HAYWARD
v.
NATIONAL BANK.
Supreme Court of United States.
*614 Mr. E.F. Hodges and Mr. Jonathan F. Barrett for the appellant.
Mr. A.A. Ranney, contra.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.
This bill seems to have been prepared upon the supposition that the bank held and owned the nine hundred shares of stock in the Calumet and Hecla Mining Company at the commencement of this action. It is evident, however, that the bank's connection with the stock ceased Sept. 8, 1868, when it was sold to three of the bank directors. After that date, the purchasers claimed and controlled the stock as their individual property, paid all assessments laid, and received all dividends declared. The evidence shows that the sale to them was absolute and unconditional; and the title which then unquestionably passed to them has ever since been uniformly recognized by the bank and the company. If the appellant is entitled, upon any ground whatever, to a transfer of the stock, such relief can only be given in a suit against the holders of it.
A large portion of the very elaborate argument made in behalf of the appellant was in support of the proposition that the bank, having received the stock in pledge to secure his indebtedness to it, could not, consistently with settled principles, buy from itself, and consequently could not sell to its directors. If these principles were at all applicable to this case, it would only follow that the bank, by violating its duty, had become liable to him for the value of the stock. But such liability is not charged, nor is such relief asked. The specific relief sought is a decree requiring the bank to transfer the stock to him, a thing now beyond its power to do. It is true that the bill contains a general prayer for such relief as may be consistent with equity and good conscience; but we incline to the opinion that *615 its whole frame and structure are inconsistent with a right in this suit to a decree for the value of the stock, even if the facts justified any such relief. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. (3d Am. ed.) 382; Chalmers et ux. v. Chambers, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 29; Hobson v. McArthur, 16 Pet. 182; English v. Foxall, 2 id. 595; Thomason v. Smithson, 7 Port. (Ala.) 144; Driver v. Fortner, 5 id. 9; Strange v. Watson, 11 Ala. 324.
But, waiving the consideration last mentioned, we discover nothing in the evidence which would entitle Hayward to a decree against the bank in any form of proceeding. The bank had the unquestionable right to sell the stock in satisfaction of his indebtedness. It is equally clear, that, with his assent, the stock could have been taken by the bank in discharge of such indebtedness, or sold to any of its directors. Where such assent is clearly shown, and the sale to them was unattended by circumstances of fraud, unfairness, or imposition, we perceive no sound reason why it should not be upheld, especially after an unreasonable and unexplained lapse of time, without objection or complaint by him. Prior to the sale, he was often requested by the bank to take up his notes, and meet the assessments upon the stock. He failed to do either, and the bank was compelled to provide for the assessments. The indulgence extended to him by the bank was characterized by the utmost liberality. It was all that he could have expected or demanded. When, therefore, he was informed (as we do not doubt he was) of the settled purpose of the bank to sell the stock, and of the proposition of the three directors to purchase it, it was his duty, if he disapproved of the latter arrangement, to give expression, in some form, to that disapproval. So far from expressing disapproval, the weight of the evidence is that he gave his consent. It is quite certain that the directors made the purchase in the belief that he had been advised of their proposition, and had assented to its acceptance by the bank. The most favorable construction for him which can be put upon the evidence is, that he was silent when notified of the proposition, and made no objection to its acceptance. His silence, however, under the circumstances, taken in connection with his subsequent conduct, should be held as conclusive as if he had originally assented, in express terms, to the sale. If it be suggested that, after having *616 been informed of the proposition of the directors, sufficient time was not allowed him for deliberation before the sale was made, and if he could have repudiated it for that reason, and reclaimed the stock, there is still no satisfactory explanation of his course after he learned that a sale had actually occurred. He was promptly advised of it, and of the amount realized therefrom. He received, at the same time, an itemized account, showing the amount claimed by the bank upon the original loans, as well as for interest and for advances to meet assessments. That account, it is true, contained no statement, in terms, of the sale, nor did it give the names of the purchasers. But he admits, in his cross-examination, that he was informed by the person who delivered the account that the stock had been sold, and that he understood the credit of $39,257.16 to denote the sum realized from such sale. There was no other mode, as he well knew, by which he could become entitled to so large a credit. He disputed no item in the account, expressed no disapproval of what had been done, and made no complaint to the bank of its action. Although he was well acquainted with the bank officers, and met them frequently after the sale, often upon terms of familiar intercourse, he made no inquiry on the subject. He gave no intimation either of dissatisfaction or of any purpose to repudiate the sale and look to the bank for the value of the stock. He says that he felt "too castaway to speak to anybody; ... couldn't help himself, nor pay the loan; cared very little about any thing." If, as soon as he was notified of the sale, he had the right to repudiate it, and compel the bank to recover the stock, such a course would have profited him nothing, since the three directors paid more for the stock than it was then worth; and the bank, under its express authority to sell, could have put it at once upon the market. It was this consideration which perhaps induced him to remain silent and inactive for more than three years and a half. During all that period he neither paid, nor offered to pay, any interest to the bank, although his present suit rests upon the basis that the bank had an unsettled account with him, embracing a valid subsisting debt, upon which, he now concedes, it is entitled to interest; and he permitted the bank and the purchasing directors to act in the belief that he was content with their action, *617 and that the money realized from the sale had been properly applied to the payment of his indebtedness. Although all the time conversant with the market value of such stock, he made no demand upon the company for dividends declared, nor did he protest against the payment of them to others. Finally, the extraordinary advance in the market price of the stock caused him to break the silence which he had so long and so persistently maintained, and, in March, 1872, he formally notified the bank of his desire and purpose to redeem the stock, although he knew, or could have ascertained upon inquiry, either at the bank or at the office of the company in Boston, that the bank had not held or controlled the stock in any form, directly or indirectly, after the sale in September, 1868.
The facts present insuperable obstacles to any decree in favor of the appellant. If the sale made by the bank was originally impeachable by him, the right to question its validity was lost by his acquiescence. He was in a condition, immediately after the sale, to enforce such rights as the law gave him, as he was fully apprised of their nature, and of all the material facts of the case. He now claims that the sale was in derogation of his rights and injurious to his interests; and yet his conduct was uniformly inconsistent with any purpose to repudiate the sale or assert ownership of the stock. His course was continuously such as to induce a reasonable belief of his fixed determination to abide by the action of the bank. He remained silent when he should have spoken. He will not be heard now, when he should be silent. He must be held to have waived and abandoned the right, if any he had, to impeach the transaction of Sept. 8, 1868.
But the appellant is equally concluded by the lapse of time during which that transaction has been allowed to stand, without any effort upon his part to impeach it. It must now be regarded as unimpeachable.
Courts of equity often treat a lapse of time, less than that prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, as a presumptive bar, on the ground "of discouraging stale claims, or gross laches, or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right." 2 Story, Eq. Jur., sect. 1520. In Smith v. Clay (Amb. 645), Lord Camden said: "A court of equity, which is never active *618 in relief against conscience or public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands, when the party has slept upon his right, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. When these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced." These doctrines have received the approval of this court in numerous cases. Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 id. 178; Harwood v. Railroad Company, 17 id. 79. In the last-named case, this court said, that, without reference to any statute of limitation, equity has adopted the principle that the delay which will defeat a recovery must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. The question of acquiescence or delay may often be controlled by the nature of the property which is the subject of litigation. "A delay which might have been of no consequence in an ordinary case, may be amply sufficient to bar relief when the property is of a speculative character, or is subject to contingencies, or where the rights and liabilities of others have been in the mean time varied. If the property is of a speculative or precarious nature, it is the duty of a man complaining of fraud to put forward his complaint at the earliest possible time. He cannot be allowed to remain passive, prepared to affirm the transaction if the concern should prosper, or to repudiate it if that should prove to his advantage." Kerr, Mistake and Fraud (Bump's ed.), pp. 302, 306; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, supra.
If Hayward was defrauded of his stock, if the title did not pass from him or the bank because of the peculiar relations which the purchasers held to him and the property; if he had the right originally upon any ground to repudiate the sale and reclaim the stock, it was incumbent upon him, by every consideration of fairness, to act with diligence, and before any material change in the circumstances and in the value of the stock had intervened. No sufficient reason is given for the delay in suing. His poverty or pecuniary embarrassment was not a sufficient excuse for postponing the assertion of his rights. He must be deemed to have made a final election not to disturb the sale of 1868; and a court of equity should not permit him. *619 under the circumstances, to recall that election. Upon the grounds, then, both of acquiescence and lapse of time, he should be held to have forfeited all right to relief in a court of equity.
For the reasons given, and without discussing other questions of minor importance, the decree should be affirmed; and it is
So ordered.