IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2010-NMSC-025
Filing Date: May 12, 2010
Docket No. 31,288
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.
ALBERTO SAVEDRA, JOSE LOZANO, SR.,
and SCOTT YATES,
Defendants-Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Freddie Joseph Romero, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Thomas E. Lilley, P.C.
Thomas E. Lilley
Roswell, NM
Trace L. Rabern, Attorney and Counselor at Law, L.L.C.
Trace L. Rabern
Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent Alberto Savedra
Gary C. Mitchell, P.C.
Gary C. Mitchell
Ruidoso, NM
for Respondents Jose Lozano, Sr.,
and Scott Yates
OPINION
SERNA, Justice.
{1} In this appeal, we are presented with the recurring issue of how our six-month rules
should be administered when the State dismisses charges in magistrate court and
subsequently refiles the same charges in district court. On separate occasions, Defendants
Savedra, Lozano, and Yates were charged with misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated
(DWI) in magistrate court, and did not reach a plea agreement. In each case, the State
dismissed the charges in magistrate court and refiled the cases in district court pursuant to
a prosecutorial policy of the district attorney in the Fifth Judicial District, the purpose of
which is to avoid duplicative trials. After more than six months had elapsed from the
arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court, each of the Defendants moved to
dismiss their cases on the basis of a six-month rule violation. The district court granted each
of the motions. The State appealed the dismissals, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a
consolidated case. State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 16, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236.
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to address whether the Court of Appeals erred
when it affirmed the district court’s orders dismissing the three cases. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
{2} The six-month rules that we have established for our trial courts “provide the courts
and parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise.” State v.
Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 46, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The time limits for the
commencement of trial in magistrate courts are governed by Rule 6-506 NMRA. The rule
provides in pertinent part: “The trial of a criminal citation or complaint shall be commenced
within one hundred eighty-two (182) days after whichever of the following events occurs
latest: (1) the date of arraignment or the filing of a waiver of arraignment of the
defendant[.]” Rule 6-506(B); see also State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 6, 140 N.M.
779, 149 P.3d 95 (“Commencement of trial within the stated period, while not jurisdictional,
is mandatory.”). In district court, the time in which a trial must be commenced is governed
by Rule 5-604 NMRA, providing in pertinent part: “The trial of a criminal case or habitual
criminal proceeding shall be commenced six (6) months after whichever of the following
events occurs latest: (1) the date of arraignment, or waiver of arraignment, in the district
court of any defendant[.]” Rule 5-604(B)(1) (emphasis added). However, there is no district
court or magistrate court rule to address the interplay between the six-month rule provisions
for each court when a complaint is dismissed in magistrate court and later refiled in district
court.
{3} Because of this gap in the rules, a long line of appellate court opinions have sought
to preserve the protections of the six-month rule by requiring the State to demonstrate that
its decision to dismiss and refile was not done in bad faith to circumvent the protections of
the six-month rule. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 7 (reiterating that “the State cannot
escape the effect of the six-month rule if the dismissal and re-filing are done for a bad
reason, including doing so for the purpose of circumventing the six-month rule”); accord
State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 495 P.2d 1073 (1972); State v. Ahasteen,
1998-NMCA-158, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328; State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, 122
N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Accordingly, in the present appeals, the Court of Appeals
majority reasoned that it was “inclined to adhere to [its] conclusion in Carreon [, 2006-
NMCA-145, ¶ 11] that the mere existence of the prosecutorial policy of dismissing every
magistrate court case that is not settled before the six-month deadline is insufficient to
sustain the State’s burden.” Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We agree that Carreon is directly on point and dictates that we affirm the district
court’s dismissals.
{4} As in Carreon, the State in these cases dismissed Defendants’ magistrate charges and
refiled the same charges in district court pursuant to a policy in which the prosecutor would
dismiss a case in magistrate court once it became apparent that there would be no plea
agreement and then refile the same charges in district court. The State offered no other
reason for the dismissals and subsequent refilings. The facts in these cases are such that the
Carreon holding—that the mere existence of such a policy is insufficient to meet the State’s
burden—directly applies to Defendants’ cases. Since the State did not meet its burden to
show why its dismissal and refiling was done for reasons other than to circumvent the six-
month rule, Defendants’ six-month rule time periods commenced with either the arraignment
or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and continued to run until they expired; a new
six-month rule time period did not commence once the cases were refiled in district court.
{5} We agree with the Court of Appeals that a literal application of Rule 5-604(B)(1),
which would grant the State a new six-month time period in which to bring the case to trial
upon refiling in district court, “violate[s] the spirit of the six-month rule[.]” Yates, 2008-
NMCA-129, ¶ 4. This Court has adopted the six-month rules in order to effectuate a
criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial and to “assure prompt disposition of criminal
cases.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 43 (“As a case management tool, the six-month rule
accounts for the amount of delay considered reasonable in bringing cases to trial.”). Thus,
the right protected by the six-month rules belongs to a criminal defendant, not the State, the
courts, or any other party. To allow the State a new six-month time period in which to bring
a case to trial after refiling would permit the State to cause delay in bringing defendant to
trial after he or she was charged in magistrate court. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 6
(noting that the six-month rules “guard against lack of preparedness on the part of the
State”). The focus of administration of the six-month rule should be on the defendant and
his or her right to have a prompt disposition of his or her criminal charges. Thus, when
charges are dismissed in the courts of limited jurisdiction, which include magistrate,
metropolitan, and municipal courts, and later refiled in district court, the triggering event for
six-month rule purposes is the triggering event that occurred in the court of limited
jurisdiction, and the six-month time period is not automatically reset upon the refiling. In
light of the existing case law in this area, the prosecution should have known that its policy
of dismissing and refiling in district court was an insufficient basis for restarting the six-
month rule period in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants’ cases are
affirmed because they were not brought to trial within the time period required under the
magistrate court six-month rule and there was no basis for restarting the six-month rule
period under the district court’s rule.
3
{6} While affirmance is warranted in these cases, we do take note of Judge Castillo’s
special concurrence in these appeals, suggesting that we re-examine the six-month rules for
district and magistrate courts. In particular, Judge Castillo suggested that:
Perhaps it would be helpful for the Supreme Court to consider amending the
Rules of Criminal Procedure for district courts and magistrate courts in order
to explain under what circumstances the arraignment in magistrate court
would remain the triggering event for application of the district court six-
month rule and under what circumstances a new six-month rule would begin.
Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 28 (Castillo, J., specially concurring). As the Court of Appeals
noted in its Opinion, the six-month rules in magistrate and district court do not address the
procedural posture presented in Defendants’ cases—there is no provision in either set of
rules governing a situation when a case is dismissed in magistrate court and then later refiled
in district court. Id. ¶ 13; see also State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 26, 138 N.M. 441,
121 P.3d 1040 (noting that Rule 5-604 “is silent on the effect of a dismissal in magistrate
court and refiling in the district court”).
{7} The Court of Appeals also expressed concerns
that [the classifications of the State’s reasons for dismissing a case as “good”
or “bad”] has unnecessarily judgmental connotations, suggesting that the
focus of our analysis is whether the State has acted with a culpable state of
mind and that six-month rule consequences attach only when the State has
acted in bad faith or engaged in gamesmanship.
Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 9. We share these concerns. The six-month rules were primarily
created to effectuate a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial. But as it stands, the “good
faith-bad faith” analysis developed through the Delgado line of cases renders a defendant’s
right to be promptly tried as a contingent right, one that may provide protection only if the
State had “bad” reasons for dismissing and refiling. We find this impermissible.
{8} As we have previously stated, the right protected by the six-month rules is a criminal
defendant’s right, not that of the State, the courts, or any other party; it is not a tool to punish
the State for dismissing and refiling cases in bad faith, nor should its diminution be a reward
for the State’s good behavior. Viewed in that light, the cases in which courts have conducted
a “good faith-bad faith” analysis regarding the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling a
case in order to determine if a new six-month time period should be granted are misguided.
Instead, any inquiry into the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling in district court
should be done within the context of any speedy trial challenge the defendant may raise after
the case is refiled in district court. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 28, 48 (providing new
time frames for engaging in the four-factor Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) speedy
trial balancing test and noting that delay resulting from dismissal and refiling should be
weighed against the State); see also State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 13, 145 N.M. 242,
4
195 P.3d 1254 (“The reasons for a period of the delay may either heighten or temper the
prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay.”).
{9} In light of the foregoing, we recognize the need to revise our six-month rules to
incorporate our decision set forth in this Opinion. Within the context of criminal
proceedings in our courts of limited jurisdiction, our six-month rules continue to serve a
useful purpose. But in our district courts, the six-month rule has become an unnecessary and
sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
Therefore, effective for all cases pending as of the date this Opinion is filed, we withdraw
the six-month rule provisions set forth in Rule 5-604(B)-(E). See State v. Pieri, 2009-
NMSC-019, ¶¶ 19-20, 146 N.M. 155, 207 P.3d 1132 (recognizing the Court’s authority to
make rule changes applicable to pending cases). In its place, defendants may rely upon and
assert their right to a speedy trial whenever they believe impermissible delay has occurred;
whether that delay is the result of a dismissal and refiling or any other cause. We therefore
request that our Rules of Criminal Procedure for District Courts Committee, Rules for Courts
of Limited Jurisdiction Committee, and Metropolitan Courts Rules Committee consider how
best to revise their rules to allow for the dismissal of cases from a limited jurisdiction court
and refiling in district court in a manner that is consistent with the principles set forth in this
Opinion and that protects the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
CONCLUSION
{10} The State failed to meet its burden to show why its dismissals and refilings were not
done to circumvent the six-month rule. Thus, Defendants’ six-month rule time periods
commenced with either the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and
continued to run until they expired; new six-month time periods were not given to the State
once the cases were refiled in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants’
cases are affirmed.
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
____________________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
____________________________________
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
5
____________________________________
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Savedra, No. 31,288
CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CT-JR Judicial Rule Making
CT-ST Speedy Trial
CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-DC Dismissal of Charges
CA-RP Reinstatement of Proceedings
CA-RD Right to Speedy Trial
CA-SP Speedy Trial
6