IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 33346
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2007 Opinion No. 36
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Filed: May 31, 2007
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
MATTHEW SCOTT COLLINS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction, affirmed; sentence for malicious injury to property
vacated; case remanded.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
______________________________________________
PERRY, Chief Judge
In this case we are asked to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by
failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation of Collins prior to the imposition of
sentence or in refusing to grant probation following a period of retained jurisdiction. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of conviction but vacate Collins’s sentence and
remand.
After his arrest for deliberately crashing a stolen vehicle, Matthew Scott Collins pled
guilty to one count of felony malicious injury to property, I.C. § 18-7001(2)(a), and one count of
misdemeanor eluding a peace officer, I.C. § 49-1404(1). Following his plea, Collins was
sentenced to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years for
felony malicious injury to property and a term of 180 days of confinement for misdemeanor
eluding a peace officer. Collins’s sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The district court
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retained jurisdiction for 180 days, and Collins was sent to participate in the rider program at the
North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI). 1
After Collins completed evaluation at NICI, the jurisdictional review committee
recommended relinquishment of jurisdiction. The district court thereafter relinquished
jurisdiction. Collins appeals. Collins asserts that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte
order a psychological evaluation prior to the imposition of his sentence. Collins also argues the
district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. Because we vacate Collins’s
sentence and remand for resentencing, we do not reach the district court’s decision to relinquish
jurisdiction.
The determination whether to obtain a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing
court’s discretion. I.C. § 19-2522(1); I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d
85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999). The legal standards governing the court’s decision whether to order a
psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2522(1), if there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a
significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the sentencing court must appoint a
psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the defendant’s mental
condition. The mental condition of a defendant can be a significant factor at sentencing when it
may be an underlying factor in the crime at issue, for example, when the actions of the defendant
are contrary to his or her history and character. See State v. French, 95 Idaho 853, 855, 522 P.2d
61, 63 (1974); State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). A
court-ordered psychological evaluation can assist the sentencing court in assessing the
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or
her conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged. See I.C. §19-
2523(1)(f). The evaluation can also aid the sentencing court in determining whether to authorize
psychological treatment during a defendant’s confinement or probation. See I.C. §19-2523(2).
We will uphold the district court’s failure to order a psychological evaluation if the
record supports a finding that there was no reason to believe a defendant’s mental condition
would be a significant factor at sentencing or if the information already before the court
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Collins has, at this time, served his 180-day sentence for misdemeanor eluding a peace
officer. Consequently, this opinion addresses his remaining sentence for felony malicious injury
to property.
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adequately meets the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). McFarland, 125 Idaho at 879, 876 P.2d
at 161. Where a defendant fails to request a psychological evaluation or object to the PSI on the
ground that an evaluation has not been performed, the defendant must demonstrate that by failing
to order a psychological evaluation the sentencing court manifestly disregarded the provisions of
I.C.R. 32. Jones, 132 Idaho at 442, 974 P.2d at 88. In those instances where either this Court or
our Supreme Court has found error in the district court’s failure to order a psychological
evaluation, we have relied upon information omitted from, or contained within, a presentence
investigation report (PSI) to identify the need for a psychological evaluation. Id.
The events leading to Collins’s criminal activity began with an argument with his mother
at her home wherein he vocalized his intent to commit suicide and brandished an unloaded
firearm to that end. Unable to find ammunition for the firearm, Collins left the house, stole his
mother’s vehicle, and led the police on a high speed chase. Collins, driving at approximately
fifty m.p.h., deliberately crashed into a parked vehicle at his stepfather’s residence. Directly
after the crash, Collins was clearly upset and, while crying and being held by his stepfather,
repeated that he was sorry and just wanted to die. After being arrested, Collins was initially
taken to the Department of Health and Welfare where he was interviewed by a designated
examiner. During the questioning, Collins claimed he was trying to kill himself when he crashed
the vehicle. The examiner did not think that Collins needed to go to the state hospital but clearly
needed help. The examiner sent Collins to Behavioral Health Services (BHS) for protective
custody and further monitoring. Collins remained at BHS for the next six days, and Collins was
prescribed unspecified medication during his stay.
Thus, significant evidence indicates that Collins’s criminal actions here--eluding the
police and intentionally destroying the property of another by deliberately crashing a stolen
vehicle--were part of a suicide effort. Collins’s claim that he was attempting to kill himself is
substantiated by the speed at which he was traveling when he crashed the vehicle. The PSI notes
that Collins reported having been previously diagnosed as manic depressive, but provides no
follow-up investigation as to when or how that diagnosis was made. While the PSI also notes
that BHS prescribed medication for Collins, which he at that time had yet to acquire, it does not
describe what the medication was or why it had been prescribed. Additionally, the result of the
suicide evaluation of Collins that was allegedly performed at BHS was not included in the PSI
nor is it included in the record on appeal. The evidence before the district court gives no
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information about the likelihood that Collins’s behavior could be significantly improved through
mental health treatment.
At sentencing, the district court reached conclusions regarding Collins’s mental
condition. Specifically, the district court stated: “I don’t think you were trying to kill yourself. I
think you were just lashing out in anger at the circumstances and everything around you.” The
district court then went on to conclude that Collins “may need some mental health intervention.
I rather suspect you do. But even with that, that’s not someone else’s responsibility.” As these
statements demonstrate, the district court made decisions about Collins’s mental condition, the
role it played in his crimes, and how that was to affect his sentence, without any formal
psychological evaluation to assist in that determination. In making its sentencing decisions in
the absence of any specific information on Collins’s mental condition, the district court
manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32 and abused its discretion.
Finally, the district court retained jurisdiction and ordered that Collins receive mental
health and anger management evaluations while at the NICI. However, the NICI report provided
no assessment of Collins’s mental condition. Even though the district court acknowledged at
sentencing that there was a need to assess Collins’s mental health while at NICI, it went on to
relinquish jurisdiction based on the inadequate NICI report and in the absence of any mental
health evaluation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction but vacate Collins’s
sentence and remand. Upon remand, a complete evaluation of Collins’s mental condition in
compliance with I.C. § 19-2522 should be conducted before resentencing.
Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.
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