TAPPAN, COLLECTOR,
v.
MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK.
Supreme Court of United States.
*495 Mr. M.W. Fuller, in support of the decree.
Mr. J.K. Edsall, Attorney-General of Illinois, contra.
*498 *499 The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
We are called upon in this case to determine whether the General Assembly of the State of Illinois could, in 1867, provide for the taxation of the owners of shares of the capital stock of a National bank in that State, at the place, within the State, where the bank was located, without regard to their places of residence. The statute of Illinois, under the authority of which the taxes complained of were assessed, was passed before the act of Congress, approved February 10th, 1868,[*] which gave a legislative construction to the words, "place where the bank is located, and not elsewhere," as used in section forty-one of the National Banking Act,[] and permitted the State to determine and direct the manner and place of taxing resident shareholders, but provided that non-residents should be taxed only in the city or town where the bank was located.
The power of taxation by any State is limited to persons, property, or business within its jurisdiction.[] Personal property, in the absence of any law to the contrary, follows the person of the owner, and has its situs at his domicile. But, for the purposes of taxation, it may be separated from him, and he may be taxed on its account at the place where it is actually located. These are familiar principles, and have been often acted upon in this court and in the courts of Illinois. If the State has actual jurisdiction of the person of the owner, it operates directly upon him. If he is absent, and it has jurisdiction of his property, it operates upon him through his property.
Shares of stock in National banks are personal property. They are made so in express terms by the act of Congress under which such banks are organized.[§] They are a species of personal property which is, in one sense, intangible and incorporeal, but the law which creates them may separate *500 them from the person of their owner for the purposes of taxation, and give them a situs of their own. This has been done. By section forty-one of the National Banking Act, it is in effect provided that all shares in such banks, held by any person or body corporate, may be included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed under State authority, at the place where the bank is located, and not elsewhere.[*] This is a law of the property. Every owner takes the property subject to this power of taxation under State authority, and every non-resident, by becoming an owner, voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the State in which the bank is established for all the purposes of taxation on account of his ownership. His money invested in the shares is withdrawn from taxation under the authority of the State in which he resides and submitted to the taxing power of the State where, in contemplation of the law, his investment is located. The State, therefore, within which a National bank is situated has jurisdiction, for the purposes of taxation, of all the shareholders of the bank, both resident and non-resident, and of all its shares, and may legislate accordingly.
The State of Illinois thus having had, in 1867, the right to tax all the shareholders of National banks in that State on account of their shares, it remains to consider at what place or places within the State such taxes could be assessed.
It is conceded that it was within the power of the State to tax the shares of non-resident shareholders at the place where the bank was located, but it is claimed that under the constitution of the State resident shareholders could only be taxed at the places of their residence. We have not been referred to any express provision of the constitution to that effect. There is nothing which in terms prohibits the General Assembly from separating personal property within the State from the person of the owner and locating it at appropriate places for the purposes of taxation, but it *501 is insisted that sections two and five of Article 9 of the Constitution of 1848, which was in force when the act of 1867 was passed, contain an implied prohibition.
Section two directs that "the General Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise." Section five directs that "the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns, and villages, may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. And the General Assembly shall require that all property within the limits of municipal corporations belonging to individuals shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law." The corresponding provisions of the Constitution of 1870 are in substance the same.
The object of these sections is to secure uniformity of taxation. That, it is said in Bureau Co. v. C.B. and Q.R.R. Co.,[*] is to be regarded as the cardinal principle, the dominant idea of this article of the constitution. But uniformity in this connection is only another name for equality, for the provision is for "levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property." The value of the property being ascertained, the same rate of taxation must be laid upon all.
Property is made the constitutional basis of taxation. This is not unreasonable. Governments are organized for the protection of persons and property, and the expenses of the protection may very properly be apportioned among the persons protected according to the value of their property protected.
The constitution does not undertake to fix the value of *502 the property. Neither does it prescribe any rules by which it is to be fixed. That is left to the General Assembly, for the provision in that respect is, "such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise." The mode and manner in which the persons appointed to make the valuation shall proceed, are left to the discretion of the General Assembly. In fact, the whole machinery of taxation must be contrived and put into operation by the legislative department of the government.
As part of this machinery taxation districts must be created. All property within the district must be taxed by a uniform rate. If property is actually within a district it is but proper that the legislature should provide that it should be listed, valued, and assessed there. In fact, the last clause of section five, Article 9, seems to make that a duty, for it provides that the General Assembly shall require that all property within the limits of municipal corporations, belonging to individuals, shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law.
This power of locating personal property for the purpose of taxation without regard to the residence of the owner has been often exercised in Illinois, and sustained by the courts.[*] Since the adoption of the constitution of 1870, which did not enlarge the powers of the General Assembly in this particular, very extended legislation has been had with a view to such location. Thus, live stock and other personal property used upon a farm, must be listed and assessed where the farm is situated; property in the hands of agents at the place where the business of the agent is transacted; watercraft where they are enrolled: or, if not enrolled, where they are kept; the property of bankers, brokers, merchants, manufacturers, and many other classes of persons specially enumerated, at the place where their business is carried on. This became necessary in order that the burdens of taxation might be equally distributed among those who should bear them.
*503 We do not understand the counsel for the appellee to dispute this power, where the property is tangible and capable of having, so to speak, an actual situs of its own, but he claims that if it is intangible, it cannot be separated from the person of its owner. It must be borne in mind that all this property, intangible though it may be, is within the State. That which belongs to non-residents is there by operation of law. That which belongs to residents is there by reason of their residence. All the owners have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the State, and they must obey its will when kept within the limits of constitutional power.
The question is then presented whether the General Assembly, having complete jurisdiction over the person and the property, could separate a bank share from the person of the owner for the purposes of taxation. It has never been doubted that it was a proper exercise of legislative power and discretion to separate the interest of a partner in partnership property from his person for that purpose, and to cause him to be taxed on its account at the place where the business of the partnership was carried on. And this, too, without reference to the character of the business or the property. The partnership may have been formed for the purpose of carrying on mercantile, banking, brokerage, or stock business. The property may be tangible or intangible, goods on the shelf or debts due for goods sold. The interest of the partner in all the property is made taxable at the place where the business is located.
A share of bank stock may be in itself intangible, but it represents that which is tangible. It represents money or property invested in the capital stock of the bank. That capital is employed in business by the bank, and the business is very likely carried on at a place other than the residence of some of the shareholders. The shareholder is protected in his person by the government at the place where he resides; but his property in this stock is protected at the place where the bank transacts his business. If he were a partner in a private bank doing business at the same place, *504 he might be taxed there on account of his interest in the partnership. It is not easy to see why, upon the same principle, he may not be taxed there on account of his stock in an incorporated bank. His business is there as much in the one case as in the other. He requires for it the protection of the government there, and it seems reasonable that he should be compelled to contribute there to the expenses of maintaining that government. It certainly cannot be an abuse of legislative discretion to require him to do so. If it is not, the General Assembly can rightfully locate his shares there for the purpose of taxation.
But it is said to be a violation of the constitutional rule of uniformity to compel the owner of a bank share to submit to taxation for this part of his property at a place other than his residence, because other residents are taxed for their personal property where they reside. It is a sufficient answer to this proposition to say that all persons owning the same kind of property are taxed as he is taxed. Absolute equality in taxation can never be attained. That system is the best which comes the nearest to it. The same rules cannot be applied to the listing and valuation of all kinds of property. Railroads, banks, partnerships, manufacturing associations, telegraph companies, and each one of the numerous other agencies of business which the inventions of the age are constantly bringing into existence, require different machinery for the purposes of their taxation. The object should be to place the burden so that it will bear as nearly as possible equally upon all. For this purpose different systems, adjusted with reference to the valuation of different kinds of property, are adopted. The courts permit this. Thus, in a case in Illinois, involving the system adopted for the taxation of bank shares, it was said by the Supreme Court,[*] "in view of this legislation it must be apparent that a system of taxation for bank shares was designed peculiar to itself and independent of the general revenue laws of the State;" and the authority of the law was sustained and enforced.
*505 Again, it is said the law in question destroys the uniformity of taxation, because it provides for the collection of the taxes assessed on account of this kind of property in an unusual way. The constitution does not require uniformity in the manner of collection. Uniformity in the assessment is all it demands. When assessed the tax may be collected in the manner the law shall provide; and this may be varied to suit the necessities of each case.
Since the decree was rendered in the Circuit Court the Supreme Court of Illinois has passed upon this same question and declared the law of 1867 to be constitutional. We might have contented ourselves by acknowledging the authority of this decision, but we are willing not only to acknowledge its authority, but to admit its correctness.
We have not felt called upon the consider whether the General Assembly could, under the provisions of the act of Congress, provide for the taxation of shareholders at any other place within the State than that in which the bank is located. It is sufficient for the purposes of this case that it might tax them there.
Other questions have been discussed in the argument, and among them one which relates to the power of the bank to interfere in behalf of its stockholders in the manner which has been done. We have not deemed it necessary to pass upon any of these questions, as those already decided are conclusive of the case.
DECREE REVERSED, and the cause remanded with instructions to proceed
IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION.
NOTES
[*] 15 Stat. at Large, 34.
[] 13 Id. 112.
[] State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds (Railroad v. Pennsylvania), 15 Wallace, 319.
[§] 13 Stat. at Large, 102, § 12.
[*] 13 Stat. at Large, 112.
[*] 44 Illinois, 238.
[*] City of Dunleith v. Reynolds, 53 Illinois, 45.
[*] McVeagh v. Chicago, 49 Illinois, 329.