INDIANA
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 1162.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 13, 1893. Decided March 13, 1893. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.*153 Mr. William E. Earle for appellant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Parker for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
By each of the acts of Congress, successively admitting the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri into the Union, Congress agreed that five per cent of the net proceeds of public lands within the State, sold by Congress, should be applied to the making of a road or roads leading to the State; and by those and other acts it was provided that, of this five per cent fund, three per cent should be disbursed by the States, and two per cent by the United States. The general purpose was to promote the construction of a national highway connecting the new States in the interior with the old States on the Atlantic seaboard.
In the act for the admission of Indiana, the original obligation assumed by Congress in this respect did not define the termini of the road or roads to be built, or bind Congress to complete any road, or require the two per cent of the proceeds of the sales of lands in Indiana to be expended within the State; but the only obligation was to apply this two per cent fund "to the making of a road or roads leading to the said State, under the direction of Congress." It was for Congress to decide on what part of the road leading to Indiana this fund should be expended; and Congress had the right to *154 treat the road as a whole, constructed for the benefit of all the States through which it passed.
It is unnecessary to determine whether this obligation was in the nature of a contract only, or whether it can be considered as in any sense constituting a trust; because, in either aspect, the contract has been performed, or the trust executed, by applying the fund in question to the making of a road "leading to the said State" of Indiana.
It appears by the statement of the account between the United States and the State of Indiana by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (which there is nothing in the case to control,) that the sums appropriated to the construction of the Cumberland road leading to the State of Indiana greatly exceeded the whole amount of the two per cent fund from sales of lands in the State; and that, therefore, in the absence of special legislation upon the subject, nothing was payable to the State of Indiana on account of this fund.
Congress having a general authority to apply this fund to any part of the road leading to the State of Indiana, the presumption is that this authority was honestly and fairly exercised, and there is nothing whatever in the record which has any tendency to rebut this presumption. Such being the case, the statement in the findings of fact, that it did not appear, from that account or otherwise, what part of the expenditures upon the road was properly chargeable to "making a road to the said State," or what proportion of such expenditures for making a road to the State of Indiana was properly chargeable to the States of Ohio, Illinois and Missouri, is wholly immaterial; and it was so treated by both parties at the argument.
As appears by the definition of the petitioner's position at the beginning of the brief of its counsel, the failure of the United States to build the National road was not made the foundation of the claim, but "was only suggested in argument as a motive, by way of incidental explanation" of the act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, § 2, upon which he relied, and under which he contended that "it was immaterial what moneys had been expended by the government toward the *155 construction of the National turnpike." The decision of the case, therefore, turns upon the interpretation and effect of this act.
The argument for the appellant is based upon the following enactments: By the act of September 4, 1841, c. 16, §§ 16, 17, the United States relinquished to the States of Alabama and Mississippi the two per cent fund accruing from sales of lands in those States. By the act of March 2, 1855, c. 139, the Commissioner of the General Land Office was required to state an account between the United States and the State of Alabama, "for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled," under the act of 1819 admitting that State into the Union, and to include in that account the reservations under treaties with Indians within the limits of Alabama, "and allow and pay to the said State five per centum thereon, as in case of other sales." By the act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, § 1, the commissioner was required to state an account between the United States and the State of Mississippi "upon the same principles of allowance and settlement as prescribed in" the act of 1855; and by section 2 of the act of 1857, "said commissioner shall also state an account between the United States and each of the other States upon the same principles, and shall allow and pay to each State such amount as shall thus be found due, estimating all lands and permanent reservations at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre."
It is argued for the appellant that, as by the act of 1857 the account between the United States and the other States is to be settled "upon the same principles" as prescribed in that act with relation to Mississippi, and in the act of 1855 with relation to Alabama, and as by the act of 1841 the two per cent fund had been relinquished to Alabama and to Mississippi, therefore the payment to the State of the whole two per cent is one of the principles on which the account with each of the other States is to be settled.
But the premises relied on do not support the conclusion. Neither the act of 1857, nor the act of 1855, refers to the act of 1841. The act of 1857 requires the account with each *156 State to be settled on "the same principles of allowance and settlement as prescribed" in the act of 1855. The principles of allowance and settlement prescribed in the act of 1855 are that the account with Alabama be stated "for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled," under the act for its admission into the Union, and including five per cent on the Indian reservations within the State, "as in case of other sales." The principles of settlement are that the United States shall be charged with the sums due, treating Indian reservations as sales. They may not be limited to Indian reservations, and may well include any unpaid balance of the three per cent fund which Congress had agreed should be disbursed by the States, as well as any part of the two per cent fund which had not been applied by the United States to the making of a road or roads according to their original obligation. But there is nothing, in any of the acts upon the subject, which warrants the inference that Congress intended that, because the United States held themselves to be liable to Alabama and to Mississippi for the two per cent fund which they had never applied as they had agreed, they should therefore be liable to the other States for the like two per cent fund which had been fully appropriated and expended in accordance with their obligations to those States.
These views being conclusive against the right of the State of Indiana to recover anything in this case, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions discussed in the opinion of the Court of Claims and argued in this court.
Judgment affirmed.