Sun Mutual Insurance v. Ocean Insurance

107 U.S. 485 (____)

SUN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
OCEAN INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. William M. Evarts and Mr. Joseph H. Choate for the appellant.

Mr. E.N. Taft and Mr. Robert D. Benedict for the appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court, and, after making the above statement, proceeded as follows:—

By the express terms of the act of Congress of Feb. 16, 1875, c. 77, defining the jurisdiction of this court, in cases such as the present, we are limited to a determination of the questions of law arising upon the record, including the rulings of the Circuit Court, presented in a bill of exceptions. And, as was decided in The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440, and substantially repeated several times since, "the facts as found and stated by the court below are conclusive. The case stands here precisely as though they had been found by the verdict of a jury." The Benefactor, 102 id. 214; The Adriatic, 103 id. 730; The Annie Lindsley, 104 id. 185; The Francis Wright, 105 id. 381. Or as it was put in The Annie Lindsley, 104 id. 185, 188: "The question, and the only question, which we can consider is, whether the facts found support the conclusions of law and the decree." The findings of fact being in the nature of a special verdict, we can go neither behind nor beyond them. We cannot correct them by inquiring into the evidence, nor supply any omissions by intendment or inference. The rule applicable to special verdicts was stated in Collins v. Riley, 104 id. 322, 327, — "that the special verdict must contain all the facts from which the law is to arise; that whatever is not found therein is, for the purposes of a decision, to be considered as not existing; that it must present, in substance, the whole matter upon which the court is asked to determine the legal rights of the parties, and cannot, therefore, be aided by intendment or by extrinsic facts, although such facts may appear elsewhere in the record," — which needs qualification in its application to such cases as the present; for our jurisdiction, in cases of this description, extending to a determination of the questions of law arising upon the record, may be predicated of facts which appear in any part of it, whether admitted by the parties in the pleadings, or by stipulation, or found by the court. But it is essential that the findings of fact should state the facts, and not the evidence merely, even although the evidence be sufficient to establish the fact. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated this rule in Barnes v. Williams, 11 Wheat. 415, when he said: "Although, in the opinion of the court, there was sufficient evidence in the special verdict from which the jury might have found the fact, yet they have not found it, and the court could not, upon a special verdict, intend it. The special verdict was defective in stating the evidence of the fact, instead of the fact itself. It was impossible, therefore, that a judgment could be pronounced for the plaintiff." This was approved in Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408. And see Prentice v. Zane's Adm'r, 8 How. 470, and Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125.

These observations have a material and important application in this case.

It was essential to the establishment of the libellant's right of recovery to show that the risk insured against by the policy sued on was the same which the libellant was adjudged liable for on its policy to Melcher. The policy of the respondent in this suit, although, in substance, a reinsurance, was not so in form. It did not describe the risk by reference to the policy of The Ocean Company, so that the identity between the two could be ascertained by mere comparison. It did not, in fact, allude to any such policy. The risk is described, solely, by words descriptive of the property insured, without a definition of the interest of the assured. It became necessary, therefore, to aver the identity of the two insurances. This the libel does. But, as it is denied in the answer, it became necessary to prove it. The finding of facts, however, in the Circuit Court does not assert it. It contains other facts bearing on the question. But the conclusion itself is stated, not as a fact, but as a conclusion of law, from the facts found, — the facts and the conclusions of law having been separately stated, as expressly required by the act of Congress. The first conclusion of law, in the statement made by the Circuit Court, is that "The Sun Company's policy covers the Rotterdam charter."

The question, therefore, presented to us on this appeal is, not whether that might be true as a conclusion of fact from the circumstances stated in the findings of fact, but whether, upon the facts found, it must be true as matter of law.

The distinction is obvious and important. The circumstances in evidence might be such, that a jury, or a court sitting to try the case without a jury, would believe, as the more reasonable probability, according to the ordinary and observed course of human conduct, that the fact disputed had or had not actually taken place; and in that case the inference would be one of fact. On the other hand, the facts found might be such as to be, in point of law, inconsistent with any supposition, except that of the existence or non-existence of the fact in controversy, in which case the conclusion is necessary, independently of any belief based upon what is more or less probable, because the law declares the uniform effect of such a state and condition of circumstances. The difference is between presumptions of fact and rebuttable presumptions of law, or presumptiones juris tantum, as distinguished from presumptiones juris et de jure, according to the classification of Best, Law of Evidence, sect. 314, 4th English ed., who states the practical test for distinguishing them thus: "Where a presumption of law is disregarded by a jury, a new trial will be granted ex debito justitiæ; but where the presumption disregarded is only one of fact, however strong or obvious, the granting a new trial is at the discretion of the court in banc." Sect. 323.

In other words, when the testimony has been sifted and weighed, and the actual circumstances of the transaction stated in a connected form, the law, by means of its presumptions, determines whether they establish such a relation between the parties as to give rise to reciprocal rights and obligations, and if so, what legal consequences have followed. The issue to be determined may be one, in form, merely of fact, as whether a particular contract was made, or whether one or both of the parties have been guilty of negligence. The circumstances of the entire transaction having been ascertained and stated, the issue is determined by the interpretation which the law puts upon them. This is an office quite distinct from ascertaining the circumstances themselves by the process of reduction from the original mass of evidence. It involves only a consideration of the facts as found, in their relation to each other, in view of fixed legal presumptions, in order to determine and declare the effect to be given to them as a connected whole.

This rule was, after much consideration, established in United States v. Pugh, 99 U.S. 265, in reference to the examination of the judgments of the Court of Claims, and we reiterate it here, as equally applicable to appeals from the decrees in admiralty of the Circuit Courts of the United States under the act of 1875. In that case, one of the issues to be determined was, whether the proceeds of the sale of the captured property belonging to the claimant had been paid into the treasury. No direct proof to that effect had been given, but if shown at all, it was by way of inference from certain circumstantial facts established by the evidence, and set forth in the finding of the court below. The Chief Justice said, upon this point: "Confessedly, the court has found all the facts which have been directly established by the evidence. These facts are not evidence in the sense that evidence means the statements of witnesses or documents produced in court for inspection. They are the results of evidence, and whether they establish the ultimate fact to be reached is, if a question of fact at all, to say the least, in the nature of a question of law. If what has been found is, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the legal equivalent of a direct finding that the proceeds of this claimant's property have been paid into the treasury, the judgment is right; otherwise, it is wrong. The inquiry thus presented is as to the legal effect of facts proved, not of the evidence given to make the proof," &c... . "The rule relieves us from the necessity of considering the evidence at all, and confines our attention to the legal effect upon the rights of the parties of the facts proven as they have been sent up from the court below. In this way the weight of the evidence is left for the sole consideration of the court below, but the ultimate effect of the facts, which the direct evidence has established, is left open for review here on appeal."

Tried according to this standard, we are quite clear that the conclusion under examination cannot be sustained.

The facts material to the point, and which, in our opinion, justify and require this result, are as follows:—

The language of the policy sued on, descriptive of the risk assumed, is, "$6,550 on charter, $2,650 on primage, and $1,500 on property on board ship `C.S. Pennell,' at and from New York to San Francisco." The proposal for this insurance was made March 23, 1864, by letter. The vessel, at that time lying at New York, had been previously chartered to her full capacity for a voyage from New York to San Francisco, of which both companies had knowledge; and on Jan. 30, 1864, was chartered by Melcher, her master, to the Peruvian government, by the terms of which charter she was to sail from New York on or before June 1, 1864, to San Francisco, and thence proceed, with all convenient dispatch, to Callao, Peru, and from thence, if on inspection she should be found well conditioned for the voyage, to the Chincha Islands for a cargo of guano to be taken to Hamburg or Rotterdam. Of this second charter The Ocean Company had full knowledge, having, on Feb. 5, 1864, insured to Pennell, a part owner, his interest in both the ship and this charter on the voyage described as "at and from New York to, at, and from San Francisco, Callao, and the Chinchas." And on March 20, 1864, Melcher, one-eighth owner and master, by letter to his agent, Sawyer, directed the latter to insure his interest in the ship and both charters, specifically describing them, and primage and personal effects on board. Sawyer, exhibiting this letter to The Ocean Company and explaining fully the circumstances, that company issued one policy to Melcher, describing the risk in the same words as those used in the policy sued; and by a separate policy insured $3,000 on his interest in the ship during the whole voyage, described as "at and from New York to, at, and from San Francisco and Chinchas, with usual liberties at Callao, to her port of advice and discharge in Europe."

The letter of March 23, 1864, from The Ocean Company to The Sun Company, containing the return of the insurance involved in this suit, included two others, both of which were accepted, one of $5,000 "on charter of ship `Charles S. Pennell' at and from New York to, at, and from San Francisco and Callao to Chinchas;" the other, a war risk only of $5,000 on the ship, on voyage described in the same words. The correspondence between the companies on the subject, at the time these risks were assumed, undoubtedly contains a reference to a voyage from New York to San Francisco, and thence to Callao and Chinchas, and of two insurances on charter, in one of which the voyage is described as including New York and Chinchas via San Francisco and Callao, and in the other, from New York to San Francisco; but there is nothing which indicates with any conclusive force that there were two distinct charters, and certainly nothing to indicate that there was one which included the return voyage from the Chinchas to Rotterdam. And in respect to the latter, it is found, as a fact, that "The Sun Company had no other knowledge of the existence of the Rotterdam charter than such as is to be inferred from the correspondence," which, as we have just stated, and as must appear from the full text of the letters set out in the findings, communicated no knowledge of such a charter whatever.

It will not suffice to say, as was said in argument, that the language of the correspondence and of the three contemporaneous insurances was such as to give The Sun Company notice of a voyage and charter beyond San Francisco, as well as of one to that port from New York, and that they must include distinct interests, so that, upon inquiry, it might have become informed of all the particulars of the Rotterdam charters. For the question is not one of notice sufficient to suggest further inquiry, and of due diligence in prosecuting it, disregard of which may be alleged as laches, but whether the minds of the parties in fact met in a common understanding, so as to consummate the contract sued on. And to show that, it was necessary to prove, in the absence of express words, and to resolve the ambiguity arising upon the evidence, that, from the circumstances, in point of fact, The Sun Company must have intended to insure an interest in the Rotterdam charter. Proof of its actual knowledge that such a charter was in existence would be only one step in that direction, and even that is wanting. Had it been supplied, the burden of proof would have still remained with the libellant to show that it was meant by both parties to describe that particular risk, under an insurance upon a charter during a voyage described as at and from New York to San Francisco.

It is admitted that the language of the policy does not of itself import an insurance of a charter beyond one during the voyage described. Prima facie, indeed, it describes a charter terminating with that voyage, and not beyond. In the action brought by Melcher against The Ocean Company in Maine, and determined in the Supreme Court of that State, it was claimed by the defendant that the language of the policy conclusively described a charter-party limited to the description of the voyage, and that proof was not admissible to show that any other existed and was the one meant. And it was held in that case, in substance, that without such proof there could be no recovery; but that, inasmuch as a description of the voyage during which the risk was insured did not necessarily determine the extent of the charter-party under which the freight was to be earned, it appearing from extrinsic evidence that two charter-parties existed to which the insurance might apply, a latent ambiguity was disclosed which was susceptible of explanation by parol evidence. And accordingly, upon proof of the communications between Melcher and The Ocean Company, not made known at any time to The Sun Company, the former was adjudged to have insured by its policy his interest in the Rotterdam charter. Without that proof he must have failed in his litigation. It cannot be claimed that such proof is admissible to explain the contract of the appellant.

Nor is the liability of the latter affected by the fact that its policy is one of reinsurance in fact; nor by the circumstance that it aided in the maintenance of the defence in the suit against The Ocean Company; nor by the result and judgment in that action.

The policy, although a reinsurance, is a contract, which, like others, must be construed according to its terms, and the same ambiguity arises in respect to it that was found to exist in respect to the original insurance. The Sun Company, in maintaining the defence in aid of The Ocean Company, that the policy of the latter did not cover an insurance of Melcher's interest in the Rotterdam charter, maintained also, what it has continued to do in this suit, its own defence against the changed claim of The Ocean Company which the latter now asserts, with the advantage that its defence cannot be overcome by proof of explanations outside of the policy itself, such as defeated the libellant in its contest with Melcher. And the judgment rendered in favor of the latter, upon the point in question, as to what was in fact the contract made with him by The Ocean Company, is no adjudication against the appellant, as to what is the contract between the parties to this suit; for it is only upon the pre-supposition of the identity of the subject-matter of the two contracts that it could be pretended that the judgment against The Ocean Company would be admissible in evidence, for any purpose material here, against The Sun Company. To admit it as evidence of that identity is a pure petitio principii. Accordingly, it was an additional and substantive error in the Circuit Court to find, as a conclusion of law, as it did, that "the judgment in the Maine court against The Ocean Company is conclusive upon the issues there made, and decided and binds The Sun." It was, of course, conclusive upon The Ocean Company, but was not even admissible in evidence against The Sun Company, without prior proof that the policy of the latter company was intended to cover the Rotterdam charter.

Much reliance is placed, in argument in support of this contention on the part of the libellant, upon the circumstance, stated in the findings of fact, that "the loss under the risk taken in favor of Charles S. Pennell, both on the ship and Rotterdam charter, was paid by the Sun Company, without objection, October 23, 1865, and May 5, 1866." These losses were paid on the two insurances effected contemporaneously with that sued on in this proceeding, in which the voyage described was, "at and from New York to, at, and from San Francisco and (to) Callao to Chinchas." But, at most, this only gives rise to an inference that these two insurances were intended to cover some charter, other than the one from New York to San Francisco, and, indeed, is not conclusive as to that. It certainly does not establish, even in respect to them, that they were understood, at the time the insurances were effected, to cover a risk upon an interest in the Rotterdam charter, or any charter in force during the voyage from New York to San Francisco; much less, can it be said, that any admission can be implied, from such payment, that the risk, described as upon ship and charter during the extended voyage to Callao and the Chinchas, although described as commencing at New York, was identical, so far as the charter was concerned, with that in the policy sued on, in which the voyage is described as from New York to San Francisco. In any aspect, the circumstance relied on is merely argumentative. The Sun Company may have made the payment inadvertently, without consideration of its strict rights. It certainly is not conclusive as an admission of liability in this case, for it has no element of estoppel, and to justify the conclusion of law sought to be drawn from it would be to give it that effect.

The fact that The Sun Company participated in the defence of The Ocean Company in the action brought by Melcher, and the communications between the companies in respect to it, so far as they are set out in the findings of fact, are, in our opinion, equally without effect, and do not amount either to an admission of liability or to an agreement to be bound by the result of that litigation; and having carefully considered all the circumstances found and relied on, without further special mention of them, we are constrained to say that they do not, either singly or together, sustain the conclusion that "The Sun Company's policy covers the Rotterdam charter."

This conclusion is, in our opinion, greatly strengthened by the consideration of other facts set out in the finding, which, while they tend to show that as a matter of fact The Sun Company did not intend to reinsure Melcher's interest in the Rotterdam charter, furnish also a distinct ground of defence, as matter of law, if the fact had been otherwise, and negative the second conclusion of law announced by the Circuit Court, that "the policy is not void because of any concealment by The Ocean Company."

The situation was this: There were two concurrent charters on the ship, both which were treated as in force during the one voyage from New York to San Francisco, in the course of which she was lost. The first charter covered a full cargo, and no additional freight could be simultaneously earned under the second, for no part of the cargo contemplated by it could be on board till after the voyage under the first charter had been completed. In case of loss during that voyage, consequently, there could be no salvage of freight applicable to the second charter. Melcher was master and owner of one-eighth of the ship. On March 20, 1864, he instructed his agent, Sawyer, by letter shown to The Ocean Company, to effect insurance on his behalf against war risk on ship, and generally on his interest in both charters specifically, besides primage, and on his personal effects, amounting in all to $19,425, and in the same letter said: "I think you had better put $5,000 or $6,000 more marine risk in case I should lose the ship." The Ocean Company accepted the risk on the Rotterdam charter, primage, and personal effects to San Francisco, and on the same day insured the master for $3,000 on his interest in the ship during the whole of her voyage, describing the duration and locality of the risk as "at and from New York to, at, and from San Francisco and Chinchas, with usual liberties at Callao, to her port of advice and discharge in Europe." This latter insurance was not made known to The Sun Company, nor was it informed of any of the communications that had taken place between The Ocean Company and Melcher, including the contents of the letter to Sawyer.

It thus appears that at the time of the loss Melcher had insurance on two concurrent charters and his primage thereon during one voyage, being insured, besides his interest in the ship, on double the amount of its possible earnings of freight for one voyage. This fact was known to The Ocean Company at the time, and was not communicated by it to The Sun Company, which was without other knowledge upon the subject, and executed its policy to The Ocean Company in ignorance of it.

That knowledge of the circumstance was material and important to the underwriter as likely to influence his judgment in accepting the risk, we think, is so manifest to common reason as to need no proof of usage or opinion among those engaged in the business. It was a flagrant case of over-insurance upon its face, and made it the pecuniary interest of the master in charge of the ship to forego and neglect the duty which he owed to all interested in her safety. Had it been known, it is reasonable to believe that a prudent underwriter would not have accepted the proposal as made, and, where the fact of the contract is in dispute, as here, corroborates the denial of the appellants. The concealment, whether intentional or inadvertent, we have no hesitation in saying, avoids the policy, if actually intended to cover the risk for which the claim is made.

In respect to the duty of disclosing all material facts, the case of reinsurance does not differ from that of an original insurance. The obligation in both cases is one uberrimæ fidei. The duty of communication, indeed, is independent of the intention, and is violated by the fact of concealment even where there is no design to deceive. The exaction of information in some instances may be greater in a case of reinsurance than as between the parties to an original insurance. In the former, the party seeking to shift the risk he has taken is bound to communicate his knowledge of the character of the original insured, where such information would be likely to influence the judgment of an underwriter; while in the latter the party, in the language of Bronson, J., in the case of the New York Bowery. Fire Ins. Co. v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 359, 367, is "not bound nor could it be expected, that he should speak evil of himself."

Mr. Duer (Lect. 13, pt. 1, sect. 13; 2 Ins. 398) states as a part of the rule the following proposition:—

"SECT. 13. The assured will not be allowed to protect himself against the charge of an undue concealment by evidence that he had disclosed to the underwriters, in general terms, the information that he possessed. Where his own information is specific, it must be communicated in the terms in which it was received. General terms may include the truth, but may fail to convey it with its proper force and in all its extent. Nor will the assured be permitted to urge, as an excuse for his omission to communicate material facts, that they were actually known to the underwriters, unless it appears that their knowledge was as particular and full as his own information. It is the duty of the assured to place the underwriter in the same situation as himself; to give to him the same means and opportunity of judging of the value of the risks; and when any circumstance is withheld, however slight and immaterial it may have seemed to himself, that, if disclosed, would probably have influenced the terms of the insurance, the concealment vitiates the policy."

This statement is sustained by the authorities cited, — Ely v. Hallett, 2 Caines (N.Y.), 57; Moses v. Delaware Ins. Co., 1 Wash. 385, — and, in our opinion, is a necessary deduction from the nature and spirit of the contract of insurance. It applies with peculiar force in the present case, as every sentence of the rule is a condemnation of The Ocean Insurance Company in imposing upon the appellant the whole risk of the insurance, without communicating its knowledge of the circumstances, which might have made the latter as unwilling to assume it as they seem to have made the former unwilling to retain even a share of it.

For these reasons, and without passing upon other questions discussed, the decree of the Circuit Court will be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree dismissing the libel; and it is

So ordered.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER, with whom concurred MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE and MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, dissenting.

I do not concur in the opinion of the court. It proceeds, as I think, upon an erroneous view of the principles of reinsurance, and places the reinsurer in the exact condition of a joint insurer, or of an original insurer of the risk of the party first insured.

In point of fact, The Sun Company insured The Ocean Company against the risk which the latter had incurred by its policies, and unless there was misrepresentation, fraud, or intentional concealment by The Ocean Company, The Sun Company should pay the loss which the other sustained, and against the hazard of which it agreed to insure The Ocean Company.

The long course of dealing between the two companies showed that The Sun Company was in the habit of reinsuring for The Ocean Company without inquiry into the particulars of the risk, and in this case there was no reason for any special communication of the circumstances of the risk by The Ocean to The Sun Company.