DA 06-0428
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 224
IN RE THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH OF E.P.B.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Silver Bow, Cause No. DI-06-50
Honorable John W. Whelan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Francis P. McGee, Attorney at Law, Butte, Montana
For Respondent:
The Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Robert McCarthy, Silver Bow County Attorney; Brad Newman, Eileen Joyce
Deputy County Attorneys, Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 22, 2007
Decided: September 11, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 E.P.B. appeals from the order entered by the Second Judicial District Court, Silver
Bow County, committing her to the Montana State Hospital. We reverse and remand with
instructions.
¶2 E.P.B. raises several issues, some of which are not properly before us because they are
raised for the first time on appeal. The restated and dispositive issue on appeal is whether the
District Court made statutorily sufficient findings to support E.P.B.’s commitment.
BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 30, 2006, a deputy county attorney in Silver Bow County petitioned the
District Court for an order to detain E.P.B. for purposes of a mental health evaluation, and to
conduct an initial hearing to determine whether probable cause existed to pursue involuntary
commitment. According to the petition, police officers brought E.P.B. to the emergency
room of St. James Healthcare on May 27 because she was standing in the street in Butte with
her luggage and staring ahead for a considerable length of time in a near catatonic state. Rick
Wagner, a mental health professional, evaluated E.P.B. and discovered that she had an
identification card from Spokane Community College and a social security card in her
possession. It appeared E.P.B. had gotten off a bus in a nearby community. The petition
maintained that E.P.B. did not talk, tried to leave the emergency room, and wrote “non-
sensible notes in block letters.” The petition further stated that Wagner believed E.P.B. was
unable to take care of her needs and might be a danger to herself or others, and recommended
commitment to the Montana State Hospital. A handwritten letter from Wagner to a deputy
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county attorney and a document entitled “brief contact/consultation summary” were attached
to the petition.
¶4 The District Court held an initial hearing on May 30 and entered an order setting a
hearing on the merits of the petition for involuntary commitment for May 31. At that
hearing, mental health professional Delbert D. Fischer testified in support of the petition, and
E.P.B. testified on her behalf. Near the close of the hearing, the District Court asked the
deputy county attorney if he had an order prepared, and the deputy county attorney replied
affirmatively. The District Court read aloud the conclusions of law and order portions
contained in the written order prepared by the deputy county attorney, and ordered E.P.B.
committed to the Montana State Hospital, authorizing the chief medical officer there to
administer medication involuntarily. The court signed and entered the written order. E.P.B.
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 We ordinarily review a court’s findings of fact in an involuntary commitment case to
determine whether, upon viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing
party, the findings are clearly erroneous. In re G.M., 2007 MT 100, ¶ 12, 337 Mont. 116, ¶
12, 157 P.3d 687, ¶ 12 (citation omitted). The threshold issue in this case, however, is
whether the District Court’s findings meet statutory requirements. In such cases, we are
presented with a question of law, and we exercise de novo review to determine whether the
court correctly interpreted and applied relevant statutes. See Jacobsen v. Thomas, 2006 MT
212, ¶ 13, 333 Mont. 323, ¶ 13, 142 P.3d 859, ¶ 13 (citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
¶6 Did the District Court make statutorily sufficient findings to support E.P.B.’s
commitment?
¶7 The statutes governing involuntary commitment, set forth in Title 53, Chapter 21, Part
1, MCA, are critically important due to the “calamitous effect of a commitment.” See G.M.,
¶ 19 (citation omitted). We have long held that these statutes must be strictly followed. See,
e.g., In re Mental Health of C.R.C., 2004 MT 389, ¶ 13, 325 Mont. 133, ¶ 13, 104 P.3d 1065,
¶ 13; In re Mental Health of D.L.T., 2003 MT 46, ¶ 8, 314 Mont. 297, ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 189, ¶ 8,
overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 2007 MT 43, ¶ 21, 336 Mont.
105, ¶ 21, 152 P.3d 727, ¶ 21; In re Mental Health of T.J.D., 2002 MT 24, ¶ 20, 308 Mont.
222, ¶ 20, 41 P.3d 323, ¶ 20; Matter of R.M., 270 Mont. 40, 44, 889 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1995).
¶8 At a trial or hearing on a petition for involuntary commitment, a district court first
determines whether the respondent is suffering from a mental disorder and, if so, determines
whether the respondent requires commitment. In determining whether the respondent
requires commitment and the appropriate disposition, a trial court must consider criteria
including whether the respondent, because of a mental disorder, is substantially unable to
provide for his or her own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health or safety; and
whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent threat of injury to the respondent
or to others because of the respondent’s acts or omissions. Sections 53-21-126(1)(a) and -
126(1)(c), MCA.
¶9 As the petitioner, the State of Montana bears the burden of proving any physical facts
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or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the respondent’s mental disorder to a reasonable
medical certainty, and any other matters by clear and convincing evidence. Section 53-21-
126(2), MCA. In ordering commitment, the court must make a detailed statement of the facts
upon which it found the respondent to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring
commitment. Section 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA.
¶10 The order committing E.P.B. contains three findings of fact:
1. The Respondent, [E.P.B.] is a transient person temporarily in the City of
Butte, County of Silver Bow, State of Montana.
2. Delbert D. Fischer, M.Ed., the professional person who evaluated the
Respondent, testified that in his opinion and to a reasonable medical certainty,
the Respondent suffers from a mental disorder requiring commitment,
specifically psychotic disorder. Fischer testified that the Respondent presently
constituted an imminent danger to herself and was unable to provide for her
own basic needs of health and safety. Fischer testified that the Respondent’s
mental disorder was amenable to treatment, but that the Respondent refused
any voluntary course of treatment. Fischer also testified that the Respondent,
in her present mental condition, was unable to make informed decisions
concerning her mental health care and the necessity of taking appropriate
medications. Accordingly, Fischer recommended that the Court commit the
Respondent to the state hospital on an involuntary basis for appropriate care
and treatment and that the Court authorize the provision of medications to the
Respondent on an involuntary basis, if necessary.
3. Fischer’s testimony was consistent with the initial report of evaluation done
by Richard P. Wagner, LCSW, another qualified professional person.
The order also contains four conclusions, including that E.P.B. “presently suffers from a
serious mental illness requiring commitment, as evidenced to a reasonable medical certainty
by the testimony of [Fischer], a qualified mental health professional,” and E.P.B. “in her
present mental condition constitutes an imminent danger to her own life and health and is
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unable to provide for her own basic needs of health and safety.”
¶11 On appeal, the State contends it presented sufficient evidence to warrant E.P.B.’s
commitment under § 53-21-126(1), MCA. Because we conclude the District Court entered
legally insufficient findings and failed to discharge its statutory duties, we do not address the
sufficiency of the evidence in this case.
¶12 As noted above, the record reflects the deputy county attorney prepared the order
signed by the District Court, and—given the deputy county attorney’s production of the order
before the hearing ended and the lack of any reference to E.P.B.’s testimony—it is relatively
clear that the order was prepared before the hearing commenced. Involuntary commitment
statutes afford the respondent numerous rights, including rights to due process of law, to be
present at any hearing, to offer evidence, and to present and cross-examine witnesses. See §§
53-21-101(4), -115(2) and -115(4), MCA. As these and other statutes make clear, a hearing
on a petition for involuntary commitment is not merely a pro forma requirement, but an
opportunity for the parties—both the petitioner and the respondent—to present evidence
upon which the trial court can make required findings and enter appropriate orders. In a
different case, adoption of a petitioner’s proposed findings and conclusions might be
appropriate in light of the evidence presented, but district courts must—at the very least—
ensure that such “prepared” orders comply with statutory mandates. See, e.g., In re C.R.C., ¶
13.
¶13 The findings in the order committing E.P.B. are a far cry from the “detailed statement
of the facts” a trial court must make pursuant to § 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA, in ordering
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commitment. Merely reciting witness Fischer’s testimony and stating it was consistent with
another professional person’s evaluation is in no way equivalent to making findings of fact—
based on the applicable standards of proof—that a person is suffering from a mental
condition and requires commitment. Nor do conclusory statements of statutory criteria and
broad references to a witness’ testimony—such as those in the conclusions at issue here—
constitute strict compliance with the statutory mandate of § 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA. See In re
G.M., ¶ 22.
¶14 We hold the District Court erred in failing to make statutorily sufficient findings to
support E.P.B.’s commitment.
¶15 Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order vacating the commitment
order.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
Justice Jim Rice dissents.
¶16 In ¶ 11, the Court explains that the State argues that sufficient evidence was presented
to warrant E.P.B.’s commitment, but because the Court concludes that the District Court’s
findings are legally insufficient, it will not address the sufficiency of the evidence.
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¶17 The State addressed the sufficiency of the evidence because that issue was raised by
the Appellant: “E.P.B. contends that the entirety of the testimony, taken as a whole, did not
and does not rise to the level of a mental disorder that substantially and adversely impacts
cognitive and volitional functions. . . . [T]he District Court misapprehended the effect of the
evidence . . . .” Appellant’s Opening Brief, pp. 14-15. The State did not address the legal
sufficiency of the findings, the ground upon which the Court is reversing, because that issue
was not raised on appeal by the Appellant. Given that the issue was not raised, it is small
wonder why the State did not address it. The State thus had no opportunity to offer argument
on the question which the Court concludes is dispositive.
¶18 I would decide the case upon the issues which have been brought before us.
/S/ JIM RICE
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