JENNISONS
v.
LEONARD.
Supreme Court of United States.
*305 Messrs. M.J. Smiley and D.D. Hughes, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. L.D. Norris, contra.
*306 *307 Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.
There is but a single question of law in the case, viz.: are the facts found sufficient to support the judgment? This question may be affected by a greater or less number of considerations, but it is the sole question.
There are no exceptions to the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial, and no objection of that character can now be heard. We are authorized by the statute of March 3d, 1865, where the finding of facts is special, to review "the determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment,"[*] and we are authorized to examine no other question. In ordering judgment for the plaintiff, certain propositions of law are announced by the judge as having been held by him. These are important only as they necessarily and of themselves affect the question, whether the facts found are sufficient to support the judgment, and they are no more important than if they had not been thus announced. No specific exception is or can be taken to them.
It is contended that the vendor had no right, under the contract of September 1st, 1866, to re-enter upon the premises, and take possession of the down timber. This contention is based upon the idea that time was not of the essence of the contract, and that although Cole was in arrears of payment to an amount exceeding $5000, this gave no right to the vendor to declare the contract forfeited. Conceding that the intention of the parties determines the question, the claim can scarcely be sustained in relation to a sale of timber lands, where the entire value of the estate consists in the timber standing upon them, and when it is provided that there shall be monthly payments, to be regulated by the quantity of timber cut, and when it is provided that a given quantity shall be cut during every month. That the parties should not have intended to require the payments to be kept up in the ratio of the cutting, and that the vendor should not have intended to reserve his only practical protection in this respect, viz., a right of entry in the case of a failure, cannot readily be believed.
*308 The Jennisons entered into possession of the premises, as mortgagees of Cole, in the hope of saving their debt from him by operating under his contract, and they agreed with his vendor to pay the sums due and becoming due under his contract as long as they should operate under their mortgage. A dispute arising as to the amount thus to be paid, "they abandoned the lands, and the vendor entered into peaceable possession" for the alleged breach, viz., the non-payment of $5280, and took possession of all the timber that had been cut and had not been removed.
Looking at the circumstances that Cole had refused to perform, and had surrendered and assigned all his interest in the contract and the timber; that the Jennisons had ceased their operations and had abandoned the land; that Leonard had entered into possession of the land and the timber cut, and had caused the same to be removed and sawed into boards; that the right of the Jennisons extended only to such timber as had been cut when their mortgage was executed; that there is no evidence that the timber in question had then been cut, it seems sufficiently plain, not only that Leonard was the owner of and lawfully in possession of the timber and lumber in question, but that his right was assented to by all parties who were in a condition to question it. The Jennisons not only failed to show any title to the lumber at any time, but voluntarily abandoned whatever interest they might be supposed to have had.
It is urged that Leonard took certain swamp lands in Ottawa as collateral security for the performance of his contract by Cole. If we suppose this to be true, we do not see that it is very important. The payments were large in amount ($27,000, with interest), extending over a period of three years. That certain lands, neither the quality nor value of which is stated, except that they were swamp lands, were agreed to be given in security, will not affect the construction of the contract or the right to relief under it. It is sufficient, however, to say that though the contract contains an agreement to convey the swamp lands, there is no finding that these lands were conveyed to the plaintiff. It rested *309 in agreement merely, and there is nothing to justify the suggestion that the swamp lands were ever conveyed by Cole.
The claim that the instrument we have been discussing is a lease, does not require much consideration. It has neither a lessor, a lessee, nor a subject of demise. The only valuable portion of it, the timber, was expected to be exhausted in procuring the means of its own payment. When the supposed demise should terminate there would be no reversion left to the vendor that would be worth the taking.
Nor is there more foundation for the suggestion that the Jennisons were tenants at will and entitled to three months' notice to quit. They did not wait for a notice to quit. Without regard to the order or effect of their going, they went when they were ready, leaving Leonard to take care of his own interest as well as he was able.
This was one of the sales of real estate by contract, so common in this country, in which the title remains in the vendor and the possession passes to the vendee. The legal title remains in the vendor, while an equitable interest vests in the vendee to the extent of the payments made by him. As his payments increase, his equitable interest increases, and when the contract price is fully paid, the entire title is equitably vested in him, and he may compel a conveyance of the legal title by the vendor, his heirs, or his assigns. The vendor is a trustee of the legal title for the vendee to the extent of his payment. The result of this state of things is quite unlike that of a conveyance subject to a condition subsequent which is broken, and when re-entry or a claim of title for condition broken is necessary to enable the vendor to restore to himself the title to the estate. The legal title having, in that case, passed out of him, some measures are necessary to replace it. In the case of a contract like that we are considering no legal title passes. The interest of the vendee is equitable merely, and whatever puts an end to the equitable interest as notice, an agreement of the parties, a surrender, an abandonment places the vendor where he was before the contract was made.
*310 No mode of terminating an equitable interest can be more perfect than a voluntary relinquishment, by the vendee, of all rights under the contract, and a voluntary surrender of the possession to the vendor. The finding of the court shows that this took place in relation to the premises in question, and that the surrender was accepted by the vendor.
We may safely say, then: first, that no importance is to be attributed to the circumstance, that the contract contains no clause of re-entry; or second, to the fact that the vendor has sought to enforce payment of the amounts which became due to him before the surrender and abandonment; and third, that there can be no doubt about the intention of the parties in making the contract, that the payments and the cutting should proceed in the ratio specified; or fourth, that when the payments ceased it was intended, and is the law, that the cutting should also cease; or fifth, that by the facts appearing by the finding of the court the plaintiff below is entitled to a judgment for the value of the lumber taken from his possession, with interest.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
NOTES
[*] Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wallace, 125.