Livingston County v. First Nat. Bank of Portsmouth

128 U.S. 102 (1888)

LIVINGSTON COUNTY, MISSOURI
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

No, 195.

Supreme Court of United States.

Submitted October 9, 1888. Decided October 29, 1888. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

Mr. James L. Davis and Mr. Henry N. Ess for plaintiff in error.

Mr. G.S. Eldredge for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The grounds urged for reversing the judgment are (1) that the statutes of Missouri did not authorize the consolidation of a railroad company organized under the laws of Missouri with a railroad company organized under the laws of another State; (2) that an authority to subscribe to stock in, and issue bonds to, the Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad Company was not an authority to subscribe to stock in, and issue bonds to, the St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company; and (3) that it does not appear by the face of the bonds, or by the findings of the court, that the County Court ordered any subscription for stock in either the Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad Company or the St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company to be made, or that any subscription for stock of either of those companies was in fact made, or that any stock of either company was ever issued to the county or to the township.

(1) As to the authority for consolidation. It was enacted as follows by the act of the legislature of Missouri, approved March 2d, 1869, entitled "An Act to authorize the Consolidation of Railroad Companies in this State with Companies owning Connecting Railroads in Adjoining States," (Laws of 1869, p. 75, and 1 Wagner's Missouri Stats. of 1870, p. 314, § 56): "Section 1. That any railroad company organized under the general or special laws of this State, whose tracks shall at the line of the State connect with the track of the railroad of any company organized under the general or special laws of any adjoining State, is hereby authorized to make and enter into any agreement with such connecting company, for the consolidation of the stock of the respective companies whose tracks shall be so connected, making one company of the two, whose stock shall be so consolidated, upon such terms and conditions and stipulations, as may be mutually agreed upon between them, in accordance with the laws of the adjoining State in which the road is located, with which connection is thus formed." The statute then went on to enact details in regard to the consolidation. The fourth section of the act provided as follows: "Section 4. Any such consolidated company shall be subject to all the liabilities, and bound by all the obligations of the company within this State, which may be thus consolidated with one in the adjacent State, as fully as if such consolidation had not taken place, and shall be subject to the same duties and obligations to the State, and be entitled to the same franchises and privileges under the laws of this State, as if the consolidation had not taken place." This statute applied to the consolidation in question although no road had yet been constructed.

It is not contended that the provisions of this statute were not complied with in making the consolidation in question. The consolidated company was, by the statute, to be entitled to the same privileges under the laws of the State of Missouri as if the consolidation had not taken place. This can only mean that it was to be entitled to the same privileges under the laws of Missouri, that the Missouri corporation was entitled to under the laws of that State at the time the consolidation took place. One of those privileges was the privilege of a subscription to stock by the township of Chillicothe.

(2) As to the authority to subscribe to stock in, and issue bonds to, the St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company, under the vote of the people of the township to subscribe to stock in, and issue bonds to, the Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad Company. The case of Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, decided by this court at October term, 1875, is relied upon by the plaintiff in error as a decision against the validity of the bonds in that respect. It arose under the same statute of Missouri, of March 23d, 1868. The bonds were issued by the county of Bates, in behalf of Mount Pleasant township, in that county, to the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company, in January, 1871. The taxpayers of the township had, in May, 1870, at an election, voted in favor of a subscription to the stock of, and the issue of bonds to, the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company. In October, 1870, that corporation was consolidated with another corporation, under the name of the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company. Thereafter, in January, 1871, the County Court, in pursuance only of the authority conferred by such vote, subscribed the specified amount, in behalf of the township, to the consolidated company, and issued the bonds to it in payment of the subscription. The objection was taken, that the question of subscribing to stock in, and issuing bonds to, the consolidated company was never submitted to a vote of the people of the township. This court held, that as, at the time of the consolidation, no subscription to stock had been made, and thus no vested right had accrued to the company named in the vote, the extinction of that company worked a revocation in law of the authority to subscribe to stock and to issue bonds. In that case, it appeared by the face of the bonds that the vote of the people was to subscribe to the stock of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, and that that company and another had been consolidated under the name of the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company. This court held, that this recital in the bonds was sufficient to put the holder on inquiry, and that the bonds were invalid. The suit was brought by a holder of coupons attached to the bonds, against the county, to recover the amount of the coupons.

In County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682, at October term, 1876, the suit was brought on coupons attached to bonds issued by the county of Scotland, in the State of Missouri, on its own behalf, to the Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Railway Company, for a subscription on behalf of the county to the stock of that corporation, which was a corporation formed by the consolidation, in March, 1870, (under the above mentioned act of March 2d, 1869,) of the Alexandria and Nebraska City Railroad Company, of Missouri, (formerly the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railroad Company,) with the Iowa Southern Railway Company, of Iowa. It was claimed that the power to subscribe to the stock had been given by the charter granted in 1857 by Missouri to the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railroad Company, before the adoption of the state constitution of 1865, which required that the question of subscribing to stock should be submitted to a vote of the qualified voters of the county. No vote had been taken in the case. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff, that the consolidated corporation acquired, by the consolidation, all the privileges of the Alexandria and Nebraska City Railroad Company, and, among others, the privilege of receiving county subscriptions to its capital stock. This court held, that the prohibition of the constitution of 1865 only extended to restraining the legislature from authorizing in the future municipal subscriptions, or aid to private corporations, without a vote of the people of the municipality, but did not take away any authority previously granted to subscribe to stock without a vote of the people. It also held, that the simple consolidation with another company did not extinguish the power of the county to subscribe, or the privilege of the company to receive a subscription. As authority for this view it cited the case of The State v. Greene County, 54 Missouri, 540.

In the case of County of Scotland v. Thomas, the power to consolidate was given in 1869, after the original charter of 1857 was granted, and after the Constitution of 1865 went into effect; but it was held that that fact did not affect the power. In its opinion, the court said (p. 691): that the railroad authorized by the charter of 1857 "was `a railroad from the city of Alexandria, in the county of Clark, in the direction of Bloomfield, in the State of Iowa, to such point on the northern boundary line of the State of Missouri as shall be agreed upon by said company, and a company, authorized on the part of the State of Iowa, to construct a railroad to intersect the road authorized to be constructed by the provisions of this act, at the most practicable point on said state line.' Bloomfield was a small town in Iowa, evidently not intended as the final objective point of the proposed line, which is only required to be `in the direction of Bloomfield.' A connection with a continuous road in Iowa was the declared object of the road proposed. It was evidently the purpose to bring Alexandria, a port of Missouri on the Mississippi River, in connection with the rich region of southern and western Iowa, by means of the road then being chartered, and a road to connect therewith, running into the State of Iowa. This purpose will be most effectually attained by the construction of the continuous line contemplated by the consolidated companies. The general direction of the road is not changed. It does not pass through Bloomfield, it is true; but it does not pass it by so far as to be a substantial departure from the route originally indicated. The amending act, therefore, which authorized a consolidation with the Iowa Southern Railway Company, and thereby constituted the Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Railway Company, was in perfect accord with the general purpose of the original charter of the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railroad Company; and, if the other rights and privileges of the latter company passed over to the consolidated company, we do not see why the privilege in question should not do so, nor why the power given to the county to subscribe to the stock should not continue in force."

The court distinguished the case from that of Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, on the ground that in that case the subscription to stock was made by the County Court in behalf of a township, and that the County Court was regarded as being the mere agent of the township, and as having no discretion to go beyond the precise terms of the power given to it, to subscribe to the stock of the company named in the vote; while in the case of Scotland County, the County Court acted as the representative authority of the county itself, and was officially invested with all the discretion necessary to be exercised under the change of circumstances brought about by the consolidation.

The court further proceeded to say, in the Scotland County case (p. 693): "If we look at the subject in a broad and general view, it will be still more manifest that the power in question was intended to exist, notwithstanding the consolidation. The project of the railroad promised a great public improvement, conducive to the interests of Alexandria and the counties through which it would pass. Its construction, however, would greatly depend upon the local aid and encouragement it might receive. The interests of its projectors and of the country it was to traverse were regarded as mutual. The power of the adjacent counties and towns to subscribe to its stock, as a means of securing its construction, was desired not only by the company, but by the inhabitants. Whether the policy was a wise one or not is not now the question. It was in accordance with the public sentiment of that period. The power was sought at the hands of the legislature, and was given. It was relied on by those who subscribed their private funds to the enterprise. It was involved in the general scheme as an integral part of it, and as much contributory and necessary to its success as the prospective right to take tolls. Why it should not still attach to this portion of the road, as one of the rights and privileges belonging to it, into whose hands soever it comes, by consolidation or otherwise, it is difficult to see."

The conclusion of the court was, that the power of the county of Scotland to subscribe, being a right and privilege of the Alexandria and Nebraska City Railroad Company, passed, with its other rights and privileges, into the new conditions of existence which that company assumed under the consolidation, and this although the company with which the consolidation was effected belonged to the State of Iowa.

In Town of East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U.S. 801, at October term, 1876, which was a suit on coupons attached to bonds issued by a town in Illinois, provision had been made by statute, prior to the time when a subscription was made by that town to the stock of a railroad company, that the company might consolidate with other companies, in order to carry out the object of its charter, and that its franchises, rights, subscriptions, and credits might be transferred, and such consolidation was effected, and a subsequent transfer by the consolidated company was lawfully made to a new company engaged in constructing a connecting road, thus forming a continuous line, the stockholders in the former companies becoming stockholders in the new company. It was held that a delivery by the town to such new company of bonds for the payment of the original subscription, and a receipt of a certificate of stock in the new company, were warranted by law. In the opinion of the court the doctrine of the case of County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682, was confirmed, and the distinction drawn in that case between it and the case of Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, was adverted to.

In County of Bates v. Winters, 97 U.S. 83, at October term, 1877, the suit was brought to recover the amount of bonds and coupons issued by the county of Bates, in the State of Missouri, in behalf of Mount Pleasant township, in that county. The bonds were issued in January, 1871, to the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company, a corporation formed by the consolidation of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company with another corporation. The township had voted, in April, 1870, in favor of a subscription to the stock of, and the issue of bonds to, the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company. No subscription to the stock of that company was shown to have been made, but the subscription was made on the books of the new company formed by the consolidation. This court held, that as, in fact, no subscription had been made to the stock of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, the bonds were void, under the ruling in Harshman v. Bates County, because the popular vote gave authority to subscribe to the stock of one company, while the subscription was made, and the bonds were issued, to a different company; and that the recitals in the bonds were such that there could be no bonâ fide holders of them. The bonds recited, on their face, that the vote had been on the proposition to subscribe to the capital stock of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, and that that company and another company had been consolidated into one company, under the name of the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company, to which latter company the bonds were, on their face, issued. This court reversed the judgment below, which had been in favor of the plaintiff, and remanded the case for a new trial.

In Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U.S. 499, at October term, 1878, the suit was against the township of Salamanca, in Cherokee County, Kansas, to recover the amount of coupons detached from bonds issued by that township to the Memphis, Carthage and Northwestern Railroad Company. The bonds were issued in September, 1872, in pursuance of an election held in November, 1871, at which it was voted to subscribe to stock in, and issue bonds to, the State Line, Oswego and Southern Kansas Railroad Company. After the vote was had, the latter company was consolidated with another railroad company, into a new corporation, to which the bonds were issued. The subscription was made to the stock of the new corporation, and no other vote was had than the one above mentioned. The case came up on questions certified, one of which was as follows: "Whether or not it is a defence to this action by a bonâ fide holder for value of the interest coupons sued on, without actual notice, that after the order of the board of county commissioners for an election, and after a favorable vote by a three-fifths majority of the qualified electors of Salamanca township, according to law, to subscribe stock in the State Line, Oswego and Southern Kansas Railroad Company, payable in negotiable bonds, to aid in the construction of its railroad, the subscription of stock and the issue of bonds without any further election were made to the Memphis, Carthage and Northwestern Railroad Company, with which said prior company, in whose favor the vote was had, had become merged and consolidated under a law existing at the time of said election, to form a continuous line." The judgment of the Circuit Court was in favor of the township; but this court reversed the judgment, and answered the above question in the negative, on the authority of the case of County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682. The court said: "The power of the State Line, Oswego and Southern Kansas Railroad Company to consolidate with other companies existed when the vote for subscription was taken in the township. When the consolidation took place, there was a perfected power in the township to subscribe to the stock of that company, and there was also an existing privilege in the company to receive the subscription. That privilege, as we held in the Scotland County case, passed by the consolidation to the consolidated company." The court distinguished the case from that of Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, on the ground that the township trustee and the township clerk, who made the subscription and issued the bonds in the Salamanca township case, acted in their official capacity as the constituted authorities of the township, and its legal representatives, and not as mere agents, and occupied the position of the County Court in the Scotland County case.

In Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U.S. 81, at October term, 1880, the suit was against the town of Menasha, in the county of Winnebago and State of Wisconsin, to recover the amount of coupons detached from bonds issued by that town to the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, in October, 1871. It had been voted by the town, in June, 1870, to issue bonds to the Portage, Winnebago and Superior Railroad Company. After the vote was had, and in November, 1870, the Portage, Winnebago and Superior Railroad Company was consolidated with another company, and its name was changed in February, 1871, to that of the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, and a further consolidation took place with a company to which the bonds were afterwards issued. It appeared that, before the subscription and bonds were voted, the Portage, Winnebago and Superior Railroad Company was authorized by statute to consolidate with other companies constructing connecting lines, and that the consolidation was effected in pursuance of the statute. This court held that, under these circumstances, the issuing of the bonds to the consolidated company was lawful.

In Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U.S. 562, at October term, 1880, bonds had been voted by the township of Harter, in Clay County, Illinois, as a donation to the Illinois Southeastern Railway Company, and were issued to the Springfield and Illinois Southeastern Railway Company, the latter company having been formed subsequently to the vote, by a consolidation between the former company and another company. This court held that the statutes of Illinois, existing when the vote was taken, authorized the consolidation, and that, upon such consolidation, the new company succeeded to all the rights, franchises and powers of the constituent companies. The court said, (p. 574:) "The power in the township to make a donation to aid in the construction of the Illinois Southeastern Railway was also a privilege of the latter corporation, and that privilege, upon the consolidation, passed to the new company. The donation was voted before the consolidation took effect, and since the consolidated or new company did not propose to apply such donation to purposes materially different from those for which the people voted it in 1868, its right to receive the donation, at least when the township assented, cannot be doubted." The validity of the bonds was upheld.

In New Buffalo v. Iron Company, 105 U.S. 73, at October term, 1881, the suit was brought on bonds and coupons issued by the township of New Buffalo, in the county of Berrien and State of Michigan. The bonds had been voted by the township in May, 1869, as a donation in favor of the Chicago and Michigan Lake-Shore Railroad Company. When the bonds were voted, there was in force a general statute under which any railroad company of the State, forming a continuous or connected line with any other railroad company in or out of the State, could consolidate with the latter. The statute provided that the new corporation should possess all the powers, rights and franchises conferred upon its constituent corporations, and that they should be deemed to be transferred to and vested in it. After the vote was had, the company to which the bonds were voted was consolidated with another company, into a new corporation, having the name of the Chicago and Michigan Lake-Shore Railroad Company. The point was taken, in this court, that the bonds were void because they were delivered to a company to which they were not voted. This court said: "The only remaining objection to the judgment is that the bonds were delivered to the consolidated company, when they were not voted to that company. We concur with the court below in holding that the aid voted must be deemed to have been given in view of the then existing statute, authorizing two or more railroad companies forming a continuous or connected line to consolidate and form one corporation, and investing the consolidated company with the powers, rights, property and franchises of the constituent companies. Nugent v. The Supervisors, 19 Wall, 241; County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682; Town of East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U.S. 801; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U.S. 504; Empire v. Darlington, 101 U.S. 87; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U.S. 81; Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U.S. 562; County of Tipton v. Locomotive Works, 103 U.S. 523. The bonds were, therefore, rightfully delivered to the new or consolidated corporation." This court affirmed the judgment against the township.

The new trial which was directed by this court in County of Bates v. Winters, 97 U.S. 83, took place and resulted in another judgment against Bates County, which was brought before this court in Bates County v. Winters, 112 U.S. 325, at October term, 1884. The bonds were issued by the County Court on behalf of the township. This court held that, at the second trial, an acceptance by the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, of the subscription to its stock, had been shown, which made the subscription complete and binding as a subscription to the stock prior to the consolidation, the judgment in County of Bates v. Winters, 97 U.S. 83, having been reversed because it did not appear that the County Court had actually subscribed to the capital stock of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company before the consolidation. This court held, in the case in 112 U.S., that the valid subscription made prior to the consolidation rendered unnecessary a subscription to the stock of the consolidated company, which latter subscription it had held; in Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, and County of Bates v. Winters, 97 U.S. 83, to have been invalid. In the case in 112 U.S. this court went on to say: "As the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Company was organized under the general railroad law of Missouri, which authorized consolidations, the subsequent consolidation of that company with another organized under the same law did not avoid the subscription which was made to its stock on the 17th of June, and the bonds in payment of the subscription were properly delivered to the consolidated company. This has been many times decided. New Buffalo v. Iron Company, 105 U.S. 73, and the cases there cited." This court held the bonds to be valid.

We do not think that the rigid rule laid down in the case of Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, ought to be applied to the present case, although it is a case of bonds issued by a County Court in the State of Missouri on behalf of a township of the county. In the articles of association of the St. Louis, Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad Company it was declared that the object of the association was to construct, maintain, and operate a railroad for public use, from Chillicothe to such point on the boundary line between Missouri and Iowa as should be deemed, after actual survey, to be on the most direct and feasible route for constructing, maintaining, and operating a railroad between Chillicothe and Omaha in Nebraska; and, by the same articles, it was provided that the association was organized under and subject to the laws of the State of Missouri, contained in chapters 62 and 63 of Title XXIV of the General Statutes of Missouri of 1865, possessing all and singular the powers therein contained. The St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company, in Iowa, was formed in September, 1870, to construct a railroad from Council Bluffs, in Iowa, to the state line between Iowa and Missouri, at a point where the Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad should reach such state line, and, in the event of the consolidation of the Iowa corporation with the Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad Company, (which was the new and changed name of the St. Louis, Chillicothe and Omaha Railroad Company,) then, in connection with that company, "to form a continuous line of railroad from the city of Omaha, in the State of Nebraska, and the city of Council Bluffs, in the State of Iowa, to the city of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri." The consolidation thus contemplated took place. The new company was called the St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company, and the bonds were issued to it. They were issued as negotiable securities, to pay for the subscription voted to the stock of the Missouri corporation. The vote was that they should be issued in accordance with the law regulating subscriptions by municipal townships to railroad companies, in payment of a subscription to be made on behalf of the township of Chillicothe to the stock of the Missouri company. The object of the consolidation was stated in the articles of consolidation to be to consolidate the two companies into one "for the purpose of constructing, owning, maintaining, using, and operating a continuous line of railroad from the city of Omaha, in Nebraska, and the city of Council Bluffs, in Iowa, to the city of Chillicothe, in Missouri, under the name of the St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company." The vote of the people to subscribe to the stock, followed by the issue of the bonds, was an adoption of the articles of association of the Missouri company, not only with the powers and purposes expressed in those articles, and conferred by then existing statutes, but with all powers which had, prior to the vote, been conferred upon it by statute. The intention and purpose of the voters of the township in voting, and of the County Court of the county in issuing, the bonds, were fully carried out in what was done. The vote of the people contemplated and authorized the very thing that was done. The bonds were voted for the express purpose of constructing a road from Chillicothe to the boundary line between Missouri and Iowa, with a view to continuing the road from such boundary line to Omaha, in Nebraska. This object was attained by means of the consolidation. The road was constructed by the consolidated company from Chillicothe to the boundary line between Missouri and Iowa, through the counties of Missouri named in the articles of association of the Missouri company, and was continued thence to Omaha, in Nebraska, and has ever since been operated upon that line. The object expressed in the articles of association of the Missouri company, of having a continuous road from Chillicothe to Omaha, was not only effectually accomplished by the consolidation, but could not have been accomplished without it. The Missouri corporation could not have built the road in Iowa from the state line to Council Bluffs, and a railroad extending only from Chillicothe to the state line would not have answered the purpose contemplated. To say, therefore, that there has been any substantial diversion, in the use of the bonds, from the purpose contemplated by the vote of the people of the township, because of the consolidation and of the issuing of the bonds to the consolidated company, which has made the very road intended, because the authority conferred by the vote was nominally one only to issue the bonds to the Missouri corporation, is not a sound proposition, in view of the fact that the statute of Missouri expressly authorized the consolidation which took place. Under the facts of the case, the provision for consolidation became a part of the contract between the township and the railroad company, and the vote to issue the bonds to the company was an assent to the exercise by it of all the corporate powers, including that of consolidation, with which it was invested at the time of the vote. So true is this, that, if the Missouri company had never been consolidated with the Iowa company, and the road had only been built to the state line, and no extension of it through Iowa to Council Bluffs and Omaha had been made, it might well have been urged that the citizens of the township had been defrauded, and that the purpose in issuing the bonds had not been carried out.

We think that, in the present case, the rule applied in the cases before cited, of County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682; Town of East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U.S. 801; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U.S. 499; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U.S. 81; Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U.S. 562; New Buffalo v. Iron Company, 105 U.S. 73; and Bates County v. Winters, 112 U.S. 325, is the more proper and salutary one, and that the doctrine laid down in Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, and in County of Bates v. Winters, 97 U.S. 83, that a County Court in Missouri could not, on a vote by a township to issue bonds to a corporation named, issue the bonds to a company formed by the consolidation of that corporation with another corporation, would not be, if applied here, a sound doctrine.

(3) As to the objection that it does not appear by the findings of the Circuit Court that there was any formal order made by the County Court for the issue of the bonds. By § 51 of the statute before cited, it was provided, that if it should appear from the returns of the election that not less than two-thirds of the qualified voters voting at the election were in favor of the subscription to the stock of the railroad company, it should be the duty of the County Court to make the subscription in behalf of the township, according to the terms and conditions thereof, and that, if those conditions provided for the issuing of bonds in payment of such subscription, the County Court should issue such bonds in the name of the county and deliver them to the railroad company. This imposed a plain duty in the present case upon the County Court, because the statute and the vote, taken together, authorized the subscription and the issue of the bonds, and no formal order by the County Court to do those acts was necessary. The acts were ministerial. The statute left no discretion in the County Court, but made it the duty of the court to make the subscription and issue the bonds. The sole duty of the court was to ascertain that the proper vote had been had. The bonds state on their face that they are "issued under and pursuant to an order of the County Court of Livingston County, authorized by a two-thirds vote of the people of Chillicothe municipal township," and each bond also states that the county has executed it by the presiding justice of the County Court of the county, under an order of the court, signing his name to the bond, and by the clerk of the court, under the order thereof, attesting the same and affixing thereto the seal of the court, and it is so signed and attested and the seal is affixed.

Moreover, the finding of the Circuit Court is, that the records of the County Court show that that court made an order, on the 21st of February, 1877, stating that, under and by virtue of the statute of the State, approved March 23d, 1868, the county of Livingston, for the use and in behalf of the municipal township of Chillicothe, had issued and delivered the bonds in question to the St. Louis, Council Bluffs and Omaha Railroad Company. It is also found as a fact by the Circuit Court, that the county of Livingston had made eleven semi-annual payments of interest on the bonds, from the proceeds of taxes levied in each year on the taxable property of the township.

The County Court having been designated by the statute as the proper authority to determine that the conditions existed which authorized the making of the subscription, to be followed by the issuing of the bonds, the fact of the issue of the bonds by the County Court, under its seal, with the recitals contained in the bonds and the other facts above stated, estop the county from urging, as against a bonâ fide holder of the bonds and coupons, the existence of any mere irregularity in the making of the subscription or the issuing of the bonds. On the foregoing facts, it must be presumed that the subscription to the stock was made by the County Court in behalf of the township, and the county is estopped from asserting the contrary.

We are referred by the counsel for the plaintiff in error to the cases of The State v. Garroutte, 67 Missouri, 445, and Weil v. Greene County, 69 Missouri, 281, as holding to the contrary of the views we have here announced. Independently of the fact that these decisions were made in 1878, many years after the bonds in the present case were issued, no such facts existed in those cases as exist in the present case. In the case in 67 Missouri, the bonds were issued to the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, to aid in building the Kansas City and Memphis Railroad, alleged to be a branch of the former road. The main line had never been built. The court said that a branch road necessarily presupposed a main trunk line; and that the Kansas City and Memphis Railroad was, for all practical purposes, really a distinct and independent branch of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, the union existing merely in name but not in substance, and the branch road having separate stock and stockholders, president, directors, and liabilities from the main road, so as to require, under the Constitution of Missouri of 1865, a vote of the people in favor of the issue of the bonds. There was no vote of the people in that case. In the case in 69 Missouri, the bonds had been issued by Greene County to the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, to aid in building the road through that county. The case did not show that there was any connection between the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company and the railroad to be built, nor what railroad it was, nor that Greene County had ever subscribed to the stock of any railroad company.

The exceptions taken on the trial, as above set forth, do not present any question different from those which have been discussed. The bonds and coupons were properly read in evidence, and so were the certified copies of the tax levies.

We find no error in the record, and

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.