United States v. New Orleans

98 U.S. 381 (____)

UNITED STATES
v.
NEW ORLEANS.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. D.C. Labatt for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. B.F. Jonas and Mr. Henry C. Miller for the defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The judge of the Circuit Court accompanied the judgment with an opinion giving the reasons of his decision, which were substantially those stated in the answer of the city: that the statute authorizing the issue of the bonds, upon which the judgments were recovered, made no provision for levying a tax to pay the principal, but intended that it should be paid out of the stock of the railroad company and its revenues; and that the proceeds from the sale of the stock had been already expended by the predecessors of the present city authorities. The court, adopting the view of the city authorities as to the construction of the statute, and the supposed intention of the legislature, proceeded on the principle that the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, and that the judiciary cannot direct a tax to be levied when none is authorized by the legislature; and that the issuing of a mandamus to apply the proceeds received from the sale of the stock would be a futile proceeding, they having been previously used for other purposes. A writ, said the court, could not issue commanding the performance of an admitted impossibility.

The position that the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, no one will controvert. Under our system it is lodged nowhere else. But it is a power that may be delegated by the legislature to municipal corporations, which are merely instrumentalities of the State for the better administration of the government in matters of local concern. When such a corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute, for all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be in express terms prohibited. For the accomplishment of those purposes, its authorities, however limited the corporation, must have the power to raise money and control its expenditure. In a city, even of small extent, they have to provide for the preservation of peace, good order, and health, and the execution of such measures as conduce to the general good of its citizens; such as the opening and repairing of streets, the construction of sidewalks, sewers, and drains, the introduction of water, and the establishment of a fire and police department. In a city like New Orleans, situated on a navigable stream, or on a harbor of a lake or sea, their powers are usually enlarged, so as to embrace the building of wharves and docks or levees for the benefit of commerce, and they may extend also to the construction of roads leading to it, or the contributing of aid towards their construction. The number and variety of works which may be authorized, having a general regard to the welfare of the city or of its people, are mere matters of legislative discretion. All of them require for their execution considerable expenditures of money. Their authorization without providing the means for such expenditures would be an idle and futile proceeding. Their authorization, therefore, implies and carries with it the power to adopt the ordinary means employed by such bodies to raise funds for their execution, unless such funds are otherwise provided. And the ordinary means in such cases is taxation. A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose.

For the same reason, when authority to borrow money or incur an obligation in order to execute a public work is conferred upon a municipal corporation, the power to levy a tax for its payment or the discharge of the obligation accompanies it; and this, too, without any special mention that such power is granted. This arises from the fact that such corporations seldom possess — so seldom, indeed, as to be exceptional — any means to discharge their pecuniary obligations except by taxation. "It is therefore to be inferred," as observed by this court in Loan Association v. Topeka (20 Wall. 660), "that when the legislature of a State authorizes a county or city to contract a debt by bond, it intends to authorize it to levy such taxes as are necessary to pay the debt, unless there is in the act itself, or in some general statute, a limitation upon the power of taxation which repels such an inference."

The doctrine here stated is asserted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Commissioners of Allegheny County, 37 Pa. 277. That county was authorized by an act of the legislature to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company, and to issue its bonds in payment thereof. The interest on them being unpaid, a writ of mandamus was applied for to compel the commissioners of the county to make provision to pay it. The return of the officers set up, among other objections to the writ, that the act authorizing the subscription and issue of the bonds provided no means of payment, either of the principal or interest. To this defence the court said: "The act of 1843 authorized subscriptions by certain counties to be made as `fully as any individual could do,' without prescribing more precisely the terms. But by the fifth section of the act of April 18, 1843, counties subscribing are authorized to borrow money to pay for such subscriptions. We have decided that bonds or certificates of loan issued by a municipal corporation is an ordinary and appropriate mode of borrowing money, and the act of 1853 expressly authorized the issue of such securities. The subscriptions were accordingly made, and the bonds issued. Thus was a lawful debt incurred by the county; and as no other than the ordinary mode of extinguishing it, or of paying the interest thereon, was provided, it follows, of course, that the ordinary mode of raising the means must be resorted to; namely, to provide for it in the annual assessment of taxes for county purposes." Again, in the same case, the court said: "In the next place, it is averred that there is no authority to levy a tax for the payment of the interest by the county. We have already treated of this, and said that the authority to create the debt implies an obligation to pay it; and when no special mode of doing so is provided, it is also implied that it is to be done in the ordinary way, — by the levy and collection of taxes."

In numerous cases, similar language is found in opinions of the State courts, not required, perhaps, to decide the point in judgment therein, but showing a recognition of the doctrine stated. Thus, in Lowell v. Boston (111 Mass. 460), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in speaking of bonds which the legislature had authorized the city of Boston to issue, in order to raise funds to be loaned to individuals to aid them in rebuilding that portion of the city which was burned in the great fire of November, 1872, said: "The issue of bonds by the city, whatever provision may be made for their redemption, involves the possible and not improbable consequence of a necessity to provide for their payment by the city. The right to incur the obligation implies the right to raise money by taxation for payment of the bonds; or, what is equivalent, the right to levy a tax for the purposes for which the fund is to be raised by means of the bonds so authorized." To the same purport is the language of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122. And in the recent case of Parsons v. The City of Charleston, in the United States Circuit Court, the Chief Justice gave emphatic affirmation to the doctrine. Hughes, 282. Indeed, it is always to be assumed, in the absence of clear restrictive provisions, that when the legislature grants to a city the power to create a debt, it intends that the city shall pay it, and that the payment shall not be left to its caprice or pleasure. When, therefore, a power to contract a debt is conferred, it must be held that a corresponding power of providing for its payment is also conferred. The latter is implied in the grant of the former, and such implication cannot be overcome except by express words excluding it.

In the present case, the indebtedness of the city of New Orleans is conclusively established by the judgments recovered. The validity of the bonds upon which they were rendered is not now open to question. Nor is the payment of the judgments restricted to any species of property or revenues, or subject to any conditions. The indebtedness is absolute. If there were any question originally as to a limitation of the means by which the bonds were to be paid, it is cut off from consideration now by the judgments. If a limitation existed, it should have been insisted upon when the suits on the bonds were pending, and continued in the judgments. The fact that none is thus continued is conclusive on this application that none existed.

If the question were an open one, our conclusion would be the same. The act of 1854 provided that the railroad company should issue to the city certificates of stock for an amount equal to the amount of bonds received; and that the stock should remain "for ever pledged for the redemption of said bonds." It is plain that this language was intended only to create a statutory pledge by way of collateral security for the payment of the bonds. It does not import that the holders of the bonds were to be thereby precluded from looking to the city, or that they were obliged to have recourse, in the first instance, to the pledge. The city, by the terms of the bonds, was primarily liable; and nothing in the language of the act in any respect affects this primary liability. The bondholder is not compelled to look to the security, but may proceed directly against the city without regard to it. Besides, as was justly observed by counsel, if we could seek the intention of the legislature from other considerations than the words of the statute, it would be still plainer that no such construction could be given to its language. The object of issuing the bonds for the stock was to aid the company in obtaining funds to build its road. If the stock had been available, the bonds would not have been needed; the stock would have been sold. But it was not available; and it is difficult to believe that the bonds would have been any more so, if their payment had been limited to the revenues and proceeds of the stock. The proposal of such a scheme for raising money would not have indicated much wisdom on the part of the legislature; to have assented to it would have indicated less on the part of the bondholders. And even if the bondholders had been required to look for payment of the bonds only to the revenues and proceeds of the stock, it comes with bad grace from the city, not to say evinces an insensibility to its obligations, to allege exemption from liability after its authorities have sold the stock and diverted the proceeds to other uses.

This construction is not affected, as contended by counsel, by the statutes of 1852 and 1853, restraining cities and towns from creating any indebtedness without providing at the same time for the payment of the principal and interest. Those statutes were not limitations on the power of the legislature to authorize the creation of debts by cities upon other conditions. It does not follow that because it was deemed expedient, as a general rule, to prohibit cities and towns from incurring debts on their own motion, without making provision for their payment, that the legislature might not authorize the incurring of a particular obligation without such provision. And it will be found, upon examination, that the act of 1854 prescribed the details of the ordinance which should be passed by the city in the execution of the authority conferred, and that the ordinance passed conformed to them. Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; Amey v. Allegheny, 24 How. 364; Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, 34 Pa. St. 496; Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 40 id. 348; Commonwealth v. Perkins, 43 id. 400; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 4 Ohio St. 472.

There is nothing, therefore, in the positions of counsel to impair the validity of the bonds upon which the judgments were recovered, if we were at liberty to consider them on this application. But, as already said, the judgments are conclusive upon this point. Owing the debt, the city has the power to levy a tax for its payment. By its charter, in force when the bonds were issued, it was invested, in express terms, "with all the powers, rights, privileges, and immunities incident to a municipal corporation and necessary for the proper government of the same."

As already said, the power of taxation is a power incident to such a corporation, and may be exercised for all the purposes authorized by its charter or subsequent legislation. Whatever the legislature empowers the corporation to do is presumably for its benefit, and may, in "the proper government of the same," be done. Having the power to levy a tax for the payment of the judgments of the relator, it was the duty of the city, through its authorities, to exercise the power. The payment was not a matter resting in its pleasure, but a duty which it owed to the creditor. Having neglected this duty, the case was one in which a mandamus should have been issued to enforce its performance. Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id. 313; Supervisors v. Rogers, id. 175; The Supervisors v. Durant, 9 id. 415; County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360.

The judgment of the court below must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to issue the writ as prayed in the petition of the relator; and it is

So ordered.

NOTE. — Three other cases against the city, on the relation respectively of Charles Parsons, of William S. Peterkin, and of James Wadick, were argued at the same time as the preceding case. The city was represented by the same counsel. Mr. D.H. Chamberlain and Mr. William B. Hornblower appearing for Parsons, and Mr. Thomas J. Semmes and Mr. Robert Mott for the relator in each of the other cases.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD, in delivering the opinion of the court, remarked, that each of the cases was, in all essential particulars, similar to that of United States v. New Orleans; and, upon the authority of the decision therein, the judgment below must be reversed, and each cause remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandamus to levy and collect a tax, as prayed by the relator, to pay the judgment described in his petition, with lawful interest thereon; and it is

So ordered.