EX PARTE CUTTING.
Supreme Court of United States.
*18 Mr. Henry Crawford for the petitioners.
Mr. William M. Evarts and Mr. J.O. Broadhead, contra.
*19 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.
To entitle the petitioners to the writ asked for in this case, *20 they must show that they have a clear right to an appeal which has been refused by the Circuit Court. The office of a mandamus is to compel the performance of a plain and positive duty. It is issued upon the application of one who has a clear right to demand such a performance, and who has no other adequate remedy. It is never granted in anticipation of an omission of duty, but only after actual default.
This application is for a writ commanding the judges of the Circuit Court, or one of them, to allow the petitioners an appeal from the decrees in the cause, and a supersedeas. This is the only specific relief asked; and, in support of the application, it is insisted that Marie, Otis, Cutting, Jr., Cutting, and Fearing were admitted as parties to the suit March 25, when they filed their petition therefor, and that consequently they were in a position to demand an appeal as parties. It would, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to this position to say that no one of these petitioners has ever made application to the Circuit Court or either of the judges for the allowance of an appeal in his favor as a party to the suit. They have only asked to be permitted to intervene and become parties, in order that they might appeal.
But, if this were otherwise, the result would not be different; for the persons presenting the petition of March 25 never did in fact become parties, and it is apparent from the record that their present claim in that regard is an afterthought. They filed their petition to be made defendants in the suit, but it was never granted. Not only was no express order made to that effect, but there is nothing to show that they were ever in any manner recognized as parties, or that they ever supposed they were parties. Formal orders were made and conditions imposed upon the admission of Akers and St. Louis County as defendants. But they afterwards withdrew, and neither Cutting nor any of his associates attempted to act in their stead. Subsequently he and some of his co-petitioners united with other persons in another petition for leave to intervene, without in any manner claiming advantage from their former action, or even alluding to it.
We are aware that there are cases in which persons have been treated as parties to a suit after having filed a petition for *21 leave to come in, when no formal order admitting them appears in the record, but in all such cases it will be found that they have acted or have been recognized as parties in the subsequent proceedings in the case. Thus, in Myers v. Fenn, 5 Wall. 205, "the petitions were filed without any order of the court, but no objection was made, and the hearing went on as if an order had been granted;" and in Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 491, "inquiries were made as to the respective claims," as asked for, and "as to all parties who were claimants before the court by bill, petition, or otherwise, their complaint, petition, and proceedings were dismissed." So, in Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 2 Black, 539, petitions were filed by certain creditors praying to be made parties, and that a receiver might be appointed, which was done; and in Bronson v. La Crosse Railroad Co., 2 Wall. 304, certain stockholders in a corporation were permitted to appear in a cause to which the corporation was a party, and present their several claims by answer in the name of the corporation; but this having been afterwards found to be irregular, the answers were considered "rather by indulgence than a matter of strict right as the answer of the individual stockholders." Upon the same principle, it was held in Railroad Company v. Bradleys, 7 Wall. 575, that where an appeal had been prayed for, and subsequently an appeal bond, approved by one of the judges, had been filed in the court, it would be inferred that an appeal had been allowed, although there was no express order to that effect in the record.
From this it is apparent that if one wishes to intervene and become a party to a suit in which he is interested, he must not only petition the court to that effect, but his petition must be granted; and while it is not necessary for him to show that he has actually been admitted by an express order entered upon the record, he must at least make it appear that he has acted or has been treated as a party. That, as we have seen, is not the case here. These petitioners seem to have been content to leave their interests in the hands of Akers; and, when he went out, they went with him. That the court understood this to be so is apparent from the following statement made by the judges in their return to the rule to show cause: "On June 6, 1876, . . . said Akers and said St. Louis County withdrew their *22 answers and dismissed their cross-bills, both said Akers and said St. Louis County purporting to act for themselves as stockholders, and for all other stockholders who might join them."
Upon this state of facts it is impossible to say that the petitioners, or any of them, have established their right to appeal as actual parties to the suit before the decree.
No appeal lies from the order of Oct. 3, refusing them leave to intervene and become parties; for that was only a motion in the cause, and not an independent suit in equity appealable here.
Neither can these petitioners appeal as stockholders. Only parties, or those who represent them, can appeal. The stockholders do not represent the corporation, but for some purposes the corporation represents them. They are sometimes admitted as parties to a suit, for the purpose of protecting their own interests in the corporation against unfounded and illegal claims against it, but this "remedy is an extreme one, and should be admitted by the court with hesitation and caution." Bronson v. La Crosse Railroad Co., 2 Wall. 302. It is always addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court. That we cannot control by mandamus.
We need not consider what rights these petitioners would have if Akers had not withdrawn his intervention before the decree. After his withdrawal, they had no representative stockholder party to the suit, and their position is the same it would have been if no parties had ever intervened in their interest.
Mandamus denied.