Court’s ruling should be upheld because the
statement was an excited utterance. Rule 803(2), M.R.Evid., defines an excited utterance
as a “statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” We have not previously
considered this hearsay exception under similar circumstances.
14
¶33 The record indicates that T.P. arrived at Cameron’s trailer around six or seven in the
evening. It is not clear how long T.P. stayed at Cameron’s before she was attacked and ran
home, but she evidently had enough time to converse with Cameron, play with the pet bird,
and use the restroom. After the attack, T.P. had to travel roughly eight miles on foot, running
at first and then walking. Very shortly after arriving home, T.P. made the statement to her
sister. Thus, although the testimony is imprecise about the time which had elapsed, it can
be reasonably inferred from the testimony that T.P. made the statement within an hour or two
after the assault.
¶34 Further circumstances are also relevant to resolution of this issue. T.P. wept from the
moment she left Cameron’s until well after she uttered the hearsay statement. As she arrived
home, T.P. showed no sign of diminished excitement. To the contrary, when her sister went
to the porch, T.P.’s physical action of grabbing J.P. and clutching her firmly until she was
able to cease sobbing long enough to utter, “Grandpa tried raping me,” demonstrates that
T.P. was still laboring under the stress of excitement caused by the attack.
¶35 Given these circumstances, we agree with the State. The facts adequately demonstrate
that T.P. made a statement relating to a startling event while she was under the stress caused
by the event. Thus, we conclude that her statement was an excited utterance as defined by
Rule 803(2), M.R.Evid.
¶36 Though we have not previously addressed the question, our conclusion is not without
precedent in other states. See State v. Strauss (Wash. 1992), 832 P.2d 78, 86 (victim’s
statement to officer qualified as an excited utterance, though made up to three and a half
15
hours after her flight from a rapist); State v. Parker (Idaho 1986), 730 P.2d 921, 924
(affirming as an excited utterance a crying, red-eyed, tired-looking, fourteen-year-old
victim’s statement to her cousin, a State Fish and Game officer, two to three hours after her
rape by a stranger, even though she silently waited for the cousin in the presence of her
parents); State v. Burns (R.I. 1987), 524 A.2d 564, 567 (eleven-year-old child’s statement
to mother hours after rape by stepfather was properly admitted as an excited utterance
because the child’s “upset” and “suspicious” demeanor, her fear of the defendant, her
hesitancy in speaking about the incident, her tender years, and the short time between the
incident and her mother’s arrival home tended to show the statements were sufficiently
trustworthy and not the product of deliberation or contrivance); Fudge v. State (Ark. 2000),
20 S.W.3d 315, 321 (admission of victim’s statement to friends, one to several hours after
incident, that the defendant had beaten, choked, and raped her was not abuse of discretion
where victim appeared nervous and scared until some time after she made the statement).
¶37 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the statement into evidence because it qualified under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.
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CONCLUSION
¶38 The District Court did not err by refusing the defendant’s proposed instruction on
misdemeanor assault as a lesser included offense of felony sexual assault. The District Court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the hearsay statement into evidence.
¶39 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We Concur:
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
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